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INTRODUCTION
“There is no use trying,” said Alice;
“one can’t believe impossible things.”
“I dare say you haven’t had much practice,”
said the Queen. “When I was your age,
I always did it for half an hour a day.
Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many
as six impossible things before breakfast.”
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland
“For you could not know that which is not, for it is impossible, nor express it; for the
same thing is for thought and for being [oÎte går ên gno¤hw tÒ ge mØ §Òn oÈ går
énstÒn oÎte frãsw tÚ går ÈtÚ noe›n ¶stn te k‹ e‡n] (DK 2.7-8). Parmenides
indicates here, first, that thought is always the apprehension of some being. Whatever is thought
is necessarily thought as something, that is to say, as some being. To think being is to think it as
thinkable. Not only are being and intelligibility coextensive, as Parmenides states, but
intelligibility is the very meaning of being.
In his middle period, Plato's understanding of being as form or idea [e‰dow, ﬁd°] seems
to be a direct consequence of this identification of being and intelligibility. In the Phaedrus he
writes, “For the colorless, formless and intangible are truly an existence that is most of all
[oÈs ˆntvw oÔs]” (Phdr. 247c). What is real are the “looks” [e‡dh] that sensible things
display to the mind, it is the whatness that can be definitively grasped in thought. The forms are
“an existence that is most of all” precisely because they and only they are altogether intelligible.
Being’s reality consists in its perfect intelligibility. Conversely, sensible instances are less than
really real in that they are constituted as multiple appearances of the forms, apprehended by
sensation and opinion [dÒj] (R. 476a). As appearances, sensible entities are not mere illusion
or nothing, but neither are they being itself, the reality that appears, the universal natures
apprehended by the intellect. “That which altogether is [tÚ pntel«w ˆn] is altogether
3

knowable, while that which in no way is is in no way knowable” (R. 477a), whereas “if
something should appear such as at once to be and not to be, this will lie in between that which
purely is and that which wholly is not, and neither knowledge nor ignorance will be about it, but
again what appears between ignorance and knowledge” (R. 478d). Here, according to Plato, there
are levels of being correlated to levels of cognitive apprehension, since being is identified with
intelligibility.
However, in many of what are taken to be his middle and late works, Plato, unlike
Parmenides, would seem to present being not as simple but as complex, a multiplicity of
interrelated forms. Each form is not any of the other forms. It is different from them and thus
shares in difference; difference, no less than identity, is necessary for and constitutive of being.
The forms are intelligible only in relation to each other by the method of “collection and
division” whereby the less universal forms are identified as differentiated specifications of the
more universal, and the more universal forms are understood as unities overarching and
pervading a multiplicity of less universal ones (Phdr. 265c). The forms’ differences from and
relations to one another are necessary conditions for their intelligibility; “for through the
interweaving of the forms with each other discourse [lÒgow] comes to be for us” (Sph. 259e).
Thus, for Plato here, he seems to think, it is precisely as intelligible that the altogether real must
be a multiplicity of distinct, interwoven forms.
Plato’s principle of the ‘good’ as that which provides being is also grounded in the
identification of being and intelligibility. Any thing, event, action, or process can be
intellectually understood only in terms of the good which is ultimately the “why” for it. In the
Republic, the sun, by providing light, is said to make it possible for sensible things to be seen and
for the eye to see them. Likewise, the good provides that which makes the forms themselves able
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to be known and the intellect able to know them (R. 508b-c). The good, then, is the enabling
source of intelligibility and intellection. “When [the soul] is fixed upon that which truth and
being [élÆyeã te k‹ tÚ ˆn] illuminates, it thinks [§nÒhs°n] and knows and appears to have
intellect [noËn]; but when it is fixed upon that which is mixed with darkness, upon that which
comes into being and passes away, it opines and is dimmed and changes it opinions up and down
and seem then not to have intellect (R. 508d). After all as Heidegger has pointed out, the very
word “truth” [élÆye], can be heard as “unconcealedness.” While this is a contested claim
there is good reason to incorporate Heidegger’s translation.1 The truth of the forms is their
unconcealedness, their availability or accessibility to the mind; and this is provided by the good,
“That which provides truth to things known and gives power to the knower is the form [ﬁd°n] of
the good” (R. 508e). Any and all beings, the forms, are intelligible only in virtue of the “look of
goodness” that they have and display.
And yet, Socrates goes on to say “the good is not what truly is but lies beyond being
[§p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w] in seniority [presbe¤&] and power” (R. 509b). Since the good provides
being and intelligibility to the forms, which taken together constitute oÈs¤, the whole of what
is, it is itself not merely one of them, a member of a complex whole but lies “beyond” them.
Each form is constituted as being by its proper determination. In the absence of differentiation,
distinction, determination, and hence in the absence of multiplicity there is not intelligibility and
therefore no being. Being itself is not the first principle but rather derives from the good, which
itself is “beyond being.” Since every being is intelligible, and hence is, only in virtue of the
determination whereby it is what it is, every being depends for its existence on that
determination. Every being must have unity, must be some one being, in order to be; but being as
1

See especially Sean D. Kirkland, The Ontology of Socratic Questioning in the Plato’s Early Dialogues (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2012), pp.51-57.
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a whole and each being within it involves multiplicity of content, without which it would not be
intelligible. Therefore, each being can be only in virtue of the unity by which it is this one being.
In short, for any being, to be is to be delimited and unitary, and hence have a dependence on the
unifying definition by which it is the one being that it is. Having discovered that being as such
must be dependent one turns to the good as the source on which being itself depends, that by
which all beings are beings at all. Again, since to be is to be intelligible and therefore delimited,
any being whatsoever is dependent on its determination and is thus derivative. Hence, to be is to
be derivative. No being, therefore, can be the first principle, and the first principle cannot be any
being; for if it were any being it would be finite and hence not within the complex totality of all
beings, rather than the source of that totality. To put it yet another way, if the good were a
member of the totality of beings, that is to say, were a being, it would be differentiated from the
other beings within that totality and so would be determinate, finite, and dependent. No common
term whatsoever including ‘being’ can embrace both the good and its products, for the good
would then be included within the totality and differentiated from others within it. And it is the
import and implications of this Platonic claim that my dissertation will undertake to analyze.
Focusing on two thinkers, Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius, this dissertation will unveil the
ways philosophy itself, as it is understood in the tradition originating with Plato and extensions
to Pseudo-Dionysius and beyond, cannot rationally account for its own ground, but must instead
posit an abyssal depth that essentially exceeds its explanatory grasp. In short, it asks what lies
behind being so that being may allow entities to manifest at all. The central theme of that which
“lies beyond being” is not to be understood as assertions or even invoking some divine
transcendence. Rather, it comes only at the conclusion of a definite sequence of philosophical
reasoning and only in terms of that argumentation can its precise meaning be correctly grasped,
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even if this ultimately suggests that philosophical reasoning throughout the “Platonic” tradition is
ruptured from the inside out.
To put it as succinctly as possible, in my dissertation, I set out to study two figures in the
tradition of Western thought who seem, at least at moments or under a certain interpretation, to
be interested in a project of thinking precisely that which is beyond logic and the ordering power
of language—Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. As a supplement, after interpreting
these two figures, and at certain points throughout these interpretations, I will show how these
earlier projects resonate with the projects of Heidegger, Bataille, and Derrida. Despite moving
from the 4th century B.C.E. to (likely) the 7th and then 20th centuries C.E., my dissertation
hopes to present a very well-defined discussion of the one basic dynamic, namely, that of, how to
bring the extra-discursive into discourse. Just as a preliminary indication, we might note that
Plato has recourse often to myth and Pseudo-Dionysius to self-contradictory speech (the via
negativa), while the 20th century thinkers with which I deal all exhibit similar tactics—
Heidegger pushes philosophy toward poetry and tautological philosophical speech, Bataille into
the literary, and Derrida into the rhetoric modes of deconstructive analysis. Bringing together
these figures and their logics of illogic, I am then ultimately concerned with how we come
together into something like a community or into a group obligated to one another in ethical
ways when we find ourselves faced with that which frustrates our ability to articulate or
understand it.
The title “A Discourse of the Non-Discursive” should be read and treated with some care.
It is not a discourse on the non-discursive, for to do so would be to make the non-discursive
something definite and concrete. It would be to make the non-discursive what it cannot by its
very nature be an element of that which is discursive. Rather, hearing the “of” in the title, we
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should be made aware that the discourse found in this dissertation is the result of meeting head
on the non-discursive and responding to it as it itself manifests without preconditions in the texts
considered here. This is in keeping with Plato’s notion of the e‰dow or ﬁd°, literally the “look”
of some entity, and with Pseudo-Dionysius’ insistence that we hymn God in songs of praise.
Both philosophers are thinkers of response to the immediate appearance of the phenomena
before them.
The purpose of this study is not to contribute to the extensive Quellenforschung that has
already been undertaken on Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius but rather to elucidate the meaning of
their vision of reality by looking through the philosophical tradition to recover the structures and
argumentation that underlie them. Hence, this dissertation seeks to be an exposition of the central
aspects of Platonic and Pseudo-Dionysian thought in terms of their philosophical foundations. To
achieve this goal, we must look to both Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius not as distant historical
figures that have long since died but rather as strange contemporaries. In fact, contemporary
figures such as Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot, Bataille, and Marion are employed in our study of
these two thinkers, these contemporary philosophers’ thought has not been forced upon Plato and
Pseudo-Dionysius, but rather they have been used as keys to unlock what would be otherwise
hidden pathways in ancient and medieval texts that are our primary focus.
Our study is structured not as a sequential commentary on the Platonic or PseudoDionysian corpus but as a series of closely interconnected essays, aiming to present their thought
in its philosophical aspect as a coherent whole. The essays each build upon one another. The
whole dissertation is broken into two parts, each corresponding to each of the thinkers in turn
and each part consisting of three essays. The first of each part addresses the topic of discourse.
That is to say, how Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius attempt to discuss the non-discursive. The
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second chapter of each part deals with in what way the non-discursive is communicated to us as
readers. Finally, the last of the chapters to each part take on the topic of the type of community
that is founded in the wake of the eruption of the non-discursive in the political realm.
Chapter one focuses solely on Plato’s Phaedrus, and it is the dialogue around which all of
the Plato chapters are centered. A close textual analysis of the dialogue is undertaken,
addressing, in particular, the phenomenon of ¶rvw. As we will see, the dialogue opens us up to
the excessive discourse and a phenomenology of excess. It will be shown that what appears does
so excessively, such that everyday forms of discussion must be put aside and make room for a
mËyow that allows the excessive to appear as such. We will also see how Socrates is able to
rehabilitate a form of lÒgow from the sophists that incorporates the excess of discourse. The
second chapter, focusing mainly on the Republic, centers around the explicit theme of excess of
tÚ égyÒn and the ways in which Plato attempts to communicate the exposure to it through the
language of the good as being “beyond being” as well as the themes of pain and anguish found in
the Symposium. Chapter three is concerned with community. And while it may seem best to set
our sights upon the Republic for such an inquiry, the focus is placed on the Lysis and the
initiation of lovers found in the Phaedrus. The purpose of this focus is twofold. First, I take the
Republic not so much as a political treatise but a great dialectical myth concerning the good as
§p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w, which has been discussed at length in the previous chapter. Secondly,
other than David Bolotin’s interpretative essay, little attention has been given to the Lysis as a
standalone dialogue. This chapter remedies this oversight. Particular attention is given to the
discussion of lack and its relationship to the community of friends that it engenders.
Chapters four through six address Pseudo-Dionysius. Chapter four’s focus is primarily on
Concerning Divine Names and unfolds the relationship between kataphasis, or positive theology,
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and apophasis, or negative theology. These two forms of discourse intertwine and result in the
via negativa, moving us beyond affirmations or denials and into silence concerning God. The
fifth chapter, presents Pseudo-Dionysius’ notions of silence and predominantly corresponds to
chapter III of Concerning Divine Names, whose focus is on prayer. Prayer as a form of
communication results in the dissolution of the one who prays and opens us to the sixth chapter
on community. This chapter attends to the two treatises on the hierarchies, the one celestial the
other ecclesiastical. Although Christ is said to head both of these hierarchies, it is the mystery of
Christ that is given weight, revealing that what appears to ground a seemingly highly regimented
order and rank is nothing but the question-worthy status of the incarnation, for which there is no
answer, not even among the highest Seraphim.
In a manner that perhaps deliberately parallels their own doctrine of the non-discursive,
the authors who are our main focus remain invisible: they lie hidden behind their works and can
be known only as they are manifest in them, so that the very names Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius
inevitably refer to the content of the works rather than to the authors. The absence of
biographical information about them encourages a reading of the works in purely philosophical
terms, without preconditions, simply as a body of thought. And just as it is impossible to know
the authors of our inquiry, the subject matter of this dissertation is impossible as well.
Or perhaps better said, the subject matter of this dissertation is the impossible. The
possible refers to the sphere of organic life, of materiality, of continuity, or the real, while the
impossible offers a share of the world of death and destruction, of discontinuity. We imagine our
place within the possible world, identifying ourselves with its fragmentary appearances that we
transform through the delusion of philosophy by thoughtfully conceiving a meaningful
association of the fragments, an imaginary totality that we can understand. Our notion of a God
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or of a good that exists in being guarantees the stability of this misbegotten conception. But we
are of the impossible, our meaning cannot be subordinate to the possible world. Bataille writes,
“man’s limit isn’t God, isn’t the possible, it is the impossible, the absence of God.”2 Language is
unstable, meaning is manifold, even “God” is only a placeholder, a word destined to be swept
away with time. God is the mediation of the possible and the impossible. As such, the image of
the perfect being always slips away in the human mind toward the impossible. In the order of
profound concepts, God surpasses the categories of intelligence to the point of being beyond the
possible and the impossible, equally beyond one as beyond the other. Thus Pseudo-Dionysius’
exposure gives God, as if by necessity, all the attributes of intellectual impossibility.
Recognizing that God or the good is not held within being means recognizing discursive
heterogeneity, the infinite play of linguistic forms. Both Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius develop and
deploy a complex system of technical terminology (e›dow, ﬁd°, tÚ égyÒn, ¶rvw, yerx¤,
ﬁerrx¤, Íperos¤) though superficially a betrayal of this notion should be read a
symptomatic of their search for consequential language. Terms are adopted, refined, and
abandoned based on their ability to produce an exposure to that which is §p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w.
We may not, as Parmenides points out, know or express the impossible, but we are nevertheless
made aware of it through the faltering of language itself. We feel it, are exposed to it. The
impossible is what not we can even become but nonetheless that toward which we can find
ourselves aimed in both our ethical and practical life.

2

Georges Bataille, Guity, trans. Bruce Boone (Venice: The Lapis Press), p.25.
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CHAPTER ONE
EROTIC AND PROPHETIC RHETORIC:
The Art of Persuasion in Plato’s Phaedrus
OkÒsvn lÒgow ≥kos, oÈde‹w éfkv°et §w
toËto, Àste gn≈stken ˜t sofÒn §st, pãntvn
kexvrsm°non.
Heraclitus, DK22B180
I. The character of ¶rvw:
The Phaedrus is a unique Platonic dialogue; it consists of two seemingly unrelated topics.
The first is comprised of three speeches, and explores the phenomenon of ¶rvw and then
abruptly ends. The dialogue then turns to a long discussion concerning the skill [t°xnh] of
rhetoric and the perfection of speech. The relationship between these two parts has perplexed
interpreters of this dialogue and has been dubbed the “problem of the unity of the Phaedrus.”3
Typically this relationship is explained in terms of rhetoric informing our interpretation of
¶rvw.4 Many scholars, then, have attended only to the rhetorical structure of the erotic speeches,
while completely ignoring their content. Consequently, the Phaedrus is understood to be less of
an erotic dialogue and more of a dialogue concerning the skill of rhetoric. While the discussion
of the art of rhetoric helps to clarify how Socrates’ second speech is more perfectly written than
is Lysias’, i.e., it speaks more truly than does Lysias’ speech, by ignoring ¶rvw one cannot
explain why the former’s speech is more perfect. We will question what is the function of the

3

Charles L. Griswold, Jr. Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press: 1996),
p.157.
4
Jane V. Curran, “The Rhetorical Technique of Plato’s Phaedrus,” Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 19, No.1
(University Park: The Pennsylvania University Press) 1986, pp.66-72; James S. Murray, “Disputation, Deception,
and Dialectic: Plato on the True Rhetoric (Phaedrus 261-266),” Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 21, No.4 (University
Park: The Pennsylvania University Press) 1988, pp.279-89. For a discussion of the Phaedrus as anti-rhetorical see,
Brad McAdon’s “Plato’s Denunciation of Rhetoric in the ‘Phaedrus,’” Rhetoric Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Taylor &
Francis) 2004 pp.21-39. Even William G. Kelley Jr., who seems to appreciate the erotic aspect of the Phaedrus,
focuses primarily on communication and rhetoric, “Rhetoric as Seduction,” Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 6, No.2
(University Park: The Pennsylvania University Press) 1969, pp.69-80.
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phenomenon of ¶rvw, how does it allow the human being to express its experience of ‘what is’
[tÚ ˆn]? Only by interpreting the discussion of rhetoric within the discussion of ¶rvw can the
truth of rhetoric come to light.
THE DRAMATIC, MYTHIC SETTING
Walking just outside of the city walls, Socrates chances upon Phaedrus, who has spent a
considerable time sitting with his teacher, Lysias. Phaedrus was treated with speeches composed
by Lysias and, having heard them, Phaedrus now walks on the road outside of the city streets, for
the former is less fatiguing than the latter. Inquiring into how Phaedrus spent his time with
Lysias, Socrates is glad to hear that that time was spent filled with hearing Lysias’ newest
speech. In fact, Socrates, Phaedrus states, is just the individual to hear this speech, since it is
§rvtkÒw, erotic (Phdr. 227c). Upon hearing that this was the topic of the speech, Socrates
states that he will not leave Phaedrus even if this should mean walking all the way to Megara.
Not satisfied with letting Phaedrus practice his own rhetorical skill, Socrates forces him to read
the speech exactly as Lysias has composed it and not to simply hear a summary of it as Phaedrus
may remember it. Uncovering the motivation of Phaedrus and noticing the speech itself under his
cloak, Socrates compels Phaedrus to read the speech so that Lysias may be present in his
absence.
Walking, Socrates tells Phaedrus to lead him to where they will listen to Lysias’ words.
And in approaching a plane tree, Phaedrus asks if this is near the place where it is said that
Boreas carried off [èrpãs] Oreithyia (Phdr. 229b). There are two aspects of this discussion
to which we must gesture. First, overwhelmed by ¶rvw, Boreas seized Oreithyia violently,
carrying her away.5 Due to the power of ¶rvw, Oreithyia was abducted from her home by a god;

5

Ovid, Metamorphoses, VI. 683.
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¶rvw has the ability to rip one away from one’s abode. Oreithyia became an object of the gods,
for good or for ill because of ¶rvw. As such and according to this myth, ¶rvw links us with and
makes us submissive to the gods, tearing us away from our home despite ourselves. As we will
come to see in further detail, ¶rvw is the overwhelming exposure to the divine. Like Oreithyia,
we are victims of its power when it erupts, seemingly out of nowhere. With this myth which
comes immediately before the three speeches of ¶rvw sets the tone for the speeches. We will see
that all of the speeches have differing ways of managing the exposure to ¶rvw. Far from being
simply an emotion that one feels, the Boreas and Oreuthyia myth demonstrates to us that ¶rvw
appears to the individual from the outside; it presents itself to us without our consent.
Furthermore, Socrates explicitly links his own preoccupation of self-knowledge with this
myth concerning ¶rvw. He takes the myth at face value, suggesting that Socratic self-knowledge
is obtained in the face of the excessive eruption of the erotic. Whatever Socratic self-knowledge
is, it is recognized only when our normal everyday understanding of our human limitations is
disrupted. For either of the choices Socrates is confronted with it, it is of a mythical nature: like
Typhon or some other divine creature.6 Far from being concerned with personal identity, his selfknowledge is only gained when Socrates aims his investigation toward that which exceeds the
human.
PROPHETIC SELF-KNOWLEDGE
It has been suggested that the theme of self-knowledge unifies the Phaedrus.7 Indeed, the
dialogue opens with an inquiry into Phaedrus’ movements, “Dear Phaedrus, whither and
whence?” [Ω f¤le F›dre, po› dØ k‹ pÒyen;] (Phdr. 227a). While this question has been

6
7

The Ontology of Socratic Questioning in Plato’s Early Dialogues, p.170.
Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, p.2.
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interpreted in numerous ways by various commentators,8 they would, I believe, agree that given
the dramatic setting,9 Socrates’ preoccupation with knowing himself, and references to the
Delphic oracle,10 one can say that the most overt sense of the greeting entails self-knowledge.
This topic carries over into the second half of the dialogue when Socrates asks, “Is not the whole
of rhetoric a skill [t°xnh] that which leads the soul by means of logos? [cxgvg¤ tw då
lÒgvn;]” (Phdr. 261a). Here, the concern is the movement of one’s soul, its whither and
whence. Furthermore, if one is to conduct a cxgvg¤ correctly “the rhetorician must know
the various forms of the soul [eﬁd°n cxØ ˜s e‡dh ¶xe]” (Phdr. 271c-d), and whether the
soul is simple or complex, what power of acting it possesses, and what power it has to be acted
upon (Phdr. 270d). Such knowledge of the soul is shown to be made possible only though ¶rvw,
as the Palinode makes clear. Thus, for the subject of rhetoric to become clear, we must come to
understand erotic self-knowledge.
In this chapter, I will interpret the whole of the Phaedrus as an erotic dialogue first and
foremost. It is true that this dialogue is concerned with the “erotic nature of communication,”11
yet to fully grasp what Plato means by ¶rvw, the necessity for communicating with the beloved
must be explained. Furthermore, ¶rvw, for Plato, is not a mere psychological, emotional or
physical state. Rather through it, one partakes in what I will call a phenomenology of excess.
That is to say, ¶rvw, as understood by Plato, opens one’s soul to an experience of a ‘beyond’
that cannot be grasped discursively. As a phenomenology of the movement of the soul makes
clear, the soul neither exists objectively over and against the world, in a realm that transcends the
5

Cf. John Sallis and Charles Griswold: Being and Logos (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 107108, and Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, pp.25-28, respectively.
9
See Phaedrus 230a.
10
In particular, see Phaedrus 228a, 229e, 230a, 235d, 244a-b, 245cff, 279b-c.
11
William G. Kelley Jr., “Rhetoric as Seduction,” Vol. 6, No.2 (University Park: The Pennsylvania University
Press) 1969, pp.69.
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physical world, nor is it an entity which exists in an absolute present. Instead, as the Phaedrus
discloses, the soul unfolds throughout time. And yet, the temporality through which the soul
reveals itself is not chronological but rather prophetic, for as Socrates states, “the soul is
somehow prophetic [mntkÒn ge t k‹ ≤ cxÆ]” and that “I am a kind of prophet
[eﬁm‹ dØ oÔn mãntw]” (Phdr. 242c). If the Phaedrus is concerned with discourse or rhetoric,
then, it must be a “prophetic discourse” that is erotic. Only a rhetoric that is itself both erotic and
concerned with prophecy allows one to know oneself in a Socratic manner.
Self-knowledge is gained through ¶rvw, since it is only in the experience of another with
whom one undergoes an erotic experience that one can “see” oneself. For the beloved’s eye is a
mirror within which the lover looks to see him or herself (Phdr. 254d, Alc. Maj. 132d, 133a).
Because the soul is revealed through the beloved, it is always outside of itself; it exists
ecstatically. Originating from an external source, the lover sees beyond him or herself, emptying
the lover of any preconceived notion of who he or she may be. Thus the beloved is now a
receptive site of “something more” than that which appears in its immediacy. It is through the
beloved that the lover manifests. Moreover, it is through the beloved that the lover remembers
the divine banquet, at which each human soul glimpsed a portion of ‘what is’ [tã ˆnt] (Phdr.
248a). Yet even though the lover is immediately before the beloved, “he is at a loss as with
whom [˜to d¢, épore›], he does not know what he suffers and cannot say it [k‹ oÈd' ˜ t
p°ponyen o‰den oÈd' ¶xe frãs]. He sees himself in his lover as in a mirror but this escapes
his notice [l°lhyen]” (Phdr. 255d). The ecstatically existing soul is always excessive with
respect to both the lover and the beloved; it cannot be thought or discussed discursively, since
the beloved cannot say what he or she undergoes.

16

DECONSTRUCTING ¶rvw
As stressed above with the myth of Boreas and Oreithyia, ¶rvw originates from a beyond
that seizes the lover and so makes us a receptive site for the beyond, and accordingly if we are to
discuss this exposure the resulting rhetoric must take account of this beyond. Socrates introduces
his second, cathartic speech with a defense of mn¤, because “love is a kind of mania [mn¤n
gãr tn e‰n tÚn ¶rvt]” (Phdr. 265a). While the two previous speeches described mn¤
as a human sickness [nÒsow], Socrates’ second speech portrays mn¤ not only as “given as a
divine gift [ye¤& m°nto dÒse ddom°nhw]” (Phdr. 244a), but says in stark contrast to the earlier
speeches “the best things we have come to us through mania [tå m°gst t«n égy«n ≤m›n
g¤gnet då mn¤w]” (ibid). Furthermore, Socrates states “the ancients attest that madness,
which comes from the gods, is more beautiful than the sound-mindedness12 that is of human
origins [kãllon mrtroËsn oﬂ plo‹ mn¤n svfrosÊnhw tØn §k yeoË t∞w pr'
ényr≈pvn ggnom°nhw]” (Phdr. 244d). In fact, in this speech Socrates will “show that this
kind of madness is given by the gods for our highest bliss” (Phdr. 245b-c). Whatever his second
speech reveals, it will show that mn¤ gives one insight into the truth and not soundmindedness [svfrosÊnh] alone. Although we will have to qualify the manner in which the
inspired speaker is able to reveal the truth to his audience, given what Plato has written
elsewhere disparaging the inspired speaker,13 I will illustrate what type of rhetoric mn¤
necessitates.
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Our discussion of the mn¤ that ¶rvw brings with it will be similar to Derridean
deconstruction insofar as the latter is a critical strategy for reading the history of metaphysics and
unveiling its inner structures. Deconstruction reveals the foundations and aims of metaphysics
and its interworkings, and moreover shows that these values are highly question-worthy.14
Through deconstruction, Derrida endeavors to unveil the ways in which metaphysical,
discursivity cannot fulfill the requirements of its own economy, since heterogeneous elements
are always present within the economy of which the closed economic system cannot take
account. These elements form a “blind spot15 [tâche aveugle].”16 The blind spot is the
disavowed background within which the closed economy of signification claims to function.
Derrida terms this forgotten dimension of discursive metaphysics the supplement—a
supplemental or vestigial page in the text of historical discourse. The supplement while treated
by the writer of the text as extra, unnecessary, and superfluous is, in fact, proven, by the text’s
own internal logic, to be necessary. To put it as concisely as possible, Derrida is points out the
necessity of a form of thinking that exceeds the limits of rational discourse and that
deconstruction is a method for articulating that which exceeds discursive thought.
The present discussion of the Phaedrus will, however, differ from Derrida’s discussion of
deconstruction in that our discussion will not simply focus on semiotics but will stress a
phenomenology of excess. Through mn¤ and Socrates’ emphasis on prophecy, as will be
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shown below, Plato is calling our attention to an experience of an extra-discursive element of the
human condition, which cannot be expressed within a rational account. The use of language,
then, is not relegated to the study of linguistics alone, but rather language itself reveals the
ontological underpinnings of the human being. Through our discussion of the various speeches it
will be shown that lÒgow itself brings the speaker to the edge of the extra-discursive.
In this chapter, we will examine each of the speeches, focusing briefly on the first two
while placing greater emphasis upon Socrates’ Palinode. I will interpret these speeches in light of
what Socrates and Phaedrus discuss concerning how to speak well and reveal truth. The
connection between the mythic and poetic qualities of Socrates’ Palinode and of speaking
beautifully [kl«w] will be made clear. Next, we will turn to the subject of truth as élÆye
and the need for rhetoric to step beyond human constraints through both mn¤ and ¶nyeow.
Finally, Socrates says of himself “I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover of dividing and of bringing
together [§rstÆw t«n dr°sevn k‹ sngvg«n] in both speech and understanding”
(Phdr. 266b). This process of dialectic is similar to the process of recollection [énãmnhsw],
which Socrates emphasizes in his second speech, and by recollection he grasps together all at
once [logsm“ jnroÊmenon] many perceptions (Phdr. 259b-c). In this last section, I will
explain how Socrates recuperates lÒgow from Lysias’ influence.
II. The Need for Mythic and Poetic Rhetoric:
Socrates’ second speech is a tale [mËyow] (Phdr. 253c, 265c) describing the soul of the
human being, its immortality, its composition, the soul’s journey among the gods’ divine
banquet, and how the way in which the embodied soul recollects this divine banquet. It
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emphasizes that Socrates tells a mËyow and not a lÒgow concerning the erotic soul.17 Even his
first, forced speech is described as a mËyow (Phdr. 237a, 241e, 243a). While Socrates does call
both his first and second speeches elsewhere lÒgo, Lysias’ speech is referred to only as a
lÒgow and never as a mËyow (Phdr. 234c, 264e, 227c, 234d). In this section, we will deal with
the difference, as presented in the Phaedrus with reference to Lysias’ speech, between lÒgo
and mËyo and why it is necessary that one tell the latter when speaking of ¶rvw.
GIVING AN ACCOUNT VERSES TELL A FABLE
To differentiate between a discourse that is a lÒgow and one that is a mËyow, it would be
too easy to translate lÒgow as “rational discourse,” “logic,” or “ratio” and mËyow as “tale” or
“legend.” Doing so results in a misunderstanding of the meaning of both words. There are, for
instance, many forms of lÒgow: a speaking; a purging of opinions; eristic; ironic; mathematical;
and that which is able to transcend mathematics,18 while a mËyow should not be taken as a mere
legend or fairytale, as if it is wholly separated from truth and therefore inferior to lÒgow. It must
be stressed that the difference between lÒgow and mËyow is not a difference between a more
perfect and less perfect way of speaking, but rather two ways of disclosing the world. John Sallis
suggests a way to think their dissimilarity. A mËyow he says is “…a bond to something
intrinsically opaque, a bond to an element of darkness in contrast to that which is capable of
being taken up into the light of logos.”19 Both disclose ‘what is’ but in different ways; a lÒgow
clarifies ‘what is’ bringing it to light, whereas a mËyow discloses ‘what is’ as obscure, vague, and
ambiguous and originating from the divine, which is always distant from the human. The critical
17
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difference between a mËyow and a lÒgow is that the latter ignores heterogeneous elements within
the argument; Lysias ignores that the speech is about Ervw, a divine entity and that its affects
are not simply human emotions. A lÒgow such as this attempts to draw the phenomena it is
explicating into a totality of thought that fully discloses the subject of its investigation. In other
words, when a topic is investigated via a Lysian lÒgow it is revealed as immediately present
without need for further scrutiny. And in so doing, it attempts to silence the irreducible excess
that is prior to the determination of its presence. MËyow, on the other hand, opens one and
situates oneself within a peripheral space, providing one a unique standpoint in which thought is
able to stretch out but never reach its end, but is still no less true.
Thus, for Socrates the difference between the two modes of discourse functions not only
on a semiotic level but on an ontological one as well. I will reveal that ¶rvw is spoken of most
perfectly through mËyow, since it is through ¶rvw that an individual is made open to an excessive
beyond, which in the Phaedrus is described as the illumination of Being vis-à-vis the beloved
(Phdr. 234d, 250b, 255c), for which only the mythical can make room by expressing the
experience of the beyond. Before engaging in a full discussion of Socratic mËyow, it will be
helpful to orient ourselves first by examining Lysias’ lÒgow.
LYSIAS’ NON-LOVER
It is surprising that the speaker found in Lysias’ speech is a non-lover who attempts to
woo a young man by convincing him to gratify a non-lover instead of a lover. And yet the speech
reveals itself to be quite banal, nothing more than a business proposition20 spoken to the boy
stating that a non-lover will be able to benefit him monetarily and socially while a lover can only
bring him ruin. Furthermore, simply hearing the subject of the text Socrates calls it dhmvfelÆw,
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a thing of general utility (Phdr. 227d). The theme of the speech is democratic. It can be
understood by everyone, it is not necessary to interpret the words. In fact, Phaedrus praises the
speech for exactly this reason, “nobody could speak more comprehensively [ple¤v] and more
admirably [ple¤onow êj]” (Phdr. 235b). Moreover, choosing from among non-lovers gives
the non-beloved a greater number from which to select an individual that will be valuable to the
non-beloved (Phdr. 231d-e, 232c) for the whole of the non-beloved’s life (Phdr. 233c). Indeed,
this individual is advised to love a person who is best suited to repay the non-beloved for his
troubles (Phdr. 233e). Love relations are portrayed in terms of efficiency, gain, profit and that
which is useful and effortlessly understandable to the audience. Given that the speaker can
rationally express what he wants and how to go about getting it, he “is clearly associated with
discursivity.”21
Lysias “sidesteps” the phenomenon of ¶rvw completely.22 However, through his
obstinate refusal to praise ¶rvw in any way, Lysias’ speech reveals that such an effort only
exposes his own belief in the hegemony of ¶rvw. The text highlights the fears most individuals
have concerning the force of ¶rvw. The lover is continually depicted as fickle (Phdr. 231a 231c,
232e-233d, 234a) and as “more unhinged [nose›n] than sound-minded [svfrove›n]” (Phdr.
231d). Ervw is characterized as dangerous precisely because it cannot be contained within
reason’s domain; it exceeds rational explanation. This lÒgow has no resources to adequately
contend with ¶rvw other than ignoring it completely. And yet unable to dispel it, Lysian ¶rvw
remains in the disavowed background of the text.
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Moreover, the very structure of his speech illustrates an excessive, non-discursive
element. Socrates comments on this in his first speech, the non-lover merely conceals his
attachment to ¶rvw (Phdr. 237b). Consequently, Lysias obscures his dependence on that which
cannot be thought discursively. Notice that Lysias simply begins his speech in mediā rēs, without
introducing or orienting the listener as to what the topic will be. He simply begins the
conversation saying “you know [§p¤sts] my state of affairs [prgmãtvn]” (Phdr. 230e);
he does not explicitly state what these state of affairs are. The audience can only guess what has
been said prior to the recorded text. Even though this lÒgow is meant to be a purely rational
account of ¶rvw, its very origin already points beyond itself, beyond the economy of the lÒgow.
This lÒgow cannot keep ¶rvw within the boundaries of discursivity alone, and for this reason, it
must assume an origin that is beyond itself. Moreover, divine philosophy [ye¤ flosof¤] is
mentioned in Socrates’ first speech, which is attributed to a concealed lover (Phdr. 239b).
However, no explanation is made as to what divine philosophy entails; it is simply ascribed to
the lover. But this should not be a surprise. That a concealed lover should make mention of
something divine is understandable, since ¶rvw opens one to the experience of the beloved,
though not wanting to “fall victim” to the overwhelming power of ¶rvw, the concealed lover
cannot give an account of where the divine originates. Consequently, he cannot give a truthful
and beautiful form of rhetoric concerning ¶rvw (Phdr. 264a), hence the need for the Palinode,
where Socrates, as a lover, is able to account for the excessiveness of ¶rvw.
STARTING FROM THE BEGINNING
In the second half of the Phaedrus, Socrates begins a critique of the rhetorical style of
Lysias’ speech (Phdr. 262d-264c) in terms of its lack of a beginning, an érxÆ. Twice Socrates
asks Phaedrus to reread the beginning, the érxÆ, of the speech (Phdr. 262e, 264a), and twice he
23

and Phaedrus cannot find the érxÆ. After he is asked a second time to reread the address to the
non-beloved, Phaedrus deferentially admits “what you seek is not there” (Phdr. 263e). Socrates
seeks out in vain an érxÆ of the text.
We should be cognizant that an érxÆ is not only a beginning point from which
something arbitrarily commences but rather a sovereign power, an ordering beginning. It is that
which is in control of itself and unable to be determined by the human being. It is an excessive
force that is in control of what follows from it. The opening of the Palinode begins with a
discussion of érxÆ, which is the fount [phgÆ] of motion that is uncreated [ég°nhton] (Phdr.
245d). An érxÆ is an originary, uncreated and therefore divine source. Lysias, however,
generates a profane beginning by ignoring the overwhelming power of ¶rvw. The approach that
Lysias takes in this text is characterized by Socrates as beginning at the end of the current of the
lÒgow and swimming supine toward the beginning (Phdr. 264a). This is a strange image, but its
meaning is clear if we keep in mind that an érxÆ is a sovereign force that cannot be challenged
by the human. Nevertheless, Lysias attempts to take possession of the force of ¶rvw, but it is in
vain, for he cannot gain control of the érxÆ. In fact, Socrates describes Lysias has having erred
against the god Ervw (Phdr. 242e). Instead of accepting the gift of ¶rvw, Lysias actively
rejects the propitious god.
Given our modern emphasis on individual autonomy, one may be tempted to follow
Lysias’ lead and force an impious beginning, attempting to partake in an autonomous choice.
Lysias characterizes the lover as being inferior to the non-lover because the lovers are few, while
the non-lovers are many (Phdr. 231d-e). Lysias wishes to demonstrate that the non-lover is able
to choose with whom he consorts. He believes himself to be a master of his natural inclinations
toward an individual who is deemed useful; and with a view to pragmatic, utilitarian, and self24

oriented interests, he chooses one of the many non-beloveds.23 Consequently, the Lysian nonlover already has in mind a subjectively decided end toward which he directs himself—his érxÆ
is predetermined by his own desire. Likewise, the concealed lover, in Socrates’ first speech, is
characterized as a wolf after a lamb (Phdr. 241d), suggesting a stance of dominance. In the
Palinode, however, the Socratic lover is depicted as perplexed [époroËs] at his condition
(Phdr. 251e), and this condition is called ¶rvw (Phdr. 252b). Consequently, while the concealed
lover hunts his prey, attacking it, the Socratic lover is, quite literally, in no such state to hunt,
much less dominate the beloved. The Socratic lover is caught unawares, throwing him in
épor¤. Only in épor¤ can Socratic ¶rvw function. Consequently, if the Socratic lover ever
did grab hold of his beloved, the fearful awe would be forgotten, undermining the state of
époroËs and therefore his own ¶rvw (Phdr. 251a).
EXCESSIVE DISCOMFORT OF A mËyow
Deriving from pÒrow, ‘a way through’, épor¤, with its alpha privativum, means ‘to be
without a path’ or ‘to be wayless’.24 As such, épor¤ names the condition one feels when one is
lost or in distress. When one experiences resistance toward which one is aimed, one experiences
épor¤. Recognizing this resistance and distance from that toward which one is aimed,
waylessness is felt. The Socratic lover, in the throes of ¶rvw, wishes to be with the beloved and
truly has a relationship with him but the latter is always experienced as distant. The beloved
withdraws from the Socratic lover precisely in his relationship with him. Distressed by the
resistance experienced, the lover is thrown into épor¤. However, this condition is engendered
by ¶rvw itself. Hence, to be exposed to ¶rvw is to run up against and attempting, but ultimately
always failing, to cross the boundary between the lover and the beloved. Consequently, frustrated
23
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at this distance, the Socratic lover can never give a discursive account of the beloved, since the
latter is always in a receding relationship with the lover.
In the Republic Socrates recites a proverbial saying “The divine withdraws itself from the
logos, as is said [ye›on m°nto ktå tØn prom¤n §jr«men lÒgo]” (R. 492e). Any
account [lÒgow] of the divine must necessarily use another form of communication other than a
lÒgow, such as mËyow, since its subject matter essentially exceeds rational discourse. Socrates
points to the inability of a lÒgow to fully account for ¶rvw, saying, “in the beginning of this tale
[§n érxª toËde toË mÊyo]” (Phdr. 253c). Here, Socrates is signaling to both the actual
beginning of the mËyow but also to the fact that it springs from a source—the érxÆ—that lies
outside of his control. Socrates gestures that the ordering beginning of his speech impresses itself
upon him from a beyond and can only be communicated through the use of a mËyow, an
announcement that signals an excessive source that cannot be comprehended through
discursivity alone. Ervw, which as we have examined exposes us to an overwhelming power, is
the érxÆ of his discourse. Realizing that a lÒgow concerning ¶rvw necessitates an excess,
Socrates even calls upon the Muses to help him give his first speech (Phdr. 237a). And midway
through this speech Socrates mentions that he “suffers the divine [ye›on pãyow]” (Phdr. 238c)
and states that “this place seems to have a divine presence [t“ ˆnt går ye›ow ¶oken ı
tÒpow e‰n]” (Phdr. 238d). He goes on to warn Phaedrus not to be surprised if he is
apprehended by the nymphs [nmfÒlhptow] (Phdr. 238d), perhaps in much the same way that
Oreithyia was seized by Boreas.
A Lysian lÒgow cannot give a full account of our exposure to ¶rvw precisely because it
is concerned with what is present in its unreflective immediacy. The phenomenon of the erotic

26

appears from out of concealment only to be revealed as obscured. Indeed, we have just seen that
¶rvw engenders épor¤, waylessness; a connection toward that which we are aimed but which
is always distant and obscure is emphasized by this. Ervw gives rise to a feeling of discomfort,
then. As we have just seen, Socrates literally suffers from the divine. The divine gives itself to
Socrates and does so without a rational ground. It comes from and presents itself to him despite
himself. Suffering, Socrates is confronted by that which overtakes him; it disrupts his rational
comportment toward the world. Socrates is distressed by such an experience, able only to discuss
it in terms of being taken over by mythical creatures. While his suffering the divine and the
mythical account given of it may seem to be just another way of discussing and describing the
nature of ¶rvw, what it truly reveals is that ¶rvw discloses itself in connection to Socrates nondiscursively. The subject matter is not an object set over and against Socrates to be interrogated
objectively and with dispassioned reason, but instead is already in relation with Socrates but as
distant. Ervw appears to Socrates to have been presented to him prior to rational reflection and
therefore as question-worthy and of concern.
After hearing Lysias’ speech from Phaedrus, Socrates cannot agree that the speech is
worthy of the phenomenon of ¶rvw. Although he cannot say just who it is that would refute
[§jel°gjos¤] him if he should agree (Phdr. 235b), Socrates professes self-ignorance once again
and relies upon what he has heard from the likes of “the beautiful Sappho or the wise Anacreon”
(Phdr. 235c). What he will say concerning ¶rvw is not of his own invention but rather as
Socrates states he “has been made full through my ears, like a pitcher, from the spring
[nmãtvn] of another, due to slowness and I have failed to notice [§pl°lhsm] how and
from whom I have heard it” (Phdr. 235d). Socrates is drawing attention to the fact that although
¶rvw appears to him, it does so as obscured from him from a source other than himself; he is not
27

in control of his speech, rather the speech originates from a source outside of his control which
presents itself to him but as obscure and distant.
Stressing the phenomenological character of mËyow, Sean Kirkland describes it in the
following way,
[M]yth has its essential character in allowing its subject matter to appear, while
simultaneously marking its essential darkness or obscurity. It explicitly presents its
subject matter as excessive, but does so precisely in the act of letting that subject matter
appear here…Myth is neither fact nor fiction, but is more original than this
distinction…it allows that which essentially exceeds human experience and withdraws
itself from human understanding to appear to us nonetheless in its withdrawal.25

By characterizing his erotic speech as a mËyow, then, Socrates takes part in an “excessive
beyond.” In fact, immediately before giving his second speech on ¶rvw Socrates says “I am a
prophet [eﬁm‹ dØ oÔn mãntw]” (Phdr. 242c).26 Mantic knowledge and pronouncements draw
their authority from a particular conception of truth;27 a mantic pronouncement comes by way of
intermediaries. For example, at the temple of Delphi, utterances were communicated by the
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prophetess and then interpreted by a group of individuals to the inquiring individual visiting
Delphi.28 Even Hermes, the intermediary between the gods and human, was assigned the Beewomen. He interpreted their movement to give messages from Apollo.29 In both of these cases,
the truth of the oracular utterance is in need of interpretation through an intermediary. Truth does
not present itself in its immediacy. By calling himself a mãntw, Socrates likens himself to an
intermediary who interprets the gods’ essentially withdrawing utterance to his interlocutor.
However, whatever the oracular utterance may say, its origin is already removed from the
audience.
What Socrates has recounted in his prophetic speech, then, is no less true than a lÒgow,
but, by characterizing it as a mËyow, Socrates emphasizes a rapport with a beyond. A mËyow
speaks of an unconquerable limitation of one’s rational understanding; in other words, it is
concerned with that which is in excess of our propositionally based understanding. What is being
recounting in the mËyow cannot be reigned in and brought to conform to any sphere of rational
knowledge (although it necessitates a speaking) since the experience of its subject necessarily
exceeds this sphere. Socrates must reconcile how to describe, through language, through lÒgow,
an experience that is non-propositional (the excessively beyond), and he does so by participating
in the excess through excessive speech via a mËyow. Let us turn, once again but in more detail, to
the first mention of mËyow in the Phaedrus.
DECEPTION BY A WISE ACCOUNT
Concerned with the veracity of the myth, Phaedrus asks Socrates if he is persuaded
[pe¤ye] whether the mythical narrative [myolÒghm] of the god Boreas carrying off Oreithyia
is true (Phdr. 229c). Aware of Phaedrus’ propensity for sophistic speeches, Socrates answers, “If
28
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I am disbelieving, as the wise [oﬂ sofo¤] are I would not be out of place [êtopow] and might
contrive [sofzÒmenow] and say that Boreas, the north wind, pushed her off of the neighboring
rock while the maiden played with Pharmacea” (Phdr. 229c). Socrates casts the explanation that
the wise would give in terms of natural phenomena: it was the north wind, and not the god
Boreas, that pushed Oreithyia to her death; giving what today might we might term a scientific
account. These wise individuals reduce the mËyow to an allegory so that it might be understood
through a natural explanation. But Socrates refuses to interpret this mËyow even along allegorical
lines,30 explaining that one would have to use a boorish or an unsophisticated sort of wisdom
[égro¤kƒ tn‹ sof¤&] (Phdr. 229e) which uses probability [tÚ eﬁkÒw], suggesting that such an
interpretation does not reach the truth of the meaning of this mËyow.31 (We will see in the next
section the way that tÚ eﬁkow deceives both the speaker and the audience.)
The import of this discussion lies in the emphasis of the use of oﬂ sofo¤ and the
participial form of sof¤zesy. The latter word, while it can suggest “to devise” or “to contrive”
also suggests “to deceive” and “to play subtle tricks.” Originating from the same root, oﬂ sofo¤,
for Plato, also has this double meaning.32 The wise devise a naturalistic explanation about things
found in mËyow and so deceive their audience. John Sallis points out33 that the deception arises
because this interpretation of the mËyow “makes no mention of love; it conceals, as it were,
whatever love may have had to do with her [Oreithyia’s] fate…they suppress the alternative of

30

Ludwig Edelstein, “The Function of Myth in Plato’s Philosophy” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol.10, No.4
(Oct. 1949) pp.463-481, p.466.
31
For a greater discussion of this exchange see The Ontology of Socratic Questioning in Plato’s Early Dialogues,
pp.166-171.
32
Being and Logos, p.114.
33
See also Eros: The Bittersweet, pp.123-29.
30

which the myth speaks, that the outcome might be an ascent into the company of gods.”34 The
deception occurs when the audience is told that there is nothing beyond that which they are told.
The opening lines of the Apology also speaks to the deceptive power of sophistic rhetoric.
“How you, men of Athens, have been affected [pepÒnyte] by my accusers, I do not know. I
myself nearly forgot [§pelyÒmhn] myself, so persuasively [pyn«w] did they speak
[¶legon]. And yet they did not speak truthfully in what they said” (Ap. 17a). Socrates, in the
Phaedrus, makes a similar statement to Phaedrus after the latter feigns ignorance concerning
Lysias’ speech, “Oh, Phaedrus. If I do know [égno«] Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself
[§mtoË §pl°lhs]” (Phdr. 228a). In both passages, our attention is drawn to the power of
rhetoric to make one forget oneself. The Apology explicitly gestures to the persuasiveness of
rhetoric in contrast to truth’s ability to allow one to recollect oneself, while in the Phaedrus this
may seem to be implicitly implied. If Socrates, like Phaedrus, had been affected by rhetoric’s
power, he would not be able to literally “perceive [égnoe›n]” Phaedrus. The soul of Phaedrus
would be unable to appear out of its originary background as described in the mËyow of the
Palinode. Instead, through mËyow, Phaedrus’ soul is unveiled so much so that Socrates already
knows that he learned Lysias’ speech by heart, practicing it and when he found someone sick to
hear speeches [nosoËt per‹ lÒgvn ékoÆn] becomes gladdened, since Phaedrus could share
in his Corybantic frenzy [snkorbnt«nt] (Phdr. 228b-c). “But you will hear the whole
truth [pçsn tØn élÆyen] from me. Yet, not by god, men of Athens, accounts [lÒgow]
finely decked out, but you will hear things said that are not well ordered [oÈd¢ kekosmhm°now]
and as they seem to strike me [§ptxoËsn]” (Ap. 17c). Socrates is not concerned with
speaking in the rhetorical manner with a pre-establish end in mind, but rather responds to how
34
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the phenomenon strikes him as in a pre-philosophical experience. Socrates has not forced a
preconceived nature upon Phaedrus but rather, as the Apology shows, allows Phaedrus’
disposition to reveal itself in its singularity. Socrates allows the whole of Phaedrus’ character to
reveal itself so that the excessiveness of the soul of Phaedrus unfolds according to its own
manifestation.
If ¶rvw is ignored, one can only believe that which lÒgow qua lÒgow reveals, that
which is immediately present, and therefore completely and discursively knowable. Socrates’
critique of Lysias’ speech (Phdr. 262c-264c) revolves around the insight that a lÒgow qua
lÒgow, while claiming to explicate the subject matter fully, must, nevertheless, assume that
which is in excess of itself; that is to say, a mËyow. I will turn to this topic now.
THE LANGUAGE OF THE GODS
Although the theme of his mËyow is essentially non-discursive, Socrates nonetheless
claims to speak the truth (Phdr. 247c). It has been revealed that mËyow discloses the truth about
¶rvw by calling attention to its excessive nature. Ervw originates from a beyond in a form of
mn¤. Described in terms of physical discomfort, for the entire soul of the lover is “stung into
madness and is caused distress [oﬁstr& k‹ Ùdnçt]" and perplexed [époroËs] at its
condition (251c-e)—called Ervw (Phdr. 252b). The experience of ¶rvw can in no way be
rationally explained but only described in the condition of épor¤. Calling attention to the
inability of language to capture such an experience, Socrates reminds Phaedrus of what the
Homeridae write, “Mortals may call Ervw, Ervt pothnÒn, “winged Love,” but [it] is
named Pt°rvt, “the Winged One,” by the gods”35 (Phdr. 252c). In the Cratylus Socrates
says, “for it is clear that the gods call things by the names that are by nature correct” (Crat.
35
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391e). While humans name ¶rvw, “Ervt pothnÒn,” the gods add the prefix ‘Pt’ because
“Pt°rvw” is the correct name of this deity, since by its nature it makes wings grow. We know
not why Hermogenes is told, when inquiring after investigating the names of the gods, it is said
“of the gods we know nothing, neither of them nor of their names, by which they call
themselves. For clearly they call names truly.” (Crat. 400e). Due to this essential distance from
the divine, the truth about ¶rvw is that it can never be understood or reduced to the language and
experience of mortals. Only the gods can speak properly of it. Although human may not know
the exact reason for the gods’ use of the name “Pt°rvw”, the Phaedrus does give us one clue.
Justifying the Homeridae statements, Socrates states, “You may be persuaded of this or not, but
the suffering [tÚ pãyow] of lovers and the cause [ﬁt¤] of it [the name], but that is it” (Phdr.
252c). Pt°rvw, then, is the correct title divine of Ervw, since the name describes the pãyow
and the cause of ¶rvw, which is to say it forces wings to grow (Phdr. 251b), driving the soul into
mn¤.
The language of the gods is the originary language from which human language has
sprung. However, human communication falls short of this originary form of communication.
We cannot grasp the ﬁt¤ that language is meant to take hold of. This is why Socrates is able to
claim to speak the truth through a prophetic mËyow. Acting as a prophet, an intermediary for the
gods, Socrates is able to utter what they reveal to him but in a manner that must, nevertheless, be
interpreted by mortals. Only through mn¤ can one begin to speak the truth of one’s experience
of ‘what is’ as a way of ¶rvw. The next section is devoted to the way in which the human can
experience the gods’ originary language but in such a manner so as not to displease the gods,
overstepping what accords to the human.
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III. Speaking Truthfully Pleases the Gods:
Although the focus in the second half of the Phaedrus changes from ¶rvw to the skill
[t°xnh] of rhetoric, the underlying substance of dialogue remains the same. Throughout the first
half of the dialogue, Socrates and Phaedrus attempt, with greater or less success, to express the
experience of ¶rvw. According the Phaedrus, Lysias achieved this feat by way of a lÒgow so
nobly given that “nobody could speak more comprehensively and more admirably” (Phdr. 235b).
Socrates, on the other hand, gives a mËyow, a form of discourse and language that truthfully
maintains ¶rvw’s relation to its object but as essentially distant and obscured. As such, what
presents itself to ¶rvw provokes ¶rvw to show itself in language as it is, i.e., unconquerable and
withdrawing, emanating from an external, divine source, which arrives unanticipatably and
inarticulately by means of wings. In the second half of the Phaedrus, Socrates has essentially the
same goal, but now approaches this question through truth [élÆye] as it applies to the
perfection of rhetoric by means of the beautiful [tÚ klÒn]. One must hone a form of
expression that allows the unintelligible experience of tÚ klÒn to manifest itself. If one
attempts to devise a logical discourse one commits an insult against Ervw (Phdr. 242c). If one
speaks as Lysias has, believing himself to be explicating an objectively independent realm,
which is epistemologically present to him and therefore is available to human analysis, Ervw
will enact a form a punishment upon the speaker, blinding him to the unfolding prophetic
temporality of ¶rvw. Socrates as “some sort of prophet” does not address himself to an
objectively present world. Instead he situates himself in a stance of openness and speculative
response to his experience, which is essentially withdrawn and thus question-worthy. The lover
must change him or herself in conformity with a particular god, who is revealed through the
beloved, with whom he or she has a natural rapport, “being enthused [§nyos«ntew] they
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receive from the god its customs and character [¶yh k‹ tå §pthdeÊmt]” (Phdr. 252e,
253a). As a gift to the lover and the beloved, the gods give a part of their own divine nature.
I will now discuss the importance of sight in Socratic rhetoric and why a form of logocentric discourse such as Lysias’ does not allow for such perception. I will then turn to Socrates’
cure for the blindness that accompanies a Lysian type discourse in terms of the givenness of
mn¤ as the only medium of communication with which the divine may be pleased. And
satisfying the gods bestow upon mortals vision of the truth allowing for beautiful speech, which
will praise the gods in the most correct manner mortals can, by (re)creating the divine banquet
through communicating with the beloved.
BLINDED BY HUMAN CONCERNS
Socrates concludes his erotic mËyow with a prayer to Ervw, asking that the god “neither
take away nor maim the erotic art [tØn §rvtkØn t°xnhn]36 that the god has given [¶dvkw]”
him (Phdr. 257a), which due to the mn¤ it causes allows him an openness and sight of
tÚ klÒn. He fears that he will suffer the same fate as Stesichorus, who was stricken blind after
speaking ill of Helen but who regained his sight after a recantation (Phdr. 243a-b). Moreover,
Socrates hopes that Lysias will cease from making such speeches, so that Stesichorus’ illness
should not come to pass upon him. Lysias erred in his account of ¶rvw not because he
characterizes mn¤ as a sickness [nÒsow] but rather because he claims that it is of profane
origin. It is true that a lover, under the influence of the ¶rvw, is more unhinged/sick [nose›n]
than sound-minded [svfrove›n] (Phdr. 231d), but because Lysias is speaking in a manner that
36
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is “useful to the people,” he does not understand that it is ¶rvw, the origin of this “sickness,” i.e.,
mn¤, that opens the lover to that which is beyond that which people in their right minds cannot
conceive. Consequently, his lÒgow is not wholly erroneous (Phdr. 235e); it simply presents
¶rvw as of human origin.37
The Palinode reminds us that the non-lover’s mode of disclosing the beloved, and
tÚ klÒn, is profane.
The kindness of the non-lover is mixed with mortal sound-mindedness
[svfrosÊn˙ ynhtª], profanely and ungenerously manages one’s affairs
[oﬁkonomoËs], begetting in the soul of the dear one a servile condition which the
common folk approve of as excellence […w éretÆn] that will cause it to wander
aimlessly about the earth and without understanding [ênon] under it (Phdr. 256e).

The non-lover must blindly stumble within the world, hoping to simply fall upon an appropriate
beloved. Socrates’ second speech reveals, however, that one should strive to please not humanity
but the gods. After all, his forced speech was spoken, head covered and blind, to Phaedrus with
the ironic hope that he may fall more deeply in love with Lysias (Phdr. 237a). The audience of
his second speech though is unclear. It too seems to be directed to Phaedrus, yet Socrates asks,
“Where is the youth with whom I was speaking. He too must hear this…” (Phdr. 243e). To
37
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whom is he speaking? Socrates wishes to converse with Phaedrus not as he is in his immediacy,
not as corrupted by Lysias, but to the Phaedrus who is a divine beloved. The audience is a divine
entity, and the speaker, with the hopes of pleasing it and not the human-minded Phaedrus.
Likewise late in the Phaedrus, Socrates imagines himself speaking with Tisias, a rhetorician who
advises not speaking the truth but what is probable [eﬁkÒw],38 and he says that one should speak
in a manner “as far as is possible that is pleasing to the gods” (Phdr. 273e). A few lines later
Socrates asks Phaedrus if he knows how one can behave and speak so as to please a god (Phdr.
274b) and he answers for Phaedrus, saying that if they are to discover the answer they “must no
longer concern themselves any longer with human seemings [ényrvp¤nvn dojsmãtvn]”
(Phdr. 274c). Should the two please the gods with beautiful speech, they will bestow upon them
gifts, which, as we will see shortly, the cicada mËyow promises. First, however, I will look to the
divine gift as such and later return to the mËyow of the cicadas. Ervw, in other words, is not of a
human origin but rather a divine dispensation (Phdr 244c).
Ervw, THE DIVINE GIFT
In a later chapter I will give a full account of the nature of the excessiveness of the divine
gift and of givenness. Here, however, relying on Derrida’s and Luc-Luc Marion’s thinking of the
gift and of givenness, I will offer a brief phenomenological description as it applies to Socratic
rhetoric. Given Socrates’ own emphasis on being given the gift of mn¤ from a source beyond
the human, both Derrida’s and Marion’s philosophy of the gift resonates well and will open
Socrates’ own claim up in a unique manner.
A gift by its very nature originates from an external source; it is quite literally a present
from and a presencing of another. The origin of the gift is always outside of the gift itself. The
38
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giver is made present through the gift even though the giver may no longer necessarily be
physically there; it is a presencing of non-presence. Ungrounded, the gift signals an essentially
non-subject/object ordered relation to a given being, i.e., the beloved, and thus is able to reveal
its singularity without preconceived notions. This notion of the gift is in opposition to the Lysian
non-lover’s promise to repay the non-beloved for any inconveniences that the latter may
experience. The gift interrupts one’s world,39 disturbing one’s ability to reason and to calculate
the value of the gift. A gift, then, is aneconomic, it is without value dictated in advance, with
without precomprehension. The idea of the gift is complex and paradoxical: “the gift, if there is
any, would no doubt be related to economy,”40 but at the same time, it is that which interrupts
economy.41 The paradoxical structure of the gift, i.e., as both relating to and rupturing the closedcircle-of-economy is inherent within the concept of a gift. The obligation of the gift cannot be
dispelled. It weighs upon the individual, who feels discomfort from never being able to repay the
gift, since its true origin is always hidden. Jean-Luc Marion describes the paradoxical structure
of the gift as “givenness.” He writes that Being, or conceptuality, is only a preparation for
givenness.42 The given gives itself and shows itself from out of itself without grounding itself. In
other words, it is an unconceptualizable experience out of which the beneficiary’s thoughts are
reordered.
The gift, divine mn¤, is the impossible but not the unnameable or the unthinkable; it is
thinkable as that which is impossible, that which defies precomprehension. The place of the gift,
the individual who is now the site for mntkØ t°xnh, exceeds itself; the individual outstrips
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him or herself and truly becomes ¶nyeow, literally having a god inside. A form of expression
must now be developed that can, to the best abilities of the human, place both the speaker and the
audience in that space of non-discursivity. Lysias, however, attempts to make the gift of mn¤
and the accompanying discourse rational and therefore common place or useful to the masses.
He attempts to lessen the resistance, obligation, and paradox that the gift exudes when one tries
to discursively understand it by placing it within a circle of exchange; and consequently, he does
violence against the gift, destroying it as a gift and a “present/presence.” A gift, then, must be
impossible to exchange. It must originate from a dissymmetrical relationship between the
benefactor and the beneficiary. From this dissymmetry, the beneficiary views the benefactor as
holding infinite import, as being superior and held in awe, through his or her singularity. With
the reverential relationship between benefactor and beneficiary the concept of divine
dispensation certainly comes to the fore.
Socrates mentions a gift at least once more in the Phaedrus when he gives the mËyow of
the cicadas (Phdr. 258e-259e). This mËyow is framed by a series of concerns over how to perfect
the skill of speaking and writing. To understand these concerns, we must understand the cicada
mËyow.
THE GIFT OF THE CICADAS
Phaedrus is amazed by Socrates’ second speech. It is “so much more beautiful [kll¤v]
than his first” (Phdr. 257c). Moreover, he worries that Lysias will not be able to write a speech
rivaling Socrates’ because Lysias fears a specific politician, who rebukes him by calling him a
speech-writer [logogrãfow] (Phdr. 257c). He may be remembered posthumously as a sophist.
Socrates reassures him that being a speech-writer not shameful but rather “speaking or writing
not beautifully [mØ kl«w] but unsightly and poorly [ﬁsxr«w te k‹ kk«w]” (Phdr.

39

258d).43 Why else, Socrates tells him would statesmen put their names on the speeches and leave
the theater with delight if the speech is well received? Phaedrus is then asked “What then is the
mien [trÒpow] of writing beautifully or not?” (Phdr. 258d). Immediately following this
question, Socrates tells Phaedrus a myth of the cicadas. And directly after this mËyow, Socrates
clarifies what he means by speaking beautifully. He asks, “to begin, if a speech is good and
beautiful [eÔ ge k‹ kl«w] must not the mind of the one speaking see [tØn toË l°gontow
dãnon eﬁd›n] the truth about the matter of which he speaks?” (Phdr. 259e). To ask what is
the perfection of speech is to inquire into the question of what beautiful speech is. In other
words, Socrates investigates what type of speech allows tÚ klÒn to manifest itself as it is. But
what is the gift the cicadas will bestow upon the two not only to speak beautifully but to see the
truth?
Socrates warns Phaedrus that they should not fall asleep in the noonday sun (Phdr. 259a)
while the cicadas look down upon them but continue conversing, “sailing past them unaffected
by their Siren charms” (Phdr. 259b). The song of the cicadas, although sweet-toned (Phdr.
230c), is dangerous. The continual droning of the cicadas has a seductive destructive power,
which could lull them to sleep “because of our idleness of thought [d' érg¤n t∞w dno¤w]”
(Phdr. 259a). Like the speeches of the sophists, the cicadas’ singing can drug the mind into an
intellectual slumber. The cicadas challenge the two to continue conversing, and if they should
pass the trial, Socrates assures Phaedrus that the cicadas “admiring us, they give the gift that the
gods have given them to humans” (Phdr. 259b).
The cicadas sprang from a race of humans that existed prior to the Muses and upon
hearing the Muses were so “struck outside of themselves with pleasure” [§jeplãghsn
43

I follow Sallis in translating mØ kl«w not as “not well” but as “not beautifully” in keeping with the etymology
of the kl«w, Logos and Being, p.169.
40

Íf' ≤don∞w]” (Phdr. 259b-c), they continually sang until they cared not [±m°lhsn] for food
and drink. “They escaped their own notice [¶lyon], having died” (Phdr. 259c). In the case of
the cicadas, they received from the Muses in the form of “from birth they require no
nourishment, singing continually, until they die” (Phdr. 259c). Their gift is not merely a
distancing from the body, but rather occurs because they were §kplÆttont, “struck out of
themselves,” they are now nmfÒlhpto, “caught by the nymphs”—just as Socrates was when
he began speaking in dithyrambics (Phdr. 238d) after calling upon the Muses (Phdr. 237a)—to
such an extent that this race of humans turned cicada so honoring the Muses by their enthusiasm
they became the intermediaries to the Muses.
It is unclear within the mËyow itself what the gift Phaedrus and Socrates should hope to
receive. Certainly it would seem odd if the gift given to modern mortals, (as it was for the
cicada-men), should be self-forgetting, since this entire dialogue is devoted to self-remembering.
Yet if we keep in mind the givenness of the gift, its presencing of non-presence and its nondiscursive element, the gift compels the recipient to alter one’s preconceived notions of the
world. There may be a kind of forgetting that is involved. The cicada-men were so affected by
the divine’s presencing of non-presence that they were struck out of themselves and so they
forgot their human life and as a result were given the gift of becoming intermediaries, belonging
neither to the mortal nor to immortal worlds, moving within a liminal, pre-philosophical space.
This space is terrifying; it recedes, it is a continually non-manifesting world. Through this terror,
the cicada-men forgot their need for bodily nourishment. Their response, transforming into
cicadas, is a speculative and profound reply to the petrifying question-worthiness of the Muses’
tunes. The cicadas symbolize the correct response to the divine, unlike an orator who is able to
rival Lycurgus, Solon, or Darius, believing that he will attain a certain immorality and while still
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living and so believes himself to be equal to the gods (Phdr. 258c), consequently forgets himself.
This individual is not truly divine since he strives not to please the gods but rather a human
audience. Mortality and immortality are conflated. The divine is reduced to something readily
comprehended and the human is given greater abilities than what accords to it.
One clue to the gift Socrates and Phaedrus are likely to receive is mentioned at 262d.
Here, Socrates exclaims, “the prophets of the Muses, who are singing above our heads, a gift of
honor would come, having inspired us [§ppepnekÒtew ên ≤m›n].” Should the two undergo the
terrifying trial that the cicadas will put them through they are given the gift of §ppne›n, they are
literally “breathed into” by the Muses, thus becoming infused with the divine and now being
¶nyeow, they are a site for the divine to appear. Philosophical mn¤ is “of all enthusiasms
[ps«n t«n §nyosãsevn] the best” (Phdr. 249e). This is their gift: to escape their own
notice as concerned with simply human affairs to such an extent that Socrates later asks
Phaedrus, “would things which the human opines [t t«n ényrvp¤nvn dojsmãtvn]
continue to be of concern for us?” (Phdr. 274c).
Sallis claims that the gift Socrates and Phaedrus will receive is a similar independence
from the demands of the nourishments the body, which fetter us to the body as an oyster to its
shell, distancing the human from the divine banquet.44 If Socrates and Phaedrus do, in fact, gain
the distance from the body as the cicadas have, obscuring their human needs, it should be
interpreted as a distance from what immediately appears. An independence from corporeal
desires is necessary, since each the of the desires competes and causes a civil war since each
demands to be satisfied without harmony now, in the present moment (Phd. 66b-d). Such desires
fetter an individual to a temporal presence, i.e., to an objectively present and immediate world.

44

Being and Logos, p.165.
42

Breaking free from, or having escaped the individual’s notice of oneself, the corporeal allows
room to be made within the individual so that ‘what is’ may appear as it is, finding the individual
perhaps for the first time in a world that is essentially obscure, mysterious, and withdrawn.
Instead of the body, which is nourished by human dÒj (Phdr. 248b), it is the wings of
the soul that feed on “the divine, e.g., the beautiful [tÚ klÒn], wisdom [sofÒn], and goodness
[égyÒn]” (Phdr. 246e). Furthermore, when a philosophically minded individual sees [ır«n]
beauty [kãllow], this individual recollects true beauty and feels the wings grow (Phdr. 249d),
driving them, as we have seen, into épor¤. In keeping with the language of givenness, the gift
given to Socrates and Phaedrus will be the ability to allow things to manifest themselves without
preconceived notions and as question-worthy, as prophetically temporal, thus permitting the
subject matter to present itself as exceeding discursivity. In the Palinode, an example is provided
of a lover who has become corrupted, perhaps by the siren song of the cicadas, and consequently
does not look toward tÚ kãllow when he sees his beloved and so does not feel a sense of awe
but instead acts like a beast giving into corporeal pleasures (Phdr. 250e). If Socrates and
Phaedrus can resist the immediacy of the body, or rather human concerns, they will be able to
recollect the divine banquet at which their souls were once present gazing upon ı kãllow.
SACRIFICING HUMAN lÒgow
Furthermore, by distancing themselves from their human all-too-human way of being,
Socrates and Phaedrus wish to be as pious as possible, attempting to please the gods not in usual
human actions such a worship and animal sacrifice45 but rather to make a sacrifice of human
communication as discursive lÒgow and to communicate through a mËyow.
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For example the Apology, grants us insight into the relationship found between lÒgow
and mÊyow in the Phaedrus. Socrates recounts to his jurors that he has gained a reputation for a
certain kind of wisdom, human wisdom [ényrvp¤nh sof¤], while Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias,
and other sophists are depicted as “wise in some wisdom greater than what accords to the
human” (Ap. 20d). Socrates repeatedly emphasizes throughout his defense that he is pious; after
all he is simply investigating the Delphic utterance that he is the most wise (Ap. 21a).
Consequently, Socratic philosophy has its origins at the temple of Delphi, a place of prophecy.
Socrates undertook to investigate whether the oracle’s announcement is true. Upon hearing that
no one is wiser than he, Socrates said, “what can the god be saying, and what does he riddle
[ﬁn¤ttet]?” (Ap. 21b). Socrates is subjected to an ‡ngm, a riddle, or literally a darksaying, whose sole purpose is to reveal the excessively obscure quality of that with which it is
concerned. An ‡ngm must be understood as essentially unsolvable and an excessive sign or
portent of ‘what is’ and the discourse resulting from it must take account of this excessiveness.
Socratic philosophy takes account of an essential limitation between the human and the divine, it
is a journeying for an answer of which one is ignorant, which is nevertheless human wisdom.
The sophists, on the other hand, ignore the essential limitation inherent to the human being,
believing that they can gain a form of immortality while still alive. The difference between these
two types of wisdom marks a kind of wisdom that accounts for human ignorance and a wisdom
that ignores or forgets its own ignorance and limitations.
Socrates makes a claim similar to the one at Apology 20d within the Phaedrus. Here,
Socrates tells Phaedrus that to explain what the look [ﬁd°] of soul is would be “utterly divine
[pãnt˙ pãntvw ye¤w] and a very long discussion, however it seems within human power
[ényrvp¤nw] to describe it in a shorter manner” (Phdr. 246a). Charles Griswold emphasizes
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that the use of a mËyow allows Socrates to condense what would be an impossibly long
discussion into a manageable length; mËyow, in other words, allows for a more “economical form
of speech.”46 While this is so, if we read Phaedrus 246a with Apology 20d in mind, the emphasis
is laid not on describing the ﬁd° in a shorter manner but rather in a manner that befits the
human, through mËyow. The distinction I wish to draw attention to is between what is divine and
what is in the power of the human. Keeping in mind that the Palinode is a mËyow, telling mËyo,
at least about the soul and ¶rvw, is the kind of discourse that is human. It allows the matter at
hand to appear, but appear as obscure and therefore as question-worthy. If this is so, giving a
lÒgow about these subjects is beyond the human being and in stepping beyond the boundaries of
the human forces the human being to be ignorant of his or her own ignorance. Giving a mËyow, a
kind of discourse that allows the excessive to appear but appear as excessive, placing both the
speaker and the audience into a state of mn¤, is perhaps the most human kind of discourse
when describing the human being and self-knowledge.
SEEING BEAUTY
Socrates, through his mn¤, wishes to lead, in a cxgvg¤, Phaedrus back to the
originary, inarticulate moment when ¶rvw first took him over in which he was “stung into
madness and caused distress [oﬁstr& k‹ Ùdnçt]” and was perplexed [époroËs] at its
condition, ¶rvw (251c-e) and finally back to the experience of the originary language of the
gods. Human language can only express this experience in mËyow, essentially an ‡ngm,
whereby Socrates attempts through mËyow to interpret the intermediaries’ utterance, the divine
for which he is now a site, through prophecy, allowing tÚ klÒn to manifest, nourishing the
wings of the soul.
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Lysias’ ¶rvw is not a responsive ¶rvw. He has a preconceived concept of who the
beloved is, and so the Lysian lover is closed to the true appearance of the beloved as it emerges.
In contrast to this subjective model of love, the Socratic lover does not force a conception of
what is good or beautiful upon the beloved. Instead the beauty of the beloved strikes him as an
illuminating but blinding light (Phdr. 250b-251a). The object of ¶rvw, according to Socrates,
cannot be desired as part of a rationally calculated decision on the lover’s part. Rather, the object
of ¶rvw reveals itself to be desirable (Phdr. 250a-c). Even in his forced speech, Socrates points
along these lines. By veiling his ¶rvw, the concealed lover can claim that he embodies
svfrosÊnh and thus will not be dragged into excess [Ïbrw] (Phdr. 238a). And yet, note the
manner in which Socrates defines ¶rvw in his first speech:
Without rational opinion [êne lÒgo dÒjhw] that strives toward the correct path, and
toward the enjoyment of beauty [prÒw ≤donØn éxye›s kãllow] and when this desire
gains victory, by the force of desires that are like itself toward personal beauty, it takes its
name from that force, and is called love [¶rvw] (Phdr. 238b-c).

Here, Socrates, albeit not as correctly as in the Palinode, ties ¶rvw to the beautiful [tò klón].
The Socratic lover, then, under the influence of the ¶rvw, does not choose with whom he falls in
love; it is simply a matter of being struck by and responding to tÚ klÒn found within the
beloved. Erotic striving, then, cannot be a result of a future calculation of how one is to master
the beloved. Rather, it originates with the vision of beauty as it appears to the Socratic lovers.
The beloved’s soul is a conduit that shines forth with its own particular luster [lmprÒw] of
‘what is.’ LmprÒw is the beauty that lovers have seen brilliantly showing forth [kãllow d¢
tÒt' ∑n ﬁde›n lmprÒw] of a specific god that the Socratic lover once saw following in the
divine train led by Zeus. In order for ¶rvw to arise, the lover must be completely caught off
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guard, throwing the lover into a state of épor¤, compelling him to gaze awestruck upon the
beloved.
Indeed, after hearing even Lysias’ speech Socrates proclaims, “How divinely
[dmon¤vw] given, comrade, so much so that I am struck out of myself [me §kplg∞n]”
(Phdr. 234d). He states further that this results not from the speech itself but rather says, “I was
affected because of you [§g∆ ¶pyon då s¢] Phaedrus, it seemed to me as I gazed upon you
[prÚw s¢ épobl°pvn], I became aware and recognized [énggn≈skvn], that to me, you
seemed to shine [˜t §mo‹ §dÒkew gãnsys] on account of your speech” (Phdr. 234d). It was
not until Socrates gazed upon Phaedrus, who, true to his name—derived from fãv, meaning “to
shine, to give light, radiant, beaming”—literally “brightened up [gãnsy]” that Socrates
became bewitched by the speech. The nature of the speech itself is bewitching not due to what is
said but because of the image of Phaedrus’ excitement. Those who have been newly initiated
through seeing ‘what is’ [tã ˆnt], when they see the god-like face [yeoed¢w prÒsvpon]
(Phdr. 251a), shutter with fear in response to the appearance of the beloved’s face.
Consequently, the love and desire Socrates shows for Phaedrus are not entirely due to intellectual
stimulation, but rather are based in the physical appearance of Phaedrus.
The enthusiasm with which Phaedrus gives the speech, even though it presents a
bastardized version of ¶rvw, is able to illuminate, and in so doing (re)awakens
[énggn≈sken] ¶rvw for the beautiful [tÒ klÒn] toward which the speech hints.47 The
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prior connection to ‘what is’ in the form of énggn≈sken allows for tÒ klÒn to appear out
of the obfuscation of the world, so that the lovers are §kplÆttont, literally “struck out of
themselves,” upon seeing the beloved (Phdr. 250a). Due to this condition, true lovers could in no
way set a subjective goal for themselves, for they are outside of themselves. Instead, they abide
within the divine mysteries of ‘what is,’ responding to its illumination. Appearing in the beloved,
tÚ klÒn announces itself, such that the beloved becomes the origin of the striving toward
tÚ klÒn, pointing further to ¶rvw’s responsive characteristic. Keeping with the language of
illumination and obscurity, one could say that it is the structure of ¶rvw that allows for the
radiance of the e‰dow of beauty to shine through the beloved and to be perceived by the lover.
The lover and the beloved have already gazed upon beauty, and consequently, it is the
experience of ¶rvw that allows those objects in the world to shine more brightly than those
objects that do not participate in beauty. In fact, no other quality, neither dkosÊnh,
svfrosÊnh, nor any other e‰dow (re)awakens desire [§pym¤] in the soul except beauty
[nËn d¢ kãllow mÒnon] (250b), which alone is a divine dispensation [¶sxe mo›rn] so that it
shows forth, discloses, and most reveals [§kfn°stton] and is loved the most (Phdr. 250d-e).
We must not fail to hear the superlative “§kfn°stton.” Of the images the soul once gazed
upon, it is beauty that shines most clearly, since it is most closely aligned with what is human,
desire for the beloved. Although the soul becomes heavy and comes to earth as a result of some
mishap furnished by forgetfulness/obscurity48 [lÆyhw] (Phdr. 248c), the beauty it saw shining in
brightness [kãllow d¢ tÒt' ∑n ﬁde›n lmprÒn] (Phdr. 250b) is not obliterated from its
memory—it is merely obscured.

48

In the word lÆyhw we must hear its root verb lãnynv, to be unseen, go unnoticed, or obscure.
48

One connects the beloved to the obscure non-presence of tÚ klÒn by means of ¶rvw
(Phdr. 253a). It is not the beloved qua beloved that inspires the memory of the gods, but rather
the beauty shinning through the godlike face [yeoed¢w prÒsvpon] of the beloved. The beloved
is an erotic conduit through which the divine glimmers with eroticism. And as such, the
relationship to tÚ klÒn can only be described through erotic mntkÆ, as when one tries to
qualify the paradoxical nature of the experience of the temporality associated with
énmmnÆsken. All utterances of and actions performed by a mãntw are in the form of an
‡ngm, since they cannot be discursively understood. By extension, others cannot fully
understand the lover and the lover, himself, is unable fully to understand himself.
AnmmnÆsken functions in the manner of an active recognition and restoration of that which is
no longer present, exactly like what is uttered in the form an ‡ngm and what is told in a
mËyow. Socratic mntkÆ, as a form of énmmnÆsken, is an active response to the excessive
flash of ‘what is.’ It is a non-discursively grounded attempt to make sense out of being reminded
of one’s prior excessive connection to ‘what is.’ As a consequence of the obscurity of
énmmnÆsken, the receptivity of ¶rvw, the Socratic mãntw is transformed into an active
desire toward ‘what is,’ that is to say, toward Beauty
Since it is by use of mËyow that Socrates attempts to lead Phaedrus back up to the divine
banquet, tÚ klÒn is revealed through the truth of what is spoken. It is only through ¶rvw that
an individual may become open to tÚ klÒn. However, since “love is a kind of madness
[mn¤n går tn e‰n tÚn ¶rvt],” the visual perception of tÚ klÒn is a gift from the
gods. The gods give the gift of mn¤ and therefore of philosophical mntkÒw, so that an
individual may become a prophet of the intermediary’s utterances and interpret them in a manner
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that befits the ‡ngm. This is why Lysias’ speech is essentially a failed attempt; it does not
reveal ¶rvw as question-worthy, since it does not unveil one’s phenomenological experience of
¶rvw. The e‰dow of an earthly thing naturally through itself has a brilliance [lmprÒw] or a
luster [f°ggow] to it, which appears to the lover; ¶rvw is the response to the illumination of
Being, revealing the passive nature of ¶rvw. As responsive, ¶rvw cannot be a result of a future
calculation of how one is to master the beloved, it, instead, originates with the vision of beauty as
it appears to the Socratic lovers. The beloved’s soul is a conduit that shines forth with its own
particular brilliance [lmprÒw] of ‘what is.’
LEADING THE SOULS OF THE CITIZENS
Above we saw that the whole of rhetoric is a skill of leading souls, it is a cxgvg¤,
which is necessary in the first place since the soul has lost its wings. The Phaedrus describes
how the soul loses its wings, i.e., ¶rvw (Phdr. 248a-b.) Human souls attempt to follow their
divine leaders up to the “back [n≈tƒ] of the heavens where immediately the revolving heaven
carries them round and they look upon [yevroËs] what is outside of the heavens [tå ¶jv toË
oÈrnoË]” (Phdr. 247c). Souls compete with each other in their race upward, attempting to
follow the gods to this place and vying for the best position. And yet, where these souls strive to
reach, tå ¶jv toË oÈrnoË, is higher than what accords to the human being, since they
attempt to see what only the divine should. Consequently, “All partaking in great toil depart with
an incomplete of view of ‘what is;’ and they are expelled, nourished by opinions/seemings
[dojstª]” (Phdr. 248b). Without a view of ‘what is’ most individuals concern themselves
only with human dÒj and not at all with truth, and so must be led back to the originary state of
the soul in an effort to regenerate their souls. Relying upon a lÒgow that is of human origin only
reveals what the concept is as already understood by both the speaker and the audience. It deals,
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therefore, only with dÒj, instead of the prophetically temporal unfolding nature of ‘what is.’
Without the ability to distinguish between seeming and ‘what is,’ one cannot even persuade the
audience and lead the souls [cxgvg¤] of the audience (Phdr. 260e-261a).
Phaedrus, though, has heard that one need not know the truth about which one speaks but
only what seems to be so [tã dÒj], since persuasion, according to Phaedrus, results from what
seems to be true and not from what is true (Phdr. 260a). Phaedrus’ opinion concerning rhetoric
was common in the Greek world. A city-state is fraught with the dangers of competing fears,
hopes, desires, opinions, thoughts, and every other idiosyncrasy found among individuals. It is a
realm inscribed with both élhyÆw and cedÆw,49 so much so that the relationship between the
two becomes fluid and dynamic. In fact, Gorgias writes, “Contests of philosophical speeches
[flosÒfvn lÒgvn] in which quick wittedness is displayed makes the opinion based on belief
changeable,”50 suggesting that philosophy is based as much on opinion as is sophistry.
The true skill [t°xnh] of Socratic rhetoric reveals the difference between seeming
[dÒj] and ‘what is’ [tå ˆnt]. Indeed, if an individual possesses the skill of rhetoric, whether
true or false, he or she will have the ability to make the same thing appear [fn∞n] to the
same person now as just and at another time unjust (Phdr. 261c-d); proceeding by small steps
from a concept to its contrary, he or she can deceive the audience (Phdr 261e-262a). Yet, in his
example of a merchant deceiving a buyer that a donkey is a horse (Phdr. 260bff)—due to
ignorance not only on the customer’s part but the vendor’s as well—Socrates connects the skill
of rhetoric to the need for knowledge of the truth. One can surely deceive one’s audience if they
themselves do not have knowledge of ‘what is,’ and yet if one does not have this knowledge
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either, it is possible to deceive even oneself. Worse yet, if an orator or sophist attempts to
convince the city-state what he believes justice and goodness are, but is in fact ignorant, not only
will the populace be deceived but the speaker will as well. In other words, the skillful rhetorician
must know the truth if he is not to be deceived as well. The skillful rhetorician must strive to
please not a human audience but a divine one.
The cxgvg¤ fails between the merchant and the consumer and between the orator
and the city-state because they are not one, but many. Each has his or her own dÒj of the topic.
Consequently, the speaker is unable to lead the audience whither the speaker wishes not knowing
whence the audience has come, since each has their own definition.51 On the other hand, if the
speaker can reveal the lmprÒw and f°ggow of the e‰dow, the sudden emergence of the
brilliance and luster catches the speaker and the audience unawares, throwing them in épor¤,
revealing ‘what is’ in its non-discursive manner of self-manifestation. In the Palinode, the
audience—just as the Socratic lover is—is perplexed [époroËs] at its condition (Phdr. 251e).
The audience is now in a state of receptivity, the sudden emergence of ‘what is’ allows them to
see the e‰dow as question-worthy. The audience is ‘empty’ in the sense of exceeding rational
understanding, so that all are now époroËs at their own condition. What results are many
individuals listening together as one being led by the speaker’s words. Listening together,
however, only arises when the speaker can lead the audience’s souls where the speaker moves
outside of the realm of discursive thought by becoming erotically enthused.
IV. Dialectics and Recollection, the Recuperation of lÒgow:
In part, this chapter has been a defense of Socratic mËyow, paying special attention to the
way mËyow non-discursively expresses an experience of the pre-philosophical prophetic
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temporality of ‘what is.’ Through such an experience the individual becomes, by being
“somehow prophetic,” a site of an excessive beyond, whose utterances disrupt the complacency
of the everyday preconceived attitude of the many. However, what has not been discussed are
those passages in which giving an account, a lÒgow, are explicitly mentioned as beneficial, i.e.,
those passages where dialectics [dlektkÆ]52 are discussed. I have shied away from a positive
discussion of lÒgow up to now, since it was necessary to clearly and thoroughly reveal that a
Lysian lÒgow necessitates a Socratic mËyow. And although the relationship has up to now
appeared unilateral, it is in fact more fluid than this. If lÒgow, as expressed through dlektkÆ,
is understood in the fashion Socrates intended, Socratic mËyow is every bit as dependent upon a
Socratic lÒgow as a Lysian lÒgow obliges Socrates to tell a mËyow. To put it differently,
Socratic dlektkÆ unveils the temporality of the appearance of an e‰dow as it appears through a
physical entity, which will correlate to the prophetic temporality of the mËyow.
Socrates’ discussion of dlektkÆ is set in the middle of an investigation of perfecting
rhetoric, or speaking beautifully, so that the truth of the matter may come to light. As Phaedrus
understands it, rhetoric has the power to make anything seem like anything else, since it is only
concerned with dÒj. Perfected speech, dlektkÆ, is a form of communication that unfolds
the originary manifestness found in our pre-philosophical experience, so that ‘what is’ shines
through entities found in the phenomenal world. However for Socrates, dlektkÆ, which
consists in division [d¤resw] and collection [sngvgÆ], is not a scientific programmatic put
forward to test the validity of an argument. “Dialectic, in the Phaedrus, is not the syllogistic
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method of argument which it becomes for Aristotle; it designates two different, but related,
practices.”53 D¤resw and sngvgÆ are not dichotomous processes but function
simultaneously to show the unity and multiplicity of a given e‰dow, throwing one into a similar
state of aporetic mn¤ as felt by the true lover when first experiencing his beloved.
Consequently, contrary to Charles Griswold’s claim that commentators “have difficulty
explaining the sense in which the use of the method of division and collection could constitute
divine erotic madness as it is described here,”54 when used together properly d¤resw and
sngvgÆ throw one into a state of mn¤, forcing the interlocutor to consider the way of
being of the e‰dow that multiplicity of it appearing can be gathered into a oneness. ‘What is’
becomes question-worthy through dlektkÆ. As such, dlektkÆ, then, is not only a
rhetorical tool for dissecting arguments but by gesturing back to Socrates’ Palinode it will be
revealed to be a mode of communication that unveils the prophetic temporality of ¶rvw and of
the soul.
EROTIC DIVISIONS AND COLLECTIONS
Recommending an improvement of Lysian lÒgow, Socrates develops his discussion of
dlektkÆ, a Socratic lÒgow. After having disrupted the everyday attitudes of his audience
through his mËyow, a Socratic rhetorician must now lead the souls [cxgvg¤] of the
audience, through giving accounts [då lÒgvn], to the truth (Phdr. 261a), while nevertheless
maintaining a sense of distance between the human and ‘what is.’ While the Lysian lÒgow
cannot unify its audience due to the multiplicity that dÒj necessitates within the audience,
Socratic dlektkÆ reveals a unified e‰dow behind the multiplicity of the appearances, which
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lead to dÒj being mistaken for ‘what is.’ In fact, it is said that if a speaker who does not “see
the truth [ı tØn élÆyen mØ eﬁd≈w], and having chased down opinions [dÒjw d¢
teyhyek≈w] possesses a laughable skill of speaking [lÒgvn êr t°xnhn]” (Phdr. 262c).
Chasing down what one opines leads one into a similar problem of the infinite regress that the
one, who relies upon a boorish wisdom, giving a discursive account of mythical creatures. This
type of lÒgow has nothing that unifies it because it is blind to the e‰dow which unifies the
discourse.
Socrates puts forward an essential description of the human.
For a human being must understand according to the e‰dow that which is said
[jn°n kt' e‰dow legÒmenon] gathering/grasping together [jnroÊmenon] from
many perceptions [ﬁsyÆsevw] into one by means of reckoning [logsm“]. This is
recollection [énãmnhsw] of those things which our soul once saw [e‰den] journeying
with god. And looking down upon that which we now say is, lifting our head to what is
most of all [tÚ ˆn ˆntvw].55 On account of which it is justly said that only the mind
[dãno] of the philosopher is winged (Phdr. 249b-c).

It is striking that énãmnhsw is connected with gathering according to the e‰dow (gesturing
toward a prophetic temporality), its association with wings (emblematic of ¶rvw), the reference
to perception [ﬁsyÆsw], and the emphasis on lÒgow. Within this passage, everything that holds
importance in the Palinode is placed within the context of e‰dow. Through this it will be revealed
that Socrates’ conception of dlektkÆ is every bit as concerned with ¶rvw and open to
prophetic temporality as is mËyow. In other words, Socrates’ §rvtkØ t°xnh, which as a divine
dispensation, allows him sight of tÚ klÒn and is intimately linked with dlektkÆ.56
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Not only is ¶rvw alluded to by the reference to the winged thought [dãno] of the
philosopher, but in fact, Socrates exclaims
I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover [§rstÆw] of these divisions [dr°sevw] and
collections [sngvg«n] in order that speaking [l°gen] and thought [frone›n] be
possible and if I believe another is able to see [ıròn] what by nature is in one and the
many, I follow after him and walk in his footsteps [‡xnon] as if he were god. And only
god knows [o‰den] if I correctly or incorrectly call those whom I address as dialecticians
(Phdr. 266b-c).57

THE TEMPORALITY OF THE e‰dow
An e‰dow, in the Phaedrus, is that by which one orients one’s understanding; without it,
neither speaking nor thought is possible. Certainly the sophist and orator speak and think but
uncritically. If speaking and thinking critically facilitates énãmnhsw, then the sophists do
neither. Socrates is drawing our attention to the human manner of speaking and thinking, “the
unexamined life is not a human life” (Ap. 38a). An uncritically lived life is rather a life of the
oyster, as the Philebus reveals, “To live not the life of a human but of some certain mollusk or as
much as sea-animals living in the midst of oyster bodies [z∞n d¢ oÈk ényr≈to b¤on
éllå tnow pleÊmonow ≥ t«n ˜s ylãtt met' Ùstre˝nvn ¶mcxã §st svmãtvn]”
(21c-d). Furthermore, in the Phaedrus, Socrates likens the immediacy of the body to the fetters
of an oyster shell. Such an individual is closed off from how the world, in its self-manifestation,
affects him or herself, one lacks the sight of tÚ klÒn which is so necessary for philosophical
mn¤. Consequently, one uncritically looks to one’s own dÒj. DlektkÆ, on the other hand,
opens one to the experience of the e‰dow as question-worthy, being both one and many and thus a
sign-post to prophetic temporality.
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Traditionally an e‰dow is understood as the thing in itself, the “Form.” For example,
during the divine banquet, the soul gazed upon, albeit with difficulty (Phdr. 247d), justice itself
[ÈtØ dkosÊnh], sound-mindedness [svfrosÊnh], knowledge [§pstÆmh], and beauty
[kãllow] (Phdr. 250b). Habitually thought, then, an e‰dow as “an existence that is most of all
[oÈs ˆntvw oÔs]” residing in “the place above heaven [tÚn d¢ Íperorãnon tÒpon]”
(Phdr. 247c), is believed to be the “world of forms.” But perhaps we are too much like Lysias in
regard to this answer as to what is an e‰dow, assuming and relying upon a closed economy of
terminology, As Sallis argues, “…the question, as formulated, already presupposes its answer,
presupposes that we know what the ‘is’ means as the very condition of the possibility of even
understanding the question.”58 The question posed in this way assumes that we are able to
articulate our experience of the e‰dow in a significant manner. Furthermore, e‰dow is oftentimes
translated by continental thinkers as the “look” of the thing. This translation, however, has
become fetishized, gesturing to an explanatory power, to which we no longer give thought. It has
become accepted that the e‰dow is “that which is seen, the seen, that which presents itself to a
seeing, that which shows itself so as to be manifest to a seeing.”59 And while it is admitted that
the human “sees” the e‰dow indirectly in the lÒgow and that this “indirect seeing” is
énãmnhsw,60 the import of the self-manifestation of the e‰dow through a Socratic lÒgow in
énãmnhsw is not thoroughly explained. Surely, as Plato writes, the e‰dow is revealed to the
perceptions and thus is wholly distinct from the world of phenomena, but appears through the
phenomena of the world. Indeed we are told that ı kãllow not only brilliantly shone during the
soul’s divine banquet but also is visible in bodily shape [§nrgestãthw] through the
58
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perceptions [ﬁsyÆsevw], “for vision [ˆcw] is the sharpest of senses that come to us through the
body [t«n då toË s≈mtow ¶rxet ﬁsyÆsevn]” (Phdr. 250d), albeit obscurely, vaguely,
and ambiguously, and in a multiplicity. There is, however, a temporality that lurks in the
background that has not been explicitly explored.
According to Liddell and Scott, e‰dow has three senses: “that which is seen: form, shape,
figure;” “a form, sort, and a particular kind of nature, a particular state of things or course of
action;” and lastly, “a class, kind, sort, whether genus or species.” These definitions point to a
movement of appearing to an individual. In other words, the e‰dow includes an individual to
whom it appears in its self-manifestation. It is not, then, in the object which is seen but is that
which is perceived through the senses; it is the movement of appearances. Furthermore, the noun
e‰dow is derived from the verb ‡den, which means “to see, to perceive, to behold.” Yet when the
verb is used in the perfect tense, eﬁd°n, (the first person of which is o‰d, literally “I have
seen”) is used in a present tense sense meaning “I know.” Not only, then, to the Greek ear would
there have been an association between knowing and seeing but there is also a specific
temporality at work. The movement of the manifesting of an e‰dow and the knowing that is
associated with this movement is subject not to linear temporality but, rather, to a prophetic type.
To know according to the e‰dow, accordingly, requires that one perceive the movement of
appearances manifesting immediately and presently before oneself, which is in fact the e‰dow
emerging out of its mythic past of the divine banquet. And yet this past condition is also that
toward which the individual’s soul and sight are directed in a futural act that presents itself in the
present moment of perceiving. To know something according to its e‰dow is to have seen, in the
past, and yet this seeing/knowing has been forgotten and must be recollected by perceiving the
e‰dow again in the present, through ‘what is said,’ which gestures toward the future condition of
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the soul. In fact, given that it is from the e‰dow that anything is understood, “the one which is
directive for the gathering must somehow be available to the gathering prior to the carrying
through of that gathering,” that is, Sallis concludes, “the one of the gathering must somehow be
manifest in advance.”61 In a distinct sense, the human must already ‘know,’ pre-reflexively and
non-discursively, the e‰dow that he or she is attempting to make manifest. This suggests that to
understand according to the e‰dh of ≤ dkosÊnh, ≤ svfrosÊnh, ≤ §pstÆmh, or ı kãllow
would entail seeing, perceiving, or beholding these e‡dh in the present, which entails coming to
know them again through an énãmnhsw of the divine banquet.
THE MADNESS OF dlektkÆ
This movement of appearing can be explained in terms of Socratic dlektkÆ, which
will reveal this movement in terms of d¤resw and sngvgÆ. I will now explore this and
show that, although, he uses a different vocabulary, Socrates is nevertheless concerned with
revealing an e‰dow in such a manner as to throw his interlocutor into divine mn¤.
In the middle of their discussion of speaking beautifully and immediately before the
discussion of d¤resw, sngvgÆ, and dlektkÆ, Socrates tells Phaedrus “The two
[speeches on ¶rvw] were in some way opposites. The one said [§leg°thn] one should court the
favor of the lover, the other the one who does not” (Phdr. 265a). To that Phaedrus exclaims
“And very manly.” But Socrates corrects him “I believed you were going to speak truthfully, that
it was ‘madly’ [mnk«w], which is the thing I was searching after. We said that ¶rvw was a
type of mn¤, right?” Granted, ¶rvw is a type of mn¤ and perhaps it is that to which Socrates
is referring. However, philosophy is the fourth type of mn¤ and Socratic dlektkÆ is the
philosophical mode of speaking beautifully. Moreover, though, Socrates emphasizes that the
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speeches were opposites, which shortly thereafter it is revealed that they both originate from the
same e‰dow (Phdr. 266a). Our question is, then, what does it mean for two opposite accounts of
¶rvw to have their origin in one e‰dow? And what resemblance to divine mn¤ does it have?
Although an e‰dow is a unity, our initial experience of it is scattered [desprm°now]
(Phdr. 265d) into a multiplicity. The unity can neither be immediately perceived nor known but
must be gathered through reckoning [lÒgsmow]. Given that we find ourselves in the midst of
the multiplicity of images, a means of gathering and sifting through the array of images is
necessary. A necessary and sufficient condition for a soul to take a human form is that it should
be able to understand that which is said [legÒmenon] according to its e‰dow (Phdr. 249b). Here,
we cannot help but hear derivations of lÒgow. Socrates is advocating for a type of lÒgow,
dlektkÆ, which will disclose the unity of the e‰dow. I have attempted already to sketch out
what this lÒgow entails, but I will now begin to examine this in more detail.
If we look to the first usage of e‰dow in the Phaedrus the distinction between Socratic
lÒgow and Lysian lÒgow will become clearer. Socrates says he pities the individual who must
explain the e‰dow of mythical creatures, since he is caught in an infinite regress (Phdr. 229d).
This ‘wise individual’ [sofÒw] using “a boorish or unsophisticated wisdom brings each of them
into accordance with probability [probbò ktå tÚ eﬁkÚw ßkston].” TÚ eﬁkÒw, as is revealed
in Socrates’ critique of Tisias’ manner of speaking (Phdr. 272d ff), is that which appears to the
many in its immediacy regardless of what the truth of the condition within which the audience
finds itself is. Lysias, too, is unsuccessful but in a different manner. Lysias’ lÒgow lacks an
érxÆ, a ruling principle, which functions in a like manner to how Socrates will later describe an
e‰dow. One of the failures of Lysias’ is that it cannot take into account its own excess;
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consequently Lysias is forced to invent for himself an érxÆ. But as we have seen, this results in
a vicious circle; he is compelled to speak repeatedly of the same topics, all of which seem
radically distinct.
Recall that an érxÆ is not an arbitrary beginning point but rather a sovereign power from
out of which events, topics, and concepts arise; it lies outside of the power of the human to make
an érxÆ arise; it arrives on its own accord. There is something of the divine in the érxÆ. And
yet the érxÆ is not wholly distant from the discourse, but is rather present throughout it, guiding
that which is said. Like an érxÆ, the e‰dow can neither be forced nor ignored but must unveil
itself through the course of a discussion.
It is not insignificant that Socrates calls his process of d¤resw and sngvgÆ
dlektkÆ and not an épÒdejw,62 a demonstration or a pointing out. Instead, Socrates claims
that the correct relation of these two is found “through an account [då lÒgon].” Furthermore,
he explicitly states that understanding arises when one is able to grasp, into one, by means of
reckoning [lÒgsmow], the drastic diversity of what appears to the senses [tå ‡syhm]
according to the e‰dow of that which is said [legÒmenow]. Language is the site from which ‘what
is’ manifests itself to us. Through the ¶legxow, for which he is famous, Socrates reveals that the
immediacy of the self-evident unified appearance of one’s dÒj is only apparent. Socrates
approaches the e‰dow from where his interlocutors begin, that is, from that which they opine
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[tÚ dÒjsm].63 Derived from the verbal root doke›n, which itself means “to seem to one” or
“to appear to one,” a dÒj is the way a matter, in its immediacy, presents itself to one in one’s
thinking. Consequently, to bring oneself into accord with the e‰dow of that which is said
[legÒmenow] is to wade through the appearances of the e‰dow, while attempting to find a unity,
thus making the e‰dow question-worthy. For how can something appear both as a multiplicity and
as a unity?
According to Lysias, each individual has his or her own dÒj of ¶rvw. The many,
immediate and self-evident appearances found in our experience are, for Lysias, taken as
completely unrelated. As was shown above, his lÒgow purposefully attempts to suppress the
épor¤ experienced when the individual is confronted with the unity of the manifold
appearances of ¶rvw—the mn¤ that results from ¶rvw cannot be both a sickness and divine.
As a result, the multiplicity with which ¶rvw manifests itself is taken for the e‰dow of ¶rvw.
Through dlektkÆ, Socrates is able to trouble the apparent self-evident immediacy of the
e‰dow of ¶rvw.
There do exist certain matters of discussion which no one but the most obstinate could
disagree, e.g., “when someone says the names ‘iron’ or ‘silver’ do we not all think of it?” (Phdr.
263a). And yet, “what if one should ask of ‘just’ [dk¤o] or of ‘good’ [égyoË]? Do we not
carry the one to the other [oÈk êllow êll˙ f°ret] and debate [émfsbhtoËmen] with one
another and even with ourselves?” (Phdr. 263a). Further clarifying his point, Socrates asks
Phaedrus with which of the two pairs one is able to more easily deceive another; to which he
answer “evidently in those cases which we make to wander [pln≈mey]” (Phdr. 263b). Those
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cases which one is able to make “wander about” are those where one does not know the truth,
i.e., that there is an excessiveness to the given phenomenon, they do not “understand according
to the e‰dow that which is said [jn°n kt' e‰dow legÒmenon]” and so must chase down
dÒj. We are told that Ervw is of the debatable type [émfsbhths¤mvn] (Phdr. 263c), since
two opposing accounts can be given; from the same e‰dow at least two dÒj can be reached,
neither of which were thought to be in contradiction with the other until Socrates approached
them through dlektkÆ.64
As the two sets of erotic speeches, the two casting ¶rvw as profane and Socrates’ own
mËyow describing ¶rvw as divine, show Ervw is of the debatable type of dÒj about which
people speak (Phdr. 263c). From the same e‰dow, two diametrically opposed conclusions can be
reached. It is the task of the one who knows dlektkÆ to pick one out from another, to pick out
in an account [lÒgow] the two and expose which of the two is the more praiseworthy. After
Socrates’ critique of Phaedrus’ beloved’s speech, two chance utterances were made that involved
“do›n eﬁdo›n” that would not be unpleasant to grasp, if t°xnh could teach it (Phdr. 263d).65 It
is one of which is “to lead [êgen] together the scattered things, seeing them at the same time
[snor«nt], into one idea [eﬁw m¤n ﬁd°n] in order that each one be made evident [d∞lon]
by definition [ırzÒmenow]…just now I was speaking about Love, we defined [ırosy°n] it,
whether it is good or bad” (Phdr. 265d).
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The one who is skilled in rhetoric, who has knowledge of dlektkÆ, must first carefully divide [d˙r∞sy] and
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The individual who knows how to properly execute sngvgÆ is able to define
[ır¤zen]66 the topic making it evident so that, “through this, the account [lÒgow] becomes
manifest [sf°w] and with itself agrees with it” (Phdr. 265d). When one defines a matter it
becomes both evident [d∞lon] and manifest [sf°w]; its unity shines through. To define an
issue, then, is a collecting together so that which is scattered may be seen together at the same
time. Ervw, like mn¤, is debatable because it presents itself in two ways, profane and divine.
Experienced as such its e‰dow appears as accidental and coincidental, something that can be
bandied about like an orphan, belonging nowhere and having no home. However, a ˜row, from
which ır¤zen is derived, is a boundary stone; it limits a portion of a field, allowing a specific
parcel of land to emerge into appearance. Without delimiting, say, a parcel of land within a field
there is no specific context from which the former can emerge; in its immediacy it is simply an
amorphous, unstructured space. Through delimiting an e‰dow of a specific locale it comes into
view for the first time, and presents itself as something specific, as a discreet unity. SngvgÆ
allows an entity to become manifest; it demarcates that ‘which is’ and that ‘which is not’ with
respect to the e‰dow. Collecting, through delimiting, the parcel of land, the field is now able to
come into view and be collected under a unified e‰dow.
Although it is only through ır¤zen, as a delimitation and sngvgÆ, that an e‰dow
manifests itself, to fully reveal the matter at hand, and bring one’s interlocutor into épor¤ and
thus a philosophical mn¤, d¤resw is also necessary. To illustrate his point, Socrates
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discusses cutting [t°mnen]67 a body “according to its form [kt' e‡dh],” where the joints are by
nature, and trying not to take after a poor butcher (Phdr. 265e). To the poor butcher, the body
does not even present itself as a body; he does see it visibly before him but rather only as an
amorphous lump of flesh. He can neither discuss it nor think about what it is, and since he does
not have sight of the e‰dow of the body he cannot understand it even in its oneness. By one
common e‰dow of the body there are two natures, both parts called by the same name,
differentiated as “right” and “left.” There is an immediate distinction between the two. Here, as
with the example of the field, the e‰dow of the body cannot emerge without d¤resw; the body
cannot be understood to be of two halves, let alone a body proper at all. But a good butcher can
divide the body according to its e‰dow, as consisting of two relatively symmetrical halves,
perhaps pre-philosophically and certainly for the first time as question-worthy. Only now is a
Socratic lÒgow able to be given.
The contradiction of the two sets of speeches reveals itself after d¤resw and
sngvgÆ are used in combination. For instance, after d¤resw has occurred, the e‰dow of the
body is seen as that which has two halves, and when sngvgÆ is able to connect the two
halves the e‰dow is now understood to be that which is a unity and a multiplicity. The individual
who is skilled in dlektkÆ understands that the pre-philosophical, non-discursive experience
of the e‰dow of the body is neither one nor many. The body, as such, becomes truly questionworthy. Likewise, Ervw does not even appear to Lysias, at least not evidently and truly. He is
unaware of the right half of ¶rvw, the “part of mn¤, that has the same name as the other half
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but now divine” (Phdr. 266b). A Socratic account [lÒgow] must be given so that the individual
is confronted with the question of how it can be both one and many. But the question can only be
answered in the form of a recollective mËyow which exposes the individual to the experience of
‘what is’ as it was experienced before embodiment. As with the example of the body, but now
more pronounced, there is no immediate contradiction between the first two speeches and
Socrates’ mËyow, they are discussing wholly separate phenomena. It is only once a Socratic
lÒgow, through dlektkÆ, is given that the mËyow reveal itself as more praiseworthy. It is at
this point that a Socratic mËyow must be told so that the audience can recollect the soul’s vision
of the e‰dow it saw at the divine banquet.
Again, Socrates exclaims, “I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover [§rstÆw] of these, of
dividing [dr°sevw] and of gathering [sngvg«n]…and if I believe another is able to see
[ıròn] what by nature is in one and the many him I follow after and walk in his footsteps
[‡xnon] as if he were god” (Phdr. 266b). Truly such an individual is divine insofar as through
dlektkÆ he or she throws another into épor¤, being aware of the innumerable appearances
of an e‰dow to which the individual is exposed in the present must. In fact, he or she is one who
gathers together these appearances. The unity of the e‰dow lays outside of the power of the
audience. However, this unity can only be recognized through énãmnhsw and thus is able to
lead Socrates in an earthly reenactment of the divine banquet. Much like Socrates’ own
§rvtkØ t°xnh, which grants him sight of tÚ klÒn through prophetic temporality,
dlektkÆ gestures to a pre-philosophical beyond. Both ¶rvw and the divine (and by extension
the divine gift of mn¤) are mentioned in connection with dlektkÆ. This individual appears
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to bring the same strange mixture of pleasure and pain as the beloved does for the lover, driving
him into mn¤.
Above, dlektkÆ was explained in terms first of a sngvgÆ, which allows one to
collect disparate sensory perceptions into a cohesive unity understood according to the e‰dow.
This allows one to speak intelligibly about the subject, something that Lysias for a variety of
reasons was unable to accomplish. Next I addressed d¤resw. This half of Socratic dlektkÆ
allowed the pre-philosophical, the always already understood e‰dow, to become question-worthy
for the first time. A Socratic account, a Socratic lÒgow, is able to begin here, in the rupturing of
discourse. These processes together seed the ground for énãmnhsw, as Socrates indicates at
249b-c of the Phaedrus. The individual’s dãno grows wings through finally being exposed to
the e‰dow as tÚ ˆn ˆntvw, what is most of all. In terms of the first half of the dialogue,
tÚ ˆn ˆntvw was revealed only in the recollective mn¤ through the experience of the
beloved. Here, the same mn¤, the state of being taken outside of one’s everydayness, is
achieved through the one who is skilled in dlektkÆ.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE EXCESSIVELY GOOD:
The Erotic Tale of the Sun in the Phaedrus, Symposium, and the Republic
The sun, from the human point of view (in other words, as
it is confused with the notion of noon) is the most elevated
conception. It is also the most abstract object, since it is
impossible to look at it fixedly at that time of day. If we
describe the notion of the sun in the mind of one whose
weak eyes compel him to emasculate it, that sun must be
said to have the poetic meaning of mathematical serenity
and spiritual elevation. If on the other hand one
obstinately focuses on it, a certain madness is implied, and
the notion changes meaning because it is no longer
production that appears in light, but refuse or combustion,
adequately expressed by the horror emanating from a
brilliant arc lamp.
Georges Bataille, “Rotten Sun” Visions of Excess

I. Presently Existing Versus Excessively Existing:
Plato’s writings are rife with the movement upward. In his Palinode, in the Phaedrus,
Socrates speaks of the soul’s ascent, pulled by a horse-driven chariot to “the place beyond the
heavens [tÚn d¢ Íperorãnon tÒpon]” where “the colorless, formless and impalpable
‘existence that is most of all’ [oÈs ˆntvw oÔs] resides” (Phdr. 247c). In Republic book
VII, the cave-dwelling captive is forced to move upwards out of the cave, making his ascent into
the blinding light where “the good” [tÚ égyÒn], which is said to be “lying beyond being
[§p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w]” (R. 509b), is revealed. Furthermore still, in the Symposium, Diotima’s
“ladder of love” describes the erotic initiation in which the initiate is led upward from a
particular, singular, and arbitrary beauty to a type of knowledge that is of a universal and
necessary type of beauty (Sym. 210d). The ladder ends with a sudden [§j¤fnhw] vision of
beauty itself (Sym. 210a-211d). The lovers, in the Phaedrus, recollecting what is most of all [tÚ
ˆn ˆntvw] (Phdr. 249d), suffer from the fourth type of mn¤ and are struck-out-of-themselves
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[§kplÆttont] (Phdr. 250a), while the prisoner looks up at the sun “in its own place” (R.
516b) instead of at mere images of it. It seems very much that Plato wishes to describe a plane of
insight in which Socrates loses himself, passing beyond this realm of being, into the “‘ineffable’,
in ‘transcendence’.”68
Socrates does, after all, in his opening discussion with Glaucon in Republic book VI, say,
“philosophers are able to grasp those things that are ever and in accordance with themselves
[oﬂ toË ée‹ ktå tÈtå …sÊtvw]” (R. 484b). Those who have a philosophical nature are
ever in love [ée‹ §r«sn] with a kind of learning [myÆmtow] that makes evident [dhlo›] to
them something of “that which is ever and most of all [t∞w oÈs¤w t∞w ée‹ oÎshw]” and is not
wandering [plnvm°nhw] due to coming-to-be and passing away (Rep. 485b). So that which is
evident may become clear and not wander about, Socrates states, at Phaedrus 263b, that one
must “acquire a certain mark of the look [toË e‡do] of each.”
Martin Heidegger gives us a particularly helpful interpretation to trace the etymology of
the term e‰dow. He reminds us that the e‰dow is literally the “look” or appearance of a thing. It
allows an entity to show and present itself, to be seen, as the very thing that it is. Accordingly,
the e‰dow names the being-ness [oÈs¤]69 of the entity in question. It is the appearance of
something as “the standing in this and placing in appearance [das Stehen in diesem und
Sichstellen in es],”70 by which he means to suggest that the e‰dow is that which stands as a stable
structure for a completed entity; it is the permanent and identical structure of an entity—leading
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us to read the Greeks as the thinkers of metaphysics as an ontology of Vorhandenheit. That is to
say, Heidegger seems to believe that the Greeks, Plato and Aristotle in particular, based their
ontology on a pure presence, which is separate from the movement of the phenomena of the
world.
This is an understandable interpretation, since tÚ égyÒn is §p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w,
literally tÚ égyÒn lies along side being, and so it is meta-physics. It certainly appears that
tÚ égyÒn has little to do with being. In fact, Heidegger writes, «ein Wissen von der fÊsw
(§pstÆmh fskÆ)» is in an essential sense metaphysics so that «voraus, da Metaphysik ebenso
sehr »Physik« ist als die Physik »Metaphysik«».71 Metaphysics, for Heidegger, is that which lies
outside of or beyond the sensuous essence of fÊsw;72 the student of fÊsw, according to
Heidegger, must turn away from the Ïlh simply given the way the Greeks thought tã metå
tå fskã and its accompanying mode of knowing, §pstÆmh. This Greek tradition, according
to Heidegger, studies “being-ness,” oÈs¤, simply as the universal feature of all things that are,
and therefore excludes the Heideggerian question of the event of Being as a dynamic background
dimension that is radically different from beings. Consequently, tÚ égyÒn, it would appear,
must be a permanent structure that is removed from the movement of the manifestation of
entities.
Heidegger is not the only thinker to believe that Plato is looking toward a stable everexisting present object. It has been said by other scholars that Socrates is working out a
mathematical project of tÚ égyÒn, investigating the ratios and proportions that exist between
the oneness of tÚ égyÒn and the infinite array of the images that it produces. This is identified
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with unity and “the Good with the One treat ‘truth’ as mathematical structure;”73 furthermore,
“Mathematical structure is both generated and revealed (a-leth’ed) by the generator of the
numbers.”74 Proponents of such an interpretation argue for the permanence of the ontological
status of tÚ égyÒn, since “the goodness (éretÆ) of a thing is shown by its permanence,
beauty, and form…The basis of order therefore is unity, and thence unity or one-ness is the cause
of all good, or good in itself.”75 Since tÚ égyÒn ‘lies beyond being,’ it is said to be selfsufficient, “Thus worth consists in ‘in-itselfness’ or self-hood’…Self-sufficiency is good when it
arises from such all-inclusiveness.”76 While I will not directly argue against Heidegger’s
interpretation, to which I am greatly indebted, the relationship that the human being has to
tÚ égyÒn as something stable and permanent and as §p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w must be
reinvestigated. To gesture toward a neglected hermeneutical approach, I will focus upon a
phenomenology of excess. Through this discussion, I wish to recoup the term “presence.” A
metaphysic of presence, according to this interpretation, does not signify a permanent structure
of being, divorced from the world of phenomena. Rather by “presence” I will mean a total excess
and surplus of being and meaning. It is an ineffability that is founded within the overwhelming
exposure of the movement of entities themselves. If it is true that Socrates passes beyond this
realm of entities into an ineffable and transcendent realm, it is due not to the withdrawal of
entities but rather to an experience of excess or overabundance that is characteristic of
tÚ égyÒn.
In this chapter, I will borrow from Paul Frieländer’s insight into the moments of pain and
agony inherent in Plato’s ascent to help explain the experience one has when confronted by that
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which is excessively present. Through such an experience, Socrates is made aware of that which
is beyond one’s normal and everyday comportment toward the world; he is placed in a state of
“special receptiveness,”77 what I have, in the previous chapter, termed “philosophical and erotic
mn¤.” This discussion will give way to the event of givenness to reveal the structure of tÚ
égyÒn as §p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w, through the analogy of the sun as a source that excessively
gives gifts of images and forms found in the world of appearances. It will be shown through this
analogy that tÚ égyÒn is the dynamic movement of phenomena. Finally, I will reveal that
Socrates is an earthly site of excess, evoking an excessive experience in himself and others,
much as tÚ égyÒn is said to do.
II. A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Good:
In this section, it will be revealed that Socrates is exposed to the overwhelming nature of
tÚ égyÒn. In this discussion, we will see that Socrates is not portrayed as retreating from the
phenomenal world into a world that transcends it, but rather that he is immediately confronted
with the world of phenomena. And being confronted by the world in this way, the questionworthiness of it manifests itself. This is to say, the initial appearance of the world moves out of
its untroubled and pre-conceived manifestation and comes to light as fundamentally frustrating to
human understanding. This frustration is due not to a limitation of the human intellect but rather
the phenomena themselves are beyond the scrutiny of discursive understanding. The phenomena
essentially lay outside of rational communication, such that the only means by which to
communicate such exposure is through a vocabulary of frustration, pain, and toil. This will be
revealed through a discussion of Socrates’ unique habit of stopping and turning himself toward
his own thought [noËw]. Instead of fleeing from or being merely unconcerned with the
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overwhelming and immediate exposure to ‘what is,’ Socrates attempts to make his way through
this exposure by communicating it with others in an attempt to make rational sense out of that
which is fundamentally frustrating. This process is characterized as difficult and filled with pain
and toil, driving Socrates into philosophical mn¤.
Following Friedländer, I wish to draw attention to those passages in the Platonic corpus
where traveling “along the way [ktå ıdÒn]” is marked with toil, pain, difficultly, distresses
[pÒno] (Sym. 210e), or, as Friedländer characterizes it, “anguish”78 so that ‘what is’ suddenly
[§j¤fnhw] appears. The frustration, which one attempts to rid oneself of by further developing
discursive methods, is a continual process and drives one into “philosophical mn¤.” I will
characterize this toil and pain and the sudden manifestation of ‘what is’ that results from the
initial experience of that which lies beyond discursivity but which is nevertheless necessary to
articulate for human experience and knowledge as philosophical mn¤, which is given by the
gods for our greatest happiness (Phdr. 245c). In other words, one attempts to recapture the initial
experience of ‘what is’ through discursive means, moving upwards, as it were, toward ‘what is.’
However, no form of communication is able fully to grasp this experience, since it lies beyond
being.
SOCRATES’ UNIQUE HABIT
On his way to Agathon [eﬁw Agãyvnow] (whose names means “the Good,” tÚ
égyÒn), “Socrates turned himself toward his own thought [tÚn oÔn Svkrãth •t“ pvw
pros§xont tÚn noËn],” and being left behind as he walked “along the way [ktå ıdÒn],”
he sent Aristodemus in his place (Sym. 174d). 79 This behavior, as odd as it seems to those
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attending the symposium, is, we are told, “a certain habit that he has [¶yow gãr t toËt' ¶xe],”
in which he sometimes stands apart from whither he goes and “by chance [tÊx˙] there he
stands” (Sym. 175b). Alcibiades later recounts similar behavior, which he witnessed during a
military campaign, to this same group of friends. Socrates stood fixedly deep in thought
[snnoÆsw] from dawn of one day till dawn of the next, and when the sun rose he offered a
prayer to the sun [prosejãmenow t“ ≤l¤ƒ] and then went on his way (Sym. 220d). These
references to Socrates’ unique habit of standing apart [éf¤stsy] from his mundane
surroundings and turning himself toward his own thought explicitly draw our attention to broader
concepts in Platonic thought, such as tÚ égyÒn and the sun. Furthermore, through the
illustration of Socrates’ particular habit, Plato gives us a recommendation for how one is to
correctly comport oneself toward both the sun and the good, even though both stand in excess of
the phenomenal world.
We may be tempted to characterize Socrates’ odd habit as a movement away from the
phenomenal world and a withdrawal into inner subjectivity. Portraying Socrates’ customary
behavior as a turning to his own noËw may lead us to believe that Plato conceived of our
relationship with the world in a modern subject/object model, in which the world is set over and
against the individual. According to this model, what appears to us and ‘what is’ may be
ontologically separated, thus leading us into a radical skepticism. After all, sense objects are said
to be unknowable,80 since they are unstable, irregular and always changing, and so can only be
objects about which one merely opines. In other words, according to this interpretation, sensible
objects can appear as what they are not in a radical sense. Consequently, individuals who “hold
is as important as his presence,” Plato’s Symposium (Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 1987), p.27. Pointing ahead to
the last section of this chapter, Socrates himself, like tÚ égyÒn, makes images of himself, which throw his
interlocutors into épor¤.
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fast to such objects wander [pln≈meno] amid that which are many and are in all kinds of
ways [§n pollo›w k‹ pnto¤vw], are not philosophers,” while “those who are philosophers
are able to grasp [§fãptesy] that which is capable of always holding itself in all respects
[oﬂ toË ée‹ ktå tÈtå …sÊtvw ¶xontow dnãmeno]” (R. 484b). In fact, Republic book
VII describes the cave dwelling individual who, unfettered, is turned away and compelled “by
force [b&]” (R. 515e), from the collected, shared closed-economy of images found within the
cave and is led upward toward the sun’s blinding light. There his eyes slowly begin to grow
accustomed to the light. The allegory of the cave describes the manner in which the individual
begins a study of the shadows he once saw, then reflections, images, then the night-time celestial
bodies until, finally, “one is able to look down upon and gaze at the sun itself in according with
itself in its own space [tÚn ¥lon Èton ky' Íton §n tª ÍtoË x∆r& dÊnt' ên
ktde›n k‹ yeãssy]” (R. 516b).
THE ANGUISH OF PHENOMENA
Passages such as these seem to suggest that Socrates’ turning himself toward his own
thought is a purely theoretical exercise, especially if one interprets the allegory of the cave as an
image of the discussion of the geometry of the divided line. Here, as it is typically depicted, is a
hierarchy of being, in which there is a strong and absolute break between the sensual world and
the world of ideas and forms.81 However, if we pay attention not only to the outcome of the
ascent but to the process itself, we notice that the prisoner’s ascent, and by extension the
philosopher’s intellectual ascent, is fraught with pain and toil due to exposure to the phenomena
themselves. Take note that élge›n, suffering or bodily pain, is used twice in Republic 515c-e
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and once to “Ùdnçsy,” “suffering,” to describe the now freed prisoner’s condition of being
exposed to light of the sun, illuminating the phenomenal world. The illumination of entities is so
bright and places the prisoner in a state of élge›n that the prisoner is in a state of épor¤ (R.
515d) in his attempt to reconcile what he formally experienced, in the cave, to what he is now
exposed. There is no radical break to be found. Rather, we are presented with the prisoner
working his way through the phenomena, attempting to make rational sense out of them, until he
arrives at the truth, which is always present throughout the process. Plato describes a similar
process in both the Symposium and the Phaedrus. The “ladder of love” begins with one particular
beautiful body up until one sees beauty itself and then, at last, the final secret (Sym. 211b), which
is realized only after “every previous distresses [pÒno]” (Sym. 211a). Moving up the ladder, one
does not simply leave behind the initial phenomenon of the beautiful body. Instead, the lover is
confronted with how to resolve the fact that the beauty found in this particular body is now found
in multiple bodies and eventually in intellectual concepts, finally beauty itself (Sym. 211c),
which will suddenly [§j¤fnhw] appear within this movement of appearances. Similarly, in the
Phaedrus, the lover suffers philosophical mn¤ due to the beloved’s presence, by which the
lover recollects true beauty (Phdr. 249d). The lover is said to be experiencing both mn¤ and
épor¤ due to the “soul being stung and caused to suffer [≤ cxØ oﬁstrò k‹ Ùdnçt]”
due to the beloved’s affects upon him (Phdr. 251d). See also, Phaedrus 251c where the entire
soul throbs and gesticulates as those whose teeth are cutting through the gums due to the
beloved’s presence which causes the feathers of the soul to grow in the lover, which is nothing
other than the lover recollecting beauty and “what is most of all [tÚ ˆn ˆntvw]” that he saw
during the divine banquet awoken by the experience of the beloved’s “divine face” (Phdr. 251a).
Exposure to the phenomena of the world has a profound effect upon the individual. Far from
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being illusions and things to be left behind completely, these phenomena are felt throughout the
entire process of gaining insight into the truth.
We could say that the process that the prisoner and lover are going through is itself
nothing other than the pain and toil of the movement through the sensible objects, and that the
truth arrived at cannot be found except through the pain and toil, which agitates the soul enough
to move beyond but never leaves behind the initial manifestation of entities. In other words, the
technical language that accompanies the ascent to ‘what is’ is not a dispassionate comportment,
but should be read as “a way to the sciences, through the sciences, and beyond them,”82 and in
fact the whole of book VII should be read as “one great dialectical myth.”83
REENACTING THE DIVINE BANQUET
Mythical language concerning the highest forms of reality is taken up in the Phaedrus.
While no human soul has fully glimpsed this place, the gods stand on the “back [n≈tƒ] of the
heavens where, immediately, the revolving heaven carries them round and they look upon
[yevroËs] what is outside of the heavens [tå ¶jv toË oÈrnoË]” (Phdr. 247c). Moreover,
“the divine mind [yeoË dãno] in the way round [perÒdƒ] looks down upon [kyorò]
justice itself [ÈtØ dkosÊnh], sound-mindedness [svfrosÊnh], and knowledge
[§pstÆmh]” (Phdr. 273d), but the human soul “sees some things and not others [tå m¢n e‰den
tå d' oÎ]” and because they are troubled by the unruly horse they “with toil look down upon
‘what is’ [mÒgw kyor«s tå ˆnt]” (Phdr. 248a). According to this myth, to be ensouled in
a human body requires not only that one has already glimpsed at least a small portion of
oÈs ˆntvw oÔs during the divine banquet (Phdr. 249e) but that the path to this place is
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inherently fraught with toil, mÒgw. To be human, then, according to the myth, is to reenact the
divine banquet, here on earth, attempting to catch sight of the truth but always fundamentally
through much toil.
Kãyrw, or perhaps a “loosening” or “setting-free” [lÊsw] (Phdr. 244d-e), is one such
enactment and communication of mn¤. To illustrate, mn¤ as kãyrw expresses itself when
excessive suffering becomes too much to bear, allowing one to participate in pure excess, while,
at the same time, “setting oneself free from present ills [lÊsn t“ Ùry«w mn°nt te k‹
ktsxom°nƒ t«n prÒntvn kk«n eÍrom°nh]” (Phdr. 244e). Here, we are not only a
receptive site for the excess but the source of it as well. Only in mn¤, in being exposed to
excess, can one, in a sudden outlet, release oneself from the excess by participating in the
excessiveness of it. Consequently, we are able to express the excess as fundamentally excessive.
For example, Achilles, who is overcome by excessive pain, can only release himself from it by
participating in an excessive expression of that pain. Upon seeing Patroclus’ corpse, he “rends
his hair with his hands [xers¤ kÒmhn æsxne d˝zvn]” and “wails terribly [smerdl°on d'
’mvjen]” (Iliad XVIII 27, 35). His anguish is so awful that it exceeds human expression, a
form of communication without discursive content, and as such its significance cannot be
understood by the merely human. While his handmaidens can only cry with him, the goddess,
Hera, hearing his excessive crying, comes to his aid. Only in the participation in that which
exceeds the human can Achilles truly express his traumatic experience, transcending the human,
calling upon the goddess and the divine itself. If, then, philosophical ¶rvw shares in this
givenness, which as the fourth type of mn¤ it seems that it must, one not only passively
receives the distress of the illumination of Being but, through its excess, one actively participates
in the agitation of illumination.
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At the end of her initiation rites, Diotima, in the Symposium, tells Socrates that a
“wondrous vision, beautiful in nature, will suddenly [§j¤fnhw] be perceived” (Sym. 210e), but
not until he has completed “all of the previous distresses [¶mprosyen pãntew pÒno]” (Sym.
210e). The previous distresses refer to the initiation into erotic matters that those who are
philosophically minded, like Socrates, must undergo. To refer to the initiation in terms of a
distress suggests that the initiate undergoes, suffers, or is affected by [pãyen] something to
which he is exposed. This, I believe, is the essentially and internally failed discursive exercise
the initiate goes through over and over to make propositional sense of the initial experience of
the beloved, as described in the “ladder of love.”
Diotima’s initiation into erotic matter is not the only method by which the beautiful itself
suddenly, and thus non-discursively, appears but also appears in the correct instruction of the
lover instilling in the beloved the correct habits and character (Phdr. 252d-253c) and after this,
the lover must account for the initial experience of beloved. Vis-à-vis the beloved, the lover
recollects the divine banquet, during which the human soul follows a certain god and lays hold of
that god “by memory [tª mnÆm˙]” (Phdr. 253a). This individual is said to be “enthused
[§nyos«ntew]” and receives from this god “habits and practices [¶yh k‹ tå
§pthdeÊmt]” (Phdr. 253a), which the lovers say is given by their beloved. By imitating
[mmoËmeno] the god, they lead the beloved into that practice and idea [ﬁd°n] of the god by
means of persuasion and ordering [=ym¤zontew] (Phdr. 253b). This describes the initiation of
the beloved into the way of ¶rvw (Phdr. 253c). It is a type of learning, just as “the idea of the
good [≤ toË égyoË ﬁd°] is the greatest object of learning [m°gston mãyhm]” (R. 505a).
And yet, this initiation is never completed; the lover is “always being initiated into the perfect
initiations [tel°ow ée‹ teletãw teloÊmenow]” (Phdr. 249c), since it is not through the
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beloved that the lovers receive their divine habits and practices but rather through divine
dispensation, originating from a source beyond and despite themselves, since “from Zeus, they
draw inspired water, just as bacchantes and pour it into the souls of those they love” (Phdr.
253a). This flow of waters, which Zeus named yearning [·merow], plentifully falls [pollØ
ferom°nh] upon the lover, and when filled to the brim it flows outside, rebounding off the lover
and returning to the beloved who is, in turn, filled with ¶rvw, “but is perplexed as to with whom
and does not know at what he suffers, and consequently is unable to speak [frãs] of it”
(Phdr. 255d). The initiation rites, then, are an ever increasing cycle of agitation resulting in
mn¤. It is this responsiveness to the beloved that one must dwell within even though it leads to
nothing but épor¤ (Phdr. 251e), the lover will reach the highest and most profound experience
of the initiation.
TRAVELING THROUGH THE PHENOMENA
However, if, as Diotima tells us, everyone seeks tÚ égyÒn (Sym. 206a),84 the question
arises, to what is the philosophically minded individual exposed that the masses are not? Diotima
gestures towards an answer,
These are the erotic matters, which even you Socrates, could be initiated into. For the
highest mysteries [tå d¢ t°le k‹ §popt¤k], I do not know if you are the sort of
person for the sake of which these things are, if one correctly abandons oneself
[§ãn tw Ùry«w met¤˙] (Sym. 209e-210a).

Here, Diotima casts doubt on the young Socrates’ ability to be initiated into the erotic mysteries.
Later she makes this doubt more clear. Socrates is too concerned with the sight of a multitude of
bodies, so much so that “he has been struck out of himself [§kp°plhj]…only to behold them
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and to be with them” (Sym. 211d-e). Diotima explicitly chides Socrates for not being the type
who would “abandon himself,” giving himself over to the exposure of excess, instead he strives
to lessen the agitation by being with the multiple bodies, uncritically affected by them. However,
the young Socrates’ experience differs from the more mature Socrates’ depiction of the lover,
whom he describes in the Phaedrus. Here, he speaks of the initial experience that the lovers have
of their particular beloved as not only “striking them out of themselves [§kplÆttont],” but
“they do not understand that which they suffer [tÚ pãyow égnooËsn]” (Phdr. 250a). Instead
of ignoring or attempting to alleviate this suffering, as the young Socrates does before
undergoing the initiation rites into the erotic mysteries, the lover, in the Phaedrus, seeks to
understand what it is about this particular beloved that makes him standout from among the
anonymous masses. It forces the lover to ask why this particular beloved causes him discomfort
and throws him into épor¤ (Phdr. 251c-251e). Charles Griswold Jr. is correct to stress that
the lover is struck by beauty and then he divinizes the beloved. It is the beloved’s beauty
and not his character that attracts the lover. Presumably if the beloved’s soul were the
object of the lover’s attentions, it would be because it was beautiful. In contrast with the
approach of the nonlover, the lover does not calculate his potential profits and losses in
selecting a beloved. Indeed, he does not really stop and choose the beloved at all….Nor
will the beloved respond to the lover with a computation of gain and losses….it seems
that he is the source of character for the beloved. There is no indication that the beloved
is beautiful because he knows, in a discursive sense, what beauty is…the beloved just is
beautiful.85

The lover, if he is a true lover and is not concerned with an economy of exchange between
himself and his beloved, must be concerned with the beloved’s divine character, which is the
source of true beauty. This source of the beloved’s attractive force must always remain a
mystery; the beloved simply is beautiful and places the lover in a condition of épor¤. Such a

85

Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, p.125.
81

lover, like Achilles, must “abandon himself” to the suffering and as a result dwell in the
discomfort that the unknowing of épor¤ brings with it.
The young Socrates, even though undergoing the experience of many beautiful bodies,
does not, it would appear, give pause and properly reflect upon this experience. He simply takes
it for granted, taking pleasure in gazing upon the multiplicity of the beautiful bodies. We must
not forget that the “ladder of love” begins with an experience of a particular beloved. The ascent
through the stages of Diotima’s initiation makes clear that the initiate “comes to see such a
certain single means of knowing [tnå §pstÆmhn m¤n toÊthn] that is of this type a
beauty” (Sym. 210d). This singular means of knowing brings forth what Diotima terms “a great
open sea” of beauty (Sym. 210d). An open sea manifests itself in many different forms and is
undergoing continuous changes. Consequently, “the problem of how to reduce the fluidity or
fluency of oceanic speech to its ultimate unity is the problem of the transition from discursive
thought to intuition.”86 As Gadamer asks,
But how are we to reconcile the manifold of true reality with the unity of the true
good?...we cannot treat the matter as if we were dealing with some new, ultimate step
leading from the multiplicity of ideas to the ‘principle’ of the one and the good. On the
other hand, one would certainly not want to say that the idea of the good is
comprehended ‘in just the same way’ as all the other ideas.87

A paradox has come into view; a unity appears as a multiplicity, which can only be understood to
be a unity by first being revealed in its multiple forms, and thus that unity is itself only
understandable as overwhelming, unutterable, inexpressible, at least discursively so. And yet, the
young Socrates, concerned only with the multiplicity of beautiful bodies, is unconcerned with
grasping the unity of the beautiful itself, which is manifest in each of the distinct appearances of
the beautiful bodies. The paradox of the one and many, along with the inability to comprehend
86
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just how this unity can be spoken of, is, I believe, the toils and pains in Diotima’s initiation of
which she speaks and warns Socrates.
Consequently, correctly abandoning oneself does not constitute quietude. The lover
initiated into erotic matters through the “ladder of love” is forever faced with the task of
attempting to discursively account for the initial non-discursive experience of the beloved. Let it
be noted that within Diotima’s ladder proper there is no indication that the experience of “loving
one body itself” (Sym. 210a) is able to be discursively accounted for; it is simply stated as
occurring; but if this experience is analogous to the non-propositional experience of the beloved
described in the Phaedrus, certainly an inference can be drawn. Within the ladder proper, the
lover is concerned with discursive argumentation, increasing in complexity as the ascent
becomes higher. One can only imagine that this inability to account for the experience of the
beloved causes an intellectual friction, toil, and discomfort within the lover, driving him into
philosophical mn¤, until, at last, beauty itself suddenly manifests. The “ladder of love” is
bookended by two non-discursive exposure points between which one gives a discursive account
of the initial experience. This is to say, in attempting to account for the beloved’s presence, the
lover pushes conceptual language to its extremes and finally ruptures it. The final vision of the
beautiful itself, which one suddenly [§j¤fnhw] sees, is something “wondrous [ymstÒn]”
(Sym. 210e). As Stanley Rosen writes, “The ‘wonderful’ (ymstÒn) nature of beauty in itself
is a sign that no logos can be given of it. Diotima’s poetic account, with its emphasis upon visual
imagery, is rather a prophecy of the step from philosophy to wisdom.”88 The sudden appearance
of this something that is wondrous simply seizes the lover. Only in his travel through the
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different ways in which the one and particular beloved manifests does the lover (re)experiences
him.
ECSTATICALLY GREETING THE SUN
Philosophical mn¤ is not an emotion, if this would entail a mere subjective condition or
a possession of the subject. It is “given as a divine gift [ye¤& m°nto dÒse ddom°nhw]” (Phdr.
244a) and, consequently, is a state of being that one cannot renounce but rather suffers (Phdr.
238c, 252c, 255d). By abandoning himself, at Diotima’s behest, the lover lies in supplication.
Ridding himself of the quest to possess the beautiful, he instead participates and gives birth in
beauty, since the work of ¶rvw is giving birth in beauty in both body and soul (Phdr. 206b,
206e). The goal is not the beautiful itself but what comes from it (Phdr. 206e), i.e., beautiful
discourse. Certainly, what beautiful discourse is, for Socrates, as is revealed throughout the
dialogues, is that form of discourse which ends in épor¤, waylessness, or non-knowing, which
is meant to spur one on to further investigate that which one is made not to know.89
Regardless of his deference, Socrates, in both the Phaedrus and the Republic, does
express that the place above the heavens and tÚ égyÒn, which lies beyond being, appear to
him. In fact, although stress is laid upon the inability to speak discursively of and thoroughly to
describe tÚ égyÒn, it must nevertheless be known in some sense. Moreover, in the Phaedrus,
Socrates goes on to give a mËyow of that place beyond the heavens, saying “for I must dare
[tolht°on] to speak the truth” (Phdr. 247c). Derived from tolmãv, tolht°on suggests an
“undertaking” or “bearing something terrible or difficult.” So, again, Socrates emphasizes the
toil, pain, and agitation that his way of inquiry places him in.
89

This is certainly the case for the Socratic dialogues, which all end in épor¤. I believe that, through this
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In Republic book VI, Socrates states that humans oftentimes speak of a “good itself
[ÈtÚ égyÒn]” in the case of all those things that we set down as many. “Referring them to
one idea [kt' ﬁd°n m¤n] of each one as if being one, we address/greet [prosgoreÊomen]
each one as it is [˜ ¶stn]” (R. 507b). Setting aside a discussion of tÚ ÈtÚ égyÒn until the
next section, let us, for the moment, focus upon the significance of greeting or addressing each
entity as ˜ ¶stn. We have seen above that Socrates, in the Symposium, greets the sun, the
offspring of tÚ égyÒn, by offering a prayer. This form of greeting seems appropriate, since the
sun is a one of the “gods in the heavens [t«n §n oÈrn“ ye«n]” (R. 508a). According to
Jacques Derrida, to greet another, to say salut, opens a space for the origin of community, of a
religion. The greeting, in other words, is a responsive openness to the unforeseeable irruption of
the visitor. The former facet, the gathering, is a call from the visitor; an obligation is laid upon
the addressor. This obligation takes the form of faith placed upon the addressor, being burdened
with the trust that the visitor is who he/she/it says it is. The respondent is obliged to take the
promise of the visitor in good faith and credit.90 Consequently, intentionally placing himself as
the addressor, Socrates approaches the sun, and thus the divine, in supplication. It is given, and
thus is a site of reception.
Socrates’ custom of turning himself toward his own thought [noËw], which compels him
to stop and stand apart from his everyday surroundings, is described as occurring by chance,
tÊx˙. TÊxh should not be thought of as ‘luck’ or that which is uncaused or even as an event that
occurs at random. Instead, what occurs by tÊxh happens contrary to what the individual does or
intends. Derived from the verb tgxãnv, “to hit a mark with an arrow,” tÊxh suggests, then,
to be hit or to obtain something from the gods. We could say that Socrates’ habit that comes
90
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through tÊxh is an overwhelming exposure to ‘what is.’91 Socrates is, then, seized by an
irresistible and irrepressible force, which compels him to turn to his own noËw, contrary to what
he may desire. Consequently, Socrates’ habit comes upon him, striking him with a force that
cannot be defended against. In fact, when considering the matter that has placed him deep in
thought “he cannot advance it [oÈ proÈx≈re Èt“]” (Sym. 220d). This resistance causes
Socrates to stand apart from the everyday circumstances in which he finds himself and to attempt
to articulate that which is inherently incommunicable. And, as a consequent, the matter appears
to him, due to its resistance, as question-worthy. The paradox of tÚ égyÒn as §p°ken t∞w
oÈs¤w strikes him and, unlike the many who are unaffected by it, Socrates dwells in this
experience. The active, external force of tÊxh places the individual in an essentially passive
state, or perhaps better put, Socrates “stood fixedly, in that place [ÈtÒy eﬂstÆke].” And so it
makes the individual a receptive site of exposure to that which is essentially beyond him or her.
Socrates has been forced into an immediate and non-discursive state during his
confrontation with the sun, forcing him to stand apart whither he goes, or rather from his
everydayness. In the Phaedrus, Socrates characterizes the lover as “standing outside
[§jstãmenow] of human interests and toward the divine, but he is rebuked by the many as out of
his senses [prkn«n], they have forgotten that he is being enthused [§nyosãzvn]” (Phdr.
249d).92 “Enthusiasm and divine madness do not mean a merging of the soul with something
entirely different, but simply an aloofness or withdrawal from what people ordinarily call serious
activities (ényr≈pn spodãsmt).93 But what people call “serious activities” are rather
trivial matters to the lover, who forgets his “mother, brothers, and friends, neglects property and
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does not care for loss, but despises all customs [nom¤mvn] and properties he took pride in
previously” (Phdr. 252a), so overwhelmed is he by the beloved. So, quite contrary to the notion
that turning toward one’s own noËw is a withdrawal from the phenomenal world, it is in fact an
opening up to the world so that the lover may experience that which is beyond the human. The
philosopher, then, as a lover of learning that makes being “that is always” evident, not only
suffers from divine mn¤ (Phdr. 249d) and is enthused [§nyosãsevw] (Phdr. 249e) but
through the correct use of memory [ÍpomnÆmsn Ùry«w] (Phdr. 249c) is able both to initiate
the beloved into the mysteries of ¶rvw such that the beloved is in épor¤ and through
énãmnhsw to see beyond [ÍperdoËs] that which the many say exists [e‰n] and lift his head
to tÚ ˆn ˆntvw, “what is most of all,” which “makes a god divine” (Phdr. 249c). Such an
individual is himself always perfectly initiated into perfect mysteries because he stands outside
of [§jstãmenow] the busy dealings of the human, since the philosopher is enthused, via the
recollection of the illumination of tÚ ˆn that the beloved awakens in him. Just as in the
Symposium Socrates turns himself toward his own thought, in the Phaedrus we are given the
image of the erotic philosopher standing outside of human affairs, which is not a theoretical
activity but rather a response initiated by the divine character of entities.
III. The Solar Economy of tÚ éygÒn:
We will now turn to an explicit discussion of tÚ égyÒn; in particular, how and in what
way tÚ égyÒn makes itself manifest to the human being, while it is itself depicted as
§p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w, “lying beyond being.” When asked by Glaucon to give a thorough
account [d∞lyew] of tÚ égyÒn (R. 506d), Socrates replies “let us dismiss, for now, what the
‘to be’ [e‰n] of tÚ égyÒn is. For it appears to me [mo f¤net] to be greater than my reach
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for the present thrust [ırmÆn]” (R. 506e). While Socrates will remain utterly silent about
tÚ égyÒn itself,94 since it eludes conceptual thinking, it must, nonetheless, in some way
manifest itself to the individual according to a different manner of thought than that which is
discursive.
TÚ égyÒn “appears” to Socrates; it literally “shines through” despite it being distant
and beyond the ability to be reached by thought. While one cannot discuss tÚ égyÒn itself,
one can investigate it indirectly through a discussion of its offspring [¶kgonow] and interest
[tÚ tÒkon] (R. 507a). In what follows, I will draw attention to the economic language and
imagery that is used to discuss tÚ égyÒn. Glaucon’s and Socrates’ conversation revolves
around the double meaning of tÚ tÒkow, meaning not only ‘offspring’ but ‘monetary interest;’
consequently, the exchange revolves around not only an erotic tone of generation but also that of
gift giving and of repayment. This discussion is reminiscent of Republic book I, in which
Cephalus and Socrates discuss one’s correct comportment toward wealth [oÈs¤] and toward
éretÆ itself (R. 330d-333d).
But, first, it will be necessary to focus upon the significance of the sun standing in
proportion with tÚ égyÒn. The “solar economy” of tÚ égyÒn will bring to the fore not only
its ontological status through an exploration of the analogy with the sun but also the
philosophical and erotic mn¤ that accompanies it.
THE SUN AND THE EYE
Although unable to speak of tÚ égyÒn directly, Socrates is able to speak of it by way
of an analogy with the sun, which is most like [ımoÒttow] it (R. 506e). TÚ égyÒn “has
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been begotten to stand in proportion with itself [§g°nnhsen énãlogon •t“]. As
tÚ égyÒn is in the space of that which is an object of thought [§n t“ noht“ tÒpƒ] with
respect to thought [noËw] and what is thought, so the sun is in the space of sight and what is
seen” (R. 508a-c). So, while tÚ égyÒn gives the e‡dh their “‘to be’ and existence
[tÚ e‰n te k‹ tØn oÈs¤n],” allows the e‡dh to be known (R. 509c), the sun—“one of the
gods in the heavens [t«n §n oÈrn“ ye«n]” (R. 508a)—through the outpouring of light, not
only gives the eye the capacity [dÊnmn] to see entities but also gives [pr°xen] the comingto-be, growth, and nourishment [k‹ tØn g°nesn k‹ Îjhn k‹ trofÆn] of terrestrial objects,
although itself is not any of these (R. 509b). In fact, the eye, the “most sun-like
[≤loed°sttÒn]” of the sensory organs (R. 508b), allows entities to manifest to the human
soul, “when it grasps this, where truth and ‘what is’ [élÆye te k‹ tÚ ˆn] shine
[ktlãmpe], it thinks, comes to know, and appears to have thought” (R. 508d). The eye
appears, at least metaphorically, to be a thinking organ since it allows the e‡dh of entities to shine
through, making them manifest through the movement of appearances.
However, the eye “receives its power, as it were, just like an overflowing [§p¤rrton]
from out of an expenditure [tmeom°nhn]” (R. 508b). Consequently, the power of the eye is
not the origin of sight. Rather its power originates from an expenditure of the overflowing of a
divine solar origin. The power of sight found in the eye and originating from the sun is nothing
other than that which the sun expends; it is what the sun, and thus the divine, does not need.
Nevertheless, it is this wasteful expenditure that gives the eye not only the ability to see but what
the eye is itself; not being an origin but it itself an expenditure, the eye is a place of accumulation
of divine power. Little wonder, then, that simply hearing about the manner in which the sun and
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tÚ égyÒn give their abilities to the body and the intellect through expenditure, Glaucon
sensing madness utters “by Apollo, what a daimonic excess! [Apollon dmon¤w
Íperbol∞w]” (R. 509c). Returning to the Phaedrus, the beloved’s soul is a conduit that shines
forth with its own particular luster [lmprÒw] of ‘what is’ (Phdr. 251a). The flowing out
[éporroÆn] of beauty enters through the eyes, where the overflowing [§prre¤shw] nourishes
[t∞w trof∞w] the roots of the soul’s feathers (Phdr. 251b), causing a great vacillating
discomfort. The soul, like the eye, is not the origin of its own capacity; rather it derives its power
from an excessive source to which it is exposed. But when the lover attempts to make sense of
this, he is maddened [§mmnÆw] (Phdr. 251e). Similarly, exposed to this insight, Glaucon must
take recourse to the language of an excessive exclamation, since everyday language will not be
able to capture what is being communicated.
While the eye and the power of sight are of the utmost importance for allowing the world
to manifest itself, the power of sight is not its own but comes only from a divine source, i.e., the
sun. The eye, then, does not have the ability to grasp this divine power. The eye undermines its
own function in the face of its desire for reaching the excessively divine. The eye, we could say,
strives to become the sun, for the eye is a symbol of the sun (R. 509d). There is an excessive
desire to be the brilliance of the sun. Unable to become an equal to the sun, the eye must turn
away from the divine overflowing source of its power, and so the soul must turn away as well.
Both become ‘blind’ in the sense of being driven to mn¤ and épor¤. As a result, the sun, as
the offspring of tÚ égyÒn, is not only a source of illumination and enlightenment but also a
source of pain (R. 515c, 515e, 518b) and mn¤, which the sun engenders in those brave enough
to gaze upon it (R. 509c, 517c). In other words, the sun, while marked with goodness, rationality,
beauty, and truth, it is equally marked by non-discursivity and mn¤.
90

THE EXCESSIVE GIFTS OF THE SUN
If the sun stands in analogy with tÚ égyÒn, then it would seem, as I will now argue,
that the latter also drives one to philosophical mn¤ through the excess of gifts that it bestows.
Socrates states that “the idea of the good [≤ toË égyoË ﬁd°] is the greatest object of learning
[m°gston mãyhm]; by availing oneself of it with just things and the others they become useful
and beneficial [xrÆsm k‹ »f°lm]” (R. 505a). This suggests that an entity or concept only
becomes beneficial, in the sense of being an object of utility, if one knows how it is good or what
relation it has to the “good.” Only by studying the greatest object of learning is one able to judge
the “good” of anything in the sense of its use-value or in what way it might be beneficial.
TÚ égyÒn is, therefore, a “pre-condition” of knowledge and ethics, according to Sallis.95 Such
a conception of tÚ égyÒn as a ground or pre-condition of moral reasoning is itself found
within the Republic.
We cannot ignore the overt language of economy that introduces the discussion of
tÚ égyÒn. As already mentioned, when Glaucon urges Socrates not to withdraw from and
defraud him [épostªw] of the goal toward which they are aimed (R. 506d), Socrates answers
that he can speak only to what “appears to be the offspring of the good [¶kgonÒw te toË
égyoË f¤net].” “Well, speak” Glaucon replies, “since you will pay me back [épot¤sew]
the narrative of the father afterwards” (R. 506e). Socrates responds, “I wish I were able to render
what is due [épodoËn] and for you to receive in full and not now simply the interest
[toËw tÒkow]. Receive this, the interest and the offspring of the good [tÚn tÒkon te k‹
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¶kgonon ÈtoË toË égyoË]” (R. 507a). Playing on the double meaning of tÚ tÒkow, as not
only offspring but also monetary interest, the conversation takes on a tone of gift giving and of
repayment, suggesting that the concept of tÚ égyÒn could by certain individuals be conceived
of in a closed-economy of exchange.
While the above interchange is certainly one of those comical and playful moments in
Plato’s writings, we should not simply disregard it as mere word play. Instead, this play on
words gives us insight into a discussion that would otherwise be obscured. For instance, the
vocabulary of an economy of moral goodness was already introduced in Republic book I.
Polemarchus asks his wealthy father, Cephalus, “Am I, then, your inheritor [s«n
klhronÒmow]?” (R. 331d). He asks this in jest, for the discussion up to this point has revolved
around one’s just comportment toward wealth. According to Cephalus, justice is related to
wealth [oÈs¤];96 he need not worry about being put into a position of lying concerning
repayment of his debts. He relies upon his wealth [oÈs¤] to make sure that he can balance the
scales of economic exchange. What is given to him he can repay in equal exchange. When
Socrates asks him, “What do you believe to be the greatest good [m°gston égyÒn] you have
enjoyed from the possession of your great wealth [pollØn oÈs¤n]?” (R. 330a), Cephalus
answers that having great wealth reduces the anxiety of suffering or doing unjust acts. Cephalus
need not worry or think critically about what the just action to take is given what his wealth and
luxuries bring him. He has an opinion of the justice of repayment that is straightforward,
unrefined, uncomplicated, and unsophisticated.
For Cephalus, one’s correct comportment toward wealth lies in being the mean [m°sow]
between extremes: between his grandfather, who increased the family’s wealth, and his father,
96
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who wasted and spent large portions of it. And yet, Cephalus reveals himself to be unconcerned
with bringing-forth something new. He is completely satisfied with what is immediately
apparent; he is concerned only with maintaining his wealth at its present state, since he is
concerned only with the m°sow.97
As Socrates interprets Cephalus’ stance, justice is “speaking truthfully to render what is
due [époddÒn]” (R. 331c-d). Everyone knows that this is true; this definition is the common
opinion of the people (R. 331c). With this conception of justice, along with his self-described
economic disposition, Cephalus strives to serve and propagate the status quo. As a result he
“must adhere to the laws, human or divine, or he would have to spend his time finding out what
justice is rather than in doing it…For Cephalus the just is identical to the law of the city….”98 He
endeavors to dispense and distribute the values which already exist, those that are already
assigned and given by a system of signification so that these same values may change hands,
circulate, and return to the same source. There will always be a return to the point of departure
and a reappropriation. In other words, Cephalus concerns himself with exchangeability,
homogeneity, and use-value. All value, for him, must be spent, rationally consumed, and finally
exchanged for another commodity of equal value. Consequently, he already has a pre-conceived
notion of what Justice is and everything that disagrees with it is excluded from consideration. He
simply accepts and argues toward this concept instead of unfolding it. As a result, Cephalus
represents the most extreme possible refusal to accept excess, expenditure, and philosophical
tension.
Socrates too is, in a sense, not wholly unconcerned with the status quo insofar as he
begins with the common, everyday opinions of his interlocutors. He even, as is revealed in the
97
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Crito, stays true to the laws of Athens. What separates Socrates, however, from someone like
Cephalus, or anyone else in Athens, is that he does not perpetuate the status quo but rather seeks
to push the common understanding of concepts to their utmost extremes, pushing them to their
breaking point. Socrates reveals that a particular concept does not fulfill the requirements that
itself or the individual presupposes. Instead, the concept bursts through the conceptual
framework in which it has been placed; it impacts the individual precisely because of the
paradoxical status that it reveals. Such a rupture provokes us to consider the question-worthy
status of the concept we hold.
For example, Socrates states that it is equally well known that if the lender should be
crazed [mne¤w], then it would be unjust to either render to him what is due or to tell him the
truth (R. 331c-d). Cephalus has never considered the consequences of this counter-argument, nor
is he particularly troubled by this tension, given that he immediately departs, leaving his son to
take up his argument. Unlike Socrates, who turns toward his own thought when confronted by
the excessiveness of a concept, Cephalus removes himself completely from the area of exposure.
And yet, Socrates has not simply refuted Cephalus’ position, by arguing eristically; if this were
the case, if Socrates were content to permit himself and interlocutor to refuse or refute the
concept, he would fall into the same unphilosophical, tensionless space from which he attempts
to remove himself and his interlocutor. Socrates does not do away with or attempt to destroy the
concept of Justice or the great Good. He instead erodes the rationally held concept through an
account that reveals the limits of the concept from within the concept itself.
THE GIVENNESS OF tÚ égyÒn
If tÚ égyÒn is a pre-condition for knowledge, this should not be taken to suggest that it
is a concept of which we have objective and discursive knowledge. Socrates reminds

94

Adeimantus that he has heard of tÚ égyÒn many times; Socrates, here, emphasizes
nonetheless that “we do not have sufficient knowledge of it [oÈx ﬂkn«w ‡smen]” (R. 505a).
Even though their philosophical discourse has been continually aimed at tÚ égyÒn, it has
neither come into view, nor perhaps even been spoken of, discursively at least. In other words,
even though the topic has been investigated by means of lÒgow, it is possible, as Friedländer
writes, that it “cannot be grasped even by the Logoi.”99 This is why, when pressed by
Adeimantus to give an account of it Socrates chides him, saying “does it seem to you just to
speak as if one knows about that which one may not know [tw mØ o‰de]?”100 (R. 506c). Clearly,
then, tÚ égyÒn does not simply indicate an imperative and universal obligation but rather a
way of being that is awakened in the individual when one’s inability to articulate it is revealed.
What Socrates terms tÚ égyÒn, then, does not suggest “absolute goodness” in the moral sense.
It is the conceptual name given to the originary experience of that which exceeds mere human
experience.101
99
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The gift which Socrates refers to in his exchange with Cephalus does not wholly
disappear. It is still present, but rather vanishes from which it is not suited. In this sense, the gift
penetrates itself as a gift; it exists outside of itself so as to manifest itself as a gift that cannot
simply be exchanged. It moves out of the anonymous homogeneity of the world of exchangevalue and appears as unique. Marion writes concerning the gift, “…better the gift I give strictly
to the degree that it renounces Being, that it makes an exception to presence, that it undoes itself
from itself by undoing subsistence in presence.”102 In other words, the gift does not ground itself
but is, rather, a sign of its own ungroundedness. The gift has no origin to which to return.
Socrates’ example of returning a loan to a crazed lender pushes the concept of gift giving to its
breaking point, such that the circle of exchange is ruptured. The concept of a just exchangeability
is revealed to point always beyond the closed borders within which Cephalus has placed it. What
Cephalus believed to be a self-subsistent entity reveals itself as dependent upon this particular
presence and circumstance. Socrates has attempted to show Cephalus that the economy of
Justice, and all instances of éretÆ, cannot be reduced to a concept, in which the object of
investigation is immediately manifest to us and to which we apply some theoretical concept. If
one is tempted to do so, one runs the risk of believing that that which is manifest can and should
be immediately understandable and thus destroys the gift as a gift.
THE TRUTH OF tÚ égyÒn
Socrates will discuss tÚ égyÒn in the same manner as he has discussed the greatest
economic good. As in Republic book I, in book VI we must be on our guard against desiring
either payment in full or being able to return a gift to its origin. In fact, before moving into a full
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discussion of tÚ égyÒn, Socrates warns Glaucon “to be aware that I not beguile you of the
thing heard, a spurious account rendering the interest [k¤bdhlon époddoÁw tÚn lÒgon
toË tÒko]” (R. 507b). Socrates signals to Glaucon that whatever he hears, he must only regard
it as something like that toward which he is aimed and not the goal; it is no more than a sign
pointing beyond itself and thus should not be taken as a literal representation of that which he
seeks. This is especially so since even in the case of “just and beautiful things, the many would
choose those things which are seemings…but no one prefers to have those things which are
seeming in the case of the good, but all seek those ‘things that are’” (R. 505d). When seeking
tÚ égyÒn no one is satisfied with opinions but rather only with the truth [élÆye] of the
matter. And yet, as we have seen above, Socrates is silent concerning tÚ égyÒn and can only
speak of its offspring and interest; he can only pay back his debt to Glaucon, by way of images,
which in fact fail in their fulfillment of that toward which they are aimed. Consequently, if
Socrates is concerned at all with an economy, it is an economy that is marked by a perpetual
reemergence and upsurge of a new reality. Here, Socrates engages in the squandering of
concepts.
Socratic squandering is markedly different than the squandering of wealth in which
Cephalus’ father partook. In the latter case, Cephalus’ father’s actions resulted in the utter
destruction of his wealth, which Cephalus attempted to remedy and to reach the truth, the
élÆye, of the greatest good by becoming the mean, a midpoint between the passing-away and
coming-to-be of monetary exchange. Socrates, on the other hand, undoes concepts so that one is
thrown into épor¤. The negation of the dyad, the either/or, is never reached. Socrates, much
like the god Ervw, is concerned with the in-between state (Sym. 202e), that state in which
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neither negations nor affirmations are reached, since that with which Socrates is concerned lies
beyond being.
If we look to Socrates’ etymology of élÆye found in the Cratylus,103 we find a playful
indication that Socrates himself did not believe the truth to be found in a m°sow between two
conceptual poles, an either/or, as it seems to for Cephalus and others in the dialogues. AlÆye
gestures toward motion and movement. Socrates breaks the word into two full words, “êlh” and
“ye¤,” “ceaseless divine wandering” (Crat. 421b). Consequently, élÆye does not simply
suggest “truth,” let alone a correspondence theory of truth. Rather, one must embody the
character of élÆye, as ceaselessly wandering in the divine. It should be noted that this
ceaseless divine wandering differs remarkably from the wandering described by plãnh, derived
from the verb plnãv, meaning “to err.” Plato uses this word, as we have seen above, to
indicate a kind of wandering between two delineated points, e.g., coming-to-be and passingaway. In a sense, this type of wandering is no wandering at all but rather a staid motion where no
movement is accomplished except between two points that the individual has decided upon in
advance. It is a motion that vacillates between an either/or. On the other hand, élÆye,
according to the etymology found in the Cratylus, has no such restrictions placed upon it. In fact,
as ceaseless divine wandering, élÆye opens the human into a daunting space and an
astonished way of being, so that when one speaks élÆye one is confronted by that which
ruptures all conceptual thought. In the Phaedrus, the lover is said to recollect tÚ ˆn ˆntvw, that
which is beyond the heavens. It is that “by which god is divine [yeÚw
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249c). The god is divine given that is it beyond the realm of being and it is within this space that
the winged mind of the lover dwells when thinking of élÆye.
REACHING OUT TOWARD tÚ égyÒn
In Republic book VI, Socrates depicts tÚ égyÒn as beyond the possible condition of
human experience. It is not being with respect to existence [oÈk oÈs¤w ˆntow], but, rather,
“lying beyond being [§p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w]” it exceeds [Íper°xontow]104 existence in both
honor [presbe¤]105 and capacity [dÊnmw] (R. 509b). Consequently, tÚ égyÒn cannot be
thought in the same terms that entities can be. However, if tÚ égyÒn is truly §p°ken t∞w
oÈs¤w, the questions arise: what role can it play in being? And, moreover, what provokes one to
reach out toward tÚ égyÒn?
For Sallis, lying beyond being “means, in turn, that the good always shows itself as it is
not.”106 TÚ égyÒn, we are told, manifests itself only by way of images, its offspring
[¶kgonow] and its interest [tÚ tÒkon], in such a way that it is not reducible to these images.
However, we should not think of the self-manifestation in terms of withdrawal,
unconcealment,107or as a protection against being profaned.108 Instead, the presence that is made
manifest by tÚ égyÒn, through its offspring and interest, must be thought only in terms of an
excess or an overabundance of presbe¤ and dÊnmw. Presbe¤ is related, at least in meaning
if not in form, to seb¤zv, “to worship or honor,” which itself is related to both the nouns s°bw,
“reverential awe,” or “the object of awe, an object of wonder,” and the adjective sebstÒw,
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“reverenced, august.” The latter two words are derived from the verb s°bom, “to feel awe or
fear, to dread or fear.” The etymology of presbe¤ will prove useful in terms of how we
experience tÚ égyÒn as excessive. We experience the overwhelming character of the power of
tÚ égyÒn, which cannot be expressed verbally. Overwhelmed by the recognition that the
existence and the ‘to be’ of entities are nothing compared to that which exceeds them, no one is
capable of verbally expressing the character of this power. It can only be revealed through the
manner in which one behaves when confronted by such an experience. In fact, immediately
before introducing the topic of tÚ égyÒn Socrates states that it is “that which every soul
pursues and brings about for its own sake [toÊto ßnek], announcing like a prophet some ‘to
be’ [épomnteom°nh t e‰n], perplexed [époroËs] and unable to receive sufficiently
[oÈk ¶xos lbe›n ﬂkn«w] just what it is” (R. 505d-e). If tÚ égyÒn is a pre-condition of
knowledge, it must be a pre-condition that is subject not to propositional discourse but, rather, to
prophetic discourse; it must appear to us as ecstatically divine, as revealed in the previous
chapter. In this prelude to tÚ égyÒn, Socrates is clearly gesturing to excess. In this moment,
one thought that the ground of one’s beliefs was steadfast but is now revealed to be nothing but
prophetic signs gesturing toward that which cannot be expressed propositionally. One is either
led to grasp that which has always appeared to be steadfast, ignoring the excessive experience, or
to give oneself over to the experience, submerged and overwhelmed, allowing one’s thought to
be spontaneously led until it reaches the rupturing point of discursivity, and to resort to speaking
like a prophet. Thus, Socrates’ ignorance of tÚ égyÒn does not result from it slipping away
from him, hiding in obscurity, or even from its being a kind of supplement hidden in a blind spot.
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Rather because he is blinded by the radiance of the images of tÚ égyÒn, he is quite literally at
a loss as to what to do with the excess of goods that tÚ égyÒn gives.
TÚ égyÒn, consequently, appears in a two-fold manner; in its immediacy, tÚ égyÒn
reveals itself as a rational ground. However, to receive it fully and meaningfully, we must
acknowledge the excessive element it contains. Appealing to the excessive element that
permeates Socrates’ mode of being and specifically to passages in which ¶rvw, tÚ égyÒn, and
the sun comingle, a non-discursive understanding of and relationship with that which is beyond
one’s everyday comprehension of the world is necessary. Passages such as these highlight
Socrates’ depiction of philosophy as “of all enthusiasms [ps«n t«n §nyosãsevn], as the
greatest form of mn¤” (Phdr. 249e). By emphasizing the common pursuit of discussing the ‘to
be’ of tÚ égyÒn, while simultaneously stressing its prophetic nature, Socrates is pushing even
this concept to its limit point. He ruptures the ‘to be’ of tÚ égyÒn internally, revealing that it
is not simply an ethical term which one is to follow as an imperative, but rather emphasizes that
it is a way of being, Socrates attempts to communicate this rupture in such a way that brings to
the fore its own insufficiency to be expressed discursively.
Friedländer cautions us, however, “to suspect an intentional mystification on Plato’s part
would be a misunderstanding. Plato is not a Neoplatonist.”109 And when he writes, “Plato’s
hightest idea does not extinguish being, but is, as it were, within the chain of being; only it is so
far above everything else that paradoxically it may be called beyond being, though still beyond
being,”110 he seems to be missing a crucial point. In this sense, tÚ égyÒn would be nothing
other than a supplement to, or a remainder of, ‘being.’ As both the Phaedrus and the Cratylus
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make clear, the gods have their own language that truly reveals the being of entities to which we
are not privy. So all naming, while not mere convention, does allow entities to appear, but only
as humanly understood. Hence, while the term ‘being’ is used by humans, it can only be used for
the purposes of human conceptuality, so that we may recognize its offspring and interest when
they manifest. TÚ égyÒn could not manifest itself to us whether as lying beyond being or
within being, that is to say, as knowable, unless such language is utilized. However, tÚ égyÒn
qua tÚ égyÒn is ineffable and we must, if we are to comport ourselves correctly with relation
to it, recognize it as such, announcing its ‘to be’ prophetically, that is, as concerned with the
divine. In other words, it must be thought of as existing prior to human conceptual knowledge. It
is nothing other than the overabundance of our discursive experience. Socrates must reveal to his
interlocutors that human discursive language must be sacrificed and squandered, if they are to
correctly comport themselves to tÚ égyÒn. And it is the communication of the insufficiency
that allows us to recognize, paradoxically, that tÚ égyÒn is one idea. To put it another way,
only by revealing the insufficiency of tÚ égyÒn to fulfill its own function as a ground of
rationality does it, become possible, for the first time, to conceive that a multiplicity of concepts
should exist in relation to it. It is, after all, a way of being and not a concept; the overwhelming
power of which must be felt as ceaseless divine wandering and to which we must lie in
supplication, offering a prayer.
IV. Socrates as Erotic Image Maker:
The discussion thus far has opened into an interpretation of tÚ égyÒn as a site of
excess. It was revealed that while tÚ égyÒn qua tÚ égyÒn is ineffable, the language that we
assign to it, even §p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w, is a conceptual framework which we must use to
attempt to understand it. The conceptual understanding cannot wholly exhaust tÚ égyÒn. Such
102

understanding always implies or gestures toward that which exceeds one’s grasp. Although
language conveys ideas and concepts, it cannot present tÚ égyÒn as itself. The agitation felt
by the individual when he or she recognizes this limitation of language is characterized by
sebstÒw, reverential divine awe. The toil that accompanies the experience of tÚ égyÒn qua
tÚ égyÒn denotes first and foremost an excess and the experience of it as sui generis and not
reducible to any other way of being in the world. One’s thought turns to it in a spontaneous
response. This experience and the way of being in the world that results was said to give rise to
philosophical mn¤. I would now like to shift our focus slightly.
Within the present section, I will show that Socrates himself is an earthly site of excess.
Describing himself as “greedy for making images [gl¤sxrvw eﬁkãzv]” (R. 488a),111 Socrates
bears a striking resemblance to tÚ égyÒn, so much so that “Socrates, it seems, is also akin to
the good.”112 While this image of Socrates as akin to the good has been associated with Socrates’
art of midwifery,113 I will show that Socrates’ very presence is excessive, characterized by
agitation, confrontation, and disturbance in others. Like tÚ égyÒn, Socrates exceeds
discursive understanding precisely because his presence, as will be revealed, is inexpressible,
primary, and not derivable from anything else.
SOCRATES AS EROTICALLY OUT OF PLACE
Socrates characterizes himself as êtopow, literally “out-of-place,” with regard to the
“wise individuals” with whom he contrasts himself, for he is persuaded by the mythical narrative
of Boreas and the customary beliefs concerning it (Phdr. 229c). Furthermore, Socrates is
geographically êtopow. Famously Socrates is loath to leave the city even on threat of death,
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since as he says “the country place and the trees will not teach me, but the men in the city will”
(Phdr. 230d). Despite being like a foreigner when outside the city’s walls (Phdr. 230a), Socrates
is nevertheless more familiar with the terrain than is Phaedrus (Phdr. 229b-c); for he knows the
location of Boreas’ altar, whereas Phaedrus, who has walked the same trail many times, says, “I
have altogether not perceived it [oÈ pãn nenÒhk]” (Phdr. 229c). Phaedrus is so struck by
Socrates’ peculiar ability to notice his surroundings that he calls Socrates “the most-out-of-place
one [étop≈ttÒw tw]” (Phdr. 230c). There is no place, either inside or outside the city,
which Socrates can properly call home. While he relies upon his fellow citizens to converse with,
he exceeds the city standing outside of everyday human affairs. He exists in a liminal state,
straddling the threshold of the urbane city life and the wilderness, and as we will see presently,
the human and the divine, as well as the rational and the non-rational.
Socrates’ display of étop¤ is so radical that Alcibiades admits that Socrates “is not
similar to any human being [tÚ d¢ mhden‹ ényr≈pvvn ˜moon e‰n], neither those of longago nor those existing today, this is worthy of total wonder” (Sym. 221c). As a result, Alcibiades
will praise Socrates by means of images “for the sake of the truth [toË élhyoË ßnek]” (Sym.
215a). Just as Socrates must speak of the offspring and the self-generated interest of
tÚ égyÒn, images of it, instead of tÚ égyÒn, he says Alcibiades must speak in a similar
manner concerning Socrates, likening him to both Sileni and to Marsyas, the satyr (Sym. 215b).
Consequently, Socrates is so unlike anyone else, in both his own self and in his words, that
Alcibiades must look to images that present a mixture of the human and the erotically divine to
gesture toward Socrates’ being. The form of communication, then, used to best describe Socrates
cannot be a literal description but rather must be mediated through images, images which
Socrates himself generates.
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Socrates, we are told, “most resembles [ımoÒtton] the Sileni,” so that when “the two
halves are opened [doxy°ntew] they appear to hold statues of gods [égãlmt ¶xontew
ye«n]” (Sym. 215b). Socrates, like a Silenus-statue, appears as he is not, but in a unique manner;
although there are two parts to the statue, the external and internal, they are not in fact separate.
The façade both hides and gestures toward its excess of images. A Silenus-statue is a Silenusstatue only insofar as it contains the promise and enticement of the images of gods, which spill
out of it when opened. Likewise, Alcibiades anticipates that Socrates, when opened through
conversation, will pour forth an irrepressible excess of images of the divine.
“For see,” Alcibiades exclaims, “that Socrates is erotically disposed [§rvtk«w
dãket] toward the beautiful ones and is always around ones such as these and is struck-outof-himself [§kp°plhkt], and further he is altogether ignorant and knows that which he does
not know [égnoe› pãnt k‹ oÈd¢n o‰den]” (Sym. 216d). While this is the same depiction as
the lover’s enthusiasm and philosophical mn¤ that Socrates describes in the Phaedrus (249d250a), Alcibiades explains that Socrates’ eroticism is “something external in which he veils
himself [toËto går ontow ¶jvyen perb°blht]” (Sym. 216d). Continuing with his
metaphor of the Silenus-statue, Alcibiades states, “if you would, drinking companions, unfold
[énoxye¤w] his interior, he is more full of sound-mindedness [svfrosÊnhw] than you would
believe” (Sym. 216d). Alcibiades recounts the following: “I don’t know if any one has seen him
being serious and unfolded [énoxy°ntow] the statues inside. But I myself have seen them once
and they seemed to me so divine and golden, utterly beautiful and wondrous, so that, briefly put,
I had to do what Socrates commanded” (Sym. 216e-217a). He again emphasizes his fidelity to
Socrates, admitting, “I was at a loss [±pÒron], I went around having been made a slave
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[ktdedolvm°now] by this human more so than anyone else has by another” (Sym. 219e).
Socrates both reveals and conceals himself simultaneously, driving Alcibiades into épor¤.
SOCRATIC svfrosÊnh
What is unique about Socrates and what strikes Alcibiades into épor¤ is the way in
which philosophical erotic mn¤ and svfrosÊnh seem incongruent but cannot be thought as
existing independently from each other within Socrates’ being. When engaging with Socrates,
Alcibiades is subject to épor¤ so much so that he is compelled to admit, “supposing myself
having been dishonored, I admired both the sound-mindedness and the manliness [te k‹
svfrosÊnhn k‹ éndre¤n] of his nature…although I could not be angry with him or deprive
myself [éposterhye¤hn] of being with him, nor did I find a way [hÈpÒron] how I could
bring him near me” (Sym. 219d). While dismayed at Socrates’ dismissal of his erotic
advancements, Alcibiades admires the rigid resistance of sound-mindedness that Socrates
exhibits and yet it is this that leads Alcibiades to long for Socrates, revealing Socrates’ eroticism.
Although Alcibiades is drawn to Socrates in the hopes of having his way with him (Sym.
217a-d, 219b-e), hoping to be one of the beautiful ones that strike Socrates out-of-himself,
Socrates due to his sound-mindedness is unmoved by the former’s erotic advancements. Indeed,
because of his sound-mindedness, Socrates is unconcerned with the beauty someone may have,
with regard to their wealth or honor, “feigning ignorance [eﬁrvneÒmenow] and playing
[p¤zvn] with humans, his whole life long” (Sym. 216e). There seems to be nothing that affects
Socrates. Consequently, in attempting to woo Socrates, Alcibiades is met with an insurmountable
impasse. The hidden beauty he finds in Socrates, his svfrosÊnh, is beyond Alcibiades’
control. Just as Socrates replies in the form of supplication when met head-on with the ineffable
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and “unmanipulateable beauty [émÆxnon kãllow]” of tÚ égyÒn (R. 509a), revealing that
every discursive concept of tÚ égyÒn is question-worthy (insofar as they all fail to wholly
capture it), it throws him into a distressful state of épor¤, so too is Alcibiades when he unfolds
Socrates. After unfolding Socrates, Alcibiades is met with images spilling out so much so that he
cannot penetrate the excessiveness of Socrates’ sound-mindedness.
Overcome by Socrates’ nature, Alcibiades is subjected to a unique moment of rejection
whose daunting character is likened to a snake bite, and whose affects can in no way be
understood expect by one who has suffered the distress [ÙdÊnh] (Sym. 218a), since it appears
incalculable and arbitrary. In the experience of unfolding Socrates’ divine nature Alcibiades
states, “I was struck [plhge¤w] and was stung [dhxye‹w] by his philosophical accounts” (Sym.
218a). Furthermore, this experience of the agony and distress caused by the experience of
Socrates’ excessive and divine sound-mindedness is shared by everyone who has engaged with
Socrates in the correct manner: “we are all struck-out-of-ourselves [§kpeplhgm°no] and
possessed [ktexÒmey]” (Sym. 215d), claims Alcibiades, who later states that everyone
present, “having had a communal share [kekonvnÆkte] of his philosophical madness [t∞w
flosÒfo mn¤w] and Bacchic frenzy” (Sym. 218b). When opened, Socrates forces everyone
within his sphere of influence into a state of bewilderment and épor¤.
The question before us is what is Socratic svfrosÊnh? How is it possible that what is
usually thought to be a steely demeanor can give rise to philosophical mn¤? I will now briefly
answer these questions and in so doing finally reveal the way in which Socrates is truly an
earthly site of excess.
A DRUNKEN SOCRATES

107

After his sudden and drunken appearance, Alcibiades bids everyone to drink and fulfill
the agreement of his fellow companions to become drunk (Sym. 213e). After swilling the largest
cup, Alcibiades orders the slave to refill the cup so that Socrates may drink but immediately
exclaims “ıpÒson går ên keleÊ˙ tw tosoËton §kpn∆n oÈd¢n mçllon mÆ pote
meysyª” (Sym. 214a). William S. Cobb translates this phrase as “No matter how much anyone
orders him to drink, he drinks it and still never gets drunk.”114 While other translations differ
slightly,115 all render the Greek with the emphasis that Socrates never feels the affects of
alcohol.116 In fact, Stanley Rosen claims that “Socrates is immune to intoxication….”117 This
suggests, for Rosen, that Socrates has achieved a state of being that is beyond the physical realm,
that he has steeled himself against the world so as to be unaffected. However, the final clause
“oÈd¢n mçllon mÆ pote meysyª” should be rendered “no more the drunk” (Sym. 214a). This
translation reveals that it is not that Socrates is in no way affected by intoxicating drink, rather
that Socrates is, in a way, already intoxicated. Socrates is awashed in the phenomena of the
world, as shown above; he is overwhelmed and makes others intoxicated by his presence. I will
show not only that this form of intoxication is congruent with Socratic svfrosÊnh as depicted
in the Symposium, but reveals Socrates’ excessive exposure to phenomena. This calls attention to
the liminal state of the rational and the non-rational Socrates inhabits.
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Socrates will become “no more the drunk.” Instead of suggesting a state of withdrawal
from the world, something akin to what Socratic svfrosÊnh has been commonly interpreted,
this passage indicates that Socrates is already overly affected by the phenomena, so much so that
his usual way of being is no different than that of intoxication. Granted, Alcibiades, who is
clearly drunk, acts much differently than does Socrates; the former attempts to control the
circumstances in which he finds himself,118 unlike Socrates, who, as we saw above, is always
seized by that which exceeds conception and gives himself over to the non-knowledge that
accompanies this exposure. In other words, Socrates is seemingly unaffected by intoxicating
drink, not because he is impervious to that which is corporeal but rather because, in a sense, he is
already overly affected by phenomena such as “the beautiful ones” to the extent that he is
stupefied, and thus is in a sense intoxicated. It is clear from Alcibiades’ depiction of Socrates that
he is nothing other than the unfolding of himself, spilling out divine images. He is the open space
within which all phenomena are allowed to manifest themselves in their immediacy. Like the
x≈r, Socrates is a place that belongs neither to being nor to non-being, but rather is a third
genus (Tim. 48e), a place in which the phenomena are able to manifest but which themselves can
be addressed neither affirmatively (as being) nor negatively (as non-being). As such, Socrates is
already out of his rational wits to the extent that he is always participating in philosophical erotic
mn¤.
However, it must be said that Alcibiades does stress that “no human has ever yet seen
Socrates intoxicated” (Sym. 220a) and immediately above this, he admires both the soundmindedness and the manliness [te k‹ svfrosÊnhn k‹ éndre¤n] of Socrates’ nature, both
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of which were exhibited in the retreat from Delium. He excelled Laches in his collectedness
[¶mfrvn] and “bearing himself haughtily casting his eye suspiciously side to side, gently giving
a sidelong glance on friend and enemy alike,” just as “he passes through those here” (Sym.
221b). Characterizing Socrates’ everyday behavior as sound-minded would seem to be the
farthest depiction from mn¤ of any kind. And nevertheless, these passages frame Alcibiades’
account of Socrates standing barefoot in the cold, while on campaign, as well as his standing
from dawn of one day till the next, deep in thought and offering a prayer to the sun. As indicated
above, this behavior is indicative of Socrates’ philosophical mn¤ and exposure to the excessive
nature of the sun. Consequently, if mn¤ is characterized by an excessive exposure to the
phenomena, the svfrosÊnh that Socrates displayed both on the battlefield and when
discussing with beautiful boys is indicative of such an exposure as well, but now radicalized such
that what svfrosÊnh is is now question-worthy. We might be tempted to focus on
the Republic, the dialogue in which Plato presents his conception of the ideal polis.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE DIS-COMMUNITY OF LOVERS:
Initiation of lovers in the Phaedrus and kinship in the Lysis
…and finally, concerning the flaw in language such
words as communism or community seem to contain, if
we sense that they carry something completely other
than what could be common to those who would belong
to a whole, a group, a council, a collective, even where
they deny belonging to it, whatever the form of that
denial.
Maurice Blanchot, The Unavowable Community
I. Political Community versus the Communion of Lovers:
In turning our attention to the issue of community, we might be tempted to focus on the
Republic. However, if we were to place the Lysis and the Phaedrus at the center of our
interpretation, we would find a radically different notion of Platonic community. Indeed, the
difference between these notions can be seen in the very different ways in which the two
proverbial expressions, the Homeric expression, “Ever, god leads like to like [ﬁe¤ to ımo›on
êge yeÚw …w tÚn ˆmo›on],”119 as well as the saying, “Friends have all things in common
[konå går tå t«n f¤lvn],”120 are understood throughout the writings of Plato. Oftentimes
these are employed with political connotations,121 e.g., Republic 419a-424a and Laws 716c and
837b. In fact, at Republic 424a, Socrates uses the latter proverb to justify his argument that the
establishment of the Good of the city-state should be aimed not at an individual or even toward a
class of individuals but rather toward the city-state as a whole (R. 420b). Furthermore, law is
aimed at “the city as a whole, fitting together [jnrmÒttvn] the citizens by persuasion or
compulsion, requiring them to give a share of benefit to one another the benefit that each class
119
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can bring to the community [konÒn]” (R. 519e-520a). Ultimately, we are reminded that only
those individuals who themselves participate and share in the Good [tÚ égyÒn], and can thus
be called good, can be friends.122 What binds these individuals, then, together in a community is
tÚ égyÒn. The city, as a whole, looks to the one [tÚ ßn], for the other name for tÚ égyÒn is
“the one.”123 Through law, the citizenry is all aimed at the same future goal, each of them
governed by the same sovereign force, that is, tÚ égyÒn. As a result, tÚ égyÒn must be
made to appear immediately present to the citizenry, since it is shared by all and would define
them as being alike.
ASSIGNED A ROLE BY tÙ égyÒn
In the Republic, Socrates attempts to reveal the sovereignty of tÚ égyÒn by examining
the body politic. For instance, in Republic book II, Socrates tells his companions, “let us observe
a city coming-into-being lÒgƒ” (R. 369a), that is, in logos, in demonstrable word. This
argument not only reveals the birth of a city but it allows Socrates and his interlocutors to
witness the coming-into-being and the subsequent passing-away of justice as well; that is, it
allows them to speak of the relationship individuals must express toward one another if the city
is to function properly. Moreover, recalling the discussion from book I concerning whether it is
better to live the just life or not, Glaucon questions whether Socrates is serious that one should be
just rather than unjust and asks whether there “exists a kind of good [t égyÒn]” which we
should desire for both its effects and for its own sake (R. 357b). Socrates remarks that it is to this
kind of good that justice belongs, linking the concepts explicitly, and states that it is of this
which they will speak and look for in their city and within its citizenry.
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So that the city becomes a unity, the entirety of the citizenry “must be forced and
persuaded [éngkst°on...k‹ pest°on] to do that which will make them the best craftsman
of their own task [•t«n ¶rgo]” (R. 421c). When the citizenry is thusly ruled, by each
fulfilling his or her own task, the city will be a unity (R. 423d). Accordingly, as Socrates states,
only in such a good city will “we find the cobbler a cobbler and not a pilot in addition to his
cobbling, and the farmer a farmer and not a judge added to his farming” (R. 397e). There is the
presumption that one’s identity can be wholly captured by living within the political sphere,
which must be mediated through law. Justice, consequently, is that which allows each and every
individual to work for “all in common [ëps konÒn]” (R. 369e), allowing for a community
that can participate in tÚ égyÒn.
For the city to be ruled justly and called good, each individual must know to what his or
her own nature most properly fits so as to provide not only for oneself but for others as well.
Regardless of whether an individual is an artisan, an auxiliary, or a ruler, in the city in logos, a
stipulated ideal has everyone fulfilling his or her own t°low perfectly, never straying from his or
her particular task. For each individual is immediately identified and defined through his or her
own task, since there is an excellence [éretÆ] of the task assigned to each thing or individual (R.
353a). Just as the organs of the body are to work with excellence (R. 353a-353d), the soul of an
individual is able to accomplish its own task with excellence when it functions according to
justice (R. 353e). Consequently, a cobbler, an architect, an auxiliary, or a philosopher ruler
accomplishes his or her own task with excellence, i.e., from justice, for the sake of and in
reference to the common good of the city.
The members of a political community are not only good individuals but share in what
this goodness provides them. This suggests that a political community is fostered through the
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reciprocal interactions between its different inhabitants.124 Because each of the individuals are
alike, insofar as each is working toward the same goal, and share in all things, these individuals
are immediately recognizable to each other either through word or deed as members of this
particular community. Granted there are many differences which distinguish exactly how justice
is expressed in each of the four cities in logos,125 there is one common element to be found:
justice is defined as each individual performing one task that is naturally fitted to his or her own
nature, so that one should mind one’s own affairs (R. 369d-370c). Defined in a more refined
manner, Socrates states, “according to this, then, the possession and doing both of that which is
akin to one [oﬁke¤o]126 and of what belongs to oneself would be agreed to be justice” (R. 433e434a).
COMMUNITY BEYOND BEING
Considering all of this and viewing the trope “friends have all things in common” in light
of the Republic, it might well appear that friendship and the resulting community are useful only
to reinforce qualities shared within the group, decided by the philosopher rulers or whoever is the
governing force within the state. This results in a closed economy of meaning and significance,
introducing a homogenizing force upon the group. However, given that this proverb is the
penultimate line of the Phaedrus, whose purpose is reveal the initiation into erotic-matters, it
must be examined carefully in this context as well. If the proverb is interpreted through the
initiation of erotic-mysteries which the lover and beloved must undergo, it indeed takes on a
completely new meaning, and the sayings with which we began point to a quite different form of
human community.
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There is one indication of this other notion of community that can be found in the
Republic, if we take seriously the claim that the idea of the Good is §p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w (R.
509b). As this has been addressed in the previous chapter, I will speak only briefly of it here.
While it is unclear how we are to interpret this particular phrase, it can be said that tÚ égyÒn
is beyond ‘what is,’ beyond what is knowable and sayable, it is what is discursively unthinkable.
And so, a question forces itself upon us: what does it mean to say that two (or a group of)
individuals share in all things which tÚ égyÒn bestows upon them, if that in which they share
and are made to be like is itself “beyond being?” That is to say, if tÚ égyÒn is not found
within the realm of being, of coming-to-being and passing-away, what are the individuals
sharing in and what characterizes them as being alike?
In the Phaedrus, Socrates speaks of a lover who is “by nature dear to” the beloved (255ab), even though at earlier times the latter may not have recognized it through the social pressure
of his peers. Their relationship is termed a ıml¤, a communion (Phdr. 255b).127 This ıml¤ is
closer than the beloved’s friends and even of his or her family, which is governed by law.
Whatever marks their ıml¤, it is marked by an excess of social norms. Indeed, the lover, it is
said, when he esteems his particular beloved above all others “looks down upon all the laws and
dignities, which he once prided himself in” (Phdr. 252a); and moreover “mortal soundmindedness [svfrosÊnh ynhtÆ] and mortal and thrifty rules of the house [oﬁkonomoËs]”
(Phdr. 256e) are understood to be hindrances to a true erotic community. The lover understands
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that the question of the erotic community revolves around the necessity to recognize mortal law
but nevertheless that there is a rupture in the totality of the lawful community. This type of
community or kinship calls into question one’s being, contesting it. Furthermore, it is not
grounded in law but in nature [fÊsw], the continual movement of an upsurge and of a
burgeoning-forth. Truly, ¶rvw disrupts the city,128 which, as we will see, gestures toward the
ungovernable and the essentially empty sovereignty of tÚ égyÒn. In fact, as we will see,
political structures obscure ¶rvw and what it fundamentally is to be human.
Moments like these in the works of Plato make explicit reference to an altogether
different type of community; a kind of kinship that is more (than) human and perhaps even,
according to Plato, a privileged type. Plato not only returns to the erotic community in three
dialogues, but also the type of knowing associated with this form of community is privileged by
Socrates. He continually insists that he does not understand anything other than erotic-matters
[tå §rvtkã] (Sym. 177e), and consequently he says of himself that he is a paltry and useless
thing, save the gift from the gods have given him, i.e., to quickly come to know [gn«n] a
lover and a beloved (Lys. 204b-c). So vital is this ability to Socrates that he asks the god Eros not
to deprive him of his erotic art [≤ §rvtkØ t°xnh] (Phdr. 257a), which has been given to him.
We will next turn to the Republic and offer an interpretation of the type of community
that tÚ égyÒn, as traditionally conceived, engenders and the shortcomings of this strictly
political model. Within this discussion, it will be shown that the definitions of justice and
svfrosÊnh, which characterize the individuals who share in tÚ égyÒn, are themselves
problematic. We will, then, reveal another manner in which community may reveal itself, this
time in the guise of an erotic community, disrupting and erupting out of the political community.
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It will be revealed to us that, in the city in logos, each individual becomes indifferent with regard
to the city-state and to him or herself. Only by revealing the limitation of the immanence, by
transgressing it while nevertheless never wholly leaving the city, will the Platonic concept of the
initiation in the erotic mysteries be demonstrated. Related to this, it will also be shown that the
sovereignty that tÚ égyÒn represents is nothing; it is empty, inarticulateable, an unconditioned
unknowing, which Socrates has termed épor¤. In fact, the political and rational community is
necessary to inspire the type of love of tÚ égyÒn that ecstatically breaks out of the rational
confines of the political and to enter into the erotic community.129 The result of this rupture of
the political will require that the individuals re-introduce themselves to one another, this time
with reference to the excessive and non-discursive element which manifests itself. As this
chapter progresses, we will see that such a re-introduction requires a new interpretation of the
two sayings with which this chapter began and finally a reconsideration of what it means to
belong and exist in a community with one’s beloved.
II. An Introduction by way of Prophetic Recollection:
Watching his city in logos coming into being, Socrates attempts to reveal, by means of
speech tÚ égyÒn and justice as immediately present, as concepts set in advance. However,
observing the coming-into-being of a city through lÒgow has its limitations. As Sallis has
already examined many of these limitations and in what way the Republic casts these limitations
with regard to such a city’s birth,130 I will look only to specific aspects of these limitations. One
of these is how the city in logos, the city that embodies tÚ égyÒn most fully, is the city in
which the individual’s identity, as exhibited through the claim that each individual mind his or
her own business, is fully revealed through such a city. Reducing the citizens’ identity in this
129
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manner does not permit the irreducible, excessive, and divine origin131 of tÚ égyÒn to reveal
itself.
We will now examine the topic of the relationship between justice and svfrosÊnh and
their relationship to tÚ égyÒn. This relationship will open a discussion of the critical
limitation of the city in logos and the need to take erotic mn¤ seriously. It will be revealed that
this city, in whatever of the four forms it may take, from a city of artisans to a city ruled by the
philosopher, is subject to a profoundly limiting form of immanence.
THE WORK OF IMMANENCE
Immanence suggests that nothing is left out of that through which an individual is
identified. This is revealed insofar as the city in logos is a unity through the use of law, since, as
seen above, law is aimed at the city as a whole (R. 519e). With regard to the city in logos, then,
each individual must know to what his or her own nature most properly fits so as to provide not
only for oneself but for others as well. Each individual must work for the common good, since
the coming-to-being of the city results from the insufficiency of one’s own needs, since one
“lacks in many things [poll«n §ndeÆw]”132 (R. 368b). Justice, therefore, arises out of the
recognition that humans are beings that are lacking something which another can provide and
make up for. Those who are just, those who share in tÚ égyÒn, wish to share and reproduce
both justice and tÚ égyÒn within the city, making up for such a lack.
If the citizenry is to become a unity and to know what it lacks, each member must
practice svfrosÊnh (R. 389d), setting a limit on the individuals’ needs (R. 373d-e). The
practice of svfrosÊnh does not come naturally to the masses, however; they must give ear to
131

Cf. Chapter two.
Later in this chapter, just as oﬁke›on will hold importance so too will §nde°w. They will be reconceived outside of
the closed-economy of a political realm.

132

118

and obey the rulers (R. 389d-e). At least for the artisan class, and I do not believe it need be
limited to this class, the practice of an art “is acquired primarily by imitation, by subordinating
oneself to a master practitioner of the art” and “excellence in the practice of the arts throughout
the city as a whole requires that there be knowledge (or right opinion) regarding the ends to be
served by the arts.”133 This, according to Sallis, requires a hierarchy found within the city itself,
which is achieved and kept according to svfrosÊnh, or the avoidance of extremes.134 It is a
unilateral scale of being. The higher levels of the hierarchy determine the lower, which depend
upon the latter for their existence and intelligibility. For example, if a practitioner is to know the
end, the t°low, toward which his or her art is aimed, e.g., cobbling, the practitioner must look to
the next higher individual found in the hierarchy, the master under whom the practitioner learns.
The practitioner’s art is assimilated by and made to resemble that of the master, who sits higher
in the hierarchy of knowledge concerning the art. And so that the hierarchy should not run ad
infinitum, e.g., this master must have learned art from another master who learned the it from
another and so on, there must be a singular determination which provides intelligibility to all
those who are within the hierarchy. This determinating factor would be the form, the e‰dow or
ﬁd°, of the art.
To place this within the broader schema of Platonic writing, the realm of intelligible
objects is governed by tÚ égyÒn. Socrates, in the Republic states “that which provides truth to
the things known and gives power to the knower is the idea of the good [tØn toË égyoË
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ﬁd°n]” (508e). Furthermore, there must be “an art of the final ends—final within the context of
the city…,”135 if the city is to be a unity. So that each element within the city, its citizenry, can be
thought to be as a unity, tÚ égyÒn is necessary; “the good and the right [tÚ égyÒn k‹
d°on] …bind and hold anything together” (Phd. 99c). Those who have knowledge of this final
end and give context to all other arts within the city are the philosopher rulers. They are those
who have wisdom. Consequently, it is said that everyone must subordinate themselves and the
practice of their task to those who are wise, i.e., to the philosopher. Only under such conditions,
in which both justice and svfrosÊnh co-exist, can there be harmony and unity which define
the city.136 The philosopher rulers through their wisdom give context, binding and holding the
city as a whole, not only to what class every individual belongs to but also what this particular
individual’s task is. Given the hierarchy described above, tÚ égyÒn must appear immanentally
within each of the cities in logos, founded within the political structure of the city, if each
individual is identified through the mediation of the “living body of the community.”137
DISAVOWING épor¤
And yet, tÚ égyÒn as a sovereign force with positive content cannot itself be
completely immanent. After all, tÚ égyÒn “lies beyond being [§p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w]” (R.
509b) and thus cannot be found within the city in logos, or rather within the realm of coming-tobeing and passing-away. For lÒgow is a form of discourse that reveals and illuminates things as
they are, but as §p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w, tÚ égyÒn appears as it is not. If we were to use lÒgow,
the infinitely excessive sovereignty which tÚ égyÒn represents would have to be reduced to a
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finite entity, i.e., brought into the realm of becoming and passing-away. If we are to discuss a
hierarchy at all with regard to this notion of tÚ égyÒn, it is not a matter of a scale of being but
an intensification of it. We must remember that, in the Republic, Socrates states, concerning
tÚ égyÒn, “that which every soul pursues and brings about for its own sake [toÊto ßnek],
announcing like a prophet some ‘to be’ [épomnteom°nh t e‰n], perplexed [époroËs]
and unable to receive sufficiently [oÈk ¶xos lbe›n ﬂkn«w] just what it is” (505e). As
inherently resisting intelligibility, tÚ égyÒn can only lead one into épor¤, waylessness, or
unknowing. However, unable to reconcile this and to disavow such épor¤, the human being is
liable to place tÚ égyÒn within the realm of discursive thought.
Plato must have had this disavowal in mind, as Republic book VIII makes clear. It is
inevitable that within the ruling class there will be fractures and that “political over throw
[polte¤ metbãlle] comes from the origin itself [§j ÈtoË toË ¶xontow tåw érxãw]”
(R. 545d). The aristocratic community, the community ruled by the philosophers and based in
lÒgow, falls under its own weight. The philosopher rulers, perhaps because they must return to
the proverbial cave, lose true insight into tÚ égyÒn, for “although being wise individuals
[sofo¤], the ones who you have educated as leaders of the city will nevertheless not attain, by
means of reasoning [logsm“] together with sensation, the proper time of begetting children,
but it will pass them by and they will beget children when they should not. There is a period
governed by divine birth, comprehended by perfect numbers” (R. 546b). Consequently, although
the philosopher rules are called wise, they are nevertheless forced to engage in practical political
matter and the opportune and divine time to beget and rear children is obscured. The identity of
the body politic becomes less clear. While it appears that tÚ égyÒn must originate from within
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the city, in logos itself, since all the arts within the city are directed toward the rulers and by
them, this cannot be the case—unless, of course, the philosopher rulers hide themselves as
tyrants. Like those of the oligarchic state, who have established for themselves some good,
which was the cause of their ruin (R. 562b), the tyrannical state arising from a democratic one
has also established its own good. Such declines result from the establishment of a finite good
that can be found within the limits of the lÒgow of the city. This too must be the cause of the rise
of timocracy out of the aristocracy.
By taking tÚ égyÒn as a good established for their own ends, then, the philosopher
rules miss the divine, or rather the excessively intelligible nature of tÚ égyÒn. In fact in book
IV of the Laws, the Athenian states “wherever a city-state does not have a god but its principle is
mortal, there the people have no rest from bad things” consequently we must “order both our
homes [oﬁkÆsew] and states in obedience to the immortal thing in us, the understanding of
thought [tØn toË noË dnomÆn] calling it law” (Laws 713e-714a). Here, law is explicitly
linked to that which is other than or more than human. Furthermore, in Laws book III, Plato
defines svfrosÊnh in accord with the reverence with which one should approach tÚ égyÒn.
Here, the Athenian stranger states, “there is something additional with regard to both honorable
and dishonorable things, that of not to speak [oÈ logoË] but something would be more worthy
of a kind of speechless silence [élÒgo sg∞w]” (Laws 696e). According to this radicalized
form of svfrsÊnh, even to utter the name tÚ égyÒn is too much, not to mention establishing
it as one’s own end. The only response to such an experience is a speechless silence, which
opens one to the vacuous eruption of the experience of to égyÒn.
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INITIATION INTO tÚ égyÒn
Certainly such an experience is unconfortable, for it overwhelms us. This will require
special preparation. Twice in the Phaedrus, Socrates makes significant references to the
initiation [teletÆ] into mystic rites that true lovers undergo (Phdr. 249c, 253c).138 The lover and
the beloved are taught knowledge which makes them akin. Furthermore, the one who undergoes
this initiation “alone becomes truly perfect [t°leow]” (Phdr. 249c). This may seem identical to
what has been said in the Republic. However, the t°low, from which t°leow is ultimately
derived, of the individual in the city in logos was directed toward is a specific and tangible,
intelligible goal, that of minding one’s own business, which was revealed to entail knowing
one’s place within the hierarchy. And yet, as we will see, this concept of t°leow is one which
entails the recognition of its own principle of insufficiency when applied to the initiate, at the
same time as it engenders within the initiate the desire to overcome this insufficiency, while
recognizing that the initiate can never do so.
While little is described of this erotic initiation, we are told that the initiation is
accomplished by “the man who rightly employs remembrances” (Phdr. 249c). In previous
chapters, it was revealed that such remembrances are due to the exposure to the beloved’s true
excessive and pre-rational nature; beauty [tÚ klÒn] shinning through his “godlike face
[yeoed¢w prÒsvpon]” (Phdr. 251a). In this way, the beloved functions as the conduit for, but
not the source of an excessive sovereign force. It cannot be mastered or assimilated by the lover.
The beauty is not found within the beloved rather, the beloved is beautiful by participating in
tÚ klÒn itself. If it is true that Plato uses tÚ égyÒn and tÚ kãlon somewhat
138

At Symposium 210a, Diotima tells Socrates that he can be initiated in the erotic-matters, if he follows the “ladder
of love,” which she describes. The nature of the progression throughout the ladder of love and especially the final
stage in which beauty itself is suddenly revealed, will help our understanding of the initiation between the lover and
the beloved.
123

interchangeably,139 just as tÚ égyÒn cannot be found within the city so too the drive toward
tÚ égyÒn by means of ¶rvw for tÚ klÒn, shining through the individual, is not found within
the individual beloved but rather the outside of the individual which is visible only in the “the
madness of the erotic [t∞w §rvtk∞w mn¤w]” (Phdr. 256d). The experience to which the lover
looks, in fact, appeals to nothing, for the initial exposure can neither be justified nor be
accounted for in itself; the experience exists outside of itself. It is not the beloved who is the
source of tÚ kãlon, but rather the recollection of “what is most of all,” which exists in “the
place above the heavens.” And so, just as tÚ égyÒn is §p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w so too is
tÚ kãlon to which the lover is exposed through the beloved. TÚ égyÒn and tÚ kãlon, then,
are not simple identities but rather ruptures within the homogeneous nature of the community.
This drive toward what is beyond the discursive is the important function of the initiation into an
erotic community. We will return to the discussion of the exact nature of the initiation and the
effect it has on the lover in the final section of this chapter.
Now, however, we will explore the experience of the initiation into that which exceeds
discursive understanding. And yet, it does provoke a form of community between the lover and
the beloved. In the remainder of this section, I will discuss the necessity of (re)introducing
oneself to the lover—something unthinkable in the city in logos.
A PROPHETIC INTRODUCTION
Due to the prophetic and ecstatic temporality of the soul140 and the excessiveness of both
the beloved and the lover that is revealed in the erotic experience, neither individual has the
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capacity to discursively greet each other, as they truly are, in advance. Moreover, that which both
individuals possess, even their own identity, is not their own, but exists ecstatically. The identity
of each will manifest itself in the ecstatic rupture of reason, opening each individual’s identity
beyond its own capacity.
Before giving his Palinode, in the Phaedrus, and more specifically immediately prior to
discussing the different forms of mn¤, Socrates engages in a playful but significant exchange
with Phaedrus. He warns Phaedrus to caution Lysias to make a recantation, just as he himself is
about to do and to praise the lover instead of the non-lover, who desires not only rationally to
understand his non-beloved but to possess him as well. Phaedrus assures Socrates that he will do
so, to which Socrates answers,
Socrates: This I believe, if until you would be that who/what you are [ßvsper ín √w ˜w
e‰].
Phaedrus: Speak therefore confidently
Socrates: Where is the youth to whom I was speaking? This he too must hear, lest if he be
overtaken by the pleasure a non-lover.
Phaedrus: Here, beside you, very much neighboring [mãl plhs¤on] always present
whenever you wish.
Socrates: So then, beautiful youth, keep in mind that the former account was Phaedrus’…
(Phdr. 243e-244a).

Whom is Socrates addressing? Who is this beautiful youth? Certainly Phaedrus is the only other
individual present; but why, then, does Socrates ask where the beautiful youth is while
addressing Phaedrus? And how does this influence the way we approach the Palinode and the
rest of the Phaedrus as a whole? If one’s identity is immediately manifested within the political
realm, Socrates would have no need to ask who or what Phaedrus is. Given that this exchange
begins the Palinode, the speech that will describe the initiation into the erotic mysteries, it would
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appear that it is here where Socrates first tells of an aspect of the human that cannot be reduced
to the immediacy that the political stresses.141
The answers to the questions above lie in the first line of the above conversation. While
this line is nearly impossible to render into grammatically correct English, it is, nonetheless,
necessary to translate the sentence literally if the significance of what would otherwise be passed
by as a mere playful moment is to be revealed. The difficulty lies in the temporality implicit in
this exchange. In the first clause, the uncertain subjunctive future conditional is used “if until you
would be [ßvsper ín √w],” while in the second clause the present tense indicative “that
who/what you are [˜w e‰]” is utilized. Consequently, on the one hand, the present moment is
saturated with a conditional future; while on the other hand, this same conditional future is
brought into the present moment. The ecstatic and excessive being of Phaedrus, and the human
being in general, is here being emphasized.
The ecstatic and prophetic temporality of the soul is brought to the fore. If one’s futural
aspect is the same as one’s past, i.e., one is headed toward the celestial abode which one
previously left. Phaedrus would be that which he has always already been. To put it differently,
Phaedrus may again become that which he is and originally was, that is to say, the uncorrupted
soul, partaking in the divine banquet. Phaedrus was, is, and may again become the beautiful boy
unspoiled by Lysias’ influence. Socrates is not recognizing Phaedrus’ identity or being in this
passage. Rather, he is contesting it, putting it into question, raising the épor¤ to which one
may be exposed while experiencing Phaedrus. “If until you would be that who/what you are.”
There is no guarantee of Phaedrus being who or what he is but Socrates is contesting whether he
141
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can be this individual. Challenging Phaedrus’ being in such a manner, with the temporality of the
language used, we must experience another as always existing within a prior exteriority, or a
being whose existence is composing itself in its being shattered.
Socrates calls attention to his faith, and to the uncertainty that lies therein, that Phaedrus
has not presently been completely “overtaken by the pleasure of a non-lover,” i.e., Lysias and his
speech, but only if and until Phaedrus becomes both what he may become and that which he is,
his beautiful boy. In other words, Socrates is simultaneously speaking to the present Phaedrus,
who is under the threat of Lysias’ influence, and calling out for and encouraging the beautiful
boy, who was previously and may again become the Phaedrus uncorrupted by Lysias. Thus, not
only does this passage draw our attention to the fact that Phaedrus exists ecstatically, but also
that his future (as the uncorrupted beautiful boy) is inherently uncertain and fragile. It is not at all
clear that Phaedrus will turn out to be/return to his beautiful state. Only if Phaedrus recollects his
prophetic past and the divine banquet, through being wooed by Socrates, would he move toward
his future, beautiful self.
So, Socrates introduces Phaedrus to his true self, perhaps for the first time, a self that
must be contested if it is to come into existence. In fact, Phaedrus urges Socrates to speak
confidently when confronted by the odd temporality of Socrates’ strange request. Indeed,
Phaedrus introduces himself to Socrates as the beauty boy. In saying “Here, beside you very
much neighboring always present whenever you wish,” Phaedrus gives himself over to Socrates
as the beautiful boy. Phaedrus’ being “present” should not be understood in a spatial or even a
temporal manner. Rather, his being present is a comportment toward Socrates. As introducing
himself as a beautiful youth, Phaedrus gives himself to Socrates as a possible, and thus contested,
beloved. Phaedrus, now, has been introduced to himself without the reference point he has had
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previously (as a non-lover, who is in control of himself), but rather now from an external
sovereign force which is neither present nor controlled by either individual. He can no longer
define himself as an isolated individual, without reference to another, but rather only in reference
to Socrates, as a possible beloved. Their point of communion begins here, in the destruction of
Phaedrus’ identity as Phaedrus. And if the boy is Phaedrus, the temporality of the exchange
suggests that Socrates cannot anticipate and guarantee Phaedrus’ character as beautiful.
Consequently, Socrates begins his erotic endeavors without preconditions or preconceptions
concerning with whom he is speaking. Jean-Luc Marion has characterized this erotic disposition
toward the world as asking the question, “Can I love first?,” which he states “means to behave
like a lover who gives himself, rather than like one who is loved tit for tat.”142 Socrates risks
loving by comporting himself as a pre-conditional lover. Socrates gambles that Phaedrus will
reveal himself to be a beloved. Socrates can place no preconditions upon this relationship and so
they must reintroduce themselves to each other.
III. What Use is a Lover and Friend?:
We are now confronted with the question of what a lover or friend is, especially in light
of the reintroduction that characterizes individuals entering the erotic community. The
ontological status of the lover or friend must be examined along with what he or she provides, if
anything. In this section, we will follow the discussion of how the phenomena of fl¤ and of
being a f¤low143 unfold within the Lysis. This description will help to unveil the relationship
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between the Socratic lover and beloved and, consequently, the initiation into the erotic mysteries
that characterizes the type of community in which they participate.
A USEFUL FRIEND
It has been noted that utility and use-value permeate the Lysis.144 Socrates presents the
fl¤ that Lysis’ parents display toward him in terms of use-value (Lys. 207d-210d). Lysis, it is
assumed, will be shown fl¤ by his parents if he proves himself wise in certain matters, e.g.,
reading letters and tuning the harp, and in so doing he is useful to them (Lys. 210d). The concept
of usefulness again returns later in the dialogue, this time in the guise of whether or not two
individuals who are like or unlike are of benefit to each other (Lys. 214d-216b). While the first
passage characterizes fl¤ as one-sided, the second gives at least the possibility for a mutual
and reciprocal benefit.
Accordingly, there have been two lines of interpretation of what characterizes the benefit
and usefulness of a f¤lon. On the one hand, it has been said that the individual’s own self is
one’s true f¤lon; David Bolotin writes, “Let us then interpret Socrates’ latest suggestion to mean
instead primarily that those who are good are friends to the Good that is their own and in this
sense friends to themselves.”145 While what is at issue in the later discussion of fl¤, according
to Mary P. Nichols, is that the two individuals enter into a community of reciprocal benefit and
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recognition that cannot simply be reduced to use-value,146 but which, as reciprocal, must be of
some benefit to both individuals. Contrary to current scholarship, I will argue that whatever the
form of community that is found in fl¤ it can be governed neither by self-interest147 nor even
by reciprocity.148 As the present section will show, both of these interpretations are subject to an
ontological certainty. This is to say, both interpretations lead one to make a fetish of the
épor¤, the waylessness, or non-knowledge that fl¤ places us in and which is central to
Socrates’ philosophy. Both interpretations place upon Socratic philosophy a positive content
which cannot be found within épor¤. Consequently, the dichotomy represented here is a false
one. We should be concerned not with the articulation of the subject/object relationship but
rather, with the relationship of knowing and unknowning.
THE CERTAINTY OF FRIENDSHIP
The human strives to gain certainty within the world. The striving is an attempt to bring
the world and oneself under the authority of the metaphysics of presence. One way of achieving
this is to make the beloved an object of perfection, placing upon the beloved all the traits one
wished oneself to have. In the Lysis, such a drive is demonstrated by Hippothales singing the
praises of Lysis. These praises are aimed at Lysis’ noble lineage, which as Ctesipuss tells
Socrates makes Hippothales ridiculous (Lys. 205d). He speaks of nothing which is personal
[‡don] but rather of that which “the whole city already knows” (Lys. 205b-c), or rather of what
society says about Lysis. Consequently, Hippothales has entered and even placed Lysis into the
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social hierarchy of economy and of exchange. And thus, if he should gain Lysis as a beloved, he
would believe that he has gained a type of certainty with regard to his social standing. And like
tÚ égyÒn found within the social hierarchy of the Republic, he cannot but help to view Lysis
as a socially engineered good. Perhaps Hippothales believes Lysis to be tÚ égyÒn. But
certainly he cannot recognize Lysis as his égyÒn, for he implicitly admits that Lysis belongs to
the city. Accordingly, Lysis not only belongs to the social structure but is furthermore reduced to
the status of a use-object—either way, he cannot properly belong to Hippothales in any
meaningful manner.
Being called ridiculous, Hippothales seeks out Socrates’ help as to how one should speak
and behave to endear [prosflÆw] one’s favorite to oneself (Lys. 206c). However, he is met
with further critique. Socrates states that these songs of praise are not aimed at Lysis but rather at
Hippothales himself (Lys. 205d-e). Socrates warns that anyone “wise in erotic-matters [tå
§rvtkã sofÒw]” should not sing songs of his beloved until he should have captured him,
“fearing what the future may result in” (Lys. 206a). Those wise in such matters understand that
the character of the beloved must unveil itself over time and cannot be seen in the immediate
moment. This suggests that the human being, the beloved in this case, is not a static entity, but
one whose ontological and ethical status is always at stake. We must always fear what the future
may bring and thus live under constant threat of our ethical well-being becoming corrupted.
Hippothales is confronted by the uncertainty of his being and of his relationship to the
community as a whole when presented by the unannounced erotic arrival of Lysis. Hippothales
believes himself to be a sufficient being within the community he finds himself composed of
Ctesipuss and of his other cohorts. He identified with the pre-reflective whole. And yet the
arrival of Lysis opens Hippothales to the desire to move beyond these limits. What he believed to
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be a self-sustaining whole now reveals itself to be ruptured by the unanticipated arrival of
Lysis.149 However, instead of crossing these boundaries he sets another barrier to sidestep the
experience of épor¤ which fl¤ engenders. To manage this, he sets up for himself a false
image of who he is with regard to Lysis and the community. In the language of Marion,
Hippothales is attempting to find certainty of his own being through vanity by asking “what is
the use?”150 concerning this relationship. Unwilling or unable to contest Lysis’ being,
Hippothales reduces Lysis and himself to the status of an object. Such songs of praise,
consequently, force both individuals to believe that they have ontological certainty of who they
are and also what is good for them. Lysis believes he is good given his linage, while Hippothales
thinks himself as good and complete if he should possess the object of his affection.
Secondly and more importantly, Socrates states that Hippothales is undermining his own
desire to possess Lysis. According to Socrates, the young boy becomes harder to catch,
becoming haughtier [meglxÒtero] and more assured of his status as being good (Lys.
206a-b). Surely this has the result of allowing Lysis to believe that he is too noble for
Hippothales, giving the former a false sense of certainty about who and what he is. However,
there may be another and related reason. Socrates uses the curious phrase “harder to
catch/conquer [dslvtÒtero].” Likening Hippothales to a hunter who makes noise and
scares away that which he wishes to seize upon, Socrates states that discourses [lÒgo] should
not be used to “enchant and to make savage” the object since this is “greatly in want of
harmony” (Lys. 206b). Furthermore, Hippothales harms himself through his poetry based on
utility. Hippothales does everything he can to give Lysis a metaphysical certainty, defining him
in advance.
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Metaphysical certainty, however, only befits objects that are completed and finished with
regard to their being. Consequently, objects as such cannot profoundly concern us as humans,
since the ontological status of an object is completed and thus not a risk and so of no real
concern for us. In the Phaedrus, Socrates explains why he rarely, if at all, leaves the city (230d).
He states that the trees and country places do not teach him anything but that the people of the
city do; in the Lysis, Socrates states that possessions such as the best quails and dogs or even all
the gold of Darius mean nothing to him when compared to finding a f¤lon (211e). Given that
Socrates’ philosophy revolves around dialogue with others, urging them “to give a contestation
of their life [¶legkon toË b¤o]” (Ap. 39c), the épor¤ that this engenders opens one to one’s
own ignorance. As such, objects in no way contest our being and thus cannot be of real concern
for us. We may possess them but they are not mine in a profound sense. By reducing Lysis to an
object that has use-value, Hippothales has made it truly impossible to be with his beloved. Lysis
comes to understand himself as an object with determinate qualities. Hippothales, too,
understands both Lysis and himself in this manner. Both become ontologically isolated although
they live among others. Communication and a community are thus rendered impossible.
Consequently, there opens an insurmountable distance between the two individuals, which is
depicted through the narrative of the dialogue. It is unclear whether Hippothales has ever had
direct contact with Lysis. Furthermore, Hippothales hides from Lysis so as not to irritate him
(Lys. 207b).151 Although he sings his praises, Hippothales cannot be with Lysis because he has
already given Lysis over to the city itself.
It has been shown that Hippothales defines himself through Lysis. However, his
definition of Lysis is founded only upon the contingency of Hippothales’ uncertain conception of
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his beloved. His self-certainty “can proclaim itself as loudly and strongly as it wants, but it
finally avers itself to be always provisional, waiting in delusion on another principle, which
would finally truly assure it.”152 If Hippothales does in fact wish to capture Lysis, he cannot but
fail, since Lysis, who represents the whole which Hippothales is after, is not graspable.
Hippothales needs Lysis to enter into the community, which is the whole, the opposite of the
isolated being Hippothales suffers from. But this whole cannot be objectified. Thus, he is on a
fool’s errand since that which he seeks cannot be found within the world of being since it is
beyond being.
A fl¤ grounded in utility, then, results in self-forgetting. We forget that we are
essentially human, not reducible to objects with a predetermined value, instead of an individual
whose future is uncertain, existing toward another. We would begin to believe that we are truly
good either by the praise of a lover or by obtaining a beloved believed to be morally excellent,
and will thus assume to be in full possession of tÚ égyÒn. Such an individual can never
experience the épor¤ of tÚ égyÒn, which is revealed through the experience of fl¤.
BEING SIMILAR AND FRIENDSHIP
Quoting the Homeric saying “Ever, god leads like to like,” further on in the dialogue, the
concept of usefulness reappears but now in terms of individuals being like, or similar [˜moow] to
one another, and therefore able to be of mutual or reciprocal benefit.153 In his discussion with the
young boys, Lysis and Menexenus, Socrates begins slowly to unhinge their understanding of the
foundation of fl¤, revealing that the relationship of those who are alike or similar [˜moow]
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cannot fully account for the experience of fl¤, since two individuals who are wholly alike are
of no benefit to one another (Lys. 214e-215a). (The assumption that two vicious individuals
should be friends is quickly dismissed, for these individuals are injurious to each other and are
unbalanced so as not to be even a friend to him or herself.) Two individuals who are good qua
good would be of no use to each other, since such an individual is sufficient in him or herself
(Lys. 215b). There is no reciprocity between these individuals because, as Socrates asks, “how
can such things be cherished [égphye¤h] by each other, when they can in no way aid
[§pkor¤n] each other” (Lys. 215a).
However, there is another way in which to understand what it is to be ˜moow. To account
for the phenomenon of fl¤, Socrates must create a third option, one in which the human exists
between the wholly good and the wholly bad. Friends are alike in sharing the character of being
neither/nor, neither good nor bad, as Socrates states, again, breaking with the binary logic of a
hierarchy. Two individuals, alike in being neither good nor bad, but existing between the two
concepts, can, it is supposed at this point of the dialogue, be friends. For example, the human per
se is neither good nor bad but is made so through the presence of goodness or that which is bad.
When an individual is not yet corrupted by the bad, e.g., ignorance, though it is nonetheless
present in him or her, this individual will desire [§pyme›n] the good (Lys. 217e), i.e., wisdom.
Only two individuals who are good, in a qualified manner, can become friends, since “friendship
is reciprocal, it requires that our friend love us in return, that he or she concur or be
willing….”154 It would appear, then, that friendship, if it is not grounded in self-interest, must be
grounded in a community of reciprocity. It is to this last claim that I will now draw our attention.
RECIPROCITY AND FRIENDSHIP
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Nichols’ argument for the reciprocity inherent within the phenomenon of fl¤ rests
upon a mutual understanding of the two individuals who cultivate “both self-awareness and
belonging, it offers support for our complex identity as human being and citizens.”155 The f¤lon
is one’s own to the extent that this individual is mine. However this same individual is different
than myself since this individual is capable of withdrawing his or her fl¤; I have no control
over his or her giving or withholding the fl¤. Friends, in other words, are simultaneously alike
and unlike. Moreover, both are alike insofar as not being wholly either one’s own, belonging to
ones friend, or wholly the other’s, being able to withdraw ones friendship. The knowledge that
friendship does indeed exist is secured, according to Nichols, when the two individuals reflect
upon their experience of sharing in certain things and differing in others, but “who are similar in
their self-sufficiency.”156
The self-sufficiency of which Nichols speaks here is, however, not one that is found
within the individuals themselves. Rather, it appears to lie in the recognition that neither
individual is sufficiently his own nor sufficiently belonging to the individual him or herself and it
is this experience that “supports the pursuit of truth, suggesting both the necessity and possibility
of that pursuit, necessary because one’s own is experienced as other, possible because another is
experienced as one’s own,”157 opening one to a reciprocal relationship. Moreover, Nichols
speaks of friends and the type of community that arises between individuals who experience a
type of fulfillment that is not grounded in each other. The truth is not found in either individual
alone. In fact, she writes, “The experience of friends offers us access to a world that must be
known rather than mastered, and one that is not so radically different from ourselves that it must
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remain unknown,”158 and that “the knowledge the philosopher seeks is both his own and
elusive.”159 Accordingly, the reciprocity discussed by Nichols results from an awareness that “we
can know more than we do, and that we can become more than we have yet become.”160
While it is difficult for me to argue with the general content of Nichols’ argument, since
she emphasizes many of the issues with which I myself am concerned. I will even say that it is
necessary to recognize that one needs another, a beloved, to experience the erotic moment, yet it
must be asked what exactly is meant by reciprocal and is reciprocity necessary for true fl¤?
Nichols’ concern that philosophy cannot be a purely intellectual pursuit, which is not informed
by human experience, is correct; for as was shown above if a purely theoretical conception of
tÚ égyÒn is established within the city-state even the philosopher-rulers cannot eliminate the
inevitable decline of it. After all, Nichols writes, “if one pursues the truth because it is one’s
good, one’s good would become the measure of the truth rather than the truth the measure of
one’s good,”161 which if pursued simply as a cure for one’s own deficiencies and ignorance then
“love of the good collapses into self-love.”162 And yet, the questions must be posed, what is
being exchanged within this reciprocal relationship? What characterizes the exchange? And what
is the benefit that the friends gain from one another so that they do indeed cherish each other? In
short, can anything be given in return?
THE NEED FOR A NON-RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP
There are moments in the Lysis where non-reciprocal relationships are brought to the
attention of the young interlocutors. And while these examples are seemingly dismissed and
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refuted by Socrates and the young boys, they nevertheless illuminate the concept of fl¤. For
instance, the question of whether or not there are horse-lovers [f¤lppo], quail-lovers
[flÒrtgew], dog-lovers [flÒknew], wine-lovers [f¤lono], sport-lovers [flogmnst¤],
and most importantly wisdom-lovers [flÒsofo] is asked (Lys. 212d). These examples are
given within the context of Socrates asking Menexenus whether or not both parties involved
must exhibit fl¤. It would certainly be odd if one were to say that animals, inanimate objects,
and concepts, such as wisdom, should show fl¤ to a human.163 And so it would appear that
none of these relationships can be an example of a f¤lon. However, there is a deeper concern.
Individuals do exhibit fl¤ for such things, welcoming them, and so phenomenologically
speaking there must be a way in which the human being does in fact exhibit fl¤ toward these
objects, especially if we are to admit that there are wisdom-lovers, of which Socrates is certainly
one. Nevertheless, there is no reciprocity between the individual and any of these.
The example continues so far as to ask whether a new-born child, who has not yet begun
to exhibit fl¤ or hatred, if chastised by his or her parents, at that moment, has fl¤
preeminently with regard to the parents. It is concluded that it is not the one who exhibits fl¤
but the one who has fl¤ bestowed upon him or her that is the f¤lon. In other words, although
the new-born may not be inclined to show fl¤ at such a time, the parent does and so is a
f¤lon. And yet the conclusion is reached that “individuals must be shown fl¤ by their
enemies” (Lys. 213a),164 i.e., the child by his or her parents, and consequently these examples are
absurdities and impossible, according to Socrates and his young interlocutor. The same could be
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said of unrequited love or of someone who wishes to befriend someone who does not share that
wish. Hence the claim that “one cannot become a friend unless another does so as well.”165
If reciprocity must be the foundation and that which grounds the phenomenon of fl¤,
then one must first be concerned with whether or not one’s fl¤ will be returned and whether or
not some return on the investment will be had. This assumes that one has formed a judgment of
the other’s being to even begin to undertake the risk. The two “friends” must also share some
idea of that toward which they are aimed if reciprocity is necessary to ground fl¤, since they
could not be friends unless this concept had been formed prior to the friendship; this assumes
that the two individual do become self-sufficient in their relationship.166 Related to this, one must
also, it would seem, have to have an idea as to what it means to be a friend and thus have a
concept of what fl¤ is—the very question the dialogue undertakes to investigate and ends in
épor¤. However, such absurdities are only the case if reciprocity is assumed. If we do not
make such an assumption, something else comes to the fore. That which allows for the
experience of fl¤ cannot lie in the object toward which it is shown but must rather be a
comportment of the individual who exhibits such a relationship.
Although reciprocity opens us to the realization that we are incomplete and insufficient
beings, we should give emphasis not only to the positive moment in the relationship with the
f¤lon, but also to the negative moment in the Socratic questioning which gives rise to épor¤,
waylessness, or perhaps non-knowledge, an openness, to which our attention should be given.
The lover, the subject, must renounce itself as a private and isolated being. The f¤lon must
recognize that it cannot grasp wisdom as a whole and yet must nevertheless strive to obtain it.
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This striving drives the individual into a state of non-knowledge, épor¤, to which the
individual must give him or herself over. After all, those who are already wise, as the gods are,
or those who simply believe themselves to be wise, no longer love wisdom, or rather are no
longer philosophers (Lys. 218a), because they possess (or believe that they possess) wisdom in
its immediacy. However, there is a type of individual who, while having ignorance within him is
not yet corrupted enough by ignorance and so who “supposing not knowing that which they may
not know” (Lys. 218); this is exactly how Socrates characterizes his own form of knowing at
Apology 21d when he says “that which I may not know I do not think I know.” This individual is
a philosopher, or a lover of wisdom. Moreover, it is only this individual who exhibits fl¤
toward tÚ égyÒn (Lys. 216e-217a). The act of opening oneself to the experience of the
épor¤ of fl¤ is enough; it is a comportment in the individual and not found within the
object. Consequently, when the f¤lo come together they do not become sufficient beings but
rather are confronted by a concern that reveals their utter inability to answer what it is that they
are confronted by, in this case what it is to be a f¤lon and more generally what is tÚ égyÒn.
The two are faced with the impossibility that question imposes and to the knowledge of that
which cannot be known. While the satisfaction of fl¤, if any is to be found, does indeed lie
somewhere other than in the other in whom we show fl¤, this does not suggest that in this
other place the two f¤lo are similar in that they are self-sufficient in this experience.167
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FRIENDSHIP AS IGNORANCE
Fl¤, like philosophy itself, awakens us to our ignorance, and allows us to be erotically
drawn toward that of which we are ignorant, i.e., the beloved and wisdom itself. Recognizing this
ignorance is an act of self-remembering. One recollects that tÚ égyÒn is §p°ken t∞w
oÈs¤w. It should be noted that oÈs¤ can mean not just being or existence but also one’s own,
one’s substance, or property. That to which we are drawn and that place within the f¤lo
experience each other is tÚ égyÒn but as that which lies outside not only being but also
beyond one’s property or what is one’s own; it lies beyond economy altogether. The f¤lon is not
properly one’s own.168 Thus, when we experience tÚ égyÒn as §p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w we
experience that which is nothing, since it is beyond being. There is no self-sufficiency to be
found within such an experience. Both individuals are exposed to the absence of being and
meaning. They are met with the unsayable and so are made open to épor¤ by the insufficiency
of one’s being while at the same time desiring to be sufficient, i.e., to grasp tÚ égyÒn.
Furthermore, we should be wary of the claim that “Ever, god leads like to like.” For
Socrates not only says that there is a dark-saying, or riddle [ﬁn¤ttont] (Lys. 214d)
concerning the conclusion that those who are good alone exhibit fl¤ toward that individual
who is good, he furthermore states, “Our account shows by means of a sign [shm¤ne] that there
are individuals who may be good” (Lys. 214e). Not only is their discussion characterized as
being a dark-saying, a manner of speaking that is normally attributed to prophetic utterances, but
also that their very account of that matter gestures beyond itself, acting as a sign to the truth of
the matter. Socrates must characterize the poetic statement as enigmatic because it will reveal
something about the human being that cannot be captured through language and binary logic.
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As was just stated, we can only exhibit fl¤ when we recognize our own ignorance,
suggesting an openness to the very phenomenon of fl¤. The individual who is neither good
nor bad represents an open space ready to receive, without preconception, the presence of the
good or the bad. There is no strict predeliniated boundary of the one who is neither good nor bad.
Such an individual is thrown or abandoned in the space of épor¤, that space in which we must
admit of due to our own non-knowledge.
FRIENDSHIP BEYOND BEING
Socrates suggests that we give ourselves over to épor¤ not only in his own examples
given above but also when he uses a language of prophecy which gestures to an area that lies
beyond being. This form of language should not surprise us, since the whole of the Lysis is
governed by the god Hermes169—the god who acts as the mediator between the gods and the
humans. Socrates uses a very specific vocabulary
I have become dizzy [eﬁlgg«]170 due to the waylessness of the argument
[Ípo t∞w toË lÒgo épor¤w] and it ventures according to the ancient proverb ‘the
beautiful is f¤low.’ It certainly resembles something soft, smooth, and sleek, on which
account and in like manner it easily slips through and evades us because of these
qualities. For I say that tégyÚn is the beautiful…Accordingly, I will speak, announcing
as a prophet [épomnteÊmeow], that the beautiful and toË égyoË is f¤lon to neither
the good nor the bad. What it is toward which I am prophetically speaking
[mnteÊom], you must hear (Lys. 216c-d).

The only way to speak of tÚ égyÒn is by way of prophetic utterance, a manner of speaking
that allows that which is inherently distant and obscure to appear but as distance and obscure.
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We have seen in chapter one that prophecy is connected with mn¤, especially philosophical
mn¤, which requires recollection. Furthermore, “the beautiful moves us, but cannot be
possessed.”171 This is certainly the case in the Phaedrus, where the beautiful that shines through
the god-like face of the beloved makes the wings of the soul grow (Phdr. 251a-b). It is the soul’s
wings that drive the human to recollect that which the soul once beheld, i.e., what is most of all
[tÚ ˆn ˆntvw] (Phdr. 249c), which the gods have seen and which are “the things outside of the
heaven” and “a place above the heavens” (Phdr. 247c), which I take to mean is §p°ken t∞w
oÈs¤w, since it is this upper area that all souls are greedy [glxÒmen] for but which is
impossible to reach (Phdr. 248a). Consequently, the beautiful, that with which the philosopher is
most concerned, is tÚ égyÒn and is a f¤lon to the human being, which as we have seen above
is the neither good nor bad, and it is this that is slipping through us and yet evading our grasp. It
forever resists our grasp despite its inherent closeness, driving one into épor¤.172 And so, due
to their prophetic givenness, the beautiful and tÚ égyÒn are, in a sense, prophetically
speaking, more inward to me than is myself. The soul, as expressed in chapter one, is prophetic,
which now as is revealed not only the beautiful belongs to but tÚ égyÒn as well. However,
according to the Phaedrus, neither the beautiful nor tÚ égyÒn is found within the beloved or
the lover, but both are only conduits for the divine. As such, as will be explained further in the
next section, neither individual can in advance be certain that the beloved will truly bestow upon
him that which he will give. There can be no guarantee of a reciprocal relationship. Socrates
becomes dizzy from the prophetic mn¤ and épor¤ which now grip him. He is wholly outside
the economy of reason.
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THE ECONOMY OF FRIENDSHIP
Furthermore, all conceptions of fl¤ in terms of any sort of economy are inadequate
since, without the introduction of the “first friend [pr«ton f¤lon]” (Lys. 219c), out of which
the very phenomenon of fl¤ erupts (Lys. 220b), it falls outside of the circle of economy
exactly as does tÚ égyÒn. The first friend cannot be rationally argued for but must
nevertheless be taken as a starting point of fl¤. It is simply presupposed and shown necessary
by means of reductio ad absurdum. That which we normally term ‘friends,’ those entities either
because of or for the sake of something else, are merely images or a phantoms [e‡dvl] of the
“first friend,” which is “truly the friend [élhy«w §st f¤lon]” (Lys. 219c-d). All phantom
friends only appear to be friends because they not only depend upon a concept under which they
can be understood as friends and thus are immediately understandable, but also because they all
emerge from reason, calculation, and exchange value. In fact, phantom friends such as gold,
silver, earthenware not only can be exchanged for other items or be replaced but must be
exchanged for something else if they are to have value (Lys. 219e). Thus phantom friends cannot
be seen in their uniqueness. “Every object of attention such as this is not zealously pursued for
real things, which are prepared for the sake of something else, but for that something that all such
things are prepared for” (Lys. 219e-220a). The terminology of for the sake of, if it is not
understood within a greater context—one within the context of a first friend, the true friend is a
friend for the sake of no other thing (Lys. 220b)—leads only to an endless cycle of attempting to
ground fl¤.173
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The terminology in the passages concerning the concepts “for the sake of” and “because
of” (Lys. 218d-220e) slowly moves us away from all economy. It is because of the bad that
tÚ égyÒn is shown fle›n (Lys. 220c), and yet if in theory the bad ceases to exist, one would
not exhibit fl¤ toward tÚ égyÒn because it would be without benefit. However, that which
we call tÚ f¤lon in which all things end [§teleÊt], are those things “for the sake of another”
and bear no resemblance to these things (Lys. 220d-e); tÚ f¤lon is not for the sake of anything.
It exists prior to and despite all such language. Socrates and his young interlocutors conclude that
that which they have been calling tÚ f¤lon is not for the sake of something but for the sake of a
foe. But as we have just seen, without the bad or the enemy, there would be no friend—and yet
this has already be refuted by previous arguments. To remove us completely outside the
language of use-value, the introduction of desire [§pym¤] and lack [§nde°w] are employed.
DESIRING AND LACKING A FRIEND
As revealed above, one can only exit the realm of asking “what is the use?” by a radical
event, such as divine beautiful/tÚ égyÒn slipping into one vis-à-vis the beloved, engendering
a recollection of one’s prophetic past and future. What is at issue here is the question, can one
exhibit fl¤ toward tÚ égyÒn? The answer must be affirmed in the negative, if use-value
and/or the promise of reciprocity are used. This is inevitable since both place one in a
comportment of economy and exchange, even possible exchange, while both fl¤ and
tÚ égyÒn are beyond such an economy—beyond all economy. There is a preconceived notion
of the possible use-value of the one towards whom one shows fl¤, in this manner of thinking.
If one befriends another with the preconceived idea that the befriended will be of some benefit,
placing the befriended within a sphere of economy, the friend advances toward the befriended as
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if the former possessed the truth of what fl¤ is. And so, he behaves like one who believes that
he or she possesses wisdom and so is no friend to wisdom, thus undermining friendship all
together.
To force a pre-determined rational framework upon fl¤ is to miss the phenomenon all
together. One is not open to the phenomenon. In his discussion, with Menexenus, of the question
of what is fl¤, Socrates begins with the former’s experience [¶mperon] of it.174 Socrates asks
Menexenus how fl¤ strikes him in its immediacy. Presumably Socrates is asking the youth to
put aside what he has been told by his elders (the law and traditions of the social hierarchy),
especially Hippothales, who sings praises of Lysis (Lys. 205d-e), and his cousin, Ctesippus. In
other words, Socrates asks not only Menexenus but Lysis as well to reflect upon the experience
of the phenomenon of fl¤ as it is expressed between them. They share in some things and
differ in others (Lys. 207b-c).175 But what they share and how they share it is another question
altogether, which I will discuss in the next section.
Through the introduction of the terminology of desire and lacking, we are taken outside
of any thought of a closed economy. For instance, the erotic-matters for which Socrates is
renowned are not static desires but are concerned with an ongoing process. For instance, when
speaking about his life-long quest for a friend, Socrates states that he has a strong erotic-longing
[§rvtk«w] for the possession of a f¤lon (Lys. 211e). And yet, he has not yet satisfied this
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erotic-longing and never had possessed it, at least as one would usually define “possess.”176
Socrates recognizes through his knowledge of erotic-matters and prophetic utterances that, as has
been shown previously, the human being is not an object among other objects in the world. The
human cannot be understood through propositional language or thought; the human exists
ecstatically, irreducible to discursive understanding, and so is impossible to possess. Through his
knowledge of erotic matters, Socrates is made aware of his profound lack of a f¤lon, which only
furthers his desire for it.
Whatever the quality of the desire and lack discussed in the Lysis is, it must revolve
around the recognition that neither can be fulfilled. If the desire or the lack is for a f¤lon and
tÚ égyÒn they can never be hypothetically fulfilled, that is to say, within the limited span of
our mortal lives, but rather there is an ontological necessity to the lack and to an ongoing desire.
It is necessary that if one desires and is erotically inclined [§pymoËnt k‹ §r«nt] (Lys.
221b) one will exhibit fl¤ toward that which is desires and erotically loves [§pyme› k‹
§rò]. The origin of fl¤ is no longer “for the sake of” or “because of,” both of which are
indicative of use-value and of exchange, but desire itself; and we desire what we lack [§nde°w]
(Lys. 211d-e), which is to say, what we will never possess.
One displays fl¤ for these things because in a sense these things are more proper to
oneself than are those things which one possesses in a static manner. Desire individualizes the
lover, since it is the lover’s alone, whether reciprocated or not. In a sense, if tÚ égyÒn is going
to be a f¤lon, which it must be if philosophy is a real possibility, and if fl¤ is a true
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phenomenon, nothing belongs to the lover more to him or her than that toward which the desire
is aimed. That which I desire is what I lack. Such a lack defines me more than that which I
possess as just another object, since what I possess as an object is external to me. Not only can it
be physically taken away from me but ontologically it is what I am not. Moreover, it forces me
into a comportment of self-forgetting; I believe that I am defined by an object, that I am
completed by something which lays outside of my being. A true desire and that which I truly
lack and am defined by must not denude itself completely, i.e., become an object. Desire denudes
in the sense of not uncovering; it reveals the one who does not manifest—this is similar to how
tÚ égyÒn and tÚ f¤lon must not be denuded. Desire and that which I lack reveal a principle
of insufficiency which defines me by putting my being into question, contesting it.
IV. The Initiation into a Home without a Hearth:
Derrida writes, in The Politics of Friendship, that the end of the Lysis is dominated by the
concept of oﬁkeÒthw177 or rather, as used in the dialogue, of tÚ oﬁke›on, kinship, or being akin.
Derrida asks whether oﬁkeÒthw implies, due to its etymological roots,
an indissociable network of significations which are of import to us here, a semantic
locus totally assembled, precisely, around the hearth (oikos) the home, habitat,
domicile—and grave: kinship—literal or metaphorical—domesticity, familiarity,
property, therefore appropriability, proximity: everything an economy can reconcile,
adjust or harmonize, I will go so far as to say present, in the familiarity of the near and
the neighbor.178

The o‰kow, as hearth, makes present the inhabitants to each other. They are immediately at hand
and fully able to be made recognizable. This has historical roots as well. The o‰kow,
found itself in a rather precarious position, squeezed between the stronger claims of the
individual and the polis. For the special relationship between city and citizen which is
such a defining feature of classical Greece in general and of democratic Athens in
177
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particular could only be achieved by damping down other affiliations that might get in the
way. Links with tribal associations, family-cults, and ancestral domain had been
deliberately undermined by the founders of democracy at the end of the sixth century and
a whole host of polis-organizations erected in their place.179

Giving in to the pressures of the city, the o‰ko became “the private space[s]…They might be
considered ‘zones of commodifications’, magic spaces that turn people into products, enabling
uncomplicated transactions a world away from ‘love-affairs’ and ‘seduction’.”180 Whatever may
have been private in the household, whatever may have been sacred, is now reduced to what is
common and belongs to the people; this is reflected by the words that are opposed to tÚ oﬁke›on,
i.e., dhmÒsow and konÒw. This description of the zone of commodification reminds us of
Lysias’ speech in the Phaedrus, in which it is suggested that a lover should choose a beloved not
based on love but for purely economic reasons, of which Socrates exclaims that it “benefits the
people [dhmvfele›w]” (Phdr. 227d). And so it would appear that, within Plato’s time of writing
the Phaedrus, the home had already been infested by the city’s effects, and now comes to
resemble just another space in which things, including people, can be exchanged for one another.
And yet, Derrida asks whether a friendship without presence is possible. He inquires into
whether or not an aneconomic friendship is possible, before which “truth itself would start to
tremble,”181 implying that a community founded upon aneconomic principles erupts in the
destruction of truth as a discursive concept. If, as I have suggested, it is the purpose of a
tÚ f¤lon to throw one into épor¤, waylessness, and because this form of thinking exists
outside of the everydayness in which one finds oneself, it is little wonder that Socrates speaks for
need of initiation into erotic mysteries, which is “the desire [proym¤] of true lovers” (Phdr.
253c). As we have just seen, desire [§pym¤] is the cause of fl¤, which is indicative of a
179
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desire for kinship, as David Bolotin suggests.182 That is to say, fl¤ is a desire to be part of a
larger whole. But desire is for that which I lack [§nde°w], in this case, a desire for a type of
kinship that cannot be reduced to the demands of the city, especially if it is tÚ égyÒn toward
which we exhibit fl¤, since by its nature it must always be outside of the city as realm of
being. Moreover, this lack [§nde°w], which defines me, is not only that what one is not; it will
never come “to be,” it cannot be in being. It will never come to manifest, unless it falls into the
zone of commodification. As a result, kinship, for Plato, does not rely upon a political model of
exchangeability, use-value, and economy. Whatever the relationship between the two friends is,
it exceeds the political.
DISRUPTIONS, IN THE SOUL, OF THE POLITICAL
Dissatisfied with the democratic state, there is little wonder that Plato attempts to return
to a concept of a type of initiation into certain mysteries that resist the mores of the city. As was
revealed above, the erotic initiation runs contrary to law or custom [nÒmow] (Phdr. 252a, 256e).
This not only challenges the social norms of the city, and thus disrupts the hierarchy which
(mortal) svfrosÊnh is supposed to engender, but more specifically defies the family unit itself,
which “does not maintain itself by nature alone, but is supported by convention or by the
laws.”183 To a certain extent the final scene of the Lysis reveals a disruption within the social
hierarchy. The two young interlocutors are beckoned home by their pedagogues, who were said,
earlier in the dialogue, to rule over [êrxen] Lysis because he must be instructed (Lys. 208c), are
now, even though ultimately unsuccessfully, warded off. Perhaps the adolescent interlocutors are
made aware that there exists a kind of kinship that is more originary than that which is grounded
in law.
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The question, then, arises, what holds together the members of this community that is
contrary to social conventions? And with whom do we display oﬁke›on? We find an answer
within the Lysis. Emphasizing the need for a kinship that is outside of the traditional household,
Socrates claims that there are individuals who are “more akin [oﬁke¤oteron]” to one than are
one’s own family members (Lys. 210e), and these individuals “by some natural kinship
[fÊse p˙ oﬁke›o¤] are each others’” (Lys. 221e). Furthermore, it is said that the lover “would
neither love [erò], nor desire, nor exhibit fl¤ if he did not chance to be akin [oﬁke›ow] to the
beloved [§rvm°nƒ] either by soul, by some disposition/habit [∑yow] of the soul or way of the
soul” (Lys. 222a). While it is difficult to understand the soul’s significance in the Lysis, the
Phaedrus does shed light upon this topic.
So unusual and profound is this natural bond that the “beloved is struck out of himself”
[§r«ntow §kplÆtte] when he discovers that all of his other friends and those who are akin are
nothing compared with the enthused friend [¶nyow f¤lon] (Phdr. 255b). The beloved ex-ists
when this natural bond is discovered. In other words, he or she steps outside of the immediacy of
the traditional home. Due to the language of the divine, being enthused, and of being struck out
of oneself—ex-isting—natural kinship is similar to a kinship of those who have been initiated
into sacred knowledge and certain mysteries, in this case the erotic mysteries.
Normally initiation into the mysteries implies a coming together of like minded
individuals who are bound within a community through the secret knowledge they gain, and
which “enforce…socially important representations,”184 which is to say, representations that
enforce important knowledge for the secret society. Furthermore, these individuals hold secrets
that not all of humanity possess and are “lifted to a higher plane; it is, in some peculiar sense,
184
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sacred or holy; its members are something more than ordinary mortals, they are in some degree
divine. Thus the Kouretes are called daemones, and even theoi; the magician for Hesiod is a
‘divine man’ (ye›ow énÆr).”185 (It should be noted not only that Socrates hears what he refers to
as a dmÒnon but also, in the Symposium, claims that one who is wise in the matters of ¶rvw
and thus able to interpret the things of humans to the gods and the things of gods to the human is
a dmÒnow énÆr (Sym. 203a). And when rightly initiated into erotic-matters, an individual is
able to suddenly [§j¤fnhw] experience the beautiful, tÚ klÒn (Sym. 210a-e), which lies
outside of the discursive reasoning of the “ladder of love.”) The ‘secret knowledge’ that joins the
erotic members is the knowledge of the soul, which can only be illuminated by the fourth type of
madness, that is philosopohy, as found in the Phaedrus.
TRACKING DOWN THE DIVINE IN THE SOUL
It has been shown that erotic initiation requires the correct employment of memories
(Phdr. 249c), by which one recollects what the soul has experienced during the divine banquet.
This includes, among other things, recollecting that the soul had followed in the train of Zeus and
the other gods (Phdr. 250b). It is said that each soul was a follower of a particular god, who the
individual honors and attempts to imitate (Phdr. 252d). Consequently, the initiation is into the
knowledge of one’s own soul and that of the beloved’s. The natural kinship is found within the
soul of the individual.
At first, neither the lover nor the beloved is aware of the god whom they followed. The
exemplary god is Zeus, since it is the individual with a Zeus-like soul who displays a
philosophical nature (Phdr. 252e), and it is with this sort of soul that we will concern ourselves
for the purposes of this chapter. Because of this philosophical nature only such an individual
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would be attentive to how one lacks or falls short of being Zeus-like, since Socrates’ way of
knowing is being cognizant of what he may not know. Indeed, Socrates claims that if individuals
are not yet aware of the character of another’s soul, these philosophical individuals will search
out anyone who can teach them and then “track down within themselves [ﬁxneÊontew d¢
pr' •t«n]” the nature of their own god (Phdr. 253a). In this way, these individuals are able
to grasp the god by memory and they become enthused and receive from him the habits and the
practices, as far as it is possible for a human to partake in the god (Phdr. 253a). Two interrelated
aspects of this passage must be brought into relief. First, the philosophical lover remembers that
the soul has journeyed together with Zeus to “what is most of all [tÚ ˆn ˆntvw]” and it is this
which causes “god to be divine [yeÚw Ãn ye›ow §stn]” (Phdr. 249c). The name “Zeus” is given
to the god simply as a name, a human concept given to him, but because he has seen ‘what is
most of all’ he is in fact divine; he is not a god but the divine itself, that which is completely
beyond human comprehension. Second and related to this, the lover does not find Zeus within
himself but only tracks [ﬁxneÊv] the god. This is to say, Zeus has left a footprint, trace, or clue
[‡xnow] within the soul. The lover never finds the god but only what is left behind, an absence.
This may, perhaps, be one reason why Socrates states that he still does not know what kind of
soul he has; he is still tracking down the divine in his own soul.
In addition, the beloved does not have the character of the god either. In fact, the lover
does all that he can to give the beloved the character of the god (Phdr. 252e). The beloved is
only believed to be the cause of the lover’s enthused state (Phdr. 253a). Furthermore, it is not
even the character of the beloved which attracts the lover; the cause, rather, is beauty
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[tÒ klÒn] (Phdr. 249d-252e).186 TÚ klÒn as the cause of the desire toward the beloved is
significant because it is the mark of excess, which allows the lover to partake in philosophical
mn¤ (Phdr. 249e). Singling out [§kl°get] a loved one from beauty, and as if the loved one
were a god, the lover sculpts and adorns the beloved like a statue, so that he will honor and
worship him (Phdr. 252d-e). If we return briefly to the topic of how the 6th century Athenian
democratic state attempted to replace household gods and family-cults with a public form of
worship, there should be little wonder why the lover makes the beloved a god-like statue. He is
creating for himself a god who has sacred significance for him. In other words, the lover is
creating a home in which the divine is able to manifest in such a way as not to be subsumed
under statist power. The lover “divinizes”187 the beloved, making the beloved god-like, by being
struck into philosophical mn¤ through the excessive beauty that shines forth from the loved
one. As the source of his philosophical mn¤, the beloved is treated by the lover to be truly godlike; in fact, the lover is in the service of the beloved “as if he were equal to a god […w ﬁsÒyeow
yerpeÒmenow]” (Phdr. 255a).
However, we should take notice that every god is present within the divine banquet
which the lover recollects, save Hestia, the goddess of the hearth, who “alone stays in the house
[o‡kƒ] of the gods” (Phdr. 247a). Consequently, whatever we recollect of the divine banquet and
of the gods, we do not recollect an oﬁke›on that revolves around a hearth. There is no hearth
around which the gods and the souls within the divine banquet gather. The human soul is not
privy to the house of the gods. We recollect viewing and following them only after they have left
their house. A community that gathers around a hearth is not for the human but belongs only to
186
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the gods, or perhaps to the divine itself. Neither the lover nor the beloved manifest themselves to
each other; their characters are always underway, in development. As such, a human kinship
must resist what has been prescribed to the individual through the law; the being of their
character must always be contested. And so, their home is one without a hearth.
ENCASED WITHIN OUR OWN FLESH
It must be asked, why does the lover make the beloved god-like at all?188 While it is
certainly true that the lover is reenacting what has occurred during the divine banquet,189 there is
more to it than this; there is a strictly phenomenological reason as well. Alone we become
hardened, as it were, to the phenomenon of tÚ klÒn. By “alone” I do not mean solitude in the
strict sense of the word, for one can be alone within the world populated by others. Instead, to be
alone suggests that one not question the world around one, but only look to how phenomena
appear in their unquestioned immediacy. As the Socratic dialogues reveal, a consideration of
éretÆ is possible only in dialogue with others—comporting oneself in relation to others,
dwelling in the pre-cognitive realm of épor¤. The non-lover depicted in Lysias’ speech in the
Phaedrus is an example of how one can be alone even within the company of another, for neither
the non-lover nor the non-beloved questions the world around them, they forget themselves and
their relationship with each other. Each is only concerned with the gain and benefits that the
other can provide. They are isolated within the flesh of their own bodies, truly desiring only what
is in their own self-interest.
Without being in a kinship and without the recollection that tÚ klÒn of the beloved
brings with it, which initiates us into the erotic mysteries, we are, as Socrates says in Phaedrus,
an oyster [tÚ ˆstreon]. Here, Socrates states, “We being cleansed [when participating in the
188
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divine banquet] and not entombed as now in that which we carry about us and we name the
body, to which we have been fettered as is the custom of an oyster [kyro‹ ˆntew k‹
ésÆmnto toÊto ˆ nËn s«m perf°rontew ınomãzomen Ùstr°o trÒpon
dedesmem°no]” (Phdr. 250c). Without the catharsis that the initiation gives to us, we are within
the world but are unaffected by the communally shared experience, unable to undergo the
épor¤ which tÒ klÒn forces us into. We are unaffected by the phenomena of the communal
dwelling place. While the shell provides protection for the vulnerable insides, it does so to such
extent that the soul is encased, distancing it from and distorting the vision of the phenomena
around it. Consequently, one is drawn outside of the community into a world that is all of one’s
own. As a result, one cannot respond to the call that the community sends out, and so one cannot
place oneself in correct relation to others and therefore one cannot situate oneself in relation to
the beloved.
Indeed, oysters, due to their shells, are destined to live an isolated and solitary life. The
verb Ùstrk¤zen, “to banish by potsherds, or shells” or “to ostracize,” is related to
tÚ ˆstreon. To be an oyster is thus always already to be self-ostracizing. Although oysters lay
together in their beds, there is no community among them. Still encased, each is fettered to his
own private worldview, not one of them experiences épor¤. Perhaps we should think of
tÚ oﬁke›on as a kinship revolving around a hearth, as a private worldview, a cloistered life, or at
least a worldview that is fit only for a god.
By treating the beloved as if he were a god, the lover is opened to the call of tÚ klÒn
and of the divine. Such a call can only be heard and supplication can only occur if one is opened
to the divine vis-à-vis the beloved. However, as having no hearth, the kinship that is shared
between the lover and the beloved is a kinship that is, at the same time, an absence. Unlike the
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oyster-like individual, however, the two lovers share in their absence. They desire to be together,
but it is this desire that keeps them as lovers, as the Phaedrus makes clear (255e-256d). Their
erotic longing cannot be fulfilled; they understand that they must remain in a constant state of
§nde°w. The two ex-ist outside within one another, existing ecstatically towards one another; their
being as isolated individuals is contested and their sense of identity is negated. Their being,
defined by mortal conventions, is shattered.
SACRIFICING THE BELOVED
As others have suggested, the union or communion of lover and beloved is not like the
lovers of Aristophanes in the Symposium, who will be bound together as a whole.190 What
appears to be at issue in this speech is the two individuals, the lover and the beloved, becoming a
third entity; such a union would result in the two individual losing themselves through their
becoming a totality. According to Aristophanes, the desire for becoming complete is one of
finding one’s missing tally [sÊmbolon] (Sym. 191d) and to recoup our archaic nature
[érx¤ fÊse], which he calls ¶rvw (Sym. 193a). I, however, approach the problem in a
slightly different light. Certainly, the two cannot become a totality, belonging to each other
immediately developing into a third entity. Not only is there no “world soul”191 into which the
two individuals could dissolve, but more significantly the lover and beloved literally do not exist.
In the experience of the lover “divinizing” the beloved, the former sacrifices the latter. He rips
apart the beloved’s former identity, disrupting his familial ties, and gives him to the unsayable
divine, to which tÚ égyÒn belongs. And in so doing the lover renounces himself, witnessing
what he too is, a non-being. The lover is now absent and the beloved dissolved, revealing the
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sacred, excessive nature of both, showing what is “there,” what is present when the lover and the
beloved are no longer. Losing their self-identity, they collapse into a singularity that is present
no-where; there is no community to be found here. They now revolve around the unsayable, nonknowledge that épor¤ represents.
Furthermore, the desire for tÚ klÒn that drives one into a philosophic mn¤ is now
exercised upon the beloved too, so that the excess of the beloved may be seen by the beloved
himself: “He is in love but is at a loss [épore›] as to with whom; he does not understand what
he undergoes [p°ponyen] and is not able to speak it…he sees himself in his lover as in a mirror
but forgets [Àsper d' §n ktÒptrƒ §n t“ §r«nt •tÚn ır«n l°lhyen]” (255d). In fact,
this reflection of himself obscures the immediacy of his view of his own self: he is de-centered
and distanced from himself, such that he can no longer understand his own condition, and does
not even know with whom he is in love. But just as a mirror is essentially empty, the lover too is
‘empty’ in the sense of exceeding rational understanding, so that the beloved, through the
influence of the lover, is now époroËs at his own condition. What results are two individuals
living together in kinship, sharing something that cannot be expressed within the merely human
and that must therefore remain in silence. The two individuals share an opening to experience the
excessively impossible. For if the two were ever to consummate their relationship, in the
mundane manner, they would simply become mere objects to each other, thus bringing the
kinship into being and thus destroying it. Whatever the community is, it takes upon itself the
impossibility of its own immanence; it is the impossible community.
It has been argued that the beloved is passive, the relationship is asymmetrical, and that
the lover imposes his hegemony upon the beloved.192 And to a certain extent this is true, the
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philosophical lover does attempt to pattern the beloved after the Zeus-like soul he believes he
has; after all, “From Zeus they draw water, just as Bacchantes, pouring upon the soul of the
beloved and they make as much as is possible, most like their own god” (Phdr. 253a). The true
lover, then, through his or her desire, leads the beloved, who is brought into measure with the
ﬁd°, the look of or perhaps the nature of, the god who the fomer follows, through the initiation
into the erotic mysteries (Phdr. 253b-c). However, as we have seen, that which governs and hold
sovereignty over the kinship of the lover and beloved is not something that can be discursively
known. If it is not the character of the beloved which attracts the lover but rather the beauty
shining through him and if it is tÚ klÒn which allows the lovers to recollect not only the gods
but that which makes the god divine, i.e., the tÚ ˆn ˆntvw, which itself, exactly as tÚ égyÒn
is said to be, is in the place beyond the heavens, outside of existence, then by its very nature the
hegemony is self-undermining. It is the sign of its own unfulfillment, a hegemony that must
always remain to come.
Besides, when the lovers are in the gymnasium and touch, longing [·meron] erupts out of
the beloved and overflows into the lover (Phdr. 255c). Here the beloved is individualized by this
eruption of longing and desire, through the lack of his lover. He knows himself to be a beloved,
although he forgets with whom, only when he admits of the one whom he lacks. The longing
speaks to him by showing what arouses him. Only then does he recognize what he may become
or is becoming.
As we have seen, first, the lover does not love the beloved’s character, or to put it
differently, his uniqueness but rather acts only as a conduit for the divine and thus could be said
to forget the beloved and that the beloved forgets who it is he loves. In fact, they both forget
themselves, at least in the sense of their mortal lives. This suggests that both wish for their own

159

destruction, they both wish to receive that which is impossible, kinship with the other. This can
only occur in the mn¤ that defines philosophical ¶rvw. Just as the beloved overflows with
longing and forgets, the lover too forgets his mortal life and, through this self-forgetting, they
both recollect who they are in a more profound manner. Both enter into a realm of épor¤, of
non-knowledge. And lest they be tempted to fall back into the world of objects, the initiation
must be reenacted time after time, and each time they both experience non-knowledge, the death
of themselves and they grow wings returning to the hearthless celestial banquet never to grasp
what is most of all.
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INTERLUDE
A MYSTERY WRAPPED IN A PUZZLE CLOAKED IN AN ENIGMA:
The Life, Times, and Translation of Pseudo-Dionysius
In Epistle I, addressed to Gaius the monk, Pseudo-Dionysius affirms that the “quite
positively complete unknowing” he is aiming at provoking is in fact a certain peculiar kind of
"knowledge of that which is in excess to everything that is known” (1065A). And indeed our
knowledge of the identity of Pseudo-Dionysius coincides with our unknowing; we do not know
anything certain about the historical author of the Corpus Dionysiacum. There are several ways
of referring to the author: Dionysius; Pseudo-Dionysius; Denys; the Areopagite; but even the
title “the Areopagite” is purely hypothetical, since our author presents himself only as
Dionysius.193
The Corpus Dionysiacum makes its first appearance during the reign of Justinian (53233), in a controversy between Orthodox bishops, Ephesus Hypatius in particular, and a group
opposed to them who gathered around Severus of Antioch.194 The Severians were monophysites
and used the Corpus as proof of the orthodoxy of their doctrine, although Hypatius expressed
doubt as to the authenticity of the work. However, throughout the medieval period the author of
the Corpus Dionysiacum had been venerated as the disciple of Paul, mentioned in Paul’s letters,
and even identified with Denys, the bishop of Paris, who was martyred.
Only during the Renaissance, due to the work of Lorenzo Valla and Erasmus, was the
authenticity of the Corpus Dionysiacum again put into question.195 Two modern scholars, Hugo
Koch196 and Josef Stiglmayr,197 also call into question the author’s identity. Their argument rests
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on Neo-Platonic terminology in general and in particular the posing of the question of evil found
in part four of Concerning Divine Names, which according to them depends on Proclus’ De
malorum subsistentia. With this in mind, Pseudo-Dionysius would appear to have been a
contemporary of Proclus, who died in 485, or to have lived little after him. In fact, PseudoDionysius attributes to his teacher Hierotheus a work entitled “Yeologk‹ stoxe≈sew,” a
title of a treatise Proclus had written. This may indicate that the author wished to hide behind the
name of his master, the last exponent of Neo-Platonism. Whatever the case may be, PseudoDionysius most likely studied at the Academy in the wake of Proclus and was greatly influenced
by him.
CHRISTIAN OR NEO-PLATONIST?
What is the true intention of the author of the Corpus Dionysiacum? Given the abundance
of Neo-Platonic terms together with the sincerity of Christian doctrine and familiarity with
liturgy,198 there is much debate as to whether Pseudo-Dionysius was a Christian or a pagan. Was
he a Christian initiated into Neo-Platonic doctrines who used the “things of the Greeks” (Ep. VII
1080B) to express the truth of the faith, or a Neo-Platonist who wished to prolongate the life of
pagan thought by introducing them into the sphere of Christian language? Scholars are
divided.199 I make no explicit reference to either heritage of Pseudo-Dionysius. I wish to let the
writings speak from out of themselves, giving us a radicalization of both Neo-Platonic and
Christian thought. And there is no reason to separate the two; a thinker can be both
simultaneously. It is clear that the Areopagite was familiar with scripture, with the patristic
tradition, and with Neo-Platonic doctrine. Emphasizing one over the others seems, to me, forced.
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I will proceed with the notion that there is no conflict between being a Christian and a NeoPlatonist.
Valdimir Kharlmov has nicely synthesized our knowledge about Pseudo-Dionysius and
his Corpus,
The Corpus Dionysiacum in its content and origin conjures up almost any meaning the
word mystical can connote. It is mysterious, veiled, hidden, clandestine, concealed,
arcane, esoteric, symbolic, otherworldly, and supernatural; and if one were asked to write
a biography of the author, it might be the shortest book in the world.200

In the end, we cannot draw any sure and definitive conclusion of the true identity and affiliations
of the author of the Corpus Dionysiacum, just as Pseudo-Dionysius wished to present himself in
the key words of his work—ineffable and unknowable.
At the very least, the supposition that Pseudo-Dionysius attended the Academy of Athens
seem convincing. Surely the Neo-Platonic tradition found its way into the Corpus. However,
there is a development of the Neo-Platonic tradition in his work. As we have seen, Plato wrote,
in what is for Neo-Platonism the single most important passage in his works, that “the good is
not what truly is but lies beyond being [§p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w] in seniority [presbeﬁ&] and
power” (R. 509b). Since the good provides being and intelligibility to the forms, which taken
together constitute oÈs¤, the whole of ‘what is,’ it cannot itself be merely one of them, but must
lie beyond them. As that by which the forms are intelligible and are beings, the good is
epistemology and ontologically prior to the forms, and in this sense “older” than being, and
makes ‘what is,’ in the sense of transcending it in power. Of course, in Plato, the precise
ontological status of the good in relation to the forms and to the intellect remains ambiguous,
since he also calls it an “ﬁd°” and an object of intellection; but Plato at least recognizes here that
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being, as the multiplicity of the forms, cannot be ultimate, i.e., that it depends for its existence
and intelligibility on a principle that transcends it, and he identifies this principle as the good.
Pseudo-Dionysius develops his doctrine of God as “nameless,” “unknowable,” and as
“beyond being.” His negative theology is not fundamentally a theory of theological language but
a philosophical position taken over directly from the Platonic tradition. Pseudo-Dionysius’ God
is transcendent, not in a vague, unspecified manner, but in the very precise metaphysical sense
that it is not at all included within the whole of reality, of the things that are. If God has no name,
that is because it is not anything at all. God is not merely beyond human thought, as if there were
some other sort of thought that could reach it, or as if its incomprehensibility were simply due to
a limitation on our part. Rather, God is beyond thought as such, because thought is directed, by
definition, to beings, and hence to that which is delimited and derivative. When we hear that God
is beyond being, we imagine some thing, even if a “superessentiality,” lying above or beyond
being. But this fails to take seriously enough the meaning of “beyond being,” for it still thinks
God as something, some being. Rather, we must recognize that for Pseudo-Dionysius, God is
simply not anything.
William Riordan has individuated four points of divergence from the Neo-Platonic
tradition: the unity of God in Pseudo-Dionysius versus the Neo-Platonic view of emanated
hypostases; the goodness of God’s universe and the Neo-Platonic doctrine concerning material
beings; God’s love for his universe and different Neo-Platonic teachings; and the ascent of the
mystic according to Pseudo-Dionysius versus the Neo-Platonic ascent.201 But Pseudo-Dionysius’
brand of Christianity is certainly a radical one, not adhering to today’s orthodoxy. He challenges
our very notion of what it is to be God at all, forcing us to question what God is and thus what it
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is to be a Christian. It is a Christianity that fully accepts and adopts its Neo-Platonic roots and
incorporates their perspective wholly and in its most radical form.
THE CORPUS DIONYSIACUM
The Corpus Dionysiacum consists of four treatises: the Celestial Hierarchy (CH); the
Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (EH); Concerning Divine Names (DN); Concerning Mysterious
Theology (MT); and ten epistles, all addressed to specific individuals. This gestures that PseudoDionysius may not have wished any of his writings to be read in isolation or as academic pieces,
but rather presents them to us as being part of a community. The Corpus Dionysiacum is
communal and should be regarded as part of a larger community.
The Celestial Hierarchy, organizes, in a rigid hierarchical system regulated by laws,
various categories of angels. The first three chapters introduce the hierarchy, both the celestial
and the human, and give definitions as to what it is to be a hierarchy. Chapters four through ten
present the celestial hierarchy by explaining the meaning of “angel” and that the hierarchy is
classified into three ranks, each of which is classified into three orders. The next four chapters
treat problems of the hierarchy, e.g., why all celestial entities are named “celestial powers;” why
human hierarchs are called “angels;” why the prophet Isaiah is said to have been purified by the
Seraphim; and what the traditional number of angels signifies. The last chapter considers
scriptural descriptions of angels.
The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, consisting of seven chapters, describes liturgical functions
and ecclesiastical orders. Each chapter considers a theme such as the tradition of the
ecclesiastical hierarchy and its scope; the rite of illumination; the sacrament of the Eucharist; the
rite of ointment; the ordination of bishops, priests, and deacons; the oders of the initiated and
monastic tonsure; and funeral rites.
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Made up of thirteen chapters, Concerning Divine Names is the longest and most complex
of Pseudo-Dionysius’ writings. It examines names attributed to the divine by scripture, revealing
the divine as ineffable and unknowable, since it exceeds all entities. Although he employs
kataphasis for naming the divine, the most appropriate path is apophatic, which consists of
depriving the divinity of every attribute and all names. And yet, the divine is the productive
cause of entities and so can be hymned or praised by all names. It is simultaneously deprived and
endowed with every name. The second chapter introduces the concepts of union and distinction
and clarifies the manner that names celebrate the divine, referring not to the first principle but to
its emanations and creative powers. The third chapter, which serves as a foundation for chapter
five of my dissertation, speaks of the importance of prayer. The successive chapters discuss
names such as good, light, beautiful, love, ecstasy, zeal, evil, being, life, wisdom, mind, word,
truth, power, justice, salvation, inequality, greatness, smallness, difference, similarity,
dissimilarity, rest, motion, omnipotence, eternity, time, and finally, perfect and the one.
The Mysterious Theology is perhaps densest not only because it is so brief, consisting of
only five chapters, but because its influence and centrality to the Corpus as a whole suggests that
it represents the entire system of Pseudo-Dionysius and should be placed within the whole
context and reexamined, since its density escapes immediate comprehension. The very title
Per‹ mstk∞w yeolog¤w could be misleading and needs to be explained. The word
“mstkÒw” could be translated as “mystic” or “mystical” but it does not, for the Areopagite,
convey a suprarational but rather something that is mysterious or hidden from others. For this
reason, I have diverged from the traditional title, “Mystical Theology” and opt instead for
“Mysterious Theology.”
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The Epistles deal with various subject matters and, because they are of a synthetic
character, could be used as an introduction to Pseudo-Dionysius’ thought as a whole. The first
speaks of the coincidence of knowledge of God and the non-knowing of God. The second
affirms that God is in excess of every source, a source that is beyond divinity and beyond the
good. Epistle III explains that the mystery of Jesus—also the divine nature, even after the
Incarnation—remains unknowable and hidden. The fourth letter continues the discourse of the
third, establishing the humanity of Jesus but at the same time, he remains excessively-existent.
The fifth resumes the argument of the divine darkness of non-knowing. Epistle VI establishes
that refuting an error does not necessarily mean comprehending the truth. In the seventh epistle,
Pseudo-Dionysius speaks of the sophist Apollophanes, of the eclipse of the sun that occurred
after the death of Christ, which was observed by Pseudo-Dionysius himself in Heliopolis. In the
eighth letter, the Areopagite strengthens the importance of the hierarchical order of the Church,
rebuking the monk Demophilus for criticizing a priest. Epistle IX speaks of scriptural and
liturgical symbolism. Finally, in the tenth, Pseudo-Dionysius foretells to Saint John the
Evangelist the end of his imprisonment on Patmos.
It is the recognition that God at once exceeds the world and being and yet is thoroughly
present in them that constitutes the heart of the Areopagite’s thought. God is beyond all the
perfections of created entities and nonetheless is the preeminent center of the circle that
exceedingly-is all of the points on the circumference (DN 821A-B). As God, it “pre-contains” as
a cause what entities have as their effects. God who is their cause surpasses them all in totality.
“Truly there is no exact likeness [§mf°re] between caused and cause, for the caused carry
within themselves only such images [eﬁkÒnw] of their originating sources as are possible for
them, whereas the causes themselves are located in a place exceeding the caused…The fire
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which warms and burns is never said to be burnt and warmed” (DN 645C). What is important for
our consideration is that a cause cannot give what it does not have. God must possess in God’s
own way all that it gives to entities to receive and possess in their dependent participating
manner. The term “likeness” [§mf°re] is derived from the verb §mf°rv, “to bear, to carry in.”
God is “carried within” entities, to the extent that they can. In fact, “it is all…it has the names of
everything that is…for it is their cause, their source, and their destiny […w ﬁt¤w …w érx∞w
…w p°rtow]. It is all in all [tå pãnt §n pçs], as scripture affirms” (DN 596C).
ISSUES OF TRANSLATION
There are two terms to which I would like to draw explicit attention. The first is PseudoDionysius’ distinctive and frequent use of the prefix “Íper-.” Although meaning “above,
beyond, or super” these translations suggest that God is a transcendent entity held above the
world of phenomena. However, this is misleading, as we will see in the last section of this
chapter; in fact “being determines method, and not the reverse.”202 Pseudo-Dionysius is primarily
concerned with how the phenomena appear to us in their initial manifestation. I have translated
the prefix as “exceeding or exceedingly” to emphasize the intensification of the word that
Pseudo-Dionysius has in mind. The term is exaggerated to such an extent that it passes beyond
its finite meaning, acting ultimately as a negation (DN 640B).
The second term to which I will draw our attention is yerx¤ (thearxia). Although it
very often names the mystery of the trinity, this is not always the case. At times it is used by
itself as a name to which things are praised. In general, I have left yerx¤ untranslated and in
the Greek. Where I have translated it, yerx¤ has been rendered as “primordial-God” to

202

Divine Light, p.34.
168

suggest that what is named here is prior to conceptuality. Yerx¤ is Pseudo-Dionysius’ name
for the highest and purest sense of God.
PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS’ “PROJECT”
To point ahead to our discussion of Pseudo-Dionysius in connection to Bataille, I have
used the term “project” in quotation marks to indicate that Pseudo-Dionysius does not have a
project in the usual sense of the word. Rather it is a project of non-project, undoing itself in the
process. Apophasis unworks the rational mind and makes it a site of exposure for that which
exceeds the discursive. His “project” could never be a personal hermeneutic superimposed upon
the subject matter. Project implies an action or a necessary to action. Pseudo-Dionysius has
something else in mind. We are left at the mercy of the “project.” Subsumed under it and held in
its sway. Discursive reasoning gives way to a surrendering of the exposure of yerx¤. That
being said, Pseudo-Dionysius does have a method, as such but is himself directed by the
phenomena themselves.
We come to know God in two respects, the soul’s double movement of ascending up into
God and becoming God through deification. We see Concerning Divine Names as PseudoDionysius’ treatise on affirmative theology, kataphasis. That is, it is about what can be affirmed
to God because of its immanence in entities and its self-manifestation in scripture. While
Concerning Mysterious Theology is a treatise on negative theology, apophasis. It is a denial of
all of these affirmations in recognition of God’s not being limited to any entity according to our
way of knowing.
The hidden God exits out of itself; it immanentizes itself in entities. Pseudo-Dionysius’
term for this is prÒodow, meaning “a going forth, advancing.” God is thus known through
sensible objects and names. In a singular way God remains [monÆ] within itself and sustains
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every entity in itself. By attraction of its goodness, God draws all, in love, back to itself. The
Dionysian term here is §pstrofÆ, “a turning back.” This divine respiration, all coming forth
from God and returning to it, takes place within God. The going forth is not a spatial distancing
of entities from God. The prÒodow is the entities’ arising into being while remaining within
God; their §pstrofÆ is its increasing resemblance to God.
The affirmative theology is a turning of the human mind toward the immanent God who
poured forth itself out into entities and of its incarnation. The affirmative theology, then, is the
soul’s deepen loving recognition of God who is, in its prÒodow, all (MT 1032D-1033C). The
soul is taken up in admiration of God’s expansive self-giving. In affirming that God is all, the
soul begins with the highest and ends with the lowest as it traces the path from the center of the
divine nature out through the divine procession and then the created emanations.
The God who is immanent in and manifest through the created prÒodow is excessivelyaffirmed beyond it. It is, then, necessary for the soul to negate all that it has affirmed of the selfmanifesting and revealing God. The soul, even as it continues to affirm that all are God by
participation, must also deny that all are God as God. What God is as God, they are according to
their mode of being, as emanations. The negative theology is a profound realization that God is
radically different from entities. In order more deeply to understand God as it actually is, then,
the soul must deny what it has previously affirmed about God. Beginning with the lowest
entities, which are not God as it is (MT 1033C-1040D), the soul ascends to denying the highest
affirmations regarding the divine nature and the trinity (DN 709C-712A). That is, God is not
limited to our conceptions of it. Thus, through these acts of negating, the soul is taken up into the
§pstrofÆ back to God.
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The soul is finally lead into a third act, which surpasses both the previous two; this third
is known as the via negativa. The soul understands that God is beyond both affirmations and
negations. It ceases discourse and in silence rises up further into God. The soul is being attracted
by God and led up [éngogÆ] and out-of-itself [¶kstsw] into union [¶nvsw] with God who
is communicated through silence itself (MT 709C-712A).

171

CHAPTER FOUR
WHAT GOES DOWN MUST COME UP:
The Aporia of the Kataphatic and Apophatic Discourse of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite
Pçn tÚ ﬁttÚn k‹ m°ne §n
tª ÈtoËﬁtﬁ& k‹ prÒesn ép'
Èt∞w k‹ §pstrÒfe prÚw ÈtØn
Proclus, Elements of Theology
Das Leben Gottes und das göttliche Erkennen
Mag also wohl als ein Spielen der Lieben mit sich
selbst ausgesprochen werden; diese Idee sinkt zur
Erbaulichkeit und selbst zur Fadheit herab, wenn
der Ernst, der Schmerz, die Geduld und Arbeit des
Negativen darin fehlt.
G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit
I. The essential undecideability of God:
In the opening chapter of Concerning Divine Names, Pseudo-Dionysius warns us “we
dare neither to speak nor think anything about that which excessively-exists [t∞w Íperos¤o]
and the hidden divinity [krf¤w yeÒthtow] except what sacred scriptures have divinely have
made manifest to us [§kpefsm°n]” (DN 588A). He again repeats this just a few lines later,
“Concerning this then, as has been said, about that which excessively-exists and the hidden
divinity, one dare not to speak or to think except what the things that the sacred scriptures have
divinely shown to us” (DN 588C). Despite exhorting us to accept what scripture reveals to us, it
gives us a conflicting discourse about God’s nature. For example, “Thusly, the nameless fits the
cause of all, which is excessive to all existing things, and so do all the names of existing things”
(DN 596C); God is both ineffable and nameable. In fact, when speaking of God the Areopagite
writes, “theologians hymn it as both without name and from every name” (DN 596A). PseudoDionysius is drawing to our attention that our discourse of the nature of God is fundamentally
shot through with contradiction. Our source from where we gain knowledge of God is unclear,
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but rather presents us with a God that is question-worthy. In other words, Pseudo-Dionysius
presents us with a fundamental aporia; how does one name that which is nameless?
It is this aporia that confronts us in Concerning Divine Names and with which the
Areopagite is deeply concerned. Moreover, from out of this, he develops two methods for
discussing God. “It is necessary to pronounce and to affirm [ktfãsken] to it [God] all the
announcements of ‘what is’. As cause of everything, it is yet even more proper to deny
[épofãsken] them all, since it excessively-exists [ÍperoÊs˙], it is above everything” (MT
1000B). Here, he presents us with kataphasis, or affirmative theology, by which we attribute
characteristics and names to God through an interrogation of entities. And also he presents us
with apophasis; literally an un-saying or a speaking-away (and perhaps in its most radical form
the via negativa)203 which denies that God can be given any attribute or name, calling to our
attention the absolute and essential ineffability of God. This entails a movement of the soul and
intellect, first downward and then in a flight upward.
And there, the word going down from that which is above, toward the extremities,
according to so great a descent, it spreads out toward a proportionate multitude; but now,
ascending away from that which is below toward the “exceeding-lying thing” [prÚw tÚ
Íperke¤menon], [the word] draws itself in [sst°llet] according to the proportion it
ascends; and after the entire way upward, it will be wholly voiceless and will be merged
with the unspeakable [˜low êfvnow ¶st k‹ ˜low •nvyÆset t“ éfy°gktƒ]
(MT 1033C).

First engaged in a long and difficult, yet necessary, battle with language, becoming entwined
with it, we make ever more affirmations of God, attempting to express its ineffable nature. And
then when the weight of discourse is almost too much to bear, we move through it, shaking free
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of it until all there is is silence. Pseudo-Dionysius presents us with a project of discourse that
undoes itself, leaving us in the aftermath of the destruction of discourse.
INTERTWINING LANGUAGE
Delimiting human knowledge, Pseudo-Dionysius writes, “if every way of knowing [ﬂ
gn≈sew] is of the things which are and is held to the limits [k‹ eﬁw tå ˆnt tÚ p°rw
¶xosn] of the things which are, then that which lying beyond all existence [≤ pãshw oÈs¤w
§p°ken] is thus removed from [§j˙rhm°n] all knowing” (DN 593A). To think being is to
think it as thinkable. What it is to be being is to be intelligible. Being means what is presented to
thought. That which is is that which is apprehended by thought. Insofar as we apply kataphasis
to God, being and intelligibility coincide; after all, “The affirmative theology (or method, as it is
sometimes called) is a turning of the human senses and intellect toward the immanent God who
has poured Himself out into His creation.”204 However, we must also employ apophasis, since
“the negative theology is a profound realization in the soul that God is radically different from all
His creatures.”205 Although God is beyond existing entities and so removed from knowing, this
does not mean to suggest that apophasis is not a legitimate disclosure of God. To be beyond
existence must be taken in a wholly negative sense, God “is the cause of all existing entities, it is
nothing [ÈtÚ d¢ oÈd°], since it is removed as excessively-existing everything” (DN 593C).
God is not any one entity. To deny the attributes of God would be to treat it as a conceptual
object even one that can be spoken of negatively. The term “being” cannot capture both entities
and God. Our thought cannot grasp God precisely because God is not there to be apprehended. In
applying both kataphasis and apophasis, we are left with a fundamental aporia that God is both
manifest in and removed from entities.
204
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Chapter VII of Concerning the Divine Names further details these two forms of
discourse.
Never, then, is it true to say that we know God; not from its nature, for this must be
unknowable and is excessively-lifted above [Íper›ron] all reason and thought
[pãnt lÒgon k‹ noËn]; but from the arrangement of all existing things, as having
thrown-forth from itself [§j ÈtoË probeblhm°nhw] and containing all sorts of images
and semblances of its divine paradigms, we ascend, by a path and order [ıd“ k‹
tãje], as it is in our capacity, into that which lies beyond everything [eﬁw tÚ §p°ken
pãntvn], in the taking away [éfr°se] and preeminence of everything and in the
cause of all. Wherefore, God is known in all things and as distinct from all things. Both
through knowing and through unknowing God is known [k‹ då gn≈sevw ı yeÚw
gn≈sket k‹ då égnvs¤w] (DN 869C-872A).

We cannot know God from its own nature, or as cause of everything, because as such God resists
a discursive account. However, God is not beyond human thought as if there were some other
form of thought that could grasp God or due to a limitation of our thought. Rather thought is
always directed toward being, while God is beyond being. This does not mean to suggest that
there is no connection between entities and God, however. As “thrown-forth” or revealed from
itself, “from the arrangement of all existing things,” we have a path toward God. What manifests
is an appearance of God, even if that appearance does not wholly reveal what manifests here.
That which is projected from God is nevertheless from God, which cannot appear clearly; in fact,
God must withhold its full manifestation. God presents itself to us by not appearing fully. There
is a movement from God to that which is “thrown out from it,” through which we can establish a
connection between God and its projections. Human reason itself is evidence of this movement
of the manifestations of God, for as the Areopagite writes, “the creation of the visible universe
having projected [prob°blht] the invisible things of God, as Paul has said, and also from
true reason [ı élhyØw lÒgow]” (Ep. IX 1108B). As Heidegger has pointed out truth, élÆye,
suggests “unconcealedness.” The truth of entities is the unconcealedness, their availability as
coming out of concealment, or obscurity. Truth entails the movement of darkness into the light.
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In this way God is known simultaneously through knowing and unknowing. God reveals itself by
withholding itself.
It may be tempting to separate kataphasis from apophasis, between God and its
projections so as not to be agitated by the aporia engendered by such a connection. But PseudoDionysius does not allow this; God is “known in all things and as distinct from all things.”
Furthermore, in Letter IX, Pseudo-Dionysius gives a description of the relationship between
these two modes of theological discourse:
Theological tradition has two aspects, on the one hand, the unsayable and mysterious, and
on the other, the open and evident. The one resorts to symbolism and involves initiation.
The other is philosophical and uses demonstration. Furthermore, the unsayable is
intertwined with what is said [k‹ smp°plekt t“ =ht“ tÚ ê==hton]. The one
persuades and treats earnestly the truthfulness of the things said. The other acts and
enacts by means of God and by instructions in a mystery which cannot be learned
through teaching, (1105D).

The Areopagite, here, tells us explicitly that kataphasis and apophasis are “intertwined.”
Although the two modes of discourse are different, approaching God from different directions,
we cannot completely distinguish them. And so, while it may be tempting for us to separate
kataphasis from the apophatic on the grounds that they are two completely different forms of
speaking, to do so would be to ignore and thus to not be affected by the aporia which
characterizes God.
It is important, and indeed vital, to understand that kataphasis and apophasis function
simultaneously in our discourse concerning God—they are “intertwined.” Recognizing this, the
reader is confronted by an aporia of how and in what way God is both “known even in all and
apart from all,” (DN 872A) transcendent and yet immanent,206 as well as how we can only speak
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The relationship between the terms “transcendent” and “immanent” is a highly complex one. O’Rourke makes
references to God’s transcendence. The term “transcendent” is misleading for there is nothing laying over and
beyond the world of beings, or the immanent. The immanent, or that which is a particular entity, does however
presuppose something prior to itself, the “transcend,” which is in fact not reducible to a being. We will see that the
two terms are not as exclusive as we may be lead to believe.
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meaningfully of God, who is ineffable, when using both kataphasis and apophasis. The two
modes of speaking, then, create an aporetic tension within the reader’s mind, “it is in the tension
between the two propositions that the discourse becomes meaningful.”207 Left with either
kataphasis or apophasis alone, all discourse concerning God is empty. God only becomes
question-worthy when one is confronted by the aporia that is engendered through both forms of
the intertwined discourse.
GOD AS UNDECIDEABLE
With these two forms of discourse coinciding, we are confronted with the statement “X is
beyond names,” and this “generates the aporia that the subject of the statement must be named
(as X) in order for us to affirm that it is beyond names.”208 A name or any set of names, no
matter how large and extensive, can only be finite; a name defines and delimits that which is
named over and against something else. To be intelligible is to be a determinate something, a
particular ‘this.’ The realm of being is intelligible by virtue of the differentiation from one
another and it is this differentiation that constitutes Being itself. The differentiation of one entity
from another is what makes all entities intelligible. And so, when we affirm that God is that
which is unsayable, we are still affirming something of God and thus delimiting it against
something else; we are affirming that God is that which is named as ineffable. Consequently, we
are left, when either affirming or denying this claim of ineffability, with an essentially
undecidable statement. In other words, the ineffability of God can neither be affirmed nor
negated. For if we affirm that God is in fact ineffable, then God would have to be named,
undermining the claim altogether, and yet, its negation must also be undecidable, since to do so
would be to utter a false claim within the well ordered arrangement of God’s creation, and
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Michael A. Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1994), p.3.
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reducing God to an entity. Anticipating this, Pseudo-Dionysius not only names God as ineffable
but as “Íper==Ætvw,” exceedingly-ineffable (DN 582D, 640D). Although this too is a name,
it is meant to signify that God is inherently unnameable. “Thus, although there is in no sense a
demonstration of God’s existence, there is the unmistaken presumption of its demonstrability.”209
That is to say, Pseudo-Dionysius has no proof for the existence of God, for there can be none,
although God’s existence must be presupposed if discourse is to make sense at all. Thus the
existence of God can neither be affirmed nor negated.210 Once again, the interconnection
between kataphasis and apophasis and the aporia which arises out of their intersection is
emphasized.
It must be noted that Pseudo-Dionysius’ discourse should not be confined to a theory of
language but has its roots within the Neo-Platonic metaphysical211 worldview.212 As Eric D. Perl
puts it,
When we hear that God is beyond being, we inevitably image something, a
“superessentiality,” lying above or outside of being. But this fails to realize the meaning
of “beyond being,” because it still thinks God as something, some being. Rather, we must
recognize that for Dionysius, as for Plotinus, God is simply not anything, not “there” at
all. If our thought cannot attain to God, this is not because of a weakness but because
there is no “there,” no being, no thing that is God.213
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Fran O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,
2010), p.7.
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Eric Perl quite correctly states “But Dionysius’ Neoplatonic negative theology transcends atheism no less than it
does theism. To be sure, Dionysius is not a theist, since theism, as ordinarily understood, involves the claim that
God exists….But neither is Dionysius an atheist for on his principles it is not more correct to say ‘God is not’ than to
say ‘God is’ (i.e., as being). Simply to deny that God exists, to say ‘God is not’ or ‘There is no God’ is still to
consider God as some (putative) being, and then to deny that there is such a being….Indeed, both ‘theism’ and
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demonstration and thus through discursive reason.
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Press: 2007), p.13.
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God is “the cause of all existing things, it is nothing [ÈtÚ d¢ oÈd°n], since it removed
[§j˙rhm°non] as excessively-existing everything” (DN 593C).214 That is to say, the Areopagite
is coming out of a tradition of thought which claims that the phenomena of the world do not have
a firm metaphysical ground upon which they rest. As we saw above, God, according to PseudoDionysius, is not a thing or an object, or subject to onto-theology, in fact “it is nothing,” and as
we will see, God is an intensification of existence to such an extent that it opens up as an
overflowing void of being, of non-being,215 or as he tells us above, nothing. However, PseudoDionysius is clear that God is “all things in all things and nothing in any” (DN 872A). The
aporia of God is brought to the fore here, escalating when we wrestle with the undecidability of
God. God is “nothing in any” insofar as God is not an entity at all; God is not included within the
whole of creation as a member of it. And yet, God is “all things in all things” in that God is
immediately present in all things as their constitutive determination. God is the Being by which
entities have existence. God is
that which is exceedingly-existent [ı n ÍperoÊsÒw §st], the under-lying cause of the
‘to be’ of the whole according to capacity, the creator of being, of coming-into-being
[Íprjevw], subsistence, existence, nature, source [érxÆ], and measure of ages and
framer of times and again of things that be. Time of things coming into being, the ‘to be’
of entities howsoever existing, birth of entities howsoever born (DN 817C).

And as such, God is beyond or removed in that it is not itself one of existing entities. And yet all
entities depend on God, which is the measure making all entities be insofar as it provides a
unifying determination by which each entity is what it is. If all determinations of all things are
the presence of God in them, then God is not simply “in all things” as if God were something
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O’Rourke, in her book, p.82, links God’s non-being with formless matter, although she admits that this is not
explicit in Dionysius it is suggested by early commentators on his work. This, however, would lead us to interpret
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other than God’s self. God is rather the whole of reality. If God were merely other or separate it
would be another entity and thus limited in relation to other entities. As “nothing in any,”
infinite, beyond, it must not be separate but present to all, and precisely as present to all entities,
God is not one of them and so is “nothing in any.” Although God’s existence must be the case,
given the well-ordered arrangements of entities, God is “all things in all things,” this existence
can neither be affirmed nor denied, and thus is “nothing in any.” Indeed, God is called “preperfect” [prot°leow] (DN 648C), and as such entities “pre-exist [prooËsn] in the good and
from the good bubbling-out [§kblzom°nhn] into entities.” (DN 712C). God is a pre-ontological
groundlessness from which entities emerge.
Furthermore, Pseudo-Dionysius himself states with regard to the individual who attempts
to track down God through hymns of praise, “You will find many of the theologians, who have
hymned it not only as invisible and unembracable but simultaneously unexaminable and
untraceable [énejxn¤ston], since there is not one trace [·xnow] of those who have penetrated
to its hidden boundlessness” (DN 588C). One not only finds oneself without a trail to follow but
there is not even a trace of oneself when moving toward God. One is, in the attempt to track
down and seek after God, subsumed and drowned in the open void that is God. Losing oneself
completely and elevating oneself to the sight of God does not, however, occur naturally (DN
589A), to do so, one’s everyday comportment to both God and the world must be interrupted. In
fact, “taking the things excessive to us [Íp¢r ≤mçw] as akin to ourselves and by being wrapped
up with that which is congenial to perception and comparing divine things according to our own,
we are deceived by the appearance we give to the divine and forbidden word” [ktå tÚ
fnÒmenon tÚn ye›on k‹ épÒ==hton lÒgon] (DN 865C). Relying upon our own thoughts,
or what appears to us immediately and taken for granted, we believe that God is an entity.
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However, giving ourselves over to the divine and taking things in excess to us as kindred to us,
we are no longer able to say for certain whether God exists. And thus, the “forbidden word” is
that which cannot be spoke and yet what is presupposed, i.e., the guarantee that God exists.
BEYOND LANGUAGE
Ultimately, however, the apophatic “consists not in negations but in silence of the mind,
rising above thought altogether.”216 We can, however, never dispense with language, for through
it we wrestle with profound concerns. But we can become victims as well as beneficiaries of
language. We must learn how to handle words effectively and at the same time we must preserve
and intensify our ability to gaze at God directly and not through opaque concepts which distort it.
And since God is that which is beyond the grasp of rational thought and resists the probing of
discursive meditation, the mind passes beyond conceptual thought and slips beyond language;
moreover, Pseudo-Dionysius describes God not only as unsayable but “excessively-unsayable.”
As we have just seen, to say that God is ineffable is too much. We must be thrown into the
fundamental aporia concerning God’s existence. Here, Pseudo-Dionysius explicitly moves us
beyond binary logic; “do not believe that denials lie over and against [éntkem°nw] assertions,
but that it is very much prior to this opposition,217 exceeding privations, exceeding all
renouncement [éf¤resn] and all announcement [y°sn]” (MT 1000B). Absolutely nothing
may be said of God, not even that it is ineffable. Pseudo-Dionysius achieves this, as we will see,
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In fact counter to Aristotelian logic, if a denial were simply the opposite of its assertion, the denial would still be
grounded in discursivity, it would simply be what the assertion is not. For the Areopagite there is no subject/object
relation between thought and the world. As Thomas Michael Tomasic has argued (“The Logical Function of
Metaphor and Oppositional Coincidence in the Pseudo-Dionysius and Johannes Scottus Eriugena,” The Journal of
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discourse. Metaphorical discourse allows for a discourse that is by its very nature excessive, i.e., it allows for a nondiscursive form of discourse. And without the restrictive propositional discourse, the world presents itself to us in a
new manner, as ‘pre-cognitive’, a world that exists prior to discursive propositional thought. This is especially
necessary if God exceeds all idols which include all words and concepts.
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through an intensifying the name ‘ineffable’ until it breaks free of its conceptual framework.
When gathered into the ultimate intensification of beingness, we pass over and beyond being.
God must not be thought as unthinkable or unsayable in the sense that the human mind, if it were
just slightly more acute, could comprehend God,218 but rather God is essentially unthinkable.
Pseudo-Dionysius states that God is “Íperãgnvston,” excessively-unknowable (DN 592D,
MT 997A). Negative theology, then, does not end in words or even in unknowing but beyond
even this. The union of the intellect occurs “in the cessation of every intellectual activity
[pãshw noerçw §nerge¤w épÒpsn]” (DN 593C). Furthermore, “ceasing from our
intellectual activities, we throw ourselves into an excessively-existing ray, as far as possible”
(DN 592 C-D). Moreover, Pseudo-Dionysius states that we are united with the unknowable “in
the inactivity of every knowing [pãshw gn≈sevw énevergns¤]” (MT 1001A), and that
“plunging into the darkness excessive intellect we find not little-speech [brxlog¤] but
absolutely non-speech and non-intellection [élog¤n k‹ énohs¤n]” (MT 1033B-C). If being
and intelligibility coincide when we speak we are necessarily in the realm of being and so we are
not gazing upon God. A “god” that can be spoken of either positively or negatively is not a god
but an entity. After all the Areopagite writes “and if someone, having seen God, understood what
he saw did not see God itself but something of those things which are and are knowable [t«n
ˆntvn k‹ gnvskom°nvn]” (Ep. V 1065A). This argument allows us to see the justification
of Pseudo-Dionysius moving beyond language and thus beyond being.
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This will be further discussed in the next chapter. However, it should be noted here that Eric Perl writes “The
ascent might be likened to hearing a sound that gradually increases in pitch until it passes beyond the range of
hearing. In one sense, there is discontinuity: we go from hearing to not hearing, from sound to silence. So also, in
ascending from Intellect to the One, we go from thinking to not thinking, from being to not any being. But, as with
the sound, in another sense there is continuity, for the transition take place through the continuation of the process
by which we reach the highest level of cognition,” Theophany, p.95. While this is a helpful example to a certain
extent, it does not do justice to the radical difference between discursive thought and the non-discursive, from the
movement of lÒgow to élÒgow.
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And so, there are claims, e.g., God’s ineffability, that while true cannot be discursively
proven, although they must be assumed.219 While systematic reasoning is something we could
not do without, neither can we possibly do without direct perception of God, which entails an
unsystematic form of language. This given reality is an infinite which passes beyond all
understanding and yet admits of being directly apprehended. This chapter will discuss the
essential aporia found in Concerning Divine Names.
Focusing mainly on Concerning the Divine Names, we will first draw attention to
kataphatic discourse. In this section, it will be explained why every name applies to God and in
what way. The names of the ‘good’, ‘being’, the ‘one’, and ‘light’ will be explained. Here, it will
be explicitly shown in what way we are able to ascribe names to that which is unnameable. This
will be revealed to be a necessary step and initiation into the topic of the next section, that of
apophatic theology. It will be shown, here, the proper way to discuss God lies in hyperlyaffirming names to God through the prefix ‘Íper-’. This intensification of conceptual thought
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Eric D. Perl in Theophany, page 6, seems to still want to think God. “To think being is to think it as thinkable.
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privative or empty but rather excessively-bubbling over with being, it is an absolute excess of being. In chapter six,
we will see that the structure and hierarchy of reality and of the body politic is anarchic.
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acts as a negation, since the concept is intensified to such an extent that the finite meaning no
longer holds sway. However, even to speak negatively of God is to think God in opposition to
something, so the Areopagite must resort to excessive-affirmations, which serve to erupt the
concept from the inside by intensifying it. Lastly, we will turn briefly to Concerning Mysterious
Theology, in which the via negativa will be applied to God. Although this text will be discussed
in the next chapter, it will be necessary here to demonstrate that and in what way discourse must
end in silence.
II. The aporia of kataphasis and symbols:
As was stated above, Pseudo-Dionysius gives us two forms of theological discourse. This
section will discuss the philosophical form associated with kataphasis and symbols. Although
there is a difference between the Areopagite’s theory of symbols and use of the kataphatic
discourse insofar as the former relies upon physical representations to describe God while the
latter focuses on conceptual representations, they both make affirmations concerning God’s
existence.220 Caught in the divine outflow, projecting from out of itself to all entities, kataphasis
serves to allow the mind to descend from its conception of God to the multiple manifestations of
entities.
Concerning Divine Names aims to show what names scripture gives to and how they
apply to God. Although this text does speak of the unnameability of God, its primary task is
kataphatic. Furthermore, its task is to reveal, given the fact that we must name God, what these
names disclose concerning the character of God. Moreover, the text ends with the Areopagite
gesturing to the lost or fictional text, The Symbolic Theology. Regardless of whether this latter
text is fictional or was intended to be written but never was or merely lost, the fact remains that
Concerning Divine Names is an introductory text. Kataphasis is the beginning of the long
220
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journey downward from God into entities. Next, the use of symbols in the revelation of God will
be discussed. Finally, we will see how the use of both names and symbols is the preparatory step
not only to other texts, such as Concerning Mysterious Theology, but for the experience of the
fundamental aporia of God.
THE EXITING AND ENTERING OF THE GOOD
The fourth chapter of Concerning Divine Names is dedicated, for the most part, to the
name ‘good’ with reference to God. The Areopagite begins this chapter,
Let us make room for the name ‘good’ [égyvnm¤], already mentioned in our
discourse, which theologians have given special honor to, the excessive-god divinity
[Ípery°ƒ yeÒtht], by calling it, as I believe, the primordial-God221 sustaining source
[tØn yerxkÆn Ïprjw],222 calling it goodness [égyÒtht]. And that the good, as
essential good [oÈs«dew égyÚn], and that by its ‘to be’ [k‹ ˜t t“ e‰n] stretches
to the utmost [dte¤ne] goodness into every entity (DN 693B).

The name ‘good’ is the first name in Concerning Divine Names to be ascribed to God; in fact,
God is “ımÒyeon k‹ ımÒgyon,” “at once both God and ‘good’” (DN 593B), God is first and
principally goodness itself, which according to Pseudo-Dionysius is that which makes whole not
only different entities but their relation with one another. The name ‘good’ makes the world
intelligible by giving each entity what it is to be. Described not only as Ïprjw, a “sustaining
source,” from which entities emerge, but also as “stretching to the utmost,” the ‘good’ is the
name for God as present in all beings. God as named ‘good’ is diffused in all entities “they are
221

The term yerx¤ “is almost absent in subsequent Christian writers; it belongs predominately to the Dionysian
theological vocabulary…in its Greek form, this word implies God’s genealogy (analogically speaking) or
generation: divine principle or origin, order, source, and beginning, which points to the ‘hidden divine nature that
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Unity and the Harmony of the Whole, p.153. In other words, yerx¤ names the God that is prior to the trinity and
thus prior to all similarity and dissimilarity. I take this to mean that yerx¤ names the “primordial God,” then. As
this word contains érxÆ, I have, for the most part, translated érxÆ and its use as a prefix or suffix as “primordial”
to help convey that God is not an entity.
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Uprjw is derived from Ípãrxv, which means “to begin, make a beginning,” “to begin to be, come into
being, arise, spring up,” “to be in existence, to be there.” As Ïprjw, then, God is that out of which entities come
forth. It is, as such, an open space, a generative void.
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through the excessively-good [då tØn ÍpergyÒtht]…they can be uplifted to the goodsource of all good things and become partakers of the illuminations thence bubbling forth [§p‹
tØn pãntvn égy«n égyrx¤n k‹ t«n §kye›yen §kblzom°nvn §llãcevn]” (DN
696C). It is that which all things participate in since the ‘good’ is the generative source from
which all entities emerge as in an upsurge and by which all are determined, “beings are because
of the value infused into them by the Good.”223 Therefore, entities are not wholly divorced from
their sustaining source but rather “bubbling out of it,” remaining within it, since it stretches out
to everything. There is a clear movement of entities.
This movement is further explained, as it is said,
The good reverts [§pstr°fe] everything to itself and is the primordial-collector
[érxsngvgÒw] of those things scattered, as the one-source [•nrxkÆ] and oneproducing deity [•nopoÚw yeÒthw]; and as source [érx∞w], as the holding-together
[snox∞w], and as end [t°low] all things are incited to it. And it is the good, as
scripture tells us, from which all things are supported and is as from an all-perfect cause
it has united all things in being…all things are reverted into it (DN 700A-B).

The ‘good’, then, is not only that in which entities are found, it is that which holds together the
arrangement of entities. It is also the source, or beginning [érxÆ] and the end [t°low] toward
which they are aimed, making the arrangement of the entities a unified, intelligible whole; God is
simultaneously the érxÆ and t°low.224 As has been mentioned by others,225 this is the NeoPlatonic “cycle of remaining, procession, and reversion.”226 Again, everything moves out from
the ‘good’, as from a generative source, and is collected by it, and returns to it. It is the
beginning, middle, and end from, in, and toward which all things tends. As a movement, this
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suggests that not only are entities dynamic, and always already manifestations of God, but that
God itself is a dynamic movement as well.
The hidden God ‘exits’ out of Himself: He “immanentizes” Himself in His creation.
Denys’ term for this is prÒodow (proodos), meaning “a going forth, advancing”…In a
singularly dynamic way, He remains (monÆ [monē], from m°nv [menō], to remain or
abide) within Himself and He lovingly sustains all creatures in Himself. By the attraction
of His goodness, He draws all, in love, back to Himself. The Dionysian term here is
§pstrofÆ (epistrophē), meaning a “turning back”. This divine respiration, all coming
forth from God and returning to Him, take place within God…The going forth (proodos,
exitus) is the creature’s arising into being while remaining (monē) within Him; its return
(epistrophē, reditus) is its increasing resemblance to its Creator.227

This movement allows one to trace the causes to the effects and vice versa;
“‘Remaining’…refers to the enfolding or undifferentiated containment of effects, or rather as, the
cause. Remaining is the identity of the effect with the cause…‘Procession,’ in turn, is the
unfolding or differentiation whereby the effects are different from each other and therefore from
the cause, so exist at all as distinct, determinate beings, as effects” and lastly “‘Reversion,’ in
turn, signifies the relation of the effect to the cause as its end, or goodness.”228 In other words,
entities occur in the midst of God as the sustaining source, whereby they are the same insofar as
they are existing things. They are given intelligibility and being as coming from the same source.
However, as proceeding from the source, entities are differentiated not only from each other and
are considered to be the specific entities that they are but also from the sustaining source from
which they arise.229 And finally, these entities are not simply different from each other but are
collected together again as aimed toward the same end, bestowing upon them intelligibility once
again. In fact, Pseudo-Dionysius writes of God
…and being, as it were, an appearing out of itself by itself [¶kfnsn ˆnt •toË d'
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•toË]…and an erotic movment, simple, self-moved [Ètok¤nhton], self-operating,
pre-existing [prooËsn] in the good and from the good bubbling out [§kblzom°nhn]
to entities, and again returning to the good (DN 712C).

We should pay special attention to the phrase “¶kfnsn ˆnt •toË d' •toË.” God
“comes out into the light or appears” out of itself through itself. Such an appearing is the
movement of God emerging from out of darkness into the light, presenting itself and
approaching the one thinking of God as from a distance. This indicates a connection that is
already accomplished between God and the individual. Approaching us in an act of “bubbling
out” God makes itself manifest through a movement of appearing. God is, then, nothing other
than the movement of the unfolding and enfolding of entities; “all being comes out from, is in,
and reverts into the beautiful and the good” (DN 705D).
GOD AS THE SUN, GIVING BEING
To illustrate the way that God, as the good, is the cause of intelligibility of entities,
Pseudo-Dionysius uses the example of the sun. “Let us now hymn the name light, according to
which we think the good” (DN 700C). We have just seen how the name ‘good’ is the name for
the self movement of entities out of, toward, and remaining within God’s manifestation.
According to this name there is no radical separation between God and entities. The name ‘light’
helps us think this in further detail, since ‘light’ is from the ‘good’ and an image of goodness.
Thus the good is hymned by the name ‘light’
as an archetype appearing out of it in images [»w §n eﬁkÒn tÚ érx°tpon
§kfnÒmenon]. Just as the goodness of the divinity [yeÒthto] lying beyond
everything, pervades from the highest and most honored entities utterly to the furtherest
most and yet is in excess of all [Íp¢r pãs §st¤], neither the foremost outstripping
[fynos«n] its superiority nor the things below crosses over its grasp, but it gives light
to everything capable (DN 697C).

‘Light’ is an archetype for the ‘good’, a foundational expression of it, which manifests itself in
images. And so ‘light’ names the ways entities appear in the world. Furthermore, the sun
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“illuminates everything capable of receiving its light and possesses light exceedingly-purely,
unfolding out [§jpl«n] everything in the visible cosmos” (DN 697C-D). The sun’s light, just
like the name ‘good’ not only encompasses everything but it literally “unfolds” that which is
visible. Light and the presence of light of the objects that it illuminates are inseparable. Presence
and withdrawal belong to the entity alone and does not describe an act of juxtaposition. Thus, for
light to be is for it to be presence. It is pure presence. Therefore, light, both sensible and
intellectual, is not only accessible but self-manifesting. Light is both the means of vision that
lends to transparency of the entities perceived and is in its own nature transparent. ‘Light’ gives
entities their movement of appearance without itself being an entity; it names the givenness of
entities to not only come to be seen but “it is the cause for the origin and life of visible bodies,
nourishing them and causing them to grow” (DN 700A). It is furthermore said that “life of the
living existence [oÈs¤] of all that is, the origin and cause [érxØ k‹ ﬁt¤] of all life and
existence, which through its goodness brings entities in their ‘to be’ [eﬁw tÚ e‰n] and maintains
them” (DN 589C). According to the name ‘light’ it is a gift from God that not only makes
determinate entities possible but also continues to give their intelligibility as well. Light solves
the problem of how entities are part of God itself and of their composite nature in the structure of
both perception and intellection. Light unfolds the intelligible nature of entities and allows them
to move us as well. The light is not only within entities and different from them but it is
manifested in every entity while not being reduced to them. All entities are good by this light
which is inseparable but distinct from them. The good cannot be an entity because it would then
be an intelligible entity and so it must be formless like light itself. Light is the intellect’s and
gives rise to an exposure that is overwhelming so that there is no “inner” or “outer” of the entity.
‘Light’ names the unified exposure of presence without distinction, an exposure, which is like
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erotic longing “divine erotic longing is ecstasy [¶st d¢ k‹ §ksttkÚw ı ye›ow ¶rvw] so that
the lover belongs not to the self but to the beloved” (DN 712A). What is good in entities is the
light, shapeless like God because it is direct vision, and is generative of the intelligibility of all
things and responsible for existence and life, which are free gifts from God. This movement,
then, is metaphysical and not simply epistemological.
Certainly, there is an epistemological component to Pseudo-Dionysius’ thought as well.
Just as we see our surroundings due to the light of the sun, revealing the world to us, the
principles of the world are revealed to us through God’s preeminent power, “and declare that the
good is called intellectual light [f«w nohtÒn] because it fills quite fully every excessivelyheavenly mind with intellectual light and expels all ignorance and wanderings from every soul in
which they might be, and imparts to them intellectual light and purifies their intellectual vision”
(DN 700D). If the intellect perceives entities of its vision, it sees the light by which it sees them,
namely the ‘good’, “the good, then, exceeding every light is called intellectual light. As fontal
ray and flood of light exceedingly-bubbling […w ékt‹w phg¤ k‹ ÍperblÊzos
fvtoxs¤]” (DN 701A). The good is light proprio sensu. We should note that for PseudoDionysius, unlike for Plato, there is no turning or spatial metaphor used to describe illumination.
He overcomes a distance that maybe attributed by the introduction of a model of representation.
The language of illumination used here stresses the continuity between perception of entities and
the illumination itself.
Just as the sun illuminates the particular entities, God, as the good, too, illuminates the
world making it intelligible. Speaking of the rays of the sun in relation to the entities on the
Earth, “due to these they are and have life, continuous and undiminished, purified from every
single corruption and death…” (DN 693C). The sun, as the ‘good’, gives the sustaining being
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and continued existence to all things, making them knowable, since to be is to be intelligible.
“We are thinking of none other than the capacity [dnãmew] which lead forth to us from it [tåw
eﬁw ≤mçw §j Èt∞w progom°nw]…the excessively-existing hidden God…producingexistence [oÈsopooÊw], bearing life and giving wisdom” (DN 645A). We can know these
capacities, according to Pseudo-Dionysius. The gifts of God are unfolded through their
participations. We discover God as we proceed through the manifestations. The distinction
between the ontological and epistemological is blurred in Pseudo-Dionysius, since they both
entail one another.
And just as Pseudo-Dionysius’ metaphysics is one of movement of appearances into the
light from obscurity, so too is his epistemology. We have already seen that “from the
arrangement of all things” God manifests “as thrown-forth by it” [»w §j ÈtoË
probeblhm°nhw],” as such the word “probãllen” plays an important role in his thought.
This word has a double valiance; it suggests both a veiling and an unveiling. God unveils itself
from the arrangement of all things, on the one hand, while on the other, “the creation of the
visible universe is a veil before [prob°blht] the invisible things of God” (Ep. IX 1108B).
The divine is veiled in the finite, created world. God is manifested throughout multiple images of
its infinite perfection, covering in form what is formless and pre-ontological. The world has a
two-fold structure. Entities simultaneously reveal and conceal the divine. They are images of
God and yet hide God’s infinite and ineffable nature. They equally reflect God’s bubbling forth
nature but they also limit the disclosure of this nature due to their limited and finite nature. It is
according to this paradoxical character that we must proceed in our investigation of God.
Continuing with Pseudo-Dionysius’ image of the sun, he writes,
For just as our sun is not calculating and choosing, but by means of its ‘to be’ sheds light
on all things able to partake of its light according to their own capacity, so too the good,
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excessive to the sun, as the preeminent archetype, is an excessive obscure image, by its
existence sends to all things that are rays of whole goodness. Due to these [rays] laid as a
foundation all the intelligible and intelligent existences and the energies and capacities,
and because of these latter they exist, have life both continuous and undiminished…and
are illuminated as to the reasons of things, in a manner particular to themselves. They
again convey to their kinfolk in spirit things appropriate to them and they have their
abiding from goodness…and while they set out to it, they have both being and good
being (DN 693B-696A).

The sun expends its energy without reason or choosing, it simply illuminates the world by its ‘to
be.’ The sun discloses entities without a ground for its doing so, it simply gives its ‘to be’ as a
gift. The appearing of entities, then, begins from the entities themselves, since there is nothing
ontological behind their appearance. There is only the movement of appearance itself. ‘Light’
names this appearance of the disclosure of entities according to their own manner of appearance.
It is a letting of entities manifest themselves in their own way or by their own capacity. This does
not mean to suggest all there is are mere appearances. God is present in the appearance of each
entity, but as the movement of the appearance itself. As “nothing in none,” God is not an entity
manifested in the individual entities, and yet God is nevertheless the being behind the
appearances. Along the same lines, in chapter V of Concerning the Divine Names, PseudoDionysius also ascribes the name ‘being’ [tÚ ˆn] to God. He writes, that his intent here in
writing this chapter is “to hymn the procession [prÒodon] of the primordial-God, sourceexistence [yerxk∞w oÈsrx¤w], the thing which makes-things-exist [tØn oÈsopoÒn], into
everything that exists. The divine name ‘good’ makes manifest the whole processions of the
cause of all things” (DN 816B). He further continues saying,
now then, since we are speaking of these things, come, we should offer hymns up to the
‘good’ as truly what is […w ˆntvw ˆn] and making-existence [oÈsopoÒn] to every last
thing. It which being, excessively-existing, is the under-lying cause [Ípostãtw ﬁt¤]
of the whole which is capable, the creator of being, of that which is sustained
[Ípãrjevw], subsistence, of existence, of nature. Source and measure of ages and being
of time and the age of things that are, time of things coming-into-being, the ‘to be’ of
things howsoever existing, the beginning of thing howsoever begun…the being in things
existing and things howsoever being reality and subsisting” (DN 817C).
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Far from being a static presence, the name ‘being’ is a dynamic movement. Take note of the
language used, the compound word “oÈsopoÒw.” The name ‘good’ as ‘being’ is itself a
“making-of-entities.” ‘Being,’ then, names the coming into being of entities and not of a
presence in the sense of being objectively there. As Jean-Luc Marion writes, “Better, the gift is
given strictly to the degree that it renounces Being, that it undoes itself from itself by undoing
subsistence in presence.”230 Pseudo-Dionysius radically rethinks being. As we have seen, being
is dynamic; it itself is a movement, which calls forth our thinking and wrestling with the
fundamental aporia that such a movement of appearance presents to us. The movement of
entities presupposes God’s existence but this existence is hidden and concealed from us, thus
calling to mind the question-worthy status of God’s existence.
To illustrate how and in what way God is the being from which all particular entities
emerge and again return, the Areopagite uses the example of a circle, its radii, and its center.
Every radii is brought to a unity in the center of the circle; the center contains every radii. As the
radii move from the center, they become more differentiated, “and in the center itself, they are
completely unified but standing a little distant from it, they are slightly separated and when more
apart, more so. And the nearer they are to the center the more they are united to it and to each
other” (DN 821A). As God is literally unfolding out [§jpl«n] into the differentiated entities
which we experience, through prÒodow, each becomes more distinct, just as the radii from the
center of a circle do when they move outward from its center. But as each moves toward God,
through §pstofÆ, each moves into a unity back to the sustaining source, or Ïprjw. The
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center holds all radii equally and is the source from which they radiate outward. Being and unity
are different and being like multiplicity requires unity, “this must be especially known, that
according to the preconceive form [proepnooÊmenon e‰dow] of each one, entities united are
said to be made one, and the one is elemental of all, and if you take away the one there will be
neither the totality or part” (DN 980B). There is a distinction between what an entity is and that
unity which makes it what it is “through the overwhelming indivisibility of the whole divine
oneness, in which all entities are uniquely collected and are excessively-unified and are with it
excessively-existing. Wherefore also all entities are rightly attributed to it; by which, from
which, through which, in which, and to which all entities exist are co-ordered and abide, are held
together, are filled and are returned to it” (DN 980B). This unity is present in an entity’s
organization but also is an immanent principle of the organization. The existence of an individual
entity is properly explicated in reference to the entity’s unifying principle, and not simply to the
entity itself. We must see not just what the entity is but why it is, and if this is to be a proper
explanation it must not be an abstract principle but in a special way internal to the intelligibility
of the entity. We have seen that it is the names ‘good’ or ‘light’ which bridge the physical and
intelligible. The names ‘good’ and ‘light’ function as productive forces in entities, not by
reasoning or action but as its own force because the ‘to be’ of the entity is inherent in its very
being. Just as light is immaterial, it is not strictly speaking in matter as a quality inhering in a
substratum but rather is directly what the entity is. Light and the good are inseparable from the
entity, for they have the power to make an entity. For example, the radii, as emerging from the
oÈsopoÒw, appear from out of themselves. Pseudo-Dionysius returns to the example of the
sun to describe how entities are both undifferentiated and differentiated both from each other and
from their emerging, sustaining source.
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Although the sun’s light comes from a unified source, its light reveals multiple objects in
multiple ways. Each entity is manifested in its particularity, but also the sun reveals them as
unified, as a collection of entities that are able to be seen as a grouping. For example, the
Areopagite writes,
For, if our sun, is one being and giving a uniform light, it makes the being and qualities
of perceived things, although they are multiple and various, it nourishes and guards,
perfects and makes them separate, unites and makes to shoot up again [ényãlpe], and
gives productivity to, increases, makes to leap forth [§jllãte], and settles, and makes
to burgeon out of [§kfÊe], stirs up, and gives life to all; and each of the whole, in a
manner appropriate to it, participates in the one and same sun and the one sun
preeminently in itself is the cause of the many participants (DN 824B-C).

While the sun gives a uniform light and unifies that which it illuminates, what it illuminates is
multiple. The unified light, then, from the sun multiples itself when it makes entities manifest.
Furthermore, although the sun is one, a unity, it nourishes and makes a multiplicity of entities
grow and burgeon forth. God is the universal principle of all that is. It, like the sun, is responsible
for the production and existence of entities. This suggests that God is responsible not only for the
unity of entities but also for their multiplicity, but it cannot be the cause of multiplicity, what is
different from it by it remaining within itself. It would appear that either God is not the principle
of multiplicity or it is and so cannot remain by itself, that is that it would alter its nature. God
must give something that it does not have, that is being. God “is being in things that are and
things howsoever existing and subsisting. And for God is not some being but absolutely and
unboundly…and it neither was, nor will be, nor became nor becomes, nor will become (DN
817D). The good is not found in God as a principle. God is the principle of the good by its not
being the good, although it is the generative force of being. God is formless, it is separate from
all names. God is the power of all the specified names. It is the power to give rise to all possible
names. If God is formless in respect to all the names, it has the power to generate them all. “To
say it again that the being of all entities and to their ages from the pre-existing” (DN 820A).
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Again, we see that ‘light’ makes entities spring into existence, making them manifest from out of
their undifferentiated source.
GOD AS CAUSE
Although, the Areopagite is giving a kataphatic account of being, it would be a mistake,
to think God as the first efficient cause, as in Aquinas’ account where “God’s essence can be
grasped through knowledge of things that are caused by God. For whatever God is, God is
essentially, and if God is the first efficient cause, God is so essentially…This means that God is
related to things as the artisan to the artifact. But production of this sort requires a grasp of the
intelligible form of things.”231 Certainly, God is the cause of existence in that it imparts being to
entities by giving what it does not have. And so, we are explicitly told that “God is not some
being [ı YeÚw oÎ p∆w §stn

n] but simply and without delimitation, having comprehended

and pre-contains [proelhf≈w] the whole of the ‘to be’ in itself” (DN 817D). God does not
initiate motion or explain how an event gives rise to another that is numerically distinct from it
but like in kind. And so if God is the cause, it must be in some other way than a first efficient
cause. In fact “to describe God positively as ‘cause’ would be to regard him as a being and
ascribe to him the attribute of causality…when [Dionysius] calls God ‘cause’ he does not mean
this in the modern sense, in which one being is the cause of other being and God as the ‘first
cause’ is the ‘supreme being.’”232
Although, Pseudo-Dionysius uses the image of an impression from a seal (DN 644A),
which would seem to gesture toward the artisan and craft relationship, this is not entirely the
case. As in the example, the wax which receives the seal differs in quality, hard, smooth, clean or
already printed upon (DN 644C), giving rise to the different impressions. It would appear that, as
231
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the example states, God is the preeminent cause, which would stand in a causal relation, as the
exemplary cause, to entities, of the impressions. However, each impression is not just simply of a
seal but rather of the archetypal, or perhaps primordial seal [érxetÊpo sfrg›dow] (DN
644B). The seal itself is hidden from us; there is nothing to which we can compare it. To show
this the Areopagite writes, “excessively-lying above this is the nonparticipation of the allcreative divinity, for the fact that there is no touch or contact [§pfÆn] with it” (DN 644B).
Although God is “all-creative,” the divinity as such does not touch entities, and so does not have
a causal relationship to entities at least in the traditional sense. Anthony J. Steinbock, in his book
Phemonenology and Mysticism, states that God is a vertical cause to distinguish it from
traditional efficient causation.233 “I use the term ‘verticality’ because of the existential sense it
bears—the orientation, the meanings, and the dynamic movement it evokes.”234 Moreover, he
states “Verticality is the vector of mystery and reverence; horizontality is what is in principle
within reach, graspable, controllable.”235 Consequently, “The unpredictability of the vertical, the
dangerous, spontaneous, undomesticable quality of the vertical is incompatible with what we
predominately value and are encouraged to value. If we live in a ‘horizontal’ world that
suppresses the vertical, it is nonetheless a world that is susceptible to verticality and beyond
control; it is a world into which the vertical erupts.”236 In other words, the vertical is the name for
the eruption of the divine into the world of entities. God as cause, then, is not a cause in the
normal sense of the word, but rather a disruption of our everydayness. If we shift the focus from
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horizontal to vertical causality, God becomes that which disrupts and resists our normal
understanding of causality as that which is completely comprehensible by rational understanding.
After all, as is stated above, “God is not a being.” “It [God] is the cause of beings, it is
nothing [ÍtÚ d¢ oÈd°n], as excessively-existing is removed from everything…And yet is the
sustaining source [Ïprjw] of goodness, by its to be [Èt“ t“ e‰n] is the cause of all
being…all things are around it and for the sake of it” (DN 593C-D), and “everything is around
it” (DN 596C). Everything revolves around God, that is to say, is made to move because of it.
And simply by its ‘to be’, simply by being this movement do things emerge. From the good, light
is the fontal ray excessively-bubbling, it emanates or erupts, springing forth. Pseudo-Dionysius
describes this as a prÒodow, a procession. Light in the form of a ray illuminates all things and is
at once of being and knowledge, the manifestation of God fills and constitutes every entity. “The
good indeed is not entirely uncommunicated to any one existing entity but benignly shows forth
[égyoper«w §pf¤net] the excessively-existing ray, fixed, by illuminations
[§llãmcesn] analogous to each entity” (DN 588C-D). Moreover, “by its ‘to be’ it sends to all
entities that are the rays of its whole goodness, according to their capacity. By reason of these
rays subsisted all the intelligible and intelligent existing entities and capacity and activities” (DN
693B). The being of any entity consists in its knowing God and in its making God known to
others. The procession of sensible to intelligible reality is not merely analogous to the procession
of light from its source; it is the procession.
We have already seen that God moves in the prÒodow-§pstrofÆ pattern. Now we can
understand how this applies to God as a cause. God as prÒodow is an undiminished giving
cause. It emanates from out of itself. As shown above, God is the activity by which entities
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emerge. Considered as an undiminished giving cause God is exemplified as a “bubbling-forth”
“and from the good, bubbling out into existing entities [§k tégyoË to›w oÔsn
§kblzom°nhn]” (DN 712C). Moreover, God “is said to be perfect, both without increase and
always perfect and as undiminished, as pre-holding [pro°xon] all entities in itself and
exceedingly-bubbling [ÍperblÊzon], inexhaustible and same and exceedingly-full
[ÍperplÆrh] and undiminished abundance [xorhg¤n] in accordance with which it perfects all
perfect things and fills [époplhro›] them with its own perfection” (DN 977B-C). Note the
ebullience in the discourse of God. Pseudo-Dionysius is contemplating God in its own work.
God is an inexhaustible reality, without reasoning or choosing. Entities are an activity springing
out from God, which its giving cannot not have occurred and cannot cease. It should be stated
that God is not compelled to bubble-forth but is beyond necessity. For God to “fill” all things it
must be “in all things” and “nothing in any.” The two mutually entail each other, since God must
be by itself alone and simple. The imagery of emanation is successful in that it expresses the
relationship of dependence that exists between the source and the entities which have bubbledforth.
But there is an irreducibility of God. Although God gives being to entities, it itself is not
a being.
Everything divine, even those made manifest to us are known by participation alone; and
they in the way that they are according to their primordial abode [ktå tØn oﬁke¤n
érxØn] and foundation are excessive to the intellect, all existing, and knowing. For
example, if we have named the excessively-existing hiddenness: ‘God’, ‘life’,
‘existence’, ‘light’, or ‘word’, we have no other thought than the capacity brought before
us from out of it (DN 645A).

We have no knowledge of the things revealed to us except by the thoughts that are given to us
from the entities themselves, but what they truly are, what their abode, or primordial seal, their
sustaining source is, is always hidden and obscured from us. Moreover, “the goodness
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excessively-named should be named, it has had pre-contained [proe¤lhfe], in itself, all things”
(597A). God “pre-contains” the entirety of what it is to be in itself. God, then, does not contain
entities or impressions as a seal would, but pre-contains them, that is to say, pre-ontologically, or
primordially. As Ïprjw, we have already seen that God is the source that allows entities to
come into being from themselves. Here too God is understood as a pre-ontological source, a
cause that is not a cause in the traditional sense but one that disrupts our very notion of what it is
to be a cause. Entities are not held in God as in a container or vessel, as something possessed, but
as pre-contained as having a place within God without imposing presence upon them. It is God
giving itself without intermediaries. God gives room for entities to manifest. We have already
seen that God is the paradigm for all existing things (DN 869C), and are in God without distinction
but we should not and cannot conceive of God as containing them in the sense of possessing

them. Rather, God pre-contains them, containing them in a primordial sense. The paradigms are
the determining factors which make entities be at all. All the features of every entity are God in
them, making them to be by making them what they are. In other words, God cannot be reduced
to a container or mere seal for the paradigms or forms of entities. Rather as pre-containing
entities there is no objective being to be found in God. There is only the movement of
appearance. By which I mean that Pseudo-Dionysius overcomes the immanent-transcendent
model. He overcomes the spectator-centered perspective. Pseudo-Dionysius maximizes the
potential for unity. It is not the case that each entity imperfectly represents God. It is also that in
each entity the unity of it is measured from the perspective of the pre-ontological unity of God.
Entities are not themselves in God but only manifest themselves as entities when they move in
the proÒdow and §pstrofÆ relationship.
Furthermore, it is written that God is “pre-existence, pre-being, pre-existing [prÚ
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n k‹ ˆntow] and pre-time and the source of all creative powers, and the middle, and

the end and for this reason, according to scripture, the truly pre-being [pro≈n] is molded in
many ways [pollplsãzet] according to every thought of beings” (DN 824A). The
middle voice “pollplsãzet” is used here to convey that our concept of God appears to
be many things in relation to us. It names both the individual’s action toward the object and the
object’s self-presentation to the individual. It is a relation of exposure and the world from the
side of that which is a manifestation originating with the object. Just as each impression is of the
archetypal seal, which does not participate in any of the impressions and which itself must be
able to take on many forms to shape all the impressions, God, too, as pro≈n, is prior to the
being of all entities but which manifests itself in relation to the human intellect. God is nothing
but the self-appearing of entities as they appear.
Along the same lines, “of all things, the pre-being [pro≈n] is the source and the end of
existing things. Source as cause and the end for the sake of which and delimitation of all things
and the limitless of every limitlessness” (DN 825B). As both the érxÆ and t°low, as that which
simultaneously gathers and pre-contains the whole, God can neither be a multiplicity nor the
whole but exists prior to this distinction. When God is said to be a unity, it is characterized in
this way, “this must be especially known, that according to the pre-conceived form
[proepnooÊmenon e‰dow] of each thing, the things united are said to be made one and the one
is the elemental thing [tÚ ©n stoxevtkÒn] of all. And if one takes away the one, neither the
whole or the part of anything will be” (DN 980B). As the pre-ontological, elemental most basic
facet of what is, God is neither the totality nor the part, but that which makes them possible and
necessary and is presupposed while never able to be proven, since it is not contained by the
totality. We could say that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Analysis always
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overlooks a remainder. We do not begin with being but with pre-being. Can we continue by
negating or affirming to incorporate the remainder into the totality? What preceded entities is not
being but pre-being, a not having a beginning. In saying this, we retrospectively speak as though
entities were present before they began. And so we are drawn to negate this beginning again. In
saying that God is nothing we must be careful to realize that there is something called “nothing”
only if there is something over and against by which it is called “nothing.” The whole out of
which entities became differentiated is both nothing, since entities have not yet emerged and is a
cause since everything emerges from it. By adding “nothing” to entities one still has to add a
remainder which is found in pre-being. But speaking, again retroactively, we believe as if there
were already entities to be present or absent. We seem to be progressing in an infinite regress,
while trying to find God as a cause. But this should come as no surprise since God is “all things
in all things and it is no thing in them” (DN 872A). Discursive thought is limited to apprehending
entities and God is not any entity, it is inaccessible to the intellect. In fact, Pseudo-Dionysius
states, “it is necessary to ask how we know God, which is neither intelligible nor sensible
[oÈd¢ nohtÚn oÈd¢ ﬁsyhtÚn] nor any entity whatsoever” (DN 869C). We must move beyond
the intellect or discursive knowledge into a union with God itself. “It is necessary to know that
the intellect in us has, on the one hand, a capacity of intellection, through which it beholds
intelligible entities, and on the other hand the union exceeding the nature of the intellect, through
which it is joined with things beyond itself” (DN 865C-D). At the peak, when union is achieved,
discursive knowledge passes over into non-discursive apprehension, “souls, uniting and
gathering their manifold reasonings into one intellectual purity, go forth in the way and order
proper to them through immaterial and undivided intellection to the union excessive to
intellection” (DN 949D).
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The above description of the prÒodow-§pstofÆ cycle would entail giving an account
of the effects back to their ultimate cause, God, except that when speaking of God as the good,
the Areopagite explicitly states that God gives being to all things in the following way,
Since we are speaking of these things, come then, and let us praise the good as being
what truly is […w ˆntow ˆn] and making being to all existing things. It, which is, the
excessively-existing thing, the underlying [Ípostãsw] cause of the whole of the to be
of things capable, and the creator of existing, the sustaining source, existence, and
nature....And moreover, God is not some being [ı YeÚw oÎ p∆w §stn Àn] but simply
and without delimitation, having comprehended and pre-contains [proelhf≈w] the
whole of the ‘to be’ in itself (DN 817C-D).

Surely God, as “truly what is,” the ˆntow ˆn, literally “beingly-being,” is the enactment or
movement of what exists. In this way, God does not stand in relation to the world as an artisan to
his or her craft, for not only is God not an entity, but there is a continual movement of entities
coming into existence.
From this Pseudo-Dionysius claims,
And through knowing God is known, and through unknowing [k‹ då gn≈sevw ı
YeÚw gn≈sket k‹ då égnvs¤w]. And there is of it intellection, and word, and
knowledge [§pstÆmh], and contact, and perception, and opinion, and imagination, and
name and all the rest. And it is neither conceived nor spoken [l°get] nor named. And
it is not any entity nor is it known in any one entity. And it is all in all, and nothing in
none (DN 872A).

On the one hand, “it is the cause of all entities, but itself is none as excessively-existing removed
from all [ÈtÚ d¢ oÈd¢n »w pãntvn Íperos¤vw §j˙rhm°non].” According to this mode of
discourse, to best know God is to deny all characteristics of entities. While on the other hand,
Pseudo-Dionysius claims that we have knowledge of God as a cause,
And yet since it is the sustain source of goodness [§pedØ d¢ »w égyÒthtow
Ïprjw], by its ‘to be’ [Èt“ t“ e‰n] it is the cause of all entities, one must hymn
the beneficent providence of the primordial-God [yerx¤w] from all of the things
caused. For it is the center of all things and for the sake of it entities are. It is prior to all
things [§st prÚ pãntvn] and in it all things are brought together; and by its ‘to be’ all
things are made and have their existence (DN 593C).
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God is known through both affirmation and by denials. Considered in its fundamental nature,
God is completely unknown, but through the processions of its “bubbling-forth,” its emanation,
God is known by entities. This is due to the manner in which entities both veil and unveil God’s
existence. This is grounded in the very tension of the aporia of God itself. God communicates
itself through the effusion of goodness in the “thrown-forthness” of its perfections; “the generous
procession [égyoprepØw prÒodow] of the undifferentiated divine unity, multiplying itself
excessively-uniquely through goodness and taking to itself many forms, is also a divine
distinction” (DN 644A). And yet, Pseudo-Dionysius insists that all participations which are
shared through the cause of all things are united “then the things united even within this divine
differentiation are the acts by which it irrepressibly imparts being” (DN 644A). God remains
“united even in its distinctions, excessively-pours [Íperx°os] in its unity and multiplies
without going out from the one” (DN 649B). As a cause, then, God appears as a paradox and
contradictory predications may be attributed to it.
Despite the kataphatic aspect to Pseudo-Dionysius’ writings, it becomes hard if not
impossible not to read them apophatically; the Areopagite says as much at the end of
Concerning Divine Names. “And neither do we apply the name goodness, as making it fit, but by
the desire to know and to tell something concerning the unsayble nature, we reserve for it the
name which is most revered. We should be in agreement in this matter with the theologians, yet
we fall short of this. They have a preference for ascent through negations” (DN981A-B). This,
however, should come as no surprise since kataphasis and apophasis are intertwined. Before
moving on to the apophatic, let us now briefly turn toward the Areopagite’s use of symbols as
these will act as a bridge to the apophatic.
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PHYSICAL AND ICONIC REALITY
Pseudo-Dionysius does not simply discuss conceptual matters, but in moving from
kataphasis to the use of symbols, he moves the discussion to physical entities. The Areopagite’s
influence over scriptural analysis went so deeply as to have quite an influence on the formation
of the Church, particularly with regard to the Second Council of Nicaea, the council that decided
the status of the use of symbols and icons. Named twice in documents from this council, PseudoDionysius shaped the early and subsequent Catholic view of iconography.237 During a time in the
formation of the Church fraught with controversy over whether or not physical objects, icons or
symbols, should be venerated, the Areopagite’s writings gave direction.
The origins of what was to become called the “Iconoclastic Crisis” began with the
question of whether images of Christ should not only be made but worshiped; was it idolatrous to
do so? “The accusation of idolatry provoked a sensitive point of Christian belief—it posed the
question whether images of Christ were acceptable since He is contemporaneously divine and
human.”238 In support of images of Christ appeals to the incarnation were invoked. If the
previous law against making idols still remained, the line of argument went, why had God, as the
Son, made itself manifest physically? “To negate this means to diminish the genuineness of
Christ’s humanity.”239 Moreover, Christ’s love of humanity and incarnation does nothing to
alleviate the question-worthy status of God’s relationship with the world. The proÒdow, then,
even if ascribed to Christ, or especially because it is ascribed to Christ, is hidden from human
understanding, despite speaking of it discursively.
The incarnation allows Pseudo-Dionysius to move from conceptual names as that which
describes God to all physical entities as symbols of God’s power; “there is understanding, reason
237
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[lÒgow], knowledge, touch [§pfÆ], sensation [‡syhsw], opinion, imagination, name…” (DN
872A). Due to the prÒodow-§pstofÆ movement, each physical entity is a touch and sensation
of God,240 “The Cause is touched and sensed in and through its effects.”241 In fact, the use of
symbols gives one the ability to move from “effects to causes, and then Jesus lighting our way,
we shall see the contemplation blessedness of primordial beauty [t«n érxetÊpvn kãllow] of
the made bright manifest things” (CH 428C). Symbols, then, allow for knowledge of the sensible
world, for matter is “some echo [éphxÆmt] of intelligible comeliness and it is possible due
to these [material things] to be led to the immaterial primordials [tåw é@low érxetp¤w]”
(EH 144B-C).
SYMBOLS, CONNECTING THE WORLD
A symbol, sÊmbolon, as “reflections of an invisible beauty” (EH 121D), is literally a
tally-marker, which has been cut in a certain fashion to fit with only one other half. As such, the
sÊmbolon is defined by what it is not as much as by what it is. Each sÊmbolon is a mirror
image toward what it gestures—it is the opposite of what it intends. For example, a finite entity
gestures toward “the excessively-bubbling up [ÍperblÊzon] source” (DN 977B) from which it
emanates and the material gestures toward the immaterial primordiality. A sÊmbolon, then, is
itself an openness, a rupture, a pure overflowing of what it indicates. Indeed, symbols must have
this paradoxical structure,
For the word of God itself asserts that it [God] is dissimilar and of the same rank as none,
as different from everything and more paradoxical, it says there is nothing that is similar
to it. Yet this argument is not contrary to the similarity towards it, for the same things are
both similar to God and dissimilar (DN 916A).
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Everything is both similar to and, at the same time, dissimilar to God, “and this is what it means
to be a symbol.”242 A symbol both conceals and reveals what it presents. It conceals God’s
infinite and unsayable nature through it being able to be spoken of, but in the act of concealing a
symbol reveals that God is unsayble, a topic to which Pseudo-Dionysius states he has given
much thought.
For not even we should have gone into investigation from out of waylessness [§j
épor¤w] into an uplifting due to the exact explanation of divine inquires, if not for the
deformities of the descriptions of the angels’ manifestations had shocked us, not allowing
our minds to linger in the boorish images, but completely rousing us to reject material
inclinations and accustoming us to elevate ourselves through things apparent to the
excessively-cosmic (EC 145B).

Only in being troubled by the apparent discontinuities, by becoming estranged to the everyday,
can one peer behind the veils or symbols, which hide the truth. And yet,
let us not think the appearances of the those things put together have been formed anew
for their own sake, they are projected forward [probebl∞sy] for the sake of the
knowledge [§pstÆmhw] of the unsayble and the invisible against the multitude…We
must, contrary to the common attitudes concerning them, reverently enter into the holy
symbols, and not dishonor them, being products and molds of the divine and they make
apparent images of the unsayable and excessive-nature visions (Ep. IX 1105C-1108C).

Moreover, symbols are likened to veils (Ep. IX 1108B); consequently they both project what the
divine is while simultaneously concealing it.
According to the Areopagite, however, God does not simply emanate unthinkingly, as the
above example of the sun indicates, but also in the symbol of Christ reveals itself out of love for
humanity;243 “Christ’s love for humanity is cited repeatedly as the motive for his
Incarnation….Throughout Deny’s understanding of Christ, Love reigns supreme. By His loving,
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ecstatically creating of the beings of the cosmos, they are, continue in being, and are
perfected.”244
As loving toward humanity because it [theachy] truly and wholly shared in one of its
under-lying things, in things belonging to us recalling to itself and lays upon the human
extremity, out of which, in a manner unsayable, the simplex Jesus was composed…and
now, according to our capacity, through the sacred veils of the love of humanity, made
known to us through scripture and hierarchy, which enwrap intellectual things in
perceptible things and things excessively-existing in things that are and place forms and
shapes around the formless and shapeless (DN 592A-B).

Here, God, as Christ, is given an intent for acting in the world and even in the creation of the
world. Again, the kataphatic language Pseudo-Dionysius employs opens up into an aporia, on
the one hand, God bubbles over without thought, while on the other from out of love for
humanity. It would appear that Pseudo-Dionysius wishes to challenge both the Neo-Platonic
notion of emanation and Christian love of humanity, placing them side-by-side and thus forcing
the reader into a deeper understanding of both.
“The function of the symbol stands in overcoming the contrast between God’s
transcendence and the hierarchy that connects God with the material world.”245 Christ, who is
both fully human and fully divine, both similar and dissimilar to both, is able to bridge the
ontological gap between the heavenly and earthly realms.246 It marks not only the earthly and
immediate manifestation of God, but draws our attention toward the hidden aspect which every
sÊmbolon presents, “they incite humans to go beyond the mere exterior perception;”247
moreover “symbols not only have a revealing role, but they also serve to conceal.”248 Instead of
ignoring one aspect of Christ’s existence for the sake of the other, in order that the aporia of his
incarnation to be resolved, the iconophile’s use of the writings of the Areopagite understood that
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“the icon exemplifies a paradoxical vision that amalgamates similarity and dissimilarity.”249
Letter III speaks to this.
“Sudden [§j¤fnhw],” is that which is contrary to what is hoped for, and out of the, as
yet, unmanifested is made manifest. But with regard to Christ’s love of humanity, I think
that the word of God speaks in riddles [ﬁn¤ttesy], that the excessively-existing
emerged from the hidden [tÚ §k toË krf¤o tÚn ÍperoÊson], into manifestation
among us by having the existence of a human. But he is hidden, even after the
manifestation, or to speak more divinely, even in the manifestation for in the truth of
Jesus has been kept hidden and the mystery with respect to him has not been reached by
reason or understanding [lÒgƒ k‹ n“] but even when spoken of, it remains unsaid
[éllå k‹ legÒmenon ê==hton m°ne] and when conceived, non-known [k‹
nooÊmenon êgnvston] (1069B).

The incarnation strikes one as sudden, that is to say, as enigmatic, contrary to expectation. There
is no reason for it despite its having been given. Furthermore, the symbol of Christ is so striking
precisely because it conceals that which it makes manifest. But it is this strikingly enigmatic
characteristic of Christ that makes a connection between what it conceals and what is disclosed.
Christ is the aporetic space into which one is lost and made open to that which is essentially
unsayable.
Connecting both kataphasis and the sÊmbolon as modes to the “philosophical
discourse,” the Areopagite compels the human mind already into apophasis. If every name is a
sign of its own negation when ascribed to God and every sÊmbolon gesturing toward what is
concealed, we cannot but at the same time speak negatively of God; “to apprehend a symbol, a
manifestation, is to apprehend some being, and hence not God himself.”250 After all, one must
ask, what sort of unity can contain opposites. We are going to see, presently, that we should not
think of the one or the unity which contains opposites as a thing, for God is beyond being.
Instead, it is a zero point, a conceptual destruction. In the prÒodow-§pstrofÆ movement that
is God, God becomes non-being, despite being ascribed to it. To put it otherwise, God is aporia,
249
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that which is essentially able and defined by contradiction. It is to the apophatic mode of
discourse that we will now turn.
III. Apophasis: Unsaying God:
We have just seen how and in what way names are ascribed to God: God as ‘cause’,
‘being’, the ‘good’, as ‘light’, and the ‘one.’ Such designations presuppose that God is the
ground of being [ÍpÒstsw], an underlying thing, which supports and gives being to entities.
However, it was also stated previously that Pseudo-Dionysius prefers the apophatic mode of
discourse. He favors this mode of discourse because God “is, in a manner, unspeakable and nonknowledge [ky' ¥n éfy°gktow k‹ égn≈stow]” (DN 586B). In fact, “nothing that is or is
known [oÈd¢ êllo t t«n ≥ tn t«n ˆntvn snegnvsm°nvn] can lead out the hidden
excessive to every word and intellect of the excessively-existing excessively-deity in excess of
every excessive-existence [t∞w Íp¢r pãnt Íperos¤vw ÍperoÊshw ÍperyeÒthtow]” (DN
981A). Apophasis, then, explicitly thinks God as the unsayable. After going through the long
initiation process of kataphasis “they discover that although it is the cause of all things, it itself is
not an entity, since it excessively-exists all things” (DN 593C). The endeavor of kataphasis is
reevaluated, “the way of negation appears to be more suitable to the divine and affirmations are
always unfitting of the hiddenness of the unsayable” (CH 141A), since “there is no name for it
nor expression but is elevated above in the inaccessible [éll' §n ébãtow §jπrht]. And
neither do we apply the name goodness, as making it equal to it, but by a desire of understanding
and saying something concerning the inexpressible nature, we give the most august names to
it…hence even then theologians have given preference to the ascent by negations, as standing the
soul our of things like it [»w §jst«sn tØn cxØn t«n •tª smfÊlvn]” (DN 981A-B).
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HYPERLY-DENYING GOD
Apophasis is not a simple negation of the names ascribed to God through kataphasis.
Rather it hyperly-negates the names by attaching the prefix ‘Íper-’. “The names, then, common
to the whole deity [t∞w ˜lhw yeÒthtow] as we have demonstrated from scripture…are
excessive-good, excessive-God, excessive-existence, excessive-life, excessively-wise and
whatever else is of a superabundant denial [éfr°sevw]” (DN 640B). Indeed, far from placing
God below the level of being, denial places God beyond being “for the mindless and the
insensible we must attribute to God, by excess [ÍperoxÆn] and not defect, just as we attribute
nonsense to it which is above reason [ sper k‹ tÚ êlogon ént¤yemen t“ Íp¢r lÒgon]”
(DN 869A).
Every name that has been ascribed to the divine is now denied so that, “after every one of
our thoughts of divine-images, halting our own powers of thought, we cast ourselves, according
to the laws, into the excessively-existing ray” (DN 592D). We must stop our own intellectual
capacities if God is excessively-existing because “if all knowing is of existing things and they
are limited to existing things, then what which lies beyond all existing things, is raised above all
knowing” (DN 593A). To recognize that God is not an entity requires that our way of thinking,
how we normally comport ourselves toward the world, is disrupted. Such a disruption pushes the
concepts that the names designate from the inside to their breaking point. We give ourselves over
to the divine itself, purifying not only language but ourselves in the process. “The god-like minds
[yeoede›w nÒew] made one by unions, through the imitations of angels as far as is possible, since
it is during cessation of every intellectual energy that such a union as this of the deified minds
[§kyeom°nvn no«n] toward the excessive-god [Íp°ryeon] light takes place, hymn it most
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appropriately through the denial of all entities [pãntvn t«n ˆnt éfr°sevw]” (DN 640BC).
The deification [ye≈sw] as found through apophasis serves to reveal the paradox that
God is unlike us yet we are like God. Our relationship to God is both close and distant. We
cannot comprehend God and yet we still have a sense of its presence, God is “all things in all and
it is no thing among them” (DN 872A). God cannot be wholly other, separate, or transcendent,
since God would then be an entity set over and against and limited by other entities, e.g., the
world itself. As beyond being, God must not be separate from entities and precisely as present to
all, God is not one of the entities, and so is beyond being. God is that by which all entities have
their being and by which they are entities and so is beyond being in that God is not one of them
that possesses being. If the determinations of entities is the presence of God, then God is not
simply “in all things” as if God were some entity other than itself. God, rather, is the power by
which entities are, deifying us.
In the Medieval period, many found apophasis particularly useful to discuss God’s
unknowable character and used Pseudo-Dionysius’ language. In particular, “In Thomas Aquinas,
for example, there are more than seventeen hundred quotations from Pseudo-Dionysius the
Areopagite…Now it is certainly a sign of the ‘universal teacher’s’ peculiar greatness that he
vigorously incorporated into his own thinking the ‘unscholastic’ element of negative theology
and philosophy, as a counterpoise to ratio’s tendency to overemphasize the positive.”251 Indeed,
“Aquinas’ discussion of the possibility of our knowledge of God” is “the question of whether
any created mind can see God’s essence. According to Aquinas, the purpose of PseudoDionysius’ claim was to describe the situation of the finiteness of the human mind and the limits
251

Josef Pieper, Scholasticism: Personalities and Problems of Medieval Philosophy (St. Augustine’s Press: South
Bend, 2001). P.53.
212

of possible knowledge of God,”252 furthermore, “Aquinas clearly acknowledged the infinite
distance between the human mind and God.”253 However, despite finding Pseudo-Dionysius
useful, Aquinas is unable to go all the way with him in terms of apophasis and its ultimate
silence, to which we will turn shortly—“Specifically Aquinas wanted not to be forced, as he
suspected the Pseudo-Dionysius was, into having to deny one can have any knowledge of God at
all—into having to claim God is simply unintelligible.”254 The apophatic mode of discourse
attempts to relate the effects and the names of God back to their ultimate source (through
§pstofÆ), however, “the problem is whether it names that signifier according to our mode of
understanding, which falls short of a proper understanding of God, can signify God…the causal
relation between God and creatures must stand outside of the scope of Aquinas’ negative and
analogical theology because these presuppose it.”255 And so, as we have seen, all naming,
predication, and defining God must fall outside of and yet be presupposed within the discussion
of God itself.
INFINITE INTENSITY
To discuss the effects of God, then, already takes for granted that God exists. But as we
saw in the first section of this chapter, the existence of God must remain essentially undecidable.
This is an act of “divine faith” (DN 872C), which revolves around a lÒgow which is “simpler
than simplicity and set free from all as excessively-existing [ÍperoÊson]” (DN 872C). The
lÒgow of “divine faith” is able to be a discourse of God, since as “simpler than simplicity” it
makes no presupposition about God’s existence, or rather is able to give room for God’s preontological being to manifest. Furthermore, “if all knowledge unites the knower and the thing
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known…nothing will separate the one who believes from the ground of true faith and it is
through that he will come into possession of an enduring, unchanging identity” (DN 872D).
Language and experience allows for the conclusion that God exists on that assumption that what
they entail is true but also that neither would be intelligible if God did not exist. Faith desires to
transverse this gap, all unnaming of God is the understanding striving to transcend itself to grasp
what is beyond it. Any formula of God is empty of concept about God and refers only to the
limits of the understanding and it is this that guarantees to refer to God. Faith describes the desire
to make what faith desires present. Faith is the intersection of language and desire. It expresses
the infinite distance between us and God and how to transverse it. There is nothing, no being, no
mode of existence, nor expression of God, in a finite way of understanding, that can fully contain
God; “and so it is as the cause of all things and transcending all things, it is rightly nameless and
yet has the names of everything that exists” (DN 596C). To remedy this Pseudo-Dionysius uses
the prefix ‘Íper-’, which changes the register of discourse from the finite to the infinite.
The prefix ‘Íper-’ acts as a corrective. All language, no matter how large, is finite and
delimits something over and against something else, but, as we have seen, God is not an entity.
Apophasis does not erase the names that Pseudo-Dionysius has given to God, after all scripture
gives these names. The Areopagite places the prefix ‘Íper-’ onto finite names so that our
understanding of them is disrupted and disturbed. The hyperly-affirmed denial is an avowel of
the superabundance which is unable to express itself. We are brought to the utmost limits of
knowing; all intelligible concepts have been removed. We accept and assert that radical
incommensurability of our thought and that of our goal. In fact, “God’s surpassing Being in
Himself, outstrips all. He is ‘é’ (not) because He is ‘Íp°r’ (beyond).”256 The prefix ‘Íper-’ is
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placed onto names ascribed to God in order to show that God is not any one entity, or even a set
of entities—but rather it is an intensification of names to push the concept of God outside of the
realm of entities, rupturing the concept of God itself. God is not only ‘good’ but “excessivelygood” and not just God but “excessively-God.” Furthermore, it is said that “the non-living
excessively-having life and the incomprehensible thing excessively-having wisdom [tÚ êzvon
Íper°xos zvÆ k‹ tÚ ênon Íper°xos sof¤]” (DN 697A). In other words, God is
not a life but life as intensified and not intellect but intense wisdom. As negating the finite
concept which our minds would normally place upon God, ‘Íper-’ intensifies the word such that
it now has a completely new meaning. In fact, those fully initiated “into the sacred mysteries of
our theological traditions say that the divine unities are the hidden and un-springing-out
[krf¤w k‹ énekfotÆtow] excessive-foundation [ÍperdrÊsew] of the excessiveunsayable [Íper==Æto] and excessively-unknown thing [Ípergn≈sto]” (DN 640D).
Those who are deified realize that God is nothing but the intensification of meaning and being.
The prefix ‘Íper-’ places God outside of the realm of the finite, and therefore stands outside of
the human intellect altogether. The ‘good’ which is the cause of all things is eloquent but makes
no utterance itself, now standing outside the reach of thought altogether. It manifests to those
who have passed beyond all things where we “plunge into the darkness where scripture says,
truly dwells the one which is in excess to all things” (MT 1001A). We now enter into the “divine
darkness,” the “darkness of unknowing” by which we know in a manner beyond understanding.
It is to this, the divine darkness, to which we will now turn.
IV. Saying nothing, the via negativa:
We have just seen that ‘Íper-’ is a denial of names in the sense of intensifying them to
such a degree that the finite conception one has of them is ruptured from the inside. Participating
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in this intensification, one becomes deified, conforming our intellect to be like that of God’s
excessive nature, “…of those who are being lead by it, a protecting leader; of those being
illuminated, illumination; of being perfected, source-of-perfection; and of the primordial-God
those being deified [yeom°nvn yerx¤]…excessively-existing absolutely everything
[èpãshw Íperos¤vn], excessive-source of source and according to what is allowed by God
and the human [ktå yemtÒn] as good gives out a share of the hidden” (DN 589C).
In fact, through God “we are brought into contact with the unutterable and unknown
[ky' ¥n éfy°gktow k‹ égn≈stow] and we are made to be joined together unutterably and
unknowingly, in proportion to the superior union of the reasoning and intellectual capacity and
activity within us” (585B-586A). Such contact is said to be “divinely-brought about lights
[yeorgkå f«t]” (592B), through which “we will become angel-like, as scripture tells us,
but until then, we use symbols appropriate to divine things and from these elevate ourselves…we
cause ourselves, as best we can, toward the excessively-existing ray, in which every limit of all
knowing have pre-existed unsayably [§n √ pãnt tå p°rt ps«n t«n gn≈sevn
Íper==Ætvw pro#f°sthken]” (DN 592D). We are brought to the very limits of what is
knowable when we give ourselves over to the divine ray which exists beyond entities. And in so
doing, “we stop the activities of the intellect and to the extent that is proper, we approach the
excessively-existing ray” (DN 592D). In fact, we are brought into conformity to that which is in
excess of all knowing, “For if knowing is of existing things and is held to the limit of existing
things, then that lying beyond all things is taken out of knowing” (DN 593A). Now we are not
only hyperly-affirming concepts and words to God but we are moved completely outside of
knowing all together. This Pseudo-Dionysius terms “divine darkness,” which is “unapproachable
light” (Ep. III 1073A), in which we are “uplifted to the ray of the divine shadow, which is
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excessively-existing” (MT 1000A). Here, in divine darkness, the soul stands in direct contact
with the manifestation of God, “where the mysteries of God’s word lie simple, absolute and
unchangeable in the excessively-light darkness of a hidden-mysterious silence. Amid the deepest
shadow they pour an excessive-luster on what is excessively-appearing” (MT 997A-B). God is
unapproachable so that in comparison to our own intellect it remains shrouded in impenetrable
darkness, not due to any defect of our intellect but due to the brilliance of “darkness in excess of
intellect [Èp¢r noËn gnÒfow]” (MT 1033B). God’s movement as appearance is now so present
as to blind the soul, unable to gaze upon divinity itself.
Deified in this way the soul understands that God is beyond both affirmations and
negations, “it is beyond assertion and denial. We make assertions and denials of what is next to
it, for it is both beyond every assertion, being the perfect and unique cause of all entities, and by
being preeminently simple and absolute nature, free of every limitation, beyond every limitation,
it is also beyond every denial” (MT 1048AB), and thus beyond all knowing whatsoever;
assertions and denials belong to the realm of being. Only profound silence is left.
“With wise silence, we honor the unsayable” [tå d¢ ê==ht s≈fron sgª
tm«ntew] (DN 589B). Faced with the logical outcome and consequences of the relationship
between kataphasis and apophasis, one is confronted by a paradox and by contradictions. All
there is left is silence of the mind. After having named God as the unsayable and through the
apophatic excessive-affirmation, we realize that no words can capture God—not only is God
unsayble, but excessively-unsayble (DN 592D). “The more we take the flight upward, the more
our words are confined…we shall find ourselves not only running short of words, but in truth
speechless and unknowing” (MT 1033B-C). We experience the unlimitedness that characterizes
God. We should not confuse this silence, however, with either quietude or a laziness of the mind.
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“It is not only that God is excessively-full of wisdom that its faculty of comprehension is without
measure, but excessively-situated above all reason [lÒgo], all intelligence, all wisdom” (DN
865B). The silence erupts from the confrontation of the aporia that has arisen from the interplay
of kataphasis and apophasis. It is won after a long contestation with language.
As we have seen, the image of light has been ascribed to God, but God is such a brilliant
light as to be darkness, blinding, bewildering (MT 997B). The light which has brought us out of
ignorance now stupefies us, due to its overwhelming nature. The Areopagite quoting from 1
Corinthians 1:25, writes “The foolishness of God is wiser than human,” and although it may
seem contrary to reason and out of place to attribute and praise this of God, it leads us up “into
the unsayble truth and pre-rational [prÚ lÒgo]” (DN 865C), for “we attribute to it [God]
nonsense [élÒgon]257 because it is excessive to reason” (DN 869A). We are exposed to the void
that God represents. “This apophatic sense of mystery is not a mystery in the sense of a secret
known only by an initiated few. It is not a doctrine that is to be accepted as true but which is held
beyond rational explanation. Rather, it is a basic human response…to the nothingness in which
being is situated.”258 For, “the one beyond thought is unthinkable to all thoughts, the good
beyond word is unsayable by means of all reason [lÒgƒ]…word unsayable, non-sense
[élog¤], unconceptual, and without name, existing according to no thing’s existence” (DN
588B).
The divine darkness brought about by the overwhelming nothing of God is what PseudoDionysius calls unity, which is beyond anything the human can achieve on its own (DN 585B),
“and participating in its [God’s] gift of intellectual light…even in the union excessive to
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I’ve chosen to translate élog¤ here as “non-sense” to emphasize that God per se is prior to discursive thought
altogether and when one confronts the non-being of God per se all reason breaks down.
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understanding, through non-knowledge and most blessed efforts according to the rays of
surpassing brilliance” (DN 592C). Speaking of Moses, Pseudo-Dionysius writes,
setting foot upon his most holy of places, upon the outermost extremity of thought—and
at that time, he is released from them, from those things seen and of seeing and enters
into the truly mysterious darkness of unknowing, by which he truly shuts out knowing.
Being seized in the wholly impalpable and invisible, he belongs entirely to him who is on
the far-side of everything, and also to nothing, neither to himself nor to another, but
absolutely to unknowing by means of an inactivity of all knowing according to the more
powerful oneness and by knowing nothing, by coming to know exceeding thought (MT
1001A).

Within mystic union there can be no discourse available because nothing exists—neither God
nor oneself; one belongs wholly to unknowing. Speaking elsewhere of the union with God,
Pseudo-Dionysius writes, “but standing outside [§jstm°now] of ourselves totally and
completely and becoming wholly God. It is better to be of God and not of ourselves. For thus
divine things will be given to those who are becoming with God. Hymning superlatively this, the
nonsense [êlogon], mindless and foolish wisdom, we say that it is cause of all mind, reason, all
wisdom and comprehension…and in it all treasures of wisdom and knowing are hidden” (DN
865D-868A). Everything is in union insofar as there are no distinctions to be made. There is no
distinction between the divine and the human any longer precisely because neither exist;
“conventional logical and semantic structures—the distinction between reflexive and
nonreflexive action, the distinction between perfect and imperfect tense, the univocal antecedent
of a pronoun—are broken down.”259 Language concerning the non-experience of God itself goes
through an §pstrofÆ, reverting back upon a non-ground, a pre-ontological meaning, which we
have seen reason [lÒgow] demands. God is swallowed up, concealed in its own revelation
turning to nothing since “it alone may make itself manifest authoritatively and with knowledge”
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(DN 588B). But as we have already seen, God is undecidable, from out of itself it can only
manifest nothing and non-sense—its authority is a non-binding non-knowledge.
The entire work of Pseudo-Dionysius has been an arduous effort to express the
inexpressible. A discourse that is concerned with words and concepts which by definition cannot
be uttered or understood. He has a strategy to impose negation upon affirmation and affirmation
upon negation, intertwining them, intensifying them both, whose only aim is to disrupt discourse
itself. All we are left with is the insufficiency of this project, which is in fact a non-project, a
means by which to destroy all conceptual thought. God may be neither affirmed nor denied. It is
to this that we will now explicitly turn our attention.
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CHAPTER FOUR
COMMUNICATING WITH SILENCE:
Prayer, Catharsis, and Suffering God

Was sich überhaupt sagen lässt, lässt sich klar sagen;
und wovon man nicht reden kann,
darüber muss man schweigen
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein

Mystische Erklärung.—Die mystischen Erklärungen
gelten für tief; die Wahrheit ist, dass sie noch
nicht einmal oberflächlich sind.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Nietzsche

I. Communicating silently in ascension:
In the previous chapter, we examined the integral relationship between the kataphatic and
apophatic forms of theological discourse. We saw that far from being separate they are
intertwined and that together they force us into a fundamental aporia concerning the status of
God’s existence. This relationship reveals that the existence of God is undecideable, which is to
say we can neither affirm nor deny God’s existence but God must, nevertheless, exist if anything
does at all. Using kataphasis, or positive statements concerning God, one is initiated into
inherently contradictory and paradoxical statements. For example, both being [tÚ ˆn] (DN
816B) is ascribed to God while it is said, simultaneously, that God is itself nothing [ÍtÚ d¢
oÈd°n] (DN 593C). Exposed to this aporia, Pseudo-Dionysius shifts registers to apophasis.
Attaching the prefix Íper-, “hyper or exceedingly,” to ordinary words, the Areopagite hyperlyaffirms terms such that they no longer can be attributed to God in the usual manner, and in fact
the preposition acts as a negation (DN 640B). With the addition of Íper-, the word is intensified
so that it cannot be ignored. When a concept is exceedingly-affirmed, we come to realize that our
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normal and everyday understanding of what it is to be divine cannot be reduced to language. We
next saw that apophasis then develops into the via negativa, the silencing of the intellect. We
realize that no discourse, not even negative discourse can reach the excessive mystery that God
represents, since it is not a concern for the intellect but rather is an immediate response. The only
way to communicate God, then, is through silence.
Aristotle set the course of Western philosophy by determining the basic form of
communication as lÒgow épofntkÒw. This is characterized by a subject-predicate structure
(“S is P”) (De Int. 17a10-15). LÒgow épofntkÒw affirms something of something [t ktå
tnow] or denies something as something [t épÒ tnow] through predication (De Int. 17a2527), and by virtue of this structure it is the only form of communication capable of being “true”
or “false” in the sense that it either discloses or disguises reality (De Int. 17a1-5). In its
fundamental structure of “something as something,” lÒgow épofntkÒw is a relational
structure. The different manners in which different determinations can relate to each other and
form such relational unities, i.e., the forms of predication, are thematized by Aristotle as the
categories, derived from kthgor°v, “to publicly declare something as something,” “to accuse
something as something.” We should note that the Aristotelian categories are not simply
“linguistic” or “mental” structures in the 20th century conception of language, but rather
structures the articulation of reality itself. Understanding this, but wishing nonetheless to
emphasize God as a non-entity, Pseudo-Dionysius attempts to recuperate the articulation of
reality under a different guise. He desires to bring communication back to a pre-theoretical
hermeneutic.
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SELF-EVIDENT SILENCE
While the saying “we honor the unsayable with wise silence” (DN 589B) has already
been introduced not enough has been said concerning this silence. In fact, one facet has not been
discussed at all; how are we to communicate the unsayable with silence? What does this silence
entail? Far from being quietism, a retreat from language, this is a wise silence, a silence that must
be earned through a long confrontation with language. At the end of his Celestial Hierarchy,
Pseudo-Dionysius writes, “other things we have left aside, as with the things said, for regard to
the symmetry of the argument [lÒgo], and honoring by our silence that which, hidden, exceeds
us” (DN 340B). To keep silent and to speak belong to one another; there is symmetry between
the two. For example, of God, “theologians hymn it as the nameless one and from every name”
(DN 596A)—naming emerges from out of the nameless, and returning again to silence. Only
after wrestling with the attempt to communicate the unsayable does silence truly honor that
which is hidden.
True silence is primary. There is nothing that lies behind it. It is self-evident and the
indemonstrable beginning point of all communication. And yet, it dwells in the background,
never making itself present. Like silence, God is an indemonstrable starting point of reflection; it
is so immediately present as to be unnoticed. God is the unspoken presupposed exposure site “at
the center of everything” (DN 593D), since it is through “the unknowing [égnvs¤] of what
excessively-exists exceeds speech, mind, and existence [Íp¢r lÒgon k‹ noËn k‹ oÈs¤],
which one should ascribe to it a knowledge which excessively-exists” (DN 588A) by which God
is revealed. God is known through unknowing, a way of disclosure that is privileged over and
prior to knowing, as is shown in the opening lines of Concerning Mysterious Theology.
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As essentially self-evident but never experienced, like silence, God exists simply; silence
is, just as God is, “imageless and exceeding-natural simplicity” (DN 592B). To say that God
possesses some characteristic is to misrepresent the simplicity of God, “we see in nearly every
theological work, the primordial-God [yerx¤n] is holy hymned as monad and union, on
account of the simplicity and unity of its exceedingly-existing indivisibility…” (DN 589D).
Anything said of yerx¤ is adding something to it; to communicate yerx¤ is to limit its
indeterminacy. Like silence, there is nothing behind God; it is elemental (DN 980B). “Moreover,
ascending, we say, since it is neither soul nor thought, it has neither the capacity to be an object
presented [fnts¤n] in thought, nor seeming, nor word, nor thought. It is neither word, nor
thought—it cannot be spoken of or conceived of” (MT 1045D). Yerx¤, as such, does not
manifest itself. Existing simply, yerx¤ resists conceptuality. This is not due to an inability or
lack of power on our part, but rather it exists in such a way as to be prior to appearing as an
object of intellection. We are exposed to yerx¤ but we never experience it.
Silence is presumed by language itself, allowing language to manifest, just as yerx¤ is
and is presupposed in all entities; “to hymn the being-making procession of the primordialsource-God source-of-existence [yerxk∞w oÈsrx¤w] into all being” (DN 816B). As the
pure being-making advancing movement, yerx¤ allows entities to become manifest as a site
of exposure but in a manner that is not itself realized, “the good cause for all is both loquacious
and laconic and at the same time speechless, since possessing neither speech nor thought it,
exceedingly-existing, is an exceedingly-lying thing [Íperkem°nhn] of everything” (MT 1000C).
Yerx¤ is loquacious insofar as it is the movement of entities manifesting themselves, but is
laconic and ultimately silent because it itself is never experienced.
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SLIPPING INTO SILENCE
The word “silence” is a “slipping word,” as Bataille tells us.260 A slipping word grabs the
attention in advance by being the abolition of what it states. The entire meaning slips away.
When it is spoken, the mind glides, despite its own volition, to its opposite, returning us
endlessly back to the word in a cycle of slipping away from the meaning of it. The movement of
meditation is interrupted. There is nothing that is represented except the movement away from
the concept itself. The slippage of the word has released another experience of language and of
thinking which does not mediate. There is an immediate grasp of what the word means to
connote. As soon as “silence” is spoken, it transgresses what it suggests. However, only in
speaking the word “silence,” in communicating it, can silence itself be experienced and brought
to the fore to be confronted. Only when “silence” is spoken and understood, when the
contradicting sound is uttered, does silence itself strike us. The word “silence” allows the mind
to slip beyond the word to the point of exposure that it presupposes.
Pseudo-Dionysius too has a concept similar to a “slipping word.” He states that the image
of the sun is an “echo” of the good (DN 697C).261 While the image of the sun is but an echo of
the good, the good manifests itself when language aims at it and, which while distant from its
origin, must be heard within a patient silence. Consequently, such echoing words point beyond
themselves and so to a pre-discursive exposure of yerx¤, “we consider the hiddenness and
struggle to set free all the workings of our intellect” (DN 645A). Silence is listening to the
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Georges Bataille, Inner Experience trans. Leslie Anne Boldt (Albany: State University of New York Press,
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See Concerning Divine Names 720A, 856B, and 868C for other references to echo. And while echo does have a
slightly pejorative meaning, the language used signals a harkening to. It reveals the need to listen, in silence, to that
which has already be uttered by God. For example, at 856B, God as life resounds “down to the last echo of life.”
While everything that is alive is not life itself, everything shares in life as an echo, a sound that does not originate
from itself but from what has already been spoken.
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resounding echo of the pre-discursive emergence from language, giving words new fullness and
meaning.
The word “God,” too, slips from the concept it means to convey; after all, God is said to
be ÍperyeÒthtow (DN 693B). “If we have named the exceedingly-existing hiddenness: “God;”
“life;” “existence;” “light;” or “word” we have no other thought than the capacity brought before
us” (DN 645A). Pseudo-Dionysius cannot merely speak of God, rattling off name after name as
if the accumulation of names could build a god and not simply invent one. The name “God” is a
confining concept and only when “God” is uttered, becoming a discrete something, “the cause of
everything” (DN 593C), can it become clear that God “is not an existing thing since it is beyond
all things” (DN 593C). Only when “God” is acknowledged as that which oversteps what it
conveys does what it presuppose come into relief. When language is kept in close relation to the
silence it presumes does Pseudo-Dionysius reminds us “do not believe that denials lie over and
against assertions but that it [God] is very much prior to this opposition, exceeding-privations,
exceeding all renouncement and all announcement” (MT 1000B). The truth that “God” assumes
is prior to both saying and renunciation, it resides instead in silence, to which we can be attuned
to only after “God” is uttered.
Pseudo-Dionysius communicates the character of God as unsayable by means of silence.
There is a sovereignty of silence. This is no longer a silence that awaits mediation through
language. It is a silence of discourse, or, better, a silencing of what subordinates the language of
signification, to the articulation of sense. To attain a sovereign silence is to make immediate
contact with the listener, such that in that listening there is a break with the demand which
governs signification, that is the subordination of God to language itself. But we must speak of
God and use language to do so, even if signification is suspended and meaning is slipped. To
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communicate “God” can appear to be edifying. Can the Areopagite avoid the same fate?
Dionysian communication is made of words; even if it does more than signify, it also signifies; it
signifies nonetheless and therefore bears the risk of becoming staid. The communication about
God is never pure; it cannot happen once and for all. It is necessary to begin and begin again.
LANGUAGE THROUGH SILENCE
Language does, nevertheless, unfold a concept, making it knowable to the extent that it
can be, “and there, the word going down from that which is above toward the extremities,
according to so great a descent, it spreads out toward a proportionate multitude” (MT 1033C).
What “God” names becomes manifest and discursively known only when it is spoken of. It is
necessary to speak of yerx¤ to know it. For example, we speak of those things which can be
determined by language, what belongs to kataphasis, e.g., “the all-perfect name good [pntel∞
égyvnm¤n]” (DN 689B), which is set apart from all other names and which the “primordialGod sustaining source is called goodness” (DN 693B).
Furthermore, “the good returns [§pstr°fe] everything to itself and is the primordialcollector [érxsngvgÒw] of those things scattered, as the one-source [•nrxkÆ] and oneproducing deity…” (DN 700A). Yerx¤, as the good, then, returns what is said back to its prelinguistical origin. In fact, all naming is determined by the good, which “gives-form [eﬁdopoe›]
to the formless” (DN 697A). As such, the name good, from which everything proceeds, leads us
back to communicate the formless, which cannot be spoken of. However, when we attempt to
make our way back to yerx¤, to comprehend what has just been uttered, “ascending away
from that which is below toward the exceeding-lying thing [prÚw tÚ Íperke¤menon], the word
draws itself in [sst°llet] according to the proportion it ascends; and after the entire way
upward, it will be wholly voiceless and will be merged with the unspeakable” (MT 1033C). And
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so, authentic silence does not result from a flight from language but rather working our way
through language and pushing it from within its interior, language ruptures and collapses under
its own weight. Language is able to lead us back to the origin only because it propagates its own
negation; it is a gesture toward the unsayable. Language collapses under the weight of
communication. We do not simply run out of words to speak, but language falters, merging with
that which is speechless.262
However, attempting to communicate God purely from kataphasis, one communicates
only one’s own presuppositions; for example, Epistle I, “Someone beholding God and
understanding what he saw has not actually seen God but rather something of his which has
being and is knowable” (1065a). Or
we must know that our intellects have the capacity of intellection, through which it looks
at the intellectual things, but that union through it is brought into contact with the thing
exceedingly-held to itself surpassed the nature of the intellect. We must then contemplate
divine things, according to this union and not in accordance to ourselves but by our whole
selves, standing in ecstasy to our whole selves [˜lvn •t«n §jstm°now] and
becoming wholly God, since it is better to belong to God rather than to ourselves (DN
865D-868A).

Emphasizing both ecstasy and belonging to yerx¤ wholly, the Areopagite is attempting to
recover a more original sense of “God” by setting aside a view of it that we have inherited from a
theory of thought that has stressed pure and dispassionate theorizing. There is no pure external
vantage point to which we can gain access to God, for we are always in the procession of God’s
manifestation.
Pseudo-Dionysius has various ways of communicating God through silence. Within this
chapter we will unveil the ways in which the Areopagite is able to communicate that which
essentially resists articulation. The first method of communication that will be discussed and
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The source from which communication arises is unstable and pre-ontological; this is why the Areopagite speaks
of yerx¤, in the Concerning Mysterious Theology, as a Íperke¤menon, a exceedingly-lying over thing, and not as
a substratum, we lose that which has being and is thus what cannot be spoken of.
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which will lay the foundation for the remaining sections of this chapter is the use of prayer. First,
prayer is a form of communication which does not predicate anything of that toward which it is
aimed. It falls outside of the true/false dichotomy which usual forms of language lay out. It will
also be revealed that prayer does not affect God but rather transforms the supplicant. It will
finally be shown that God is neither an object set over and against the individual nor found
within the individual but rather manifests itself ecstatically in the prayerful space between the
two. The dualism between subject and object has been dissolved. Ecstasy is another form of
communication used by Pseudo-Dionysius. Here it will be revealed that the human itself has no
ground for its being other than the ecstatic nature of the divine. Ecstasy is communication insofar
as it challenges our own isolated being. Finally, suffering God is the form of communication for
the divine, which most befits the human being. We suffer or undergo God in the sense that God
happens to the individual despite the willingness of the individual. Silence does not mean noncommunication, rather it lays bare the individual in a total loss, or a squandering of the self,
opening the individual.
II. Prayerful communication:
We have just seen that silence is elemental and primary, mirroring the simplicity of
yerx¤. Here, a mode of communication that is able to maintain its relation to silence while
communicating the exposure of yerx¤ will be revealed. In this section, we will examine
prayer. Although it is a form of communication, whether spoken or simply thought to oneself,
prayer exposes us to that which cannot be articulated.
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The focus of chapter three of Concerning Divine Names is “the capacity [dÊnmw] of
prayer” (DN 680A). What is examined in this chapter, in part, is what prayer “accomplishes.”263
Pseudo-Dionysius describes how prayer influences the way we comport ourselves to the world.
A discussion of prayer is necessary, since in our common era prayer “connotes a petition of some
kind, a kind of ritual worship, or an attempt on our part to communicate vocally or interiorly
with a Supreme Being. Often prayer tends to be an attempt to bend God’s will to our own.”264 In
what follows it will be shown that Pseudo-Dionysius very clearly does not share our
contemporary view of prayer. Rather, Pseudo-Dionysius’ prayer is an originary, pre-ontological
exposure to yerx¤.
THE PARADOX OF THE TRINITY
First, that toward which prayer is intended, for the Areopagite, is not a personal deity, or
a “Supreme Being” but rather the trinity, which holds within itself the paradox of differentiation
and unity. Maintaining this paradox, the trinity is prior to all conceptual thought and is closely
linked with,265 if not identical to the yerx¤,266 the primordial-God. Pseudo-Dionysius states,
“first, if it may be permitted, let us thoroughly examine [§pskec≈mey] the all-perfect
manifesting name good of the whole procession [proÒdvn] of God and having invoked the
primordial-source-good [égyrxkÆn] and exceedingly-good trinity…” (DN 680B). The name
good is surely important for Pseudo-Dionysius; not only is it the foundation upon which he
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We will see that prayer does not accomplish anything of value as understood under the rubric of utility and
knowledge. Indeed, as the chapter unfolds, it will be shown that prayer brings ruin to the self or ego of the
supplicant, reducing and returning it to nothing. If anything positive results it is non-knowledge.
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John N. Jones “The Status of the Trinity in Dionysian Thought” The Journal of Religion, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Oct.,
2000), pp.645-657, “For the sake of this article, I define Trinitarian thought as any thought identifying the highest
moment of the Godhead as Trinitarian in some way. This would include, e.g., a subordinationist view that posits the
Father as the source of the Godhead, but would exclude a view of Father, Son, and Spirit as subordinate to a prior
principle with no Trinitarian identity” p.645n1.
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builds his kataphatic theology, but here we are told that the trinity, yerx¤, is prior to the name
good. Having thoroughly examined the name or concept of the good, we see that within it hides
the trinity. Only having invoked the trinity first can the good manifest. The name good, the most
fundamental name, is dependent upon the trinity. In fact, all names are dependent upon the
trinity, since “it is present to absolutely everything although not everything is present to it” (DN
680B).267 That upon which kataphasis is built originates from the paradoxical structure of the
trinity, or yerx¤.
Although it is a principle of differentiation, the trinity, as yerx¤, is responsible for the
unity of all things but in a very unique manner. “For all the formal trinitarian orthodoxy of the
writings of Pseudo-Dionysius, neither the One nor the Three of earlier trinitarian theology could
be maintained in the conventional terms…so that to call God one was not strictly proper unless it
was made clear that unity did not mean here what it meant anywhere else,”268 in fact, PseudoDionysius calls God “exceedingly-being unity [ÍperoÊs ßnvsn]” (DN 641c)269—it is a
principle of being without it itself possessing being or without itself being an entity (DN 821D).
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In other words, everything participates in the trinity while it itself does not participate. The trinity is prior to what
is posterior. The latter depends upon the former, whereas that which is prior exist independently of the posterior.
The good, then, exists without impinging upon the independence of the trinity. It may be tempting to think of this
presence as a presence of something, that the union which we experience is a union with some entity. The trinity “is
not in a place in such a way as to pass over from one thing and toward another. But to say that it is in all things is
misleading since it leaves exceedingly all things and gathers all things” (DN 680B). In some sense the trinity is
omnipresent, gathering all things. It is meant to demonstrate that it is impossible to say what reality is without being
a unity. However, the trinity’s “transcendence,” its exceedingly-leaving all things cannot be separated from its
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simultaneously being nowhere it would not be different from its effects. But as exceedingly-leaving all things, by a
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of our intellectual faculties are meant to cease—the trinity is ineffable, for all statements concerning it assume its
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it as a unity (DN 980B). Unity while itself is not subject to predication, is the foundation for it, since ‘to be’ is to be
intelligible. “It is not one part or a plurality nor a total of parts. In fact its unity is not of this kind, for it does not
share in unity nor have it for its possession” (DN 649C).
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“The Thearchy in Pseudo-Dionysius is the only source of anything that is divine and is revealed
in the universe without jeopardizing its transcendent hiddenness.”270 Yerx¤ is presupposed
by entities but does not coincide with them.271 As such, the trinity is a capacity of entities
manifesting without being one of them,272 and as such is itself prior to intelligibility.
The ineffability of the trinity is characterized as follows,
there is a making unite and communion to the one-primordial-source [•nrxkª] trinity,
the exceedingly-existing sustaining source [ÍperoÊsow Ïprjw], the exceedinglydivine divinity, the exceedingly-good goodness, beyond everything all together, beyond
every whole peculiarity, the oneness exceeding to the one-primordial-source, the
voiceless [êfyegkton], the much-speaking, the non-knowledge, the wholly intellected,
the placing of everything, removal of everything, that which is necessarily said…if one
may say, the remaining [mon±] and underlying and foundation universal exceedinglynamed (DN 641A) .273

Furthermore, “the father is the only well-spring of the exceedingly-existing divinity and the
father is not the son, nor the son the father, since the hymns purely guard the kinship of each of
the standing-under primordial-God [t«n yerxk«n Ípostãstevn]. These, then, are the
unities and separations according to the voiceless [êfyegkton] unity and sustaining source”
(DN 641D) . By characterizing the trinity as “voiceless” twice, Pseudo-Dionysius draws to our
attention that it remains unthinkable. We may pray to the trinity, but the trinity as voiceless
cannot respond discursively. Consequently, the trinity, as yerx¤, is not a personal entity
270

The Beauty of the Unity and the Harmony of the Whole, p.162.
Yerx¤ gives without having the multiplicity in itself. It is the naturally burgeoning forth of the son and the
spirit, which are responsible for the various entities of our experience. It itself is different from the various names we
experience; yerx¤ is formless with respect to the particular instances of it. Yerx¤ does not possess the rational
structure of existence or of one particular instance of existence; it is the principle of all rational structures and is the
groundlessness of all instances but as groundless it cannot coincide with them.
272
“We say that God is capacity [dÊnmw], as pre-having [pro°xvn] and exceedingly-having every capacity in
itself and as cause of every capacity and producing everything as fits an inflexible and unencompassed capacity and
as the cause of the very “to be” of capacity, either the universal or particular and as boundless in capacity not only
by the production of all capacity but by being exceeding to all, even to the self-existent capacity.” (DN 889D). God,
as pre-having capacity, gives capacity to all else without itself being equated with any of its effects or the capacity
itself. Moreover, as the “to be” of capacity, God is the unfolding of capacity itself.
273
The trinity is the capacity of all individual entities of it. It is not an entity but the power which is presupposed in
entities. It is formless and so has the capacity to be the differentiation of everything without being one of them. The
trinity “pre-has” them as possible criteria for all entities.
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toward which a prayer can be aimed. And yet, we are, nevertheless, urged to pray to the
yerx¤, and as such, we are advised to comport ourselves to it through a specific type of
lÒgow through prayer.
PRAYER AS A GROUNDLESS lÒgow AND SONG
As Aristotle states, “prayer is a lÒgow, but neither true nor false” (De Int. 17a5). In other
words, prayer is a form of lÒgow, of communication, that does not establish its own ground.
Prayer is an invocation that allows the manifestation of what it communicates to appear as it is
without grounding it within another concept. Consequently, prayer is a form of lÒgow that is
itself groundless. Pseudo-Dionysius’ own conception of lÒgow is a saying whose soundless
voice is able to call forth that which has been concealed in the sense of being presupposed. There
cannot be a final conclusive word concerning God, since the essence of God is never
conclusively utterable. Rather, we must think along with the one who speaks in the silent saying
of language, reawakening us to a new experience of God.
Jean-Luc Marion writes that prayer takes the form “praise as…,”274 or what I have
translated as “to hymn.” In a “hymn or praise,”275 a name is not attributed to God through
predication, not even negatively, but rather only insofar as God is symbolically thought to be.276
Marion continues “It remains to specify a crucial point: instead of using the logical operations of
274

Jean-Luc Marion, The Idol and Distance trans. Thomas A. Carlson (New York: Fordham University Press,
2001), p.186.
275
See the following for where hymns are discussed: Concerning Divine Names 593C-D; 596A; 637B; 652A; 681D;
684A; 701C; 709B; 713C; 816B-C; 820B; 820C; 824A; 868A; 872A; 909B 969A; Concerning Concerning
Mysterious Theology 1025A’ Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 425D; 440D; 444A. In the latter most, the symbol of the
Eucharist is hymned to represent something other than it is.
276
“But if someone should say that divine-manifestations were made directly and immediately to some holy
individuals, let them learn, and distinctly, from scriptures, that no one has seen nor will see the hidden [tÚ krÊfon]
of God as it is in itself. Divine-manifestations were made to the pious fitting with the revelations of God, that is to
say, through holy visions analogous to those who see them” (CH 180C). God’s revelation itself not as it is, but in a
way that is shaped by the individual who receives the manifestation. We will see that the individual responds to God
in a way that is hearing the call of God, and thus is unique to each individual. God does not exist in an objective
entity, but manifests with respect to the disposition of the individual.
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affirmation and of negation, Denys277 utilizes the operation designated by ‘as’; whence ‘as’ is not
at all equivalent to ‘as if, als ob,’ but to ‘inasmuch as,’ and where the Requisite is especially not
identified with y, which is not predicated categorically of the Requisite; y indicates the relation
under which x aims at the Requisite; y presupposes distance and therefore refers back first to
x.”278 However God is praised, God is praised by the one praising; it is how the individual
understands and is predisposed to God and does not make any claims as to what God is. “Now
what is proper to the proper name consists precisely in the fact that it never belongs properly—
by and as essence—to the one who receives it. Never is the proper name a name for the essence.
This rule is even more applicable in the case of a possible God than in that of the finite recipients
of names (humans, or even animals).”279 The list of names Pseudo-Dionysius provides at
Concerning Divine Names (596A-C) does not give the essence of God but names how we
experience and receive God.
Pseudo-Dionysius, himself, claims that hymns and subsequently prayers are songs (DN
589B). As with a song sung, the individual is overtaken by the experience of the song itself;
there is an immediate exposure to that which is sung. The songs are heard from that which is
already spoken, like hearing an echo from a sound uttered prior to hearing it. And yet, these
songs of hymn are not directed by the individual but rather by that to which one is exposed.
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Pseudo-Dionysius is also known as “Denys,” especially by those who wish to emphasize the religious aspect of
Pseudo-Dionysius, who was thought to be the first archbishop of Paris.
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The Idol and Distance, p.187. Marion emphasizes the distance between God and the human. Distance, for
Marion, seem to be his way of indicating that God’s nature radically differs from the human, which is true for
Pseudo-Dionysius. However, the radical distance of the “God without Being” is a God that can have no relation to
the human and thus there is a question of how and why this God should be a concern for us at all. I, on the other
hand, emphasize God’s excessive presence, and so radically depart from Marion’s analysis on this point. However,
his writings are, nevertheless, still useful and insightful.
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Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn Hornner and Vincent Berraud (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2002), p.142.
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God is hymned, by holy scriptures, as lÒgow, not only because it is the chorus-leader
281
[xorhgÒw] of word, intellect, and wisdom, but because it pre-contains the causes of
all things, only in itself and because it moves through all, as scriptures say, even the end
of all things; and even more than these because the divine word is exceeding-simplicity
[ı ye›ow ÍperÆplv lÒgow] and having been set free from [épolelm°now] all, as
exceedingly-existing (DN 872C).

God, as the “chorus-leader,” is the one who composes the tune to which we listen and respond in
an appropriate and harmonious manner. The song, the lÒgow, is exceedingly-simple and thus
pre-discursive and a response to this lÒgow is sung in and shaped by the context of what has
already been stated. If the song is directed perfectly, it is as if the leader recedes, since one is
overwhelmed by the song. The chorus-leader is necessary for the inspiration and to keep the song
continuing, but there is no difference between the song sung and the one from whom it

280

While this is a reference to the Gospel of John 1:1-3, this passage also tells us about how the Areopagite
approaches lÒgow in general. The lÒgow, Christ, is spoken by God, the speaker, and is heard throughout the world,
and can in this context be understood in a wider sense as “discourse” or “articulation,” “to make something clear and
articulate.” The most concrete and fundamental connotation of the Greek verb l°gen, is “(selective) gathering,”
“picking out,” “collecting.” For example, when we read, we look at a multiplicity of written symbols and we collect
them together into meaningful units: words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs. In this sense, reading and lÒgow are a
gathering: they are the formation of meaning and sense through the discovery of unity in plurality. The text only
makes sense if one pays attention to the context within which the words are already written or spoken. This, for
Pseudo-Dionysius, is precisely the original Greek sense of lÒgow as l°gen “to collect” or “to gather” the original
essence of reason, of rationality, of discursively articulate meaningfulness, originally understood not as some
subjective faculty but as the very way in which meaningful reality in itself is articulated. This also allows him to call
lÒgow a name for God, i.e., for the articulation of meaningfulness as such. God as lÒgow is something that is
heard, something whose address needs listening to and in which all things are gathered (DN 589D, 701D, 817D).
This lÒgow is simple and truly what is truth [ˆntvw oÔs élÆye] around which as pure and
unerring knowing of the whole, the divine faith [ye¤ p¤stw] the enduring foundation of those
who believe, which establishes truth in them and the truth in them, by an unchanging identity they
having the simply knowing of the truth of those things believed. For if knowing unites the
knowing and the thing known but ignorance is a cause of change in the one ignorant and
separation from himself. (DN 872C-D).
God as lÒgow gives us divine faith for what is actually our good. We must first believe or have faith, granted to us
by God as lÒgow, in things that we may not understand or know immediately. But this divine faith as a form of
knowing unites the faithful knower and God, it allows us to grow in a position to understand God. God illuminates
the faithful knower so that the individual may come to know how to approach God in a prayerful manner. “For
Denys, conversion from sin is not simply a ‘moral questions’ or a matter of ‘values clarification’ but a deep,
thorough turning of one’s being to true Being…This knowledge is highly charged with the Being of God Himself; it
is a communication of God’s own Being,” (Divine Light, p.139). It would be misleading to claim that we are turned
toward God’s “being” as if God had being as an entity does. Rather, prayer situates us within the mystery of God
and as this makes us more like God, we ourselves become a mysterious being who needs to be continually
investigated as living beings.
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We will return to God as “chorus-leader” in the next chapter on the hierarchy.
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originates.282 In other words, a hymn, in the form of prayer, allows the individual to understand
and acknowledge that God is irrepressible—that which must be listened and responded to, even
against one’s willingness.
Prayer does not affect or touch the object, i.e., God, toward which it is aimed but rather
transforms the one who prays. The subject is dissolved in its division from the object and from
the ground, God. Any attempt to possess the object must fail; the object being the whole, which
cannot be captured. In renouncing itself and of the discursive nature of God the subject becomes
non-discursive, the object the voiceless. The one who prays can only be exposed to God when
the two are no longer distinct; when possession of it is impossible. God becomes a place of nonbeing, on its own it can generate no sound, and the site is where the power of speaking is
consolidated. The isolated individual reinforces his or her removal from the possession of God;
the communicant becomes lost in the echoes of God. This is a loss which at the same time
constitutes a return to what is there, a return to that which one evades in discursive activity. The
prayerful subject becomes absent in the activity of prayer itself. We will now turn to how this
occurs exactly.
HIEROTHEUS’ INITIATION
Pseudo-Dionysius writes that we must situate ourselves to the trinity, and more generally
to the world, by approaching it prayerfully, he writes, “first, it is necessary that we, by prayer,
come up to it [§p' ÈtÆn], as the primordial-source-of-the-good, and being brought more near it,
to be initiated into it as to all good gifts which are established around it…for when we have
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God is “all beings and none of beings [pãnt tå ˆnt k‹ oÈden t«n ˆntvn]” and “all things in all things
and nothing in any [§n pçs pãnt §st‹ k‹ §n oÈden‹ oÈd°n]” (DN 596C and 872A respectively). “PseudoDionysius’ God is all things in all things in that whatever intelligible content is found in any thing, and so that thing
itself, is God-in-it, in the distinct way that is constitutive of that being; and he is nothing in any, in that he is not any
one thing, distinguished from others within the whole or reality and constituted by that distinction” (Theophany,
p.31). As the chorus-leader, God both is and is not the song of hymn sung; God disappears within the context of the
song itself.
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invoked it by wholly pure prayers and with an untroubled mind and by a suitability toward the
divine unity, we will also be present to it” (DN 680B). Not only is it we who come into the
presence of the trinity through prayer,283 but we are initiated, or changed by the experience.
Furthermore, “we are lead by the light to the primordial-God-source [toÁw yerxkoÊw] hymns
by which we are exceedingly-mundanely enlightened and molded by the sacred songs of hymns,
so to see the primordial-God-source illuminations given to us” (DN 589B). In and by prayer we
are transformed and molded by the exposure itself. Yerx¤’s presence is irrepressible,
conforming us despite ourselves.
Speaking of his teacher, Hierotheus, Pseudo-Dionysius writes,
he, after the theologians, surpassed, as you know, all the other divine instructors, wholly
away from home [˜low §kdhm«n], wholly standing outside of himself [˜low
§jstãmenow •toË] and suffering [pãsxvn] the communion with the things hymned
and all who have heard and have seen him was distinguished as a divine hymnist, to be
apprehended-by-God [yeÒlhptow], by all who have heard and have seen him, having
been known and not known (DN 681D-684A).

Hierotheus, in his ecstasy, is “suffering communion with the things hymned.” Despite himself he
undergoes this communion, and he is a divine hymnist, or singer. He is one who speaks of the
things to be hymned under the influence of God. Hierotheus is so affected by God that he is
outside of his rational mind, standing in ecstasy. He steps outside of the subject/object dichotomy
to which he is normally subjected to and being apprehended, yeÒlhptow, or perhaps “possessed
by God,” has an unmediated exposure of the divine things. Partaking in such songs, the rational
mind comes to a halt and becomes a site to hear the silence that is always already present,
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The relation to entities is one of a first principle, it is independent and has ontological priority. The trinity is
internally related to itself; its existence is self-derived.
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“unknowing by means of an inactivity of all knowing according to the more powerful unity and
by knowing nothing, by coming to know exceeding-thought” (MT 1001A).284
Furthermore, Hierotheus is no longer known to those around him after his initiation. He
becomes something other than what he previously was; his entire comportment undergoes a
radical change. At Concerning Divine Names 872D, it is written “the individual who is in union
with the truth knows clearly that all is well with him, even if everyone else knows him as
displace, or having had stood outside of himself […w §jesthkÒt].” Our disposition is opened
to that toward which we become attuned, gripped by that to which we are exposed. Shaped by
the ‘voicelessness’ of the songs, we are initiated into a non-discursive way of being, the divine
nature is “the cause of all beings, though itself being nothing [oÈd°n]…it is removed from all
states of being [ßjevw], movement, life, imagination, seeming, name, reason [lÒgo], thought,
conception, existence…” (DN 593C-D). Standing outside of himself, Hierotheus’ own person is
groundless because that by which he is apprehended, since yerx¤ is, as we have seen, without
a ground. Hence, as a form of communication, this form of prayer listens to the groundlessness
of God’s being. Initiated into the ways of God, we, like Hierotheus, become nothing and do not
share in any human states of being. We become something alien to our fellow human, standing
outside of all reason.
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Furthermore, the cessation of intellectual capacity is not something that one can achieve on one’s own, “we
cannot try to stop the intellect on our own, for the intellect, and our activity or freedom in general, cease to work
only because God suspends them. More precisely, the work of effort on our part is stilled because God ‘occupied it
in another way,’” furthermore, “what holds activity in abeyance—‘above’ or despite my activity in which I must in
some sense be engaged—is something of a different order” (Phenomenology and Mysticism, p.59). God is so
present, in an excessive and ungovernable manner, that the intellect is forced into ecstasy. The intellect is
completely shut down due to the overwhelming experience of God. The divine arrives on its own accord with
excessive force. God illuminates the intellect in order to leave it halted so that the intellect may be responsive to
God.
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THE GIVENNESS OF PRAYER
To show this change in one’s comportment to the trinity we have through prayer, PseudoDionysius uses two examples.
Let us stretch ourselves upward by our prayers to the lofty peaks of the divine and good
rays, as if a luminous chain suspended from heavenly heights, coming hither, ever
grasping it upward by one hand, then another, we seem to draw near, but truly we are not
leading it downward, it being both above and below, but we ourselves are lifted upward
toward the lofty sparkling luminous rays. Or having stepped onto a ship and holding onto
ropes reaching from some rocks, such as are reached in return, for us to grasp, we do not
draw the rock to us but we, in truth, and the ship are brought to the rocks. For another
example, if someone standing on the ship pushes away the rock, he does nothing to the
stationary and unmoved rock, but he will separate himself from it and the more he will
thrust away the more he will be hurled from it (DN 680C-D).

Either of the examples we choose to examine, the message is clear, it is the individual who is
affected by prayer and not God. And yet despite, or rather in spite of this one way relationship
we, as supplicants, are still urged to pray. For in prayer, there opens an ontological
incommensuration between the “hidden divinity” (DN 588C) and we who seek after it.285
Yerx¤ presents itself to us through prayer but as insurmountable. “Prayer, as it were, makes
the reality of our relationship to what is higher, what is ultimate. As such it has been called
‘ontological prayer’, prayer which expresses the nature of our ontological condition.”286 After
all, such recognition is “standing the soul outside of [§jst«sn tØn cxÆn] things like itself
[•tª smfÊlvn]” (DN 981). The soul is outside of that which is proper to it, rational thought
and discursivity, finding its pre-ontological origin. We, as supplicants, now understand ourselves
285

There must be some anxiety over the distance felt and it is the turn to prayer that helps to lessen both the anxiety
and the apparent distance from God. Pseudo-Dionysius does speak of evil and sin. Evil is “an impotence and
weakness” (DN 732B) and “lies in the inability of existing things to reach their natural perfection” (DN 728C),
which is a perversion of §pstofÆ. In other words, it is a “deficiency of knowledge” (DN 736A). An individual
does not choose to sin but rather occurs from a lack of knowing what is good for the individual. Far from a simple
privation theory of evil “for Pseudo-Dionysius, however, evil remains outrageous precisely because it is irrational,
because there is no reason, no justification for it. The privation theory of evil, expressed in a radical form by PseudoDionysius, is not a shallow disregard or denial of evident evils in the world, we can only say that for no reason, and
therefore outrageously, the world as we find it does not perfectly love God, the Good, the sole end of all love”
(Theophany, p.64). Evil remains outrageous but so does the good, for yerx¤ is without a rational ground.
Consequently, our goodness has no reason behind it either. It cannot be justified and so must be taken with faith.
286
Andrew Louth, Denys the Areopagite (London: Continuum, 1989), p.92.
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to be under the influence of the divine and that we are powerless in the face of it, just as
Hierotheus is while in ecstasy. Shaped by songs of hymn, we are made ready to hear the silence
and to know ourselves as given over to the silence. And as always in silence, we are made aware
of the need for further prayer and supplication; the initiation process is never complete. The
presence of the divine can always be further clarified by prayerful attunement.
Within prayer we recognize and acknowledge that to which we pray cannot be
appropriated discursively. We find ourselves within a world, whose ground falls away. Our
initiation is one into a world that is itself mysterious and question-worthy, “this is the kind of
divine enlightenment into which we have been initiated by the hidden tradition of our inspired
teachers, a tradition at one with the scriptures. We now grasp these things in the best way we can
and as they come to us, wrapped in the sacred veils of the love toward humanity” (DN 592B).
The phenomena present themselves to us despite any effort on our part after we have been
initiated; we receive them simply, the divine freely gives itself. Consequently, within prayer, we
find ourselves already within the presence of God, for the luminous chain is present “both above
and below.”287 Provided this, prayer discloses and orients us toward the givenness of God’s
manifestation. Distancing himself from a theoretical mode of relation to beings, PseudoDionysius proposes that we are always already within the presence of God, engaged in everyday
dealings with God’s manifestation in the world. God is manifest in all entities, including the
human body, for “there is not evil in our bodies” (DN 728C). It must be stressed that we are not
fallen creatures because we are embodied, or that distance is an indication of sin, according to
the Areopagite. Instead, this is an embodied form of prayer. This is a lived experience and is
neither merely theoretical nor wholly contemplative. When we are aware of this, there is a
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This is a non-localized presence. The omnipresence is the condition for entities at all. God continuously gives
itself by participation. All entities are what they are given this participation. Although this may seem as if yerx¤
must be wholly transcendent, its transcendence cannot be separated from its omnipresence.
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distinctive kind of presence in all things.288 Our comportment toward the world is not neutral, it
is nuanced depending upon how we approach and hear it.
THE SCREAM OF PRAYER
Prayer further rejuvenates the individual, being a reversion, to reinvestigate the
mysterious nature of yerx¤. Prayer stirs us out of our own concern and belief of what God is
and what is our own good. In fact, opening the first chapter of Concerning Mysterious Theology,
entitied “what is divine darkness [t‹w ı ye›ow gnÒfow],” Pseudo-Dionysius invokes a prayer to
the trinity.
Trinity! Exceedingly-existing! Exceeding-divinity! And exceedingly-good! For
Christians, guide of the wisdom of God lead us up to the point of that which is
exceedingly-unknowing of the mysterious words and to that which is exceeding-light, to
the outermost height, where the simple, unqualified, unmoved mystery of God’s words
have been veiled owing to the exceedingly-light darkness of the concealed mystery of
silence; amid the deepest shadow, the exceedingly most manifest thing is exceedinglybrilliant. And amid the wholly elusive and unseen, it exceedingly fills the sightless
thought with exceedingly beautiful adornments (MT 997A-B).

Pseudo-Dionysius’ prayer is an exclamation and a scream, “trinity!” in response to its
overwhelming and immediate manifestation. It is a scream that grips him and us pre-rationally
and meant to situate us within the experience of the trinity itself. Prayer as a scream suggests that
there is an affective or emotional component to this experience. Again, speaking of his teacher,
Hierotheus, Pseudo-Dionysius writes “but having suffered the divine things [py∆n tå ye›]
and from his sympathy [smpye¤w] with them, if I must speak thusly, having been perfected
to their unlearned and mysterious union and faith” (DN 648B). Hierotheus cannot be said to have
learned anything from his divine sufferings, for he was immediately present in the experience,
there was no subject/object dichotomy, and hence he can only be said to have “sympathies,”
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Anthony J. Steinbock terms this epiphany, which he defines as “a mode in which ‘Being,’ ‘Ereignis,’ and so
forth, leaves the realm of the impersonal region and becomes radically personal” (Phenomenology and Mysticism,
p.162).
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literally “a suffering-with” them. What Hierotheus experienced cannot be taught, it can only be
awoken or incited by suffering the silence of the divine.
THE BEAUTIFUL GOD CALLS US BACK
We are now in a position to see in what way the human is made a receptive site for the
divine manifestations due to prayer.
Following these primordial-God bindings [to›w yerxko›w zgo›w], which govern the
whole holy ranks of exceeding-heavenly orders, honoring the hiddenness of the
primordial-God which exceeds the intellect and existence, with inscrutable and holy
intellect, we honor the unsayable with wise silence, we raise ourselves to those things
which illuminate us in the sacred word and are led-by-light to the primordial-Godly
hymns, by which we are exceeding-mundanely enlightened and molded to the sacred
hymn of praise…it is cause, source, existence, and life of everything and even to those
who fall away from it both as a calling back [énklhs¤w] and resurrection (DN 589B-C).

Yerx¤ calls us back to itself. Drawing on etymology, Pseudo-Dionysius, in his discussion of
the name beauty, writes “beauty calls [kloËn] all things to itself, whence it is called beauty
[kãllow]” (701C-D).289 Everything is a calling out of the divine’s love culminating in the
incarnation.290 Beauty is only beauty in its ability to be experienced, in our hearing its call or
echo in all entities. “The beautiful which is exceedingly-existing is called beauty because of the
beauty bestowed upon all existing things, each according with what it is, and as the cause of
good-suitability and splendor in everything because like a light it hurls light into all things the
beauty-causing givenness of its well-spring ray” (DN 701C). Standing under beauty’s wellspring ray, we are awashed in its presence. We are not meant to merely contemplate the beauty
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Pseudo-Dionysius draws this etymology from Plato’s Cratylus 416c.
There is a profundity of experience within the prayer which distinguishes it from every other experience. Having
opened oneself to the unapproachable outpouring of light, the unexpected manifests as “sudden” (Ep. III 1069B).
The experience of this as “sudden” is immediate, “one is ‘struck,’ surprised in a way that the experience is not only
not anticipated but non-anticipatable” (Phenomenology and Mysticism, p.118). The “sudden,” which PseudoDionysius here speaks of is the realization of God’s love for humanity in the person of Christ, which is called
“mysterious” (CH 181B). That God should take a human form is completely unanticipated, leaving its wholly
ineffable character it takes on what is known. But this further exacerbates the mysterious nature of God.
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of the mysterious calling out to us but rather to be fully exposed to it, suffer it, to be transformed
by it; we are to be a vehicle of that mystery.
And so, beauty does not adhere in an entity as an objective characteristic but rather only
reveals itself as beautiful in its manifestation as “the fontal beauty [phg¤n kllonÆn] of
every beautiful thing, pre-eminently in a pre-having in itself [§n §t“ pro°xon]” (DN 704A).
The beautiful is that which, like a fountain, pours forth and is found neither in the fountain as an
object, for beauty is its own pouring forth, nor found wholly upon that which it falls but rather is
found in the very act of the outpouring. In fact, “the beautiful is the source [érxÆ] of all things,
as the making cause [pohtkÚn ‡ton] and moving and holding together the whole by the
erotic longing [¶rvt] of its proper beautifulness, the limit of all things, and cherished
[égphtÒn] as the final cause [telkÚn ‡ton], since all things come-to-be for the sake of the
beautiful” (DN 704A).291 Beauty manifests itself in the making of all things, collapsing the
distinction between being the source and end of all things. In short, beauty is found in the
relationship between the one calling out and to beauty’s own calling back.
This erotic calling back of the beautiful is related to the prÒodow-§pstrofÆ movement
discussed in the previous chapter. “To boldly say it with truth, the cause of all things due to an
excess [ÍperbolÆn] of goodness erotically longs [§rò] for all things, makes all things, perfects
all things, sustains all things, reverts [§pstr°fe] all things. And the divine erotic longing
[ye›ow ¶rvw] is good, of good, through the good. For erotic longing, the benefactor of
everything, pre-exists [pro#pãrxvn] in excess in the good, it did not permit it to remain
unproductive in itself but moved it to productive action in the excess which is generative of all
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For Pseudo-Dionysius use of ¶rvw and égãph, see John M. Rist “A Note on Eros and Agape in PseudoPseudo-Dionysius Vigiliae Christianae, Vol. 20 No. 4 (Dec. 1966), pp.235-243. Pseudo-Dionysius’ use ¶rvw is
indicative of his Neo-Platonic roots, particularly in reading the Phaedrus.
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things” (DN 708A-B). “God is Love.”292 Excessively giving being, which pre-exists in the good,
God attracts all things to it through being loved or yearned for. God as erotic longing also has
another facet as well.
The cause of all things, by the beautiful and good, erotic longing of all things, through
excess of erotic goodness, becomes out of itself [¶jv •toË g¤net] in its providence
toward all existing things and is as it were bewitched by good and being cherished
[égpÆse] and erotic longing is led down, from above all things and beyond all things,
to and in all things, according to an ecstatic capacity exceedingly-existing [§ksttkÆn
ÍperoÊson dÊnmn] without going out of itself (DN 712A-B).

God, as erotic longing, exists ecstatically. God moves out of itself, while remaining an imminent
force, going toward all things. “God goes ‘out of himself’ without ‘going out from himself’ in
that he is, as it were, intrinsically ecstatic, not a self-contained self but always already ‘out of
himself and ‘in all things’ as their constitutive differences…God is pure exteriority, having no
inner core of ‘selfhood,’ no ‘interior’ that could be distinguished from his ‘outward’ productive
activity. God is not a ‘self’ of his own, a being, but only the self, the determining identity of
others, of all things….”293 God does not occur as an entity over and against us as a subject but
rather manifests within the sphere of God’s own ecstatic self-manifestation. In short, God exists
neither as an objective entity nor merely within the consciousness of an individual but within the
world of lived experience. We are, when prayerfully attuned, in immediate contact with God,
washed over in its presence.
We will now move to a full discussion of ecstasy in the following section. In the
following sections, we will turn to the Areopagite’s via negativa. Our focus, for the most part,
will be aimed at the text, Concerning Mysterious Theology. The form of communications found
in the following sections will be: ecstasy and inebriation; catharsis; and lastly, transgression.
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Theophany, p.44.
Ibid, p.46.
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III. Following in the Footsteps of Our Father, Divinely and Ecstatically Inebriated:
Quoting from the Song of Solomon, Pseudo-Dionysius writes that God partakes in “strong
drinks and suffers from hangovers [ﬂ mey‹ k‹ ﬂ krtãl]” (MT 1033B) and writing
Concerning Mysterious Theology, he advocates for participation in “divine darkness,” a divine
blackout as it were, in which we “plunge into darkness” (MT 1033B). Now, while drunkenness
may seem to be a topic unworthy of the divine,294 Pseudo-Dionysius in Epistle IX describes and
ascribes inebriation to God, writing, that God is said to be drunk [meyÊen] “on account of a
excessive-fullness [d‹ tØn ÍperplÆrh] of delight that exceeds thought [Íp¢r nÒhsn]”
(1112b), and “as drunk, God stands outside of [§jesthk≈w] all good things, being the excessivefullness [ÍperplÆrhw] of all these things” (Ep. IX 1112C). Drunkenness and ecstasy arise from
being exceedingly-full, swept away from normal and everyday concepts of the world until they
no longer hold sway. Characterizing God in ecstasy of all good things—that which makes all
things intelligible—suggests that God, as drunk, stands outside of this. That is to say, God’s
nature is not intelligible, precisely because intelligibility does not say enough about God’s
existence. And so while “to exist” does gesture toward God, “existence” never fully reveals God
294

Pseudo-Dionysius does ask whether it is not more proper to deny drunkenness to God than speech and thought
(MT 1033C-D). The issue here are those symbols which are similar and dissimilar. God is more similar to speech
and thought than to being drunk and so it would seem that drunkenness is so dissimilar to God’s nature that it should
not be attributed to it. However, “Since God is not any being or object of thought, it is false, and false in the same
sense, to say that God is Word, Mind, or Being as to say that he is lion, stone, fire, worm. All expressions of God,
the exalted and intelligible no less than the lowly and sensible, are infinitely, and in that sense equally, inadequate,
and hence all are ‘dissimilar’. For this reason Pseudo-Dionysius even says that the obviously ‘dissimilar’
expressions are in fact more appropriate, as more clearly indicating the infinite otherness of all things from God”
(Theophany, p.103). To say that God is drunk may be dissimilar insofar as drunkenness is a vice of immoderation, it
is nonetheless, perhaps, in spite of this, most appropriate to attribute it to God to reveal that God is outside of what
human reason can comprehend. The Areopagite writes, “scripture itself asserts that God is dissimilar and that it is
not comparable with anything, that it is different from everything, and that more puzzling still that there is none like
it at all. Nonetheless, words such as this do not contradict the similarity of things to it, for the very same things are
both similar and dissimilar to God, they are similar to it to the extent that they share what cannot be shared and they
are dissimilar to it in that as effects they fall very short of their cause and are infinitely and incomparably
subordinate to it” (DN 916A). Drunkenness, even though it in fact falls short of describing God and is thus
dissimilar, is in a sense similar in that it describes God as that which cannot be shared or understood by us. There is
no symbol that is utterly so dissimilar to God so as not to be appropriate to God simply for the fact that God is so
foreign to everything that the dissimilarity only reinforces it.
245

because “to exist” is not an intense enough concept to communicate God’s way of being.
Accordingly, God is said to ÍperoÊsow, exceedingly-existent (Ep. IX 1112C).
TO EX-IST IN DRUNKENNESS
God’s drunkenness and ecstasy gestures to a presence that is too ebullient to be expressed
in the normal categories of language. We have seen above that God has no self; God is
ÍperyeÒthtow, exceeding-divinity (DN 693B), out stripping its own being. For example, every
name is predicable of God so much so that God overflows with existence and “God brings forth
existence according to a flowing out of existence [§pe‹ k‹ oÈs¤w prãge ktå tØn épÚ
oÈs¤w ¶kbsn]” (DN 824C). God, then, as the act of pouring forth is the overwhelming
intensification of the manifestation of existence and so appears to us to be drunk and raging,
since God stands outside of reason’s dictates. God is said to stand outside of the good by pouring
forth and being a fontal source of it. God is an unapproachable possibility by the power of its ‘to
be.’ “As the sustaining source of goodness by its own ‘to be’ [Èt“ t“ e‰n] it is the cause of
all existing things… and by its ‘to be’ [t“ e‰n] it is the production and origin of all things”
(DN 593D). Far from merely existing, God overflows and is the source of coming-to-be, and the
description of this experience as drunk is a creative image used by Pseudo-Dionysius to evoke
this God to which we pray, but never comprehending what we experience; “the mystical
experience of God is not a static experience, but a perpetual discovery.”295
“To exist” would simply point to a pure presence which is not applicable to God’s
irrepressible and insistent expenditure. God pours forth, as we are told, its goodness and
existence into all things just as the sun gives sustenance to living things on earth. And just as the
sun does “not calculate or deliberate [oÈ logzÒmenow ≥ proro¤menow] but by its own nature
295

Richard Sorabji, “Myths about Non-Propositional Thought,” Language and Logos, (Cambridge: Cambridge
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sheds light on all things that are able to partake of its light” (DN 693B), so too God by its nature
pours forth existence without reckoning. God is not motivated to sustain a potential aggregation
of existent entities; instead it must appear to us to have no motivating end but only to be a fontal.
As such, God is a pre-representational impulse. For instance, if “being” is the accumulation of
essence or reason, God depicted as drunk is the contrary to this; God’s drunkenness is the total
loss of being and accumulated knowledge. God, as the sun, is a unilateral discharge; it is for
nothing with regard for utility and relation. God exists without excuse or reason.296 There is no
fidelity to existence, but rather to a chronic squandering which violates reciprocity and thus also
the principle of relation found in “to exist.” “Ecstasy,” then, is the name for God as pure upsurge,
as a productive impulse. Consequently, ecstasy is the only suitable manner to communicate
God’s mode of being.
Furthermore, attuned to God in the most correct way through prayer, we drink God in,
making us drunk with God’s overwhelmingly non-discursive nature. And while human
drunkenness, as we are told, oftentimes has a pejorative meaning of an “immoderate fullness
[éssÊmetrow époplÆrvsw]” (Ep. IX 1112C), it is however through this immoderate fullness
that “the soul standing outside of [§jstm°nh] absolutely everything associated with the living
body, of that which is perceptible, and of that which is well-ordered [t«n svmtk«n
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Eric D. Perl astutely points out that for Pseudo-Dionysius evil is uncaused [én¤ton] (DN 732D). “For it is only
beings and their activities, things that are and that take place, that must have causes, without which they would not
be or happen. To look for the cause of evil is to ask why it occurs. But evil is not something that occurs, but notsomething that does not occur. It is not an act of non-love, but a non-act of love,” Theophany, p.62. He continues
“For Pseudo-Dionysius, however, evil remains outrageous precisely because it is irrational, because there is no
reason, no justification for it. The privation theory of evil, expressed in radical form by Pseudo-Dionysius, is not a
shallow disregard or denial of the evident evils in the world. It means rather that, confronted with the evils in the
world, we can only say that for no reason and therefore outrageously, the world as we find it does not perfectly love
God, the Good, the sole end of all love” p.64. In the same manner that Pseudo-Dionysius, according to Perl, does not
want to establish a cause of evil, there can ultimately be no cause of God or the good either. This cause is always
something presupposed but can never be affirmed, not even exceedingly-affirmed. We saw in the previous chapter
that God’s existence is essentially undecideable. We must pass beyond God in all forms of thought and being. God
itself must appear outrageous, outrageously existent.
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èps«n ﬁsyÆsevn k‹ kosmk«n]” (DN 981B), for “standing outside of sound-mindedness
[toË frone›n ¶kstsn] is a consequence of drunkenness” (Ep. IX 1112C). While discursive
thought is proper to the human,297 through ecstasy we overstep this. The human, as ecstatically
inebriated, is taken outside of one’s body as a symbol of its own being. We transgress the symbol
of the body. This however is contrary to everything that is natural to us, “that is why so many
continue to be unbelieving in the presence of the explanation of divine mysteries, we behold
them only by means of the perceptible symbols associated with them. What is necessary is to
uncover them, to see them in their nakedness and purity [gmnå k‹ kyrã]. For beholding
them in this way, we can revere the font of life flowing into itself” (Ep. IX 1104B-C),298 and no
longer attending to the external garb of symbols we “alone have the simplicity of mind and the
receptive, contemplative capacity to cross over to the simple, marvelous, exceeding truth of the
symbols” (Ep. IX 1105C). We move beyond kataphasis and even apophasis altogether and enter
into the via negativa. Here, we peer behind the symbolic clothing and see the world and
ourselves denuded of external appearance and we see God within us as the fontal act of
production. Reason no longer holds sway. We, in our ecstasy, become absorbed into the exterior,
what is outside of us—flowing outside of ourselves—and opened to what is not only outside of
us but of reason as well. This is why Hierotheus is said to be “˜low §kdhm«n,” literally “wholly
out of one’s home,” or “alienated.” He no longer belongs to himself and the world but rather to
the foreignness of the divine, becoming absorbed into God’s fontal and ecstatic nature.
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Theophany, p.90.
Eric D. Perl states “there can be no non-symbolic knowledge of God, no knowledge of God without the
concealment of symbolism. Only a symbol, in that qua symbol it conceals what it reveals, can make God known
without objectifying him as a being, enabling us to know God without violating his unknowability, and thus truly to
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veil of the symbols, seeing them, and therefore God, naked are we exposed to God. So it may be true that we cannot
know God without symbols but as will be shown throughout what follows, knowledge of God is nothing compared
to the experience of, or better put, the exposure to God. In fact, mere knowledge of God is not to experience God at
all and by emphasizing non-knowledge of God, exposure to God is superior to any type of knowledge.
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ECSTATIC SOVEREIGNTY
In fact, Pseudo-Dionysius writes “according to this, we pray to be born [gen°sy] into
the exceedingly-light-darkness; and through blindness and unknowing, to see and to know the
exceeding-sight and exceeding-knowing itself. This is neither to see nor to know, for this is truly
to see and to come to know…” (MT 1025A). Again using the vocabulary of prayer and
supplication, the Areopagite requests that discursivity be taken away and replaced with divine
unknowing, that we share in the divine overwhelming manner of being. The Areopagite prays
that we should be given to ourselves in such a way that this giveness, or being born, is not selfgrounded. The soul is driven out of itself toward what is unlike its finite nature by means of the
negations, “for it is the way of negation, apophatic theology, that surrenders the soul to the
unknowable God.”299 Our integrity as an individuated person is called into question.300 The
individual soul is taken from itself and given to the ineffable and infinite nature of God, after the
soul stands outside of itself and is brought into unknowing. Far from being abandoned by God,
the soul experiences, receives itself but now as living within God and not from or in the world.
We experience the self as now wholly unique and mysterious, instead of as from a profane
nature. Again, we are completely within the realm of the via negativa. And so we too, then, are
thought to be inebriated when we no longer abide within the sovereign domain of human reason
but instead submit ourselves to God’s non-discursive sovereignty.
God’s non-discursive sovereignty is characterized in the following manner,
God is named great according to its own particular greatness it gave of itself to
everything, exceedingly-pouring [ÍperxeÒmenon] and exceedingly-stretching out
[ÍperektenÒmenon] outside of all greatness…both according to its exceeding-fullness
and great-operation and its fontal gift, insofar as these are being participated by all in
pouring of boundless-gifts are undiminished in any way and have the same exceeding299

Denys the Areopagite, p.103. Louth does not make the distinction between apophasis and the via negativa that I
do, but the meaning is the same.
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fullness and are not lessened by the unparticipation but are still more exceedinglybubbling over [ÍperblÊzos]. This greatness is boundless and without measure or
number and is preeminence with regard to the absolute and exceedingly-stretching flood
(DN 909C).

The greatness, or sovereignty arises from God’s exceedingly-bubbling over, which does not
participate in anything but in which everything participates. As a fontal source, God gushes forth
as in a flood giving of itself totally to everything. Concerning God’s sovereignty, PseudoDionysius writes, “it [God] establishes it, it makes it secure, and holds it together. It binds the
whole completely to itself. It leads out everything from out of itself as from some all-powerful
root [§k =¤zhw pntokrtork∞w proãgosn]” (DN 936A-D).301 God is the source, or root,
of all creation from which all things naturally burgeon forth. As a root, God is the essentially
hidden excess or nutritive surplus from which everything emerges, “from this Source burst forth
all, in their ‘being-ful’, ‘good-ful’, and beautiful similarities to it….”302 In fact, at Concerning
Divine Names 893C, Pseudo-Dionysius terms God “ÍperdÊnmon,” “exceeding-capacity.”
God’s capacity is that through which all other capacities have their potentialities but which itself
is not reducible to a specified capacity. As exceeding-capacity, God is without, or prior to reason
and of the capacity of the cause and effect of entities. As such, God is not grounded in the
interplay of cause and effect. The task of God as the root is to spontaneously produce and to
consume life. God’s sovereignty is nothing but the uninhibited flow of abundance.303
However, this is a sovereignty that does not come wholly from the outside but rather
occurs within the divine respiration. Divine sovereignty does not occur through the fiat of an
301

This echoes the language of the son and the spirit burgeoning forth, like flowers, from the father.
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It could be asked whether God acts from necessity or freely. If God is the pure production of being, God is not
free not to produce. But this does not suggest that God is necessitated by a principle higher than itself because it is
not a being, not even the highest being, and so cannot be subject to any principle. It is the primordial origin of the
coming-to-be of entities. “Only a God who is not a producer but Production itself can “produce” without entering
into a relation with his products” (Theophany, p.50). There is some debate as to whether Pseudo-Dionysius believes
in creation or emanation. I cannot enter into this debate at the present moment but I will say it is of some interest
that Pseudo-Dionysius nowhere refers to creation ex nihilo but only to God as cause.
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external law giver but through our going out, receiving and dwelling within God; the distinction
between oneself and God does not hold. Oneself is neither God nor an isolated self (MT 1001A),
and divine sovereignty refers to a time prior to such a distinction.
Becoming absorbed within the divine erotic longing one is immediately exposed to it, as
is reveal in Hierotheus’ suffering and sympathies with divine things. “Knowledge is regarded as
superficial—it is only thinking about things; feeling engages the depths of the human person—it
is in love that man discovers himself.”304 A religion and a God that is not felt and lived are dead
and neither a religion nor God at all. Such an exposure cannot be a merely theoretical endeavor
but rather lived within the absorption of God. We disappear despite ourselves, even though we
must not.305 It is in the “despite ourselves” that gives rise to ecstasy. Unless we acknowledge and
feel something greater than ourselves, what surpasses our own power and understanding, what is
greater than we are despite ourselves, something which we, as isolated beings must not and
cannot be, then we would never reach ecstasy. “Recognizing the surpassing goodness of God,
these souls are drawn out of themselves ecstatically toward It. They, too, are taken up into the
divine erotic attraction to the Divine Goodness, and they willingly enter into the great divine
ecstasy. Thus, they who have come from God pass beyond themselves into God.”306 Emerging
intellectually impotent from the exposure, we stand at the limit of what is possible to be
experienced. Our own intellectual activity can do nothing to serve as authority. Exposed to God
in this manner, we stand outside of the world, becoming §kdÆmow and standing in ecstasy and
thrown outside of our normal, everyday, rational disposition toward the world.307
304

Denys the Areopagite, p.123.
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The physical or conceptual manifestation is put aside and the hidden meaning, which cannot be show itself as
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Becoming absorbed within the divine, our own intellectual powers cease not due to an
effort on our part but it results from the excessive appearance of God. Speaking of Moses’
ecstasy Pseudo-Dionysius writes, “being seized in the wholly impalpable and invisible, he
belongs entirely to that which is on the far-side of everything, and also to nothing, neither to
himself nor to another, but absolutely to unknowing by means of an inactivity of all knowing”
(MT 1001A). Moses is seized by the divine, unable to produce anything on his own and becomes
a product of God, which is nothing. Ecstasy cannot be the meeting of God (MT 1000D); if it
were we would define God. Instead it occurs in challenging what we believe God to be “denying
that which is in excess of every denial [Íp¢r pçsn éf¤resn]” (MT 1033C), challenging
knowledge itself.308 In other words, the language of being divinely inebriated and in ecstasy
allows Pseudo-Dionysius to communicate that the traditional logical, rational structures, and
order of the world are recognized to be illusory, and for the first time able to be critiqued.
IV. Purging the rational mind:
If there is a theme that runs throughout the beginning of Concerning Mysterious
Theology it is that of kãyrsw, a cleansing or ritual purification in the form of an épÒlsw, a
setting-free, a loosening, or deliverance, from “everything perceived and understood, everything
perceptible and understandable [ésyhtå k‹ nohtã] all that is not and all that is [oÈk ˆnt
k‹ ˆnt]” (MT 997b); we are set free from existing entities all together. Once undergoing the
kãyrsw, we are initiated into the divine mysteries. The Areopagite describes Moses’ ascent
toward the summit of Mount Sinai and his descent into the mysteries of divine darkness (MT

concealed, is attended to. We penetrate deeper into the divine mystery and thus unknow all things and by becoming
overwhelmed to the light of the divine, we are blind and thus see the divine darkness which is hidden in light.
308
John N. Jones claims that the pçn here “does not mean ‘all together’ but ‘each’.” (“Sculpting God: The Logic of
Dionysian Negative Theology, The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 89, No. 4 (Oct. 1996), pp.355-371, p. 363.)
This would imply that God is not beyond all denials or assertions but each one independently of each other. I believe
that I have here and in the previous chapter shown why this cannot be the case.
252

1001A)—we must note that every ascent is equally a descent, every enlightenment is equally a
divine blackout. Before beginning his climb, “the divine commands Moses first to go through an
absolute purification [épokyry∞n] and then to banish [éforsy∞n] himself from those
who have not undergone this” (MT 1000C).309 Moses’ departure may seem due only to his desire
to ascend the Mount, however if we turn to Epistle IX 1108C, a different motivation comes to
light, “We have therefore to run counter to the common people’s belief, if we are to take up the
holy word and stride toward the sacred symbols.” Moses must ritually purify himself as a sign
that he will now transgress the traditions of the idolatrous community. Submitting himself to the
divine, which is pre-representational and pre-ontological, Moses sets himself apart from those
whose community revolves around the idolatry of the golden calf—a community that is founded
upon exchangeability, use-value, and homogeneity. They have set for themselves a good,
something that they want in advance and unable to hold their desire in check they create an idol
for themselves. On the other hand, Moses is purified and is set free from a world that revolves
around the traditional structures of discursive intelligibility.310 It is necessary for Moses to
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This is not a separation from the multitude in the sense of a total renunciation from them, but rather Moses is to
come back and initiate them into the mysteries. “By the hierarchy, according to the law, the elevation toward
spiritual worship [ltre¤n] is initiation. The religious instructed individuals for the holy tabernacle by Moses’
sacred mysteries, the first initiator and leader by the law…he called all the sacred services of the law an image of a
type shown to him on Mount Sinai. Those initiated are those who are being conducted to a more perfect mystery of
the symbols of the law” (EC 501C). There is an ethical component to kãyrsw. Those who are higher in the
hierarchy are bound to instruct those below. We will return to this in the next chapter.
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“In summary, I may say this not inappropriately that the participation of the primordial-God knowledge is
purification [kãyrsw], illumination, and perfecting; purification, as it were from ignorance [égno¤w], by the
knowing of the more perfect mysteries [mÆsevn] according to worth fitness, enlightening by the self-same divine
knowing [ye¤& gn≈se], through which it purifies that which did not before contemplating the things now made
manifest by the higher illuminations and perfecting further by the self-same light according to the abiding knowing
[§pstÆmh] of the manifest mysteries” (CH 209C-D). Also, “The holy work of the sacraments as god-like capacity
[yeoed∞ dËnmn] is the purification of the initiated, as a middle the enlightening mystery of the purified and as last
and summary of the former the perfecting of those one instructed in the knowledge [§pstÆmh] of their proper
instructions” (EC 504A). In these passages, kãyrsw is an initiation in the mysteries of divine knowledge. In the
first passage “ignorance” is not used in the technical sense of divine darkness but rather ignorance, here, is used as
more closely associated with believing that God is subject to human standards or can be captured in idols. Instead, as
the passage from Ecclesiastical Hierarchy makes clear, being initiated into the sacraments makes one god-like, or
deifies one. We are transformed in the process of supplication as purification.
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separate himself so that he can become a heterogeneous element in the community, introducing
something which can have no use-value and cannot be assimilated and so cannot be ignored and
must be confronted. Moses’ catharsis, a union with the non-knowledge that characterizes God, is
an anti-accumulation practice which ends in a separation from the masses. Consequently, he
violates the reciprocity which governs the logic of exchange, i.e., that every loss should be
correlated with a gain. Having emphasized Moses’ catharsis and Hierotheus’ being ¶kdhmow,
there is a perpetual re-emergence and breaking with the established economy of the community
in which one finds oneself.
CATHARTIC PREPARATION
The ecstatic unification that results from catharsis is the goal of mystic exercise and not,
for the Areopagite, a union with some eternal presence for “[Moses] does not meet/consult with
[sgg¤net] God itself, for it may not be seen [éy°tow], but rather beholds [yevre›] its place
[tÒpon]” (MT 1000d). Moses does not meet or consult with God but rather with the empty space
of a God passing by unseen (Exod. 33.18-23). Moses, in ecstasy and undergoing catharsis, is
beyond anything that he could induce on his own; there is no reason behind the experience. It is
crucial for us to emphasize that God’s place, its tÒpow—what Moses experiences—is nowhere
but here in the world of appearances.311 The prefix Íper- that the Areopagite is so fond of to
describe that which applies to the divine does not, then, signal absolute transcendence from the
phenomenal world any more than Moses’ ascent is only an upward climb and not also a descent
into the abyssal ground of ‘what is,’ which absolutely resists conceptuality’s penetration. There
is nothing behind the representation of the concept. The prefix Íper- signifies a framework that
is utterly alien and foreign to a dependence upon the rational concept. Catharsis results in the
311
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exposure to and the ability to communicate the Íper-, since we are purified from rational
concepts, which hold the same significance for all people.
To gesture toward the manner in which Pseudo-Dionysius begins our descent into divine
darkness let us, again, note the prayer which opens Concerning Mysterious Theology. This is a
particularly odd prayer, invoking not a particular individual: God, Jesus, Mary, or some saint, but
rather the mystery of the trinity. In this prayer, it is said of such mysteries “amid the deepest
shadow they pour exceeding-brilliance on what is exceedingly-manifest [§n skotenottƒ tÚ
Íperfn°stton Íperlãmpont]” (MT 997b). The exceeding-brilliance [Íperlãmpont]
does not make that which is exceedingly-manifest [Íperfn°stton] appear in the sense of
showing it as obvious or knowable, but rather by blinding us, it reveals what is more than
manifest and as essentially foreign and thus outside of the economy of knowledge. The prayer
invokes something foreign, strange, and is set free from rationality because its ultimate source
while manifesting itself within the conceptual life of the human being cannot be comprehended
and penetrated by the individual as a rational subject, so that through the prayer we are situated
at the very limit of conceptuality itself.
As such, for the Areopagite, ritual purification is not meant to make us ready for some
esoteric knowledge, but rather is a spiritual exercise for non-knowledge. For instance, PseudoDionysius in Epistle III writes, “what is to be spoken remains unspoken [ê==hton] and what is
intellectable is unknowable [k‹ nooÊmenon êgnvston]” (1069b). Now, while Concerning
Divine Names certainly focuses on affirmative theology, we are told that the text is simply a
preparatory step for genuine theologico-philosophical thinking. Here, in Concerning Mysterious
Theology, Pseudo-Dionysius is outside of kataphasis, there is no closed economy of knowledge
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for him. Radical unknowing, the via negativa, is a perpetual purging and a re-emergence of
God’s upsurge.
Furthermore, catharsis is not a purification of the body as the site of emotion,312 instead it
intensifies our emotional attunement to the world; it is the desire for what is new, it flows from a
logic of negation at which we will never arrive. As the abolition of integrated being, catharsis
corresponds to an intensification of the negative and of the nothing that God is. It is the flux of
an impersonal desire renewed by the impulse of God’s upsurge. For claiming that God is beyond
every assertion and denial, Pseudo-Dionysius gestures toward a loss of a conventional and stable
theological worldview and in this space we must now give a discourse that will inevitably reveal
itself to be in excess of itself. Theologico-philosophical discourse, as Pseudo-Dionysius
understands it, begins only in the aftermath of the destabilization of affirmative discourse.
CATHARTIC CREATION
Consequently, his thought should be interpreted in some sense as ‘creative.’ PseudoDionysius purges all language from the semantical categories of subject and predicate, defying
the laws of the excluded middle and of non-contradiction, and from all the basic forms of
discourse provided by the Aristotelian lÒgow épofntkÒw. In fact, counter to Aristotelian
logic, the Areopagite writes “we should not conclude that the negations are simply the opposite
of the affirmations, but rather that the cause of all is considerably prior to this, beyond
privations, beyond every denial, beyond every assertion” (MT 1000B). If Dionysian denials were
simply the opposite of their assertions, they would still be grounded in discursivity; they would
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For Iamblichus kãyrsw is not a total removal of the passions or of the body “If it is purification from passions
and freedom from the toils of generation and unification with the divine principle that the ascent through invocations
procures for the priests, how can one attach the notion of passions to this process? For it is not the case that such
activity draws down the passionless and pure into laying down to passion and impurity; on the contrary, it makes us,
who have come to be subject to passions by reason and birth, pure and immutable…as the truth of things itself
desires to teach is, disposing the human intellect to participation in the gods, leading up to the gods and bringing it
into accord with them through harmonious persuasion” (De Mysteriis, I.12.42).
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simply be what the assertions are not. Pseudo-Dionysius reminds us, at Concerning Mysterious
Theology 1025B with the metaphor of the sculptor, that this is a creative act. “Through
renouncing [éfr°sevw] all of ‘what is’ from it, just as it is the nature of sculptors, removing
[§jroËntew] all the hindrances having covered the pure view of the hidden thing [tª
kyrò toË krf¤o y°&], and by an act of renouncing [tª éfr°se] alone, they make
manifest the hidden away beauty itself by itself.” This ‘creative’ act should not be thought to be
engaged in any t°xnh, skill or craftsmanship, or as a creation of an idol. Rather, it is a
fundamental and spontaneous response to divine darkness. All there is in such an act is the total
removal of everything that is present, since the “pure view of the hidden away beauty itself by
itself” is essentially hidden, never to be manifest in anything.
Only by removing and cleansing what is present, what is already known, what is already
manifest, can the hidden beauty show forth. The hidden beauty always calls out to us, but we can
be confused and believe that the call originates from what is present. It is only through a
renunciation of what is manifest does the true call of the beautiful echo and resonate. So as not to
risk making an idol, the sculptor must know that his creation does not correspond to the divine.
The idol fixes the divine for us permanently, for a commerce where the human hems in
the divine from all angles…It is characterized solely by the subjection of the divine to the
human conditions for experience of the divine, concerning which nothing proves that it is
not authentic. The human experience of the divine precedes the idolatrous face…The idol
reflects back to us, in the face of a god, our own experience of the divine…It delivers to
us to the point of enslaving it to us, just as much as it enslaves us to it.313

The divine must appear as in a manifestation to its deliverance through the renunciation of what
is already present. Therefore, the “creation” is just as much of a destruction. It is the breaking
down of the manifestations and a demand for a human experience that cannot find support in a
self-grounding. Instead of emphasizing the act of creation and by placing the stress on the
313
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removal of what is already present, the Areopagite puts us in a space that is prior to truth and
falsity, placing us squarely in an exposure to the abyssal ground and space of God’s “to be.” Just
as the sculptor purges what is unnecessary, what is present and already known, to reveal what is
not present in the marble, our kãyrsw is a purification of what is manifest in its immediacy to
reveal the unspoken, hidden, presumed, and unanticipated. It is the negative space, that which is
removed, the space around the sculpture that defines the truth more so than what is present.
The Areopagite rejects the scientific subject/object relation between thought and its world
that the uninitiated glorify through the use of idols. Pseudo-Dionysius also rejects any notion of
truth as correspondence between a subjective re-presentation and an independent, objectively
present reality.314 “Hymning superlatively this, the nonsense [êlogon], mindless [ênon] and
foolish wisdom [mvrån sof¤n], we say that it is cause of all mind, reason, all wisdom and
comprehension…and in it all treasures of wisdom and knowing are hidden” (DN 868A). Our
wisdom is foolish when compared to divine wisdom, which, however, as we have seen, looks
like drunkenness to us. When God’s wisdom speaks, we remain silent. And in remaining silent,
God speaks and so does Pseudo-Dionysius. If he does speak to us through his writings, it must be
by a foolish wisdom. And yet, from this foolish wisdom, which given all of its apophatic
language and the nonsense of the via negativa, all treasures are hiddenly kept. And so PseudoDionysius, then, in his foolish wisdom must be speaking God’s wisdom. By engaging in a
philosophical mode of thinking that always threatens to exceed itself, we are required to employ
a form of thinking that does not search for eternal essences but rather situates itself at the limit of
appearance and conceptuality itself.
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For example, although the Areopagite writes of God, “it is the eternity of existence, the source and measure of
existence” he immediately writes “it is before existence, being, and eternity, it is the productive source, middle, and
end of all things” (DN 824A). This is just one of many passages where Pseudo-Dionysius clarifies himself in this
way. God is not identifiable with eternal existence, nor is there any reason to suppose that they exist in any form.
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Non-discursive language allows for a thinking that exposes us to the disruption of the
apparent ordering of our world and out of this experience creatively generates a non-discursive
philosophical form of thought. The need for something like a non-discursive language, which is
the creative, speculative, intuiting, intoxicated response arising from the exposure to the
disruption of the apparent order of the world is necessary if God exceeds all idols, all words and
all concepts. To experience the divine, then, we must purify ourselves from social norms by
becoming inebriated. Being intoxicated is being driven into an ecstatic state where traditional
and formal logic do not apply.315
V. Death and our critical transgression:
The cathartic preparation seems to have been complicated, difficult and exhausting, for
Moses cannot begin his ascent until “after every purification is complete [metå pçsn
épokãyrsw].” In fact, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy describes the “hierarchic rites” as “holy
contests [ﬂerÒw égvn¤],” “within which he is placed under Christ as judge, since, as God, he is
the institutor of the awards of the contest…and following in the divine footprints [ye›ow ·xnes]
of the first athletes” (401c-404A), whose purpose it is to purge the initiate from the influence of
the perceptible, conceptual, and idolatrous world (EH 401A). Characterizing them as “contests,”
égvn¤, and the initiates as athletes, the physical and the psychological exertion and
discomfort that is associated with cathartic preparation is brought to the fore. As we will
presently see, the contests result in the transgression of the isolated self.
Divine erotic longing is ecstatic [¶st d¢ §ksttkÚw ı ye›ow ¶rvw], not permitting
lovers to be themselves but rather of their beloved. This is shown by the providence of
the superior to the inferior, and equals by their coming together and the inferior by a
315

Christ, the Areopagite reminds us, speaks in parables so that the Holy of Holies should be “shaken free of the
masses [to›w pollo›w époses«sy]” (Ep. IX 1108A). A parable is thought “illogical” because it is an
essentially metaphorical and creative response to the experience of the overwhelming intensification of presence that
is indicative of the divine, which takes that which seems to be patently clear in its immediate manifestation and
places it outside of our conceptual understanding so that something unanticipated may come to the foreground.
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more divine respect toward the superior thing. Also, the great Paul, when possessed by
divine erotic longing and participating in its ecstatic capacity says “I no longer live, but
Christ lives in me.” As a true lover and standing outside of himself as he says to God and
not living the life of himself but the life of the beloved (DN 712A).

We see here that ecstatic erotic longing is the total surrendering of oneself to the other. God
becomes that in which we are born but as a non-subject of non-knowledge, or divine darkness.
Only in this drunken and ecstatic darkness do we truly touch and communicate with each other.
Moreover, purged from all that is perceptible and intelligible, kãyrsw, then, results in the
death of the subject.316 There is a fusion, which is opened in Christ’s ecstatic love of humanity.
Only in betraying one’s isolated existence does life and communication emerge. We are brought
to the limit of what is possible for existence, dying in the process. We are shot through by the
love of Christ for humanity, and made vulnerable on an ontological level. We are annulled. It is
necessary to die since individual existence is capacious, always emerging and re-emerging in the
cycle of God’s movement.
Chapter one of the Concerning Mysterious Theology makes a distinction between the
ego, the conceived self, the traditional subject as the center of human life and the source of
human action associated with making assertions and denials, and that which suffers, or
undergoes the exposure to the divine without planed action and is rather a spontaneous
irruption,317 as the exclamations in the prayer to the trinity reveals. Immediately after this prayer,
Pseudo-Dionysius says,
I, myself, pray for these things: that you, dear Timothy, with utmost relentless honing
around the mysterious sights [tª per‹ tå mstkå yeãmt sntÒnƒ dtrbª]
abandon both the operations of perception and thought and all objects of perception and
thought; all that is not and all that is; and toward union, as is accessible, unknowingly
stretch forth to what wholly exceeds existence and knowing. (MT 997B).
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See Divine Light pp.247-251. William Riordan mentions the similarity between purification and death as found
in non-Christian cultures. He only tangentially discusses this in reference to Pseudo-Dionysius.
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See Phenomenology and Mysticism pp.168-178. The distinction between the “I” of the individual and a
spontaneous response to the divine is discussed.
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Timothy is being advised to lose himself by unremittingly spending time with the mysteries
“which calls to mind the ritual tortures and ordeals of archaic initiations,”318 until he is released
from everything, including himself, spontaneously stretching forth into unknown depths. After
enduring such a purgation, “one is neither oneself nor another [k‹ oÈdenÚw oÎte •toË oÎte
•t°ro] by an inactivity of all knowing [t∞w pãshw gn≈sevw énenerghs&]” (MT 1001A).
All that is left of the self is a purely responsive site disrobed of any personal identity.
Describing the purification rites, Pseudo-Dionysius states, “In the trail, he has
overthrown, in his struggles, after the example of the divine, every activity and with every
impulse which stands in the way of his deification [prÚw y°vsn §nnt¤w]. By dying to sin in
baptism, one could say that he mysteriously shares in the death of Christ himself” (EH 404A).
We are called to suffer, to die, and become deified, as Christ had done on the cross, through
being cleansed by water.319 On the Cross, Christ is purged from individualizing corruption of the
body and rational mind through,320 and perhaps because of the suffering endured, Christ’s
participation in the divine darkness is revealed. Completely spent and in a state of bewilderment,
torment, and confusion, Christ has been overcome by suffering, only now in his overwhelming
exhaustion can he fully surrender to God. In the throes of death and purged from all rational
discourse, Pseudo-Dionysius reminds us that Christ can only cry out, “My God, my God, why
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“As for baptism, the Fathers emphasize it initiatory function more and more plastically by multiplying images of
death and resurrection. The baptismal font is compared to both the tomb and womb; it is the tomb in which the
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death is clearly expressed in a Syrian liturgy…” Mircea Eliade Rites and Symbols of Initiation trans. Willard R.
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been known to Pseudo-Dionysius, a Syrian born writer.
320
Again, there is nothing inherently sinful in being embodied, but embodiment suggest the working of the intellect,
which as we have seen makes neither affirmation nor denials of yerx¤ but rather what is next to it and thus we
“sin” in the sense of missing our mark.
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have you forsaken me? ['O yeÒw mo Ù yeÒw mo eﬁw t¤ §gkt°lp°w me]” (Mk 15:34),321
which is echoed in Pseudo-Dionysius’ own “cry of the prophet,” “Knowledge of you is
wondrous, it is outside of me [§j §moË]; it is high, it is not possible for me” (Ep. V 1073A).
Knowledge of God becomes the impossible for which we strive. These cries originate from the
painful recognition that the divine is so excessively present that it has overwhelmed the self, and
that the ego is no longer present. It is the rational self that is distant from God, and not God who
is in itself absent. God has completely overwhelmed the individual; it is now God who lives in
the individual, who has been displace and stands in ecstasy to him or herself. In the cry of prayer
there is no meaning; it cannot be justified. It is a form of communication that speaks out without
a subject being present. The cry is a supplication, a request for a reply, but since it is directed
toward that which exceeds rational understanding, it is a request that will be met in vain, but
through this we are opened to that which exceeds our comprehension. Here, self-surrender
reaches its peak. It is an utter abandonment of the self, a transgression against one’s own
biological birth and a desire to die and to be born anew without an ego, which is exactly what
Pseudo-Dionysius states that he hopes for Timothy.
The death cry or the prayer of Christ and Pseudo-Dionysius’ own “prophetic cry”
indicates the death of, or rather transgression of the ego by its reduction to nothingness, after all,
as we have seen, in divine darkness we do not find union with God, but more profoundly belong
to nothing (MT 1001A). “Annihilation is deeper than union because in union there is still the
experience of (the self) being united with God. Annihilation is also deeper than the station of
oneness because, while there is the experience of all spatio-temporal creation as if it were
321

It is of note that Pseudo-Dionysius this passage is from Mark and not from Luke, 23:46, where Christ cries out
“Father, into yours hands I commit my spirit.” The uncertainty found in Mark results from the complete loss of self
through the suffering and deification on the cross. Christ literally has lost himself in this process and so it appears
that God has forsaken him. There is no “I” or spirit to be committed, let alone a God into whose hands he could be
delivered.
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nothing…In annihilation, however, it is the self that is annihilated in God and that is of no
essential significance.”322 In annihilation and death we experience non-knowledge. It is even
impossible to know that God dwells within one, for such knowledge would require a difference
in a unity of indistinction. Annihilation is the return to nothing, or rather to the generative source
of yerx¤ which is prior to being. “Being” is traded for the intensity of the experience. The
intensity of this is oriented around one’s own extinction. Death, then, is a desire to return to
yerx¤, to the pre-ontological. Our life is based upon and molded by death, in which we
become lost to ourselves, taken into divine darkness and intensified into a site of pre-articulated
speech. When the initiate “dies” he or she becomes “indifferent to all contrary things”
(EH 404C). Since only that which is rational, grounded in binary opposition, can admit of
contraries, when one dies to every assertion and every denial, one becomes an open space in
which contraries are able to co-exist without opposition. Dying to one’s old life, the life of
perceptible and conceptual notions, one is now able to make the descent into divine darkness.
Whatever it is to live a meaningful (Christian) life for the Areopagite it is to transgress
established laws that have become idols for us, purging ourselves from them. Likewise, we too
are initiated into a world, a world emanating from the void of discursive thought, and not a
member of the slavish masses who believe they know and who “think that by their own
intellectual resources can have direct knowledge of what has made the shadows its hiding place
[skÒtow épokrfØn ÈtoË]” (MT 1000A). In fact, in submitting ourselves to divine darkness
“it [the divine] could reveal itself [épof¤noto] authoritatively and stand firmly [kr¤vw
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k‹ §pstht«w]” (DN 588B). By inverting theological language, the authoritative relationship
God has over us as a present entity giving us laws falls away, transforming it into a exceedinglypresent void to which we must craft a creative response.323
Through divine drunkenness we are now able to “straddle both heresies and the guiltless
[k‹ tå §ng∞ k‹ tå kyrå db¤nos]” (MT 1000C). In other words, if we are take
Pseudo-Dionysius’ thought to its ultimate conclusion, we must understand that those who
transgress God as that concept that is knowable and present pass “beyond the summit of every
holy ascent, transgress [Íperb¤nos] every divine light, every voice, every word from
heaven, and who go into the darkness [eﬁw tÚn gnÚfon eﬁsdom§now]” (MT 1000C), so as to
become, for the first time, open to the divine, which is to transgress God’s laws and God itself. It
is transgression that opens us to true communication, the ruin of self-identity, permanence,
individuality. God must be defied, stepping into heresies to reveal to us that God is not an entity.
The mystic response understands that the prohibition against heresies must be challenged in
order to unveil the hidden nature of God; the forbidden must occur and as forbidden, if the
hiddenness of God is to manifest. The law as a condition for the survival of a discrete being must
be put aside or broken for a law that is unconditionally applicable to all entities and thus to none.
There is no guarantee that the one engaged in mysticism will come out ethically intact, for in the
moment of the via negativa everything is lost. We must be completely empty, even of the
expectation of being born anew, giving up the hope of the resurrection and even of God itself.
And to give up this desire is to risk everything. Christ’s love of humanity becomes all the more
sudden and surprising in recognizing that it applies to no one at all and yet is nevertheless given.
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That God is a void that is atop the hierarchy will be further explained in the next chapter. It will be shown that
Pseudo-Dionysius’ hierarchy is essentially anarchic.
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We must suffer God, entering into a “theopathic state,”324 laying aside knowledge for the
sake of unknowing. We must become what we are by embracing what we are not and can never
be, i.e., that which is without an ego. Dying to the self, we become empty. Standing on both
sides of heresies and purity simultaneously, the soul is both God and is not God, both pure and
impure. We suffer God because of the upsurge it reveals in the order of creation. When we suffer
God, it is the disorder that signifies God’s overwhelming presence. It is to this experience that
we must pray. Prayer may result in ecstasy and catharsis but it accomplishes nothing positive,
but only disruption. To find the divine, we must experience a disruption in ourselves, struggling
with our own finite created self and existence, pushing beyond it and fighting to become what we
are not. The individual engaged in prayer can only recognize a profound desire to overstep what
we are. It is supplication without response, ending in a community that cannot revolve around
the affirmation of a collective identity but rather the dissolution of identifiable traits. By dying to
the self, it is an anonymous flow of community. Such a community cannot be political since it
does not begin from a controllable process but rather the blinding overflow of the autonomy of
God. It is to this topic that we will now turn.
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CHAPTER SIX
ANARCHY IN THE HIERARCHY:
The Decapitated Hierarchical Community
Wer, wenn ich schriee, hörte mich den aus der
Engel
Ordnungen?
Denn das Schöne ist nichts
Als des Schrecklichen Anfang, den wir noch grade
ertragen,
und wir bewundern es so, weil es gelassen
verschäht
uns zu zerstören. Ein jeder Engel ist schrecklich.
Rilke, Duineser Elegien

I. Liturgical community:
Having placed our focus on Concerning the Divine Names and Concerning Mysterious
Theology, it may seem as if Pseudo-Dionysius’ project is a solitary one; one individual’s journey
to and through the concept of the divine. However, all the works of the Areopagite, four treatises
and his ten letters, are addressed to others, and thus they are concerned with making connections
between individuals and these works present Pseudo-Dionysius as part of a society bound and
defined by relationships. Indeed, “there is no such thing as an individual, a being conceived as a
closed, self-contained unit which extrinsically enters into relation with other beings.”325 Far from
being an isolated author of texts, Pseudo-Dionysius presents himself emphatically as a member
of an ordered community, in which one member turns toward another for advice and counsel, in
which there are teachers and disciples, as well as, holy men, propounders of false teachings, and
raisers of objections. In fact, in Epistle VIII he rebukes a monk, Demophilus, for overstepping his
place in the hierarchical order of the church by criticizing a priest, his superior.326 The works of
Pseudo-Dionysius, then, situate themselves explicitly, and importantly, within the framework of
a strictly ordered monastic community.
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It may be that the works of the Areopagite are philosophical but by addressing them to
specific individuals this is not how he presents them to us. They are concerned with responding
to the living needs of a Christian community,327 predominately through the interpretation of
scripture. Concerning Divine Names deals with scriptural names ascribed to God. The Celestial
Hierarchy is concerned with the meaning of the imagery given to the angels, where the divine is
first made manifest. This hierarchy “forms an intermediary between the incorporeal angels and
wholly corporeal, visible things,”328 through which, finally, the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy
expounds and interprets the ceremonies of the Church. This latter hierarchy is the space in which
the liturgy of the community is performed, expressing the mystery of the faith. With these two
texts on the hierarchies “the universe (in all its invisible and visible multitude) is an everlasting,
radiant, cosmic liturgy.”329
So certainly Pseudo-Dionysius is concerned with a community. As we have seen in the
previous chapter, Pseudo-Dionysius does not engage in polemical exchanges. There is a sense of
sureness in his writings, one that is based on the tradition that has been handed down to him
through the hierarchy in which he finds himself. We have seen as well that the two modes of
theological discourse are interwoven. That is to say, what is written, open and evident is
intertwined with that which requires initiation. The former is for and available to everyone,
giving them a foothold in a tradition, while the latter is only for those who can respond
appropriately to the teachings. A hierarchy incorporates both directions. In fact, a similar
sentiment is found in the opening chapter of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, “for the divinely
transmitted scriptures are existences of our hierarchy. As we affirm that these scriptures, all such
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as were given from our holy-initiators in inspired words of theology are most august. And further
whatever our leaders have revealed to us from the same holy individuals, by immaterial intiation
[é#lot°r& mÆse]” (EH 376B-C). Scripture is the formless expressed in the multiplicity of
material goods and the liturgy is the timeless expressed in temporal actions. We are initiated into
a community in which the divine is expressed in human terms while keeping it fundamentally
mysterious.
It will be helpful from the outset to say that the hierarchies incorporate both kataphasis
and apophasis. Indeed, a traditional interpretation of the hierarchies will reveal that both are
ridged structures which govern the entities that fall within them. The hierarchies, in part,
function as fixed measures of the amount of divine found within a particular level. These levels
are, in the case of the Celestial Hierarchy, unchanging and within the Ecclesiastical they are used
to give each participant authority over the lower strata. The kataphatic element of the hierarchies
gives us a highly organized structure of reality. In fact, this structure is only realized under the
ridged organization of the hierarchy. Although the hierarchies give us a rank and ordering of the
angels and the clergy, there is an apophatic quality as well.330 I will radically depart from a
traditional explanation of the hierarchies through employing apophasis. The liturgy expressed in
the hierarchies allows us to recognize the divine as inherently mysterious through the enactment
of the liturgy itself. “The liturgy is eschatological, in the sense that it points beyond this world to
the final consummation when, in Deny’s terminology, hierarchies will display rather than merely
seek to achieve their purpose.”331 The purpose of the hierarchy and the significance of its
structure are necessary to recognize the importance of this lived experience while at the same
time gesturing beyond the hierarchy. The reality which the highly organized hierarchy
330
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necessitates is revealed to presume a level of being that exceeds the structure of the hierarchy
itself. Christ is seated at the summit of both hierarchies but as an enigmatical receding Abgrund.
Far from simply telling us what the liturgy means, the hierarchies are means of expressing the
divine as question-worthy, allowing us to participate in that mystery. If we are to place the
mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysius anywhere “that place is within the Church and the Church’s
liturgy.”332 The object of the hierarchies is to establish homogeneity. However, the hierarchy is
not an abstract entity. It is the group of individuals living in aspirations inherent in the process of
establishing homogeneity. But founded by individuals, there are always heterogeneous elements,
irreducible facts. Hierarchy finds itself deprived of functional satisfaction and thus terms them
apophatically. Consequently, the community that Pseudo-Dionysius is concerned with is one that
is always on the verge of overcoming its own limitations. In fact, it is my view that through the
apophatic hierarchy we transgress an organized form of community altogether and enter into the
darkness of the Dionysian God.
The hierarchies work on different registers, epistemologically, metaphysically, and
ethically. Although the hierarchies function within each of these, Pseudo-Dionysius does not
seem to make a strong delineation between them. They are, in fact, interconnected and
interwoven within the discourse of community.
Before discussing what the two forms of hierarchies or communities achieve, I will first
give a brief overview of each of them and how they are related. After that discussion, I will then
give an account of the significance of what it is to be a hierarchy and what its function is for
Pseudo-Dionysius. Finally, I will demonstrate that despite, or rather only because of the highly
regimented organization that is found in both hierarchies, we are left ultimately with a “headless”
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hierarchy, one not grounded in being or ‘what is’, but rather in an abyssal depth that endlessly
recedes.
THE CELESTIAL HIERARCHY
In his Celestial Hierarchy, the Areopagite presents us with an account of those
immaterial beings, generally termed ‘angels.’333 They are called angels for “the reason that all
the heavenly capacities hold as a common possession an inferior capacity to conform to the
divine [yeoed°w] and to enter into communion with the gift of light from God [YeoË
fvtodos¤n]” (CH 196C). This angelic realm is depicted as being closer to God, yerx¤ in
particular (CH 177C, 180A, 186C, 209B), than we are, (a topic to which I will return to below)
being “forever around God [per‹ yeÒn] and permanently united with it, without intermediaries”
(CH 200D). It is, however, impossible for us to know “the hidden truth about the celestial
intelligences” (CH 140B), instead we can only know what has been revealed to us by God via the
angels, what “the primordial-God has mysteriously revealed [≤ yerx¤ memstg≈ghken]
through them” (CH 200C). In fact, angels help “human beings solve a major epistemological
problem.”334 Through the angels, God becomes manifest to us. “And so all the angelic beings
follow the first rank of intelligent beings in heaven as their source, after God, of all sacred
knowledge of God and of all imitation of God, for it is this latter order which mediates the
primordial-God enlightenment to all other beings, and to us” (CH 301D-304A). Angels allow the
unmanifested to become manifest. Through being wholly other to the human, angels are able to
make yerx¤ appear as it is, an irreducible element of our experience.
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Because the angels are immaterial, symbolic language must be is used to describe them in
terms of what we perceive, and that language is to be found in scripture. The language of angelic
revelation is discussed in detail in chapter two of the Celestial Hierarchy. All such language
refers to images drawn from sensual experience so that we may be drawn together into a
communion with that of which it speaks; “let us therefore look as far upward as the light of
sacred scripture allows and in our reverent awe of what is divine, let us be drawn together toward
the divine” (DN 588A). To respond to this language is to be raised up toward the celestial realm
and thus to the divine. This language is symbolic, which is to say that what is conveyed is
conveyed indirectly. For, if we interpret what scripture gives to us literally, we are faced with
absurdities: “Perhaps one will also think that the excessively-heavenly places are filled with
certain herds of lions, troops of horses, and bellowing songs of hymn, flocks of birds, and other
living creatures and material and less honorable things” (CH 137C-D). Pseudo-Dionysius gives
us two reasons for “why forms are naturally attributed to the formless and shapes to the
shapeless” (CH 137D):
It is not alone our capacity which is unable immediately to elevate itself to the intelligible
contemplations [§p‹ tåw nohtåw énte¤nesy yevr¤w] and that it needs appropriate
and intellectual instructions which present images suitable to us, of the formless [t«n
émorf≈tvn] and exceedingly-natural contemplations; but further, that it is most
agreeable to the revealing scriptures to conceal, through forbidden and sacred enigmas
[d' épo==Ætvn k‹ ﬂer«n ﬁngmãtvn] and to keep holy the secret truth respecting
the exceedingly-mundane intellects inaccessible to the multitude. Not everyone is sacred,
and as scripture says, knowledge is not for everyone (CH 140A-B).

The latter concern is directed toward that which is clear and obvious, seeking to awaken faith in
those who do not yet believe, while that which is forbidden and enigmatic is the exposure to the
mystery of the divine, it is a growing understanding of the faith mediated through the experience
of the liturgy of the Church and a more profound grasp of the hidden significance of scripture. It
is an immediate exposure and response to that which is enigmatic for those who have already
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been properly initiated. This mirrors the interconnection between kataphasis and apophasis. The
apophatic moment is embedded within a rational context. Apophasis proceeds logically through
the aporia that is engendered through a contestation of language, making visible the forbidden
enigma. The awakening of faith occurs within a kataphatic theological context. The apophatic
aims to induce an exposure that will emerge from a kataphatic context, but which refuses
discursive thought. The forbidden enigma is not a doctrine that is to be accepted as true, but
rather is held beyond rational explanation. It is a sense of wonderment that is rediscovered within
the enactment of the liturgy but which also points beyond the horizon of it. Part of PseudoDionysius’ other point is that by means of negations we are able to form immaterial concepts. By
ridding the mind of particulars we are led to a deeper understanding of reality. We move from
sensible particulars and then beyond the concept of those particulars. It is a practice and exercise
that must be repeated through which the human intellect is able to no longer be dependent upon
concepts.335 The apophatic language of dis-ontology, in continually moving toward a removal of
‘what is’ suggests a different mode of comparison, one less likely to reduce the particularities of
language to a homogenous set of doctrines.
The symbolic language found in scripture both conceals the esoteric meaning while
simultaneously revealing it by providing images that are within our grasp. “For theology artlessly
[étexn«w] uses of poetic representations of sacred things, respecting shapeless intelligences
[ésxhmt¤stvn no«n], out of regard for our intelligences, so to speak, befitting it and in an
uplifting way [éngvg∞w] natural to it, and molding the inspired writing for it” (CH 137B). “If
theology use poetic language it does so only to open the path that would be accessible to our
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imperfect nature.”336 Within this symbolic language, Pseudo-Dionysius uses like and unlike
symbols, which “remain connected to liturgical communities.”337 Apophatic thought arises out of
the communal engagement of a worshipping community running up against its own limitations.
Some symbols possess a similarity to that which they symbolize, such as ‘word’, ‘intellect’, and
‘being’ (CH 140C). When scripture ascribes such names to God, it depicts God as rational,
intelligent, and that to which all entities owe their existence. The unlike symbols are drawn from
the material world and would seem ridiculous to apply to God. This is not only discussed in the
Celestial Hierarchy but as well in Epistle IX, which presents us with a long list of inappropriate
symbols which concentrate on anthropomorphism (Ep. IX 1104C-1105B): God as an individual
of war, or drunk, an erotic lover, as jealous, deceitful, or wearing jewellery.
The Areopagite is clear, however, that these unlike symbols, are in a certain way, more
appropriate to God because in fact God exceeds anything we can say of it. If we use like symbols
such as being omnipotent and an all knowing creator we are likely to mistake God as truly being
like this, that is to say, as an entity among others. God is not an entity but rather is in excess of
every entity and conception that we may have of it, “in excess to every manifestation of
existence and life, no reference to life can characterize it; every word and intelligence fall short
of similarity to it” (CH 140C). And so, if we use unlike symbols and say that God is an
individual of war or all consuming fire, there is little danger that we will literally apply these
characteristics to God.
But surely there is no need to dwell on this, for scripture asserts that God is dissimilar and
that it is not to be compared with anything, that it is different from everything and
stranger still, that there is nothing like it. Nevertheless, words of this sort do not
contradict the similarity of things to it, for the very same things are both similar and
dissimilar to God [tå går ˜mo ye“ k‹ énÒmo]. They are like it to the extent that
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they share what cannot be shared. They are dissimilar to it in that its effects fall short of
their cause and are infinitely and incomparably subordinate (DN 917A).

Applying both sorts of names to God unveils the paradoxical structure of God as bestowing that
which cannot be given, while simultaneously being far superior to what is given. It cannot be
spoken of but only sensed. Such names brings visibility to that which is absolutely invisible and
incomprehensible. And such names keep in play the movement toward the divine made possible
through the interplay of kataphasis and apophasis.
The truest mode of language, as we have seen, to describe God is that of denial; “but at
other times, its praises are exceedingly-mundanely sung by scripture itself, by dissimilar
revelations [énomo¤ow §kfntor¤w], when they affirm that it is invisible, boundless, and
ungraspable [éÒrton ÈtØn k‹ êperon k‹ éx≈rhton] and other things which recall not
what it is but what it is not” (CH 140D). Negation describes God truly, since God is in no way
like existing entities, “we rightly describe its non-relationship to created entities, we do not know
its excessively-existing nature, and inconceivable, ineffable indefinability. If, then, negations in
respect to divine things are true but affirmations are inharmonious, the revelation as regards to
invisible things, through dissimilar representations, is more appropriate to the hiddenness of
ineffable existing things” (CH 141A). Unlike symbols compel us to seek out God endlessly by
denying what is said and disorienting us, opening us to a deepening wisdom of one’s tradition.
Angels, too, are best described through dissimilar symbols. Scripture intentionally tells us
that angels are horses, bird, and wheels (CH 137A), since there is less danger of us ascribing
these attributes literally, such as thinking that angels are “golden or gleaming men, glamorous,
wearing lustrous clothing” (CH 141B) might compel us to do.
In order that individuals might not suffer from this, by thinking they are nothing more
exalted than their beautiful appearance, the elevating wisdom of the pious theologians
conducts to incongruous dissimilarities, not permitting our earthly part to rest fixed in
unseemly images [ﬁsxråw eﬁkÒnw] but urging the upward tendency of the soul and
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goading it by the unseemliness of the phrases that it belongs neither to lawful nor
seeming truth, even for the most earthly conceptions, that the most heavenly and divine
visions are actually like things so base (CH 141B-C).

This language goads us; it is meant not to describe but rather to stir our devotion and lift us
upward. It stirs us out of our compliancy of thinking that God and angels are like us and compels
us to view them as inherently question-worthy.
Taking his cue from scripture, Pseudo-Dionysius names nine angelic beings, appearing in
three ranks: the first rank consists of seraphim, cherubim, and thrones; the second, dominions,
powers, and authorities; and the third order is made up of principalities, archangels, and angels.
These ranks are fixed and meant to fill the individual with wonder, in fact Pseudo-Dionysius
gives the traditional Hebrew names to the highest rank of angels. Seraphim are ‘fire-makers’,
cherubim means ‘fullness of knowledge’ or ‘outflowing of wisdom’ and thrones suggest
‘standing over every earthly defect’ (CH 205B-D). This wonder is meant to keep us on an ethical
path, so that we “strive toward angelic life” (DN 696C).
Now divine manifestations were made to the pious as in keeping with revelations of God,
that is to say, through certain holy visions, analogous to those who see them. Now the allwise word of God naturally calls theophanies that particular vision which manifests a
divine similitude depicted in itself as shaping the shapeless, from the elevations of the
beholders, and the divine persons themselves are initiated into some mystery. But our
fathers were initiated into these divine visions through celestial powers (CH 180C).

The angels initiate humans into a way of living that is in keeping with the divine, “to manifest
the hidden goodness in themselves, to be, as it were, the angelic messengers of divine silence
[ye¤w sg∞w]” (DN 696B). By shrouding the divine in silence, the angels remind us of the
incomprehensibility of it, initiating us into the divine mystery.
This revelation through the angels is meant to affect the human being. In fact, PseudoDionysius tells us,
for probably not even we should come to a seeking out of a waylessness [eﬁw zÆthsn
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m¢n §j épor¤w] to an uplifting [eﬁw éngvgÆn] through a precise explanation of
sacred things unless the deformed imagery used by scripture to describe the angels had
shocked us, not permitting our intellect to linger on the discordant representations, but
stirring us to reject utterly the material proclivities [tåw Ílkåw prospye¤w] and
accustoming us to uplifting ourselves through manifestations to the things exceeding-the
world [då t«n fnom°nvn §p‹ tåw Íperkosm¤ow éngvgãw] (CH 145B).

Only through the discordant language used to describe angels, are we awoken out of our
complacency and made ready to perceive the mysterious divine. Pseudo-Dionysius applies these
principles to the way in which human emotions are meant to be applied to that which is in excess
to us, “yet the scheme is so extraordinarily impressive, it dwells on the splendor of the celestial
hierarchy, as to create an emotional presumption.”338 If emotions are to be applied to the celestial
realm and have meaning for it, we must sublimate them. “For anger [ymÒw], in entities without
reason, takes its rise in the passions and their movement, which takes the form of appetite, is full
of all kinds of unreasonableness. But with regards to the intelligent, we must think of anger
differently, as denoting, according to my judgment, their courageous manner and their
determined persistence in their godlike and unchangeable steadfastness” (CH 141D). Also, desire
[§pym¤] is sublimated into a divine erotic longing [¶rvt ye›on], which “by necessity
exceeds reason and intellect [Íp¢r lÒgon k‹ noËn]” (CH 144A). “Divine erotic longing is
ecstasy [¶st d¢ k‹ §ksttkÒw ı ye›ow ¶rvw] not permitting any lovers to be of themselves
but those of the beloved” (DN 712A). We abandon ourselves, letting go of the distinction
between self and other. Acting in such a way, the soul no longer exists in a formal sense, as a
subject, but acts from out of the divine. Applying language correctly to the celestial realm allows
for a transformation of the emotions and redirecting them. Understanding the angels keeps us on
an ethical path, reminding us that we have a higher nature and that what we participate in is
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beyond us. Through living the liturgical act of thinking God apophatically, we are drawn out
beyond ourselves and into the divine which exceeds existence.
As stated above, the Celestial Hierarchy is concerned with applying these principles to
understanding what is said in scripture concerning angels, treating each of the ranks separately.
The first rank of angels is immediately present before God, and it is God’s revelation that is
received by them first. This interpretation of the three highest angelic beings is represented in a
motif of purification, illumination, and perfection; the thrones standing above defects represents
purification, cherubim illumination, since they are contemplative, and seraphim represent
perfection in their continual union with God. The discussion of the second rank of angels:
dominions, powers, and authorities serves to place our attention on the mediation in which
revelation is given; “no doubt, as regards that message, which is said to pass through one into
another angel [d' êllo eﬁw êllon êggelon], we may take as a symbol of a perfecting
completed from afar and obscured because of its passage to the second rank” (CH 240C). There
is a prÒodow, a procession, of transmitting God’s being from what is higher to what is lower.339
In the angelic contemplation, whether it is direct, as it is with seraphim, or mediated, it is God
who is loved and known, which passes through them all but to differing degrees; “wherefore by
our sacred tradition, the first intellects are named perfecting, and illuminating, and purifying
powers of those which come after, who are conducted through them to the excessively-existing
origin of all, and participate, as far as is possible for them, in the purifications, illuminations, and
perfections. For this is divinely fixed absolutely by the divine source of order that through the
first the second partake of the supremely divine illuminations” (CH240C-D). Every angel,
therefore, does not have equal access to revelation and participation in God, but “according to its
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rank [kt' éj¤n]” (DN 893D). The first rank causes the illumination in the second, which are
affected by the first. “Because all ‘effects’ are caused by God, therefore, in this descending chain
of participation, all beings through ‘dissimilar similarities’ are ultimately partaking in the same
single Cause. It is a structured collaboration, or synergy, between God and created beings.”340
There is a movement of illumination and participation. The second rank of angels receive
illumination from the first rank, which illuminates and perfects the second and which are
themselves purified, illuminated, and perfected by the first rank, which receives its own
illumination by God itself. “Just as the first ranks possess eminently the holy-befitting properties
of those after, so the latter possesses those of the earlier, not in the same way, but in a lesser
manner” (CH 293B). Every being participates in the same source and cause, God.
The primordial-God capacity, coming to all things, spreads and extends irresistibly
through all things and again is unmanifest to all, not only as exceeding all things in a
manner in excess to existence, but also as hiddenly spreading its providential activities to
all. But it is also manifested analogously to all intellectual entities, reaching out its own
gift of light to the senior entities, through them, as first, imparting it in good order to the
subordinate, according to the God-seeing measure of each rank (CH 301A).

The activity of every level of the hierarchy is the presence of God as manifested in that rank. The
Celestial Hierarchy, then, introduces us to the principle of a hierarchically structured order that
informs Pseudo-Dionysius’ understanding of universe. “Angelology becomes ontology.”341 By
passing “through one angel to another” God is manifest throughout the hierarchy as a dynamic
whole in which we participate. “Intermediate beings mediate between God and beings more
remote from God as theophany: as theophany they call other beings…back to their source from
which all beings immediately derive, but they do not mediate Being, beings do not derive from
other beings, but directly from the source and cause of all.”342 God is present at every level of the
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hierarchy in which we partake while allowing for the recognition of the divine as divine. And
just as the celestial hierarchy is an “image of the thearchic ripeness [eﬁkÒn t∞w yerxk∞w
…rÒthtow]” (CH 165B), so the ecclesiastical hierarchy mirrors, at a lower level, the splendor
of the divine.
The two hierarchical orders allow for the presence of the divine to be revealed in terms of
more and less presence. Although we do not directly participate in the Celestial Hierarchy, it
functions as a paradigm for the Ecclesiastical, giving it its own structure. Christ sits atop both
hierarchies and acts as an insolvable enigma around which both hierarchies revolve. These ranks
and orderings intensify the presence of the divine to such an extent that they end in the
overwhelming appearance of the divine. As we ascend the hierarchical orderings, the presence of
the divine becomes so manifest as to blind us, exposing us to vertigo. The emphasis on
hierarchies reinforces the movement of the divine felt by the human being. As hierarchical
orderings both function as a conduit for the presence of the divine. The higher we move, the
more profoundly the divine is felt. As an active transmitter for the divine, the hierarchies
measure the extent to which each entity both receives and passes on the living expression of the
divine. The higher an entity is placed on the hierarchies, the greater it is an expression of the
divine nature. However, at their pinnacles, the divine is so apparent that it reveals itself as a
puzzle of which there is no answer. The more we participate in the hierarchies, the more we are
thrown into the mystery that Christ represents. We must hold ourselves within the hierarchies, as
hierarchical, to be exposed to this mysterious abyssal depth. It is not just any hierarchy that will
accomplish this paradoxical function of the hierarchy, but one that is founded upon the Celestial
one.
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THE ECCLESIASTICAL HIERARCHY
In the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy there is an extension of God’s outreaching into the human
realm, “our hierarchy is our world, our true world. It is the created analogue, on the level of
human existence (which involves a body and soul, as opposed to the angels’ lack of bodies).”343
“Our hierarchy [≤ ky' ≤mçw ﬂerx¤],” as Pseudo-Dionysius terms it, is our world, which does
not stand over and against us, but rather is a world in which we participate. It is a space that
opens up when we engage in the liturgy, which orients us toward the divine. The purpose of the
whole arrangement is to draw humans into a union with God. Our hierarchy is the space where
liturgy is performed, a space where rites are performed, “within liturgy there is then an image of
the relationship of God to beings and thus liturgy—its performance and our participation in it—
impresses on those beings that belong to our hierarchy a realization of the transcendence of the
source from which they derive and to which they long to return.”344 We do not achieve this
movement toward God on our own, it is God’s movement toward us. Pseudo-Dionysius’
understanding of hierarchy is an expression of his sense of God’s active search for the human,
let us quietly receive the beneficent rays of the truly good, the excessively-good Christ
and let us be led by their light towards his divinely good deeds. After all is it not
characteristic of his ineffable, incomprehensible goodness that he makes the existence of
entities, that he draws everything into existence, that he desires everything to be always
akin to him and to have fellowship with him according to their merit? Does he not come
lovingly to those who have turned away from him? Does he not contend with them and
plead for them not to spurn his love? Does he not support his accusers and plead on their
behalf? He even promises to be concerned for them and when they are far from him they
have only to turn back and there he is, hastening to meet them. He receives them with
completely open arms and greets them with the embrace of peace (Ep. VIII 1085C1088A).

Hierarchy is the outreach of God’s love. To depend on God’s love is to depend on others,
within our community. It is the members of the hierarchy who purify, illuminate, and perfect,
and who also stand in need of the same. The hierarchy is a community that is being saved and
343
344

“The Mysticism of Dionysius the Areopagita: Platonist or Christian?,” p.104.
“Apophatic Theology: Denys the Areopagite,” p.80.
280

mediates salvation. The hierarchy is not impersonal but we are arranged as part of a community,
whose members are seeking to draw nearer to God and who draw others in the process (CH
165B-C). The Church itself becomes a space in which the different ranks of clergy enact the
divine mysteries. The hierarch is able to approach the Holy of Holies (Ep. VIII 1088D), while the
monks stand at the doors. The position represents the rank that they hold. This gives a picture of
a community. The ordered arrangement of the Church reflects Pseudo-Dionysius’ hierarchical
structure of a graded participation of divine mysteries, with a secret source at its core, veiled
from the outside but manifest to those outside through the hierarch, who “generously comes out
to those outside the divine veils” (Ep. VIII 1089A). The Church is a space, a world, in which the
divine is made manifest.
Our hierarchy reflects the same principles of the celestial. It takes on the form of triads,
and the triads express a threefold movement of purification, illumination, and perfection.
Although the two hierarchies are supposed to mirror each other, there are significant differences
and the ecclesiastical hierarchy does not exactly map onto the celestial, “the parallelism between
the celestial and the ecclesiastical hierarchies is nominal rather than strict.”345 This difference
shows itself most clearly in chapter V of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, which discusses the rank
and ordering of the clergy. Again, every hierarchy is divided into three; however, the
ecclesiastical hierarchy consists of only two triads of types of people, while the other triad is that
of the sacraments: the rite of illumination, the gathering together [sÊnjw], or Eucharist, and the
rite of oil. The other two triads are: those who understand the sacraments and initiate others into
them, the clergy—hierarchs, priests, deacons—and those who are initiated by them into the
sacraments, the laity—monks, those who are baptized, and the catechumen. The significance of
the hierarchical ordering corresponds to the triad of purification, illumination, and perfection.
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The lowest order, the catechumen, penitents, and the possessed need purification and are being
purified.346 The sacred people are being illuminated and are called the contemplative order. The
monks are being perfected, while the deacons are responsible for purifying, and the hierarch’s
task is to perfect (EH 504A-B). Likewise, baptism is called illumination although it purifies as
well and the Eucharist and the sacrament of oil are said to be perfecting (EH 504C). In the
angelic triads there is nothing that corresponds to the sacraments. Furthermore, the three triads of
the angel orders are classed by strongly delineated metaphysical ranking. Such a ranking
corresponds to their proper position within the hierarchy which are fixed and permanent, “among
angels, there is only inner individual development in the fullness of being that does not affect
their ontological status,”347 whereas in the ecclesiastical hierarchy there is not a static ranking,
“hierarchy is no longer about a single charismatic leader, but is a generalized relation in which
we are embedded….”348 This is due to the fact that the individuals are of the same metaphysical
status and our ranking is, therefore, not metaphysical but rather spiritual. Consequently, members
can move upward from one rank to another. There is a movement upward and downward within
this hierarchy. It is the spiritual efficacy of the individual that defines the rank of the individual.
“Nevertheless, every change of hierarchical position in the human hierarchy is a spiritually
transcending metamorphosis that necessarily should presuppose the transformation of the
metaphysical quality.”349 An individual unable to perform the actions assigned to their task in
their rank, are not worthy of the rank and will be demoted; an unworthy priest is no priest at all.
Moreover, Demophilus’ offence was not simply one against the hierarchical order but against the
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purpose of a hierarchy, that is to express God’s love of humanity and to draw others to God, for
Demophilus drove out a priest who was reconciling a sinner.
Although a priest derives his authority from the consecration, Pseudo-Dionysius speaks
as if his authority most rightly comes from his ethical and intellectual qualities. The efficacy of a
priest’s ministrations depend upon his own purity. The members of the hierarchy are persons and
their relationships within the hierarchy are personal relationships and for this reason the
correlation between the worth of the priest and the dignity of his office is imperative. Just as the
angels are holy beings who have an excessive purity who receive and pass on the rays of the
divine, this should be the case in our hierarchy as well.
Naturally, then, the source and the foundation of all good order, invisible and visible,
causes the God-activity rays [tåw yeorgkãw ékt›nw] to approach the more godlike
first, and through them, as being more transparent intellects, and more properly adapted
for reception and transmission of light, transmits light and manifestations to the
subordinate, according to what is suitable for them. It is, then, the function of these, the
first contemplators of God to exhibit ungrudgingly to those second, in proportion to their
capacity, the divine visions reverently gazed upon by themselves, and to reveal the things
relating to the hierarchy, since they have been abundantly instructed with a perfecting
knowledge in all matters relating to their own hierarchy and have received the effectual
power of instruction, and to impart sacred gifts according to merit, since they, with
knowledge, wholly participate in sacred perfection (EH 504D-505A).

The flow of light through the hierarchies is not a matter of impersonal power, but of a personal
assimilation to God, so that the created order is perfected. The more the hierarchy reflects God,
the more it becomes a manifestation of God. So the priestly order should be a group of people
who share in the understanding of God; fundamentally his effectiveness as a priest is not
separable from this sharing of God’s-work. Pseudo-Dionysius says of the embrace in the
ordination of priest:
Now the embrace, for the completion of the sacred consecration, has a religious
significance. For all the members of the sacred ranks presents, as well as the hierarch
himself who has consecrated them, embrace the ordained. For when the sacred habits and
powers, and by divine call [ye¤& klÆse] and dedication, a religious mind has attained a
sacred completion, he is dearly loved by the most holy order of the same rank, being
conducted to a most godlike beauty [tÚ yeoedÒstton kãllow], loving the intellects
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similar to himself, and religiously loved by them in return. Hence it is that the mutual
sacred embrace is religiously performed, proclaiming the religious communion of
intellects of like character and their loveable benignity toward each other, as keeping
throughout, by sacred training, their most godlike beauty (EH 513B).

It is a call which itself is an attraction to divine beauty. Belonging to the priestly order is a
response to the call of God. Fulfilling that call is achieved by being fashioned after divine beauty
to be made godlike. The priest is the one who understands God and his love and his
understanding is exhibited in their lived world. Fundamentally the efficacy as a priest is not
separable from that.
Throughout the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy we see that the Areopagite is fond of
underlining how the whole orientation of the hierarchy is aimed toward unity. This unity is
further detailed through the three sacraments described in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, that is to
say, the rite of illumination, gathering together, or the Eucharist, and the rite of oil. The
community of the liturgy opens a space in which the divine is made manifest. Participation in the
liturgy is the enactment of God-work, yeorg¤, here in our world. “From scripture it has been
shown that the sacred divine birth is purification and an illuminating enlightenment. The
sacraments of gathering together and of oil provide a perfecting knowledge of the God-works
[yeorg«n] and that it is through this that there is effected both the unifying uplifting toward
the primordial-God and the most blessed communion with it [≤ prÚw tØn yerx¤n
§nopoÚw éngvgØ k‹ mkrvtãth konvn¤]” (EH 504B-C). We are uplifted to the
divine enabling us to become members of the divine community, where hierarchs “make known
the works of God [yeorg¤w] by way of sacred symbols and prepares the postulates to
contemplate and participate in the holy sacraments” (EH 505D). It is to these rites that we will
now briefly turn.
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The first rite is of illumination and primarily refers to rebirth as a divine birth
[yeogenes¤], which makes deification possible (EH 392B). Pseudo-Dionysius refers to the
teachings of his own mentor, Hierotheus, that “in the intellectual realm it is the love of God
which first of all moves us toward the divine” (EH 392B). Being given a divine birth allows us to
love God through being made like God, as far as is possible. It is the love of God that gives us a
divine beginning, a divine birth; it is a procession toward the divine and the enactment of our
divine existence. Describing the account of this rite, Pseudo-Dionysius writes, “yet it is not
possible to hold, simultaneously, qualities thoroughly opposed, nor that the one who has had
communion with the one [prÚw ßn] should have a divided life, if he clings to the firm
participation in the one [eﬁ t∞w toË •nÚw ént°xet beb¤w mey°jevw]” (EH 401A). This
symbolizes the opposition between the life the postulant is renouncing and the one he seeks, the
lived life of dividedness and the life of unity in pursuit of tÚ ßn.
The immersion into water, as we have seen previously, is our sharing in the death of
Christ. Death is “the separation of two parts which had been linked together. It brings the soul
into what for us is invisible where it, in the loss of the body, becomes formless” (EH 404B).
Formlessness is the special attunement and receptivity to the formless divine that illumination
brings to the individual. Through formlessness we are shaped by the divine and given a new
form, we take on the illumination of the divine. “It is evident, I believe, those who understand
the hierarchies that in a continued tension toward the one [dhnek°sn §n snton¤ prÚw ßn] by
the complete death and dissolution of what is opposite intelligent entities are given the
immutable capacity to mold themselves on the divine-form [yeoedoËw]” (CH 401B-C). The life
lived toward tÚ ßn is a constant tension in which we dwell and by which we are shaped upon the
divine. Furthermore, then the postulant puts on brightly colored clothing, “his courage and his
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likeness to God, his firm thrust towards the one [prÚw tÚ ßn], makes him indifferent to all
contrary things. Order descends upon the disorder within him. Form takes over formlessness,
being made brilliant throughout his light-formed life [tª fvtoede› kyÒlo zvª
lmprnÒmenon]” (EH 404C). A certain ethical disposition is required to be molded and
shaped by the divine. The primary function of the community in which one finds oneself is
essential as a model to demonstrate the life to be lead.
This movement toward tÚ ßn underlies Pseudo-Dionysius’ understanding of the “divine
Eucharist,” (EH 424D), which he terms sÊnjw, a gathering together of the many into one, and
“the reception of the divine Eucharist is a symbol of participation in Jesus” (CH 124A), by which
the community is made one. He claims that Hierotheus called it “the rite of rites [telet«n
teletÆ]” (EH 424C), playing off of the etymology which recalls t°low, the end or purpose and
tele«sw, perfection. No other rite can take place without the Eucharist, “each of the hierarchic
sacraments is incomplete to the extent that it does not perfect our communion and gathering to
the one [tØn prÚw ßn ≤m«n konvn¤n k‹ sÊnjn oÈ telesorgÆse] and by being
incomplete it cannot work out our full perfection [k‹ tÚ e‰n teletØ då tÚ ét°leston
éf˙rm°nh]” (EH 424D). We are perfected by this rite, “every sacredly initiating activity draws
our fragmented lives together into a one-like deification. It forges a divine unity out of the
divisions within us, granting communion and union with the one [tØn prÚw tÚ ßn konvn¤n
k‹ ßnvsn dvrom°nhw]” (EH 424C-D). We are made one-like through participating in the
liturgy of the Eucharist, drawing us together into a single community. “For it is not possible to be
gathered together toward the one [oÈ går ¶nest prÚw tÚ ßn snãgesy] and partaking of
peaceful union with the one while divided among ourselves” (EH 437A); the liturgy provides the
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participation in tÚ ßn. Pseudo-Dionysius understands this movement in terms of God’s love out
toward us and drawing us back to it in our answering this movement.
Pseudo-Dionysius’ primary concern is the movement of the liturgical action. The
enactment of the sacrament is brought to the fore. “When, then, the comprehensive song of the
holy hymns have harmonized the habits of our souls to the things which are to be ministered and
by the unison of the divine odes as one and concordant chorus of holy men has established an
accordance with the divine things and with themselves and one another…he who devoutly
contemplates these will see the uniform and one consipiration as moved by the one
[…w Íf •nÒw], the primordial-God spirit” (EH 432A-B). This movement of the liturgical action
is accounted for in the hierarch’s procession at the beginning of the liturgy. He comes from out
of the sanctuary, going to the farthest part of the nave and returns,
I think we must now go inside the sacred things and reveal the meaning of the first of the
images. We must look attentively upon the beauty which gives it divine form and we
must turn toward the double movement of the hierarch, when he first goes from the
divine alter to the far edges of the sacred place, spreading the fragrance and returns to the
alter. For the blessed primordial-God exceeding all, while proceeding [prÒesn]
outward because of the goodness to commune with those who participate in it, never truly
departs from its essential stability and immobility…similarly, the divine sacrament of
gathering together remains what it is, unique, simple, and indivisible and yet our of love
for humanity it is made multiple…then it draws all the varied symbols together into a
unity and conforms unity on all those sacredly uplifted to it. And it is the same with the
divine hierarchic understanding which is especially his own…then freely he returns to the
starting point without any loss. In his intellect he goes toward the one [tØn eﬁw to ßn
•toË noerãn] and with a clear eye he looks upon the unity of things that are
underlying the sacred rites. He makes the divine return [§pstrofÆn] to the primary
things, the goal of his procession [proÒdo] toward secondary things, which had been
undertaken out of a love for humanity (EH 428D-429B).

The hierarch’s movement makes the prÒodow-§pstrofÆ movement manifest in this lived
world. Just as God moves outward in a procession, all things coming into existence and drawing
them into communion with itself again the hierarch moves from his contemplation of tÚ ßn, out
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into congregation and imparts to them what he contemplated, returning back to his contemplation
without any loss. Similarly the hierarch distributes the consecrated bread and wine.
The bread which had been covered and undivided is not uncovered and divided into many
parts. Similarly, he shares the one cup with all, symbolically multiplying and distributing
the one in symbolic fashion. With these things he completes the most sacred act. For
because of his goodness and his love for humanity the simple, hidden oneness of Jesus,
the most divine word, has taken the route of the incarnation for us and without suffering
any change has become a reality that is composite and visible. He has beneficently
accomplished for us a unifying communion with himself (EH 444A).

The incarnation is the revelation and movement into the multiplicity of the hidden and single
divinity of Jesus and this is completed and made manifest in the Eucharist. It is accomplished by
being performed and our attention is kept on the sacramental action.
The sacrament of oil completes the triad of the rites. Pseudo-Dionysius, in this case, is
not concerned its use but with what it represents. The oil [mÊrv], is, as the lexicon tells us, a
mixture of balsam and olive oil, which the Areopagite remarks on its fragrance, to which we will
turn presently. First, the oil symbolizes something hidden and secret, to be treated with reverence
and awe (EH 476B-D). The oil is kept in a container “covered by a dozen sacred folds
[dok¤dek pt°rjn ﬂer›w]” (EH 473A). The folds, which word is derived from the word
for wings, signifies the twelve wings of the seraphim (EH 480B), who veil the presence of God.
The oil is hidden although its fragrance is perceived by all around it, bypassing the rational mind
altogether, “these divine beauties are concealed. Their fragrance is something in excess to any
effort of the intellect…” (EH 473B), furthermore, “the concentration and the persistence of their
contemplation of this fragrant, secret beauty enables them to produce an exact likeness of God”
(EH 473C). Bypassing the intellect altogether, the scent immediately strikes us while being kept
hidden. Such exposure represents how the divine makes itself manifest to us, allowing for a
symbol of the divine’s hidden appearance. The sacrament of oil represents the movement of the
divine and our immediate exposure to it. Furthermore, just as Christ is God made human, a
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composite, the oil too is a composite of olive and balsam oil, and so this is symbolic of the Godhuman, “so it is that the composition of the oil is symbolic, giving a form to what is formless. It
shows symbolically that Jesus is the rich source of the divine fragrances” (EH 480A), whose
incarnation is “sudden [§j¤fnhw]” (Ep. III 1069B), like the immediate exposure of the divine
fragrance. Christ is the exposure to that which is in excess of discursive reasoning; a mystery that
cannot be solved but only surrendered to.
Now that we have discussed the two hierarchies and given a brief account of what each
entails, we will now discuss what it is to be a hierarchy at all. This discussion will unfold into the
original meaning of ‘hierarchy’ which has been covered over by tradition and modern day
concerns. While hierarchy does consist of rank and ordering, it entails more than this. We will
see that it is an assimilation to divine likeness. We come to know God and in this knowing
become more like it. “Since the order of hierarchy will mean that some are being purified and
others purify, some are being enlightened, while others illuminate, some are being perfected,
while other complete the perfecting initiation, each will imitate God in the way that is
harmonious with its own function” (CH 165B-C). The hierarchy is an arrangement of a
community, whose members seek to draw nearer to God and to draw others to God.
II. The original hierarchy:
Pseudo-Dionysius develops the neologism “ﬂerrx¤,” hierarchy.350 Usually ‘hierarchy’
whether applied to the social, political, or economic realms, has the negative connotation of
those who rule at the top of it are living at the expense of the lower strata. However, this is our
modern conception of a hierarchy.351 Given that he is here coining the term, we should not
simply apply our notion of what it is to be a hierarchy for Pseudo-Dionysius but instead allow it
350
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to appear from his own writings. Ierrx¤ is derived from two words, ‘sacred’ and ‘source;’ it
names the source of the sacred. It entails the letting of the sacred come forth from its own source
within a community of those being made one. It is this movement that is ﬂerrx¤. PseudoDionysius defines it several times352 but at the beginning of chapter III of the Celestial Hierarchy
we writes,
Hierarchy is, according to me, a sacred order, knowledge and activity [§pstÆmh
k‹ §n°rge], which is assimilated, as far as is possible, to the likeness of God
[yeoed°w] and conducted to the illuminations given to it from God, with a view to divine
imitation [§p‹ tÚ yeom¤mhton] (164D).

Taken in its original meaning, ﬂerrx¤ is more than a simple rank and ordering; it also refers to
what this sacred ordering makes possible: knowledge and activity.353 The sacred ordering gives
knowledge and enables the members of the hierarchy to act effectively. The entire hierarchy is
aimed toward assimilation to the divine. “The mark [skopÒw] of a hierarchy is assimilation and
unity, as far as is possible, toward God” (CH 165A). The knowledge of God is a deepening
likeness to it. We become united with God so that the divine activity is an activity that flows
throughout us, “indeed, for every member of the hierarchy perfection is this, that each is uplifted
to imitate God as far as is possible, and more wondrous still is that it becomes that scripture calls
‘a becoming fellow workman for God [YeoË snergÚn gen°sy]’ and to show forth the
divine activity in oneself, as much as is possible” (CH 165B). The more we know God, the more
God acts through us, drawing us into a likeness to it.
MANIFESTING AT A DISTANCE
Pseudo-Dionysius, again, uses the theme of light to conceive of the revelation of God,
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…and copying, as far as possible, and by perfecting its own followers as divine images,
mirrors most transparent and without flaw, receptive of the primordial-light and
primordial-God ray [ßsoptr ded°stt k‹ ékhl¤dvt dektkå t∞w
érxf≈to k‹ yerxk∞w ékt›now], and devotedly filled with the radiance, and again
spreading this radiance ungrudgingly to those after it [eﬁw tå §j∞w énlãmpont] (CH
165A).

The light that radiates from God is not a light that shines on entities, but rather shines through
them, to that which is nearest from that which is farther away. The light is first received by
angels, in their rank and order, which passes “through one into another angel [d' êllo eﬁw
êllon êggelon]” down to all things, even non-living entities (CH 177D).354 God is found not
simply at the peak of the hierarchy but throughout the entirety of the hierarchy. The hierarchies
are a theophany, the manifestation of God, itself,355 “Dionysius’ understanding of hierarchy,
whether ontological, celestial, ecclesiastical, is a development of his account of the divine
processions, of the constitutive perfections of beings, and hence of the whole of reality, as the
differentiated presence of God.”356 Pseudo-Dionysius gazes into the manifestation of yerx¤
and sees within it the whole array of ‘what is.’ This moving manifestation is a holy icon of
yerx¤ itself. Everything is an active conduit through which the divine appears. A hierarchy is
not so much a mediation of knowledge, but rather is knowledge itself, a vehicle for divine
revelation.
We should not conceive of this hierarchy as a static presence of God but rather as a
movement, where God appears at a distance through the manifestation of entities. PseudoDionysius states,
The distribution of the sun’s ray passes with ease through the first matter, as being more
transparent than all, and, through it with greater clarity, lights up its own splendor. But
354
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when it strikes more dense materials, its distributed brilliancy becomes more obscure,
from the inaptitude of the materials illuminated for transmission of the gift of light and
from this it is naturally contracted so as to almost entirely exclude the passage of light
(CH 301A-B).

The sun is not a light that passively shines on entities as an external source, but literally passes
through, illuminating them from within. Its light is more obscured as it passes through entities,
but nonetheless is a passage through all. God is pure light and this reception is accomplished
from the primordial-God by most exalted causes, for all the sacred intelligences by an
excessively-existing hiddenness, is in a manner more clear and exhibits and distributes
itself, in a higher degree, to the highest capacities around it, but with regard to the second,
or us, the lowest intellectual capacity, as each is distant from, as regards the divine
likeness, so its contact is brilliant illumination to the single unknowable of its own
hiddenness. And it illuminates the second, severally, through the first and if one must
speak briefly, it is firstly brought from hiddenness to manifestation through the first
capacities (CH 305A-B).

God is “source of light,” to which “we must lift up the immaterial and steady eyes of our
intellects, the gift of light, both primal and exceedingly-primal [k‹ tØn érxkØn k‹
Íperãrxon], of the divine father, which manifests to us the most blessed hierarchies of angels
in types and symbols, let us then, from it, be elevated to its simple ray [èpl∞n ékt›n]” (CH
121A-B). What is prior is simple and transparent, like God, which “unifies by way of its own
simplified unity” (CH 121B). The light from God does not simply shine but is received and
passed on, coming into appearance, from out of hiddenness. The hierarchy, therefore, is an active
transmitter of the divine light, spreading out from what is simpler and therefore nearer to God to
what is more complex and thus farther away, giving shape to what is shapeless and
unmanifestated. The more the theophanous nature of the order of the world is perfected, the more
it is assimilated to God, reflecting and manifesting God.
Furthermore, when speaking of this distance, Pseudo-Dionysius writes, “do not imagine
that the proximity here is physical. Rather, what I mean by nearness is the greatest possible
capacity to receive God” (EP VIII 1092B). If then the rank of priests is illuminating, he who is
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wholly fallen from the priestly rank and capacity, does not illuminate, or rather, he becomes
“unilluminated” (Ep. VIII 1092B). Such a priest is unable to enact the divine manifestation and is
thus unreceptive to the divine. “The hierarch who lives in conformity with God and who has a
full and complete share of the hierarch’s capacity is not content to enjoy the true and divinely
enlightening understanding that comes from the words and works of the hierarchic rites but he
also gives them to others in accordance to their place in the hierarchy [éllå k‹ •t°row
énlog¤w ﬂerrxk›w metd≈sontow]” (EH 513C-D). The hierarchy is not based on ones
place within the hierarchy but rather on ones efficacy. The more the hierarch, or any entity, is
able to enact the light-bearing capacity of the divine, the more similar is it to the divine. The
more similar we are to God, the more we are able to receive God, the more we make it manifest
to others. “The purpose of every hierarchy is an unswerving devotion to the divine imitation of
the divine likeness and that every hierarchical function is distinguished in the sacred reception
[eﬁw metoxØn ﬂerãn] and distribution of an undefiled purification” (CH 208A). To receive the
divine, and to be more like it, is not a passive capacity but an activity of passing along, or
making manifest the divine to others.
What an entity consists in is its taking part in God’s making them to be. The productive
power that is God runs throughout the hierarchy of being, each entity exercising its own proper
activity. The light that runs throughout all entities is God in all of them. All entities performing
the proper activities which are their very being, participate in the manifestation of the divine,
taking part in the divine ordering of the whole.
Perfection for each of those appointed in an hierarchy is to be uplifted according to its
proper analogy to the imitation of God, and…to become a cooperator [snergÒn] of God
and to show the divine activity revealed in itself [de›j tØn ye¤n §n°rgen §n
•toË énfnom°nhn] as far as is possible. As since the order of hierarchy is that
some are purified and other purify, some are illuminated and other illuminate, some are
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perfected and other perfect, the imitation of God is adapted to each in a certain way (CH
165B).

The hierarchical organization of entities is the divine activity manifest in them, becoming a
cooperator with God, allowing the hidden God to make itself manifest. The being each entity is
is the presence of God throughout the whole structured order, passing along from one entity
through another. Thus, the central principle of Pseudo-Dionysius’ hierarchy is immediate
mediation. It is through the mediation of entities that God is immediately present to all. This is
shown in the participation of the sacraments. The celebrant of a sacrament acts in the person of
Christ and it is this activity that is the activity of Christ himself. It is this principle, in which the
activity of the entity is the activity of God in it, that is extended to all reality, which as
theophany, is sacramental in nature. The whole of reality is the enactment of the sacrament of
participating in God. Every entity participates in God by giving and receiving light to and from
one another, in one sacramental act. The divine flow of light is not an impersonal assimilation of
God, but personal “out of a concern of us because it wanted us to be made deified [ye≈sevw]”
(CH 124A).
Y°vsw, BECOMING GODLIKE
We have seen that the rites concerned in the ecclesiastical hierarchy consists of finding
unity with God. Coming to know God is actively becoming like God, “and deification [y°vsw]
is being, as much as possible, like and in union with God” (EH 376A). Hierarchy is concerned
with being as much like God as is possible, through which we are exposed to the divine light
which “returns [§pstr°fe] us to the oneness and deifying [yeopoÒn] simplicity of the father,
who gathers us back in” (CH 120B). God is the cause of all things and as such “rational beings
have the ontological capacity and metaphysical proclivity to strive for closer proximity to their
Cause. They participate in higher effects that constitute participation in deifying activities, and,
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by having a single Cause for their existence, this deifying ascendance leads to an actual union
with God as their only source of divinity.”357 The hierarchy is a description for the intelligible
reality as manifested through God. “We must say this, the blessed primordial-God, which by
nature is the deity, the source of deification [≤ yerx¤ mkrÒthw ≤ fse yeÒthw ≤ érxØ
t∞w ye≈sevw]” (EH 376B). The goal of such a hierarchy is the achievement of the divine
harmony and the process of y°vsw.
We have seen that angels are closer to God than are humans, but we are nonetheless
expressions of the divine light.
Each intelligent being, celestial or human, has it own set of primary, middle, and lower
orders and capacities, and in accordance with its capacities, these indicate the
aforementioned uplifting, directly relative to the hierarchic enlightenment appropriate to
every being. It is in accordance with this arrangement that each intelligent entity, as far as
it properly can and to the extent that it might, participates in that purification in excess to
purity, that superabundant light, that perfection preceding all perfection. Nothing is
perfect of itself. Nothing is completely free of the need for perfection. Nothing except
that being truly perfect in itself and truly preceding all perfection (CH 273C).

Both hierarchies are expressions of the primal divine light and both are in need of further
perfection, which is to say that they are not a full manifestation of the divine hiddenness. This
demonstrates that there is, at least metaphorically, a continuity between the celestial and
ecclesiastical hierarchies.
For the sake of our deification, relative to our ability [≤m«n énlÒgo ye≈sevw], and
because of his philanthropic sacred order he manifested celestial hierarchies for us;
similarly constituting our hierarchy, as co-ministers with them, through imitation of their
godlike priesthood, according to our capacity, so that through perceptible images
revealed in sacred scriptures, of excessively-heavenly intellects, we might be uplifted
from what is perceived by the sense to what is perceived intelligibly, from sacredly
designed symbols to the simple, highest perfection of celestial hierarchies (CH 124A).

The celestial hierarchy is present to uplift us from out of our human nature and instill a divine
one. We are able to climb the hierarchy by the divine’s reaching out toward us in the form of the
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incarnation. Similar to the celestial hierarchy, “our hierarchy consists of an inspired [§ny°o],
divine [ye¤w], and divinely-worked knowledge [yeorgkÆw §pstÆmhw], activity and
perfection” (EH 369A). Y°vsw lifts us to the divine, which is “a mystery that cannot be taught,
it puts the soul firmly in the presence of God” (Ep. IX 1105D). Certainly, humans will never
become angels but through y°vsw, through the continuum of being,358 “Pseudo-Dionysius laid
the systematic foundation for speculative mysticism and apophatic methodology and, in his
rather complex Greek language, enriched Christian vocabulary with such terms as ‘hierarchy’
and ‘mystical theology.’”359 Indeed, “enabling entities to be as God-like as possible and to be at
one with it…a hierarch bears in himself a stamp of God, causes its members to be clear and
undefiled mirrors reflecting the luster of the primordial-light and primordial-God rays
[érxf≈to k‹ yerxk∞w ékt›now]” (CH 165A) and “deification [y°vsw] is being toward
God [prÚw yeÒn] as possible and in union with it” (EH 376A). The hierarch is stamped or
molded by the divine itself and is able to cause others to become like this, bringing us closer to
God. The hierarchy reveals that which is in excess of itself, “each angelic person and each
human person is called to a knowledge and love of God as He is beyond creatures.”360 Through
adapting our nature to that of the angels, to that which is in excess of our hierarchy, receiving
light passed through them, we become molded by this illumination making us divine and
inspired.
As was just revealed “the celestial and ecclesiastical hierarchies are included as elements
within the one total hierarchy of creatures, which extends from the highest seraph to the lowliest
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element, all abiding within the One who is in and above them all.”361 And so it should come to
no surprise that Pseudo-Dionysius writes “this source of the hierarchy is the font of life
[tÊthw érxØ t∞w ﬂerrx¤w ≤ phgØ t∞w zv∞w], the being of goodness, the one cause of
everything, namely the trinity which in goodness, bestows being and well-being on everything”
(EH 373C-D). The trinity, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is yerx¤, the primordialGod. This suggests that yerx¤, that which is the abyssal depth of being, is “the sole source of
deification.”362
The y°vsw of intellectual entities mirrors the trinitarian manifestation of yerx¤.
The procession [prÒodow] of our intellectual activity can at least go this far, that all
fatherhood and all sonship bestows by that ultimate source of fatherhood and sonship on
us and on the celestial capacities. This is why godlike [yeoede›w] intellects come to be
and to be named “gods” or “sons of gods” or “father of gods.” Fatherhood and sonship of
this kind are brought to perfection in a spiritual way, that is, incorporeally, immaterially,
and in the domain of the intellect, and this is the world of the divine spirit, which is
located beyond all conceptual immateriality and all deification [y°vsn], and it is the
work of the father and of the son, who ultimately is in excess of all divine fatherhood and
sonship (DN 645B-C).

Pseudo-Dionysius continues,
Since many, through deification [ye≈se] from it are made gods [yeoede› ye«n] so as
far as the godlike capacity of each allows, there thus appears to be what is termed
differentiation and a reduplication of the one God, yet nonetheless it is the primal God,
the excessively-divine and excessively-existing one God [ı érx¤yeow k‹ Íp°ryeow
Íperos¤vw e‰w yeÒw], which dwells indivisibly within the separate and individual
entities, being an undifferentiated unity in itself and without any mixture or
multiplication through its contact with the many (DN 649C-D).

The source of our deification is in excess to all entities, and it is through this that we are “made
gods.” We are able to overcome our own limitations since the cause is beyond being. Mediated
through entities, yerx¤ is manifest immediately, making us Godlike and more than simply
human. Yerx¤ multiplies itself, while remaining whole, through y°vsw. We, as far as
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possible, become like yerx¤, taken up out of our own nature. Indeed, it is Jesus, in the
Ecclesiastical Hierarchy “who is in excess of the intellect, utterly divine intellect, who is the
source and the entity underlying all hierarchy, all sanctification, all the workings of God, who is
the most-primordial-God capacity [yerxkvtãth dÊnmw]” (372A). In fact, we become
Xrstoed∞, “Christ-form” (EH 553D). “According to their proximity to Jesus, the primal Light
of the Father, they become ‘photographed’ (from phos + grapho: to write with light). Written in
their being in an ever-deeper and more beautiful inscription is the very Light that is Jesus
Himself.”363 We become like Christ through y°vsw, which entails incorporating that which is in
excess of the intellect. Y°vsw allows us to transcend our merely human nature.
Through y°vsw we become divine, more than what we were before, but only when we
accept the place assigned to us in the hierarchy. We must be initiated into the divine to the
degree appropriate to us. If we overstep our place, as Demophilus as done, we lose sight of the
correct sublimation of the emotions, “so then give the correct place to desire and anger and to
reason. Accept the place assigned to you by the divine deacon, let him accept what the priest
have assigned, let the priest accept what the hierarchs have assigned to him” (Ep. VIII 1093C),
and so may make a mistaken judgment concerning yerx¤. Only in holding ourselves within
the confines of the hierarchy as a place of enlightenment, does the tension of the question-worthy
status of yerx¤ come to the fore in such a way that the human aspect of us can meet it
appropriately.

THE ABYSS OF THE ﬂerrx¤
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The question before us now is what heads the ﬂerrx¤ of which the Areopagite speaks.
At the celestial level, the hierarchy is structured around the understanding of Christ, while at the
ecclesiastical level the hierarchy is patterned as the mind of Christ at the levels in which they
participate in Christ. Humans are the working of Christ in this world; we are his activity
expressed, purifying, illuminating, and perfecting each other, “he accomplishes the ontic
perfection of this hierarchy in and through the hierarchy in each of its members.”364 There is both
a radical unity and difference between Christ and the liturgical community. Each member is a
participator in the imparticipatable (DN 644B); indeed, “of this sacred deification occurs in him
directly from God [§ggnom°nhw Ètƒ yeÒyen ﬂerçw ye≈sevw]” (EH 373A), for “the divine
rank of the hierarchs, then, is the first of the God-contemplative [yeoptk«n] ranks” (EH
505A). Each individual is an excrescence of yerx¤ caught in the cycle of prÒodow and
§pstrofÆ. The members are centered around Christ and are Christ as participators in his
manifestation through the unfolding of entities.
Every hierarchy…has one and the same capacity throughout all its hierarchical striving,
namely the hierarch himself and…its being and proportion and order are in him divinely
perfected and deified, and are then given to those below him according to their merit,
whereas the sacred deification occurs in him from God directly. Subordinates, then, are to
pursue their superiors and they also promote the advance of those below them, while
these also, as they proceed, are led by others. And so it happens that because of this
inspired, hierarchical harmony each one is able to have as great as possible a share in him
who is truly beautiful, wise, and good (EH 372C-373A).

It is only through the highly regimented hierarchy that we can become living icons of Christ,
who is, himself, a question-worthy entity. Although the angels are set in their hierarchical
ordering and rank, e.g., cherubim cannot become a seraphim, even the seraphim still seek
illumination. The angelic choir seeks after how Jesus became incarnate,
others, being quite at a loss [dporoÊs] about Jesus himself, as desiring to be
instructed in the knowledge of his divine work [yeorg¤w tØw §pstÆmhn] on our
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behalf, and Jesus himself teaching them immediately and showing to them, first hand, his
beneficent work out of love to the human (CH 209B).

They begin to exchange inquires among themselves showing their “desire to know how
God works” (CH 209B). The incarnation of Christ is a mystery even to the highest order
of angels (DN 648A). Truly the foundation of the ﬂerrx¤ is a profound mystery of
which there is no answer. Christ is an abyssal point which while heading the hierarchy is
always receding, and it is this understanding of Christ that must force us to readjust what
is to be a structured hierarchy.
III. Topology of the headless hierarchy:
We have just seen that Christ stands at the head of the hierarchy, at least as expressed
through the paradoxical structure of yerx¤, for “Jesus is at once the hidden Godhead and
manifest divinity, revealed gift and transcendent darkness.”365 And we must continue to allow
the original meaning of ﬂerrx¤ to manifest itself, if we are to gain a true understanding of the
liturgical community that Pseudo-Dionysius is attempting to found. In this section, we will see
that although Christ sits at the seat of the hierarchy, this seat is essentially and profoundly empty.
It is a continually receding point that escapes our grasp. This will compel us to view the
hierarchy apophatically. Using the language of topology to discuss our place in the hierarchy
will help us realize and to illustrate how we are situated within a structure that is always under
treat of exceeding the hierarchy. When we take the hierarchy as an expression of PseudoDionysius’ apophatic thought, our participation in it must be radically reconsidered.
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THE DARK SEAT
We have seen above that when Pseudo-Dionysius claims that angels are “closer to God
and more divine than those which follow” (DN 817B-C) this does not mean that they stand in a
higher strata and orders of God. Rather, entities “participate in God in many ways
[pollx«w]” (CH 177D). All things participate in God in the manner appropriate to them.
Each entity participates directly in God by occupying its proper place within the hierarchy.
Pseudo-Dionysius applies the prÒodow-§pstrofÆ movement to the hierarchy of entities, “we
should think of a unifying and co-mingling capacity which move the superior to provide for the
subordinate, peer to be in communion with peer, and subordinate to return to the superior and the
exceedingly-lying thing [Íperkem°nvn]” (DN 713B). And since the very being of each entity is
its proper participation in God, the entity’s procession and reversion is the entity’s hierarchical
ordering to every other entity. The hierarchy is an interconnected relationship. Every entity has
an active role in the perfection of itself and of others, but which is not grounded in any being but
rather in the “excessively-lying” thing, to which we are exposed only in a “pure abandonment”
(MT 1000A) of ourselves. If we are to make our way through the hierarchy, we must be willing
to give up our own sense of an isolated self.
If we take Pseudo-Dionysius seriously when he writes “thus each rank of the hierarchy is
led, in its own degree, to the divine cooperation [ye¤n sn°ren], by performing through grace
and God-given capacity those things which are naturally and exceedingly-natural to the
primordial-God [tå yerx¤& fsk«w k‹ Íperf«w §nÒnt] and accomplished by it
exceedingly-existing and manifested hierarchically for the permitted imitation of the God-loving
intellects [k‹ prÚw tØn §fktØn t«n floy°vn nÒvn m¤mhsn ﬂerrxk«w §kfnÒmen]”
(CH 168A-B), we find ourselves coming into union with yerx¤. We must keep in mind that
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the ultimate unity with the divine ends in égnvs¤, unknowing, and gives rise to the
unknowability of the divine itself. This unknowing, that goes beyond rather than falling short of
kataphasis, is at the center of Pseudo-Dionysius’ thought. Unknowing begins with a gazing upon
[yevr¤] the “place” of the divine beyond all contemplation (MT 1000D). One is freed from
what is seen and one “plunges into the mysterious darkness of unknowing” (MT 1001A). The
darkness of unknowing is an exposure with that which is beyond all, and thus is a participation in
the “exceedingly-natural.” It is an encounter when the polarity of the self and other is
transcended and when “one is neither oneself nor another” (MT 1001A). The difference between
immanence and transcendence has no absolute measure. The ‘hierarchy’ of binary difference of
polarity is made infinite. It is a definitive rupture of commensuration. There are phases of
intensity. There are not definite concepts but an intense sequence. We must keep in mind that
Pseudo-Dionysius inverts the already paradoxical mystical language, as he places darkness above
light and non-seeing above seeing. And so there is reason to believe that a similar revaluation of
what it is to be a hierarchy maybe in play in Pseudo-Dionysius’ thought, if for no other reason
than God is not an entity but is exceedingly-existing. If it is this that we are initiated into through
the hierarchy, we must radically reconsider around what we gather in our community and so also
how this reflects how we are related to one another in the hierarchy.
It was also shown that God proceeds, emanates, or rather creates366 from out of itself.
This pattern of emanation is the prÒodow and §pstrofÆ movement to which we have been
introduced. It is an emanation out of the divine into entities and the return of everything back to
and beyond their primordial-source, yerx¤. If a hierarchy refers “to the arrangement of all
sacred realities” (EH 373C) and the arrangement revolves around yerx¤ this is to say, that
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entities are created or emanate from a source that is beyond being, as it is an “excessively-lying”
thing. This brings to our attention the paradox of the self-caused divine, which is both beyond
being and the cause of all things, God is “all things in all things and nothing among things” (DN
872A), and which overflows into all entities. This paradox draws out the apophatic and nonbeing conception of the divine in its most radical expression.
The hierarchical conception of the expression of existence becomes subject to apophasis.
The rank and order of existence ultimately returns into a primordial unity. There is a tension
between the emphasis upon a rank and ordered succession of processions and an immediate
relationship each entity has with its source. We must come to know Jesus, who is the light of the
father (CH 121A),
let us, then, from it, be uplifted to its simple ray. For it never abandons its own inner
unity [•nk∞w •ndÒthtow] but multiplied and going forth [plhynom°nh k‹
proÛoËs], as fitting its goodness, for an uplifting and unifying blending of entities
within its care, remains firmly and alone centered within itself in its unmoved sameness,
and raises those who lawfully aspire to it and make them one, after its own oneness
[k‹ •nopoe› ktå éplvtkØn Èt∞w ßnvsn]. For it is not possible that the
primordial-God ray should otherwise illuminate us except having been upliftedly
enveloped in sacred veils [t«n ﬂer«n prpetsãtvn éngvgk«w
perkellmm°nhn] (CH 121B-C).

Our relation is one of procession and reversion but also as an immediate relation with yerx¤,
which presents itself only through veils. It appears as it is not. If this is the case, we are
expressed through veils as well. Our relation to others is inherently obscure. Granted our relation
is one thought through a rank and ordering, this relationship is one that is not entirely static; the
Areopagite must be rethinking the hierarchy of being as a fundamentally open ended hierarchy,
subject to apophasis. For “speaking of a hierarchy clearly it is both an inspired and divine man
[tÚn §nyeÒn te k‹ ye›on êndr], one knowing all sacred understanding, one in whom an
entire hierarchy is completely perfected and known” (EH 373C). Only in an “inspired and divine
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man,” someone who is other than merely human, can the hierarchy, which emerges through
yerx¤ be understood. However, as we have seen, the hierarchy that is found within the
ecclesiastically ordered system only comes to light when one holds oneself in the strict ordering
found in the hierarchy. But notice the outcome, “souls, uniting and gathering their manifold
reasonings into one intellectual purity, go forth in the way and order proper to them through
immaterial and undivided intellection to the union exceeding intellection” (DN 949D). By
holding ourselves within the hierarchy of being do we ascent from discursive reasoning to the
non-discursive silence.
ONTOLOGICAL DARKNESS
Entities are what they are by participating in the divine. But, as we have seen, entities
“pre-exist” in the divine (DN 712C, 820A) and that the divine “pre-contains” entities (DN 597A,
817D), “pre-holds” them (DN 977B), and is even termed “pre-being” (DN 825B). The essence of
the entity must already be in the divine in order that it is allowed to be in the first place. This
essence is posited as being that which must pre-exist its own being so as to receive its being.
Pseudo-Dionysius’ language does not distinguish between essence and existence in a way that
allows us to solve the dilemma by simply conceiving of essences subsequently given in
existence. The entity that pre-exists its own being haunts it as an ontological darkness such that
there is a critique of spatial, temporal, and causal significance within the language of emanation
and creation.
We should return briefly to the topic of participation through emanation. Speaking of the
rite of oil and its fragrance, Pseudo-Dionysius writes,
Now it is clear, I believe, that the distribution of the fontal fragrance [≤ t∞w phg¤w
eÈvd¤w éndosw] to things exceedingly existing to us, which are more divine, are, as
it were, nearer, and manifest and distribute themselves more to the transparent and
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wholesome intellectual condition of the receptive capacity exceedingly-bubbling
[ÍperblÊzos] ungrudgingly and entering in many ways (EH 480B).

This bubbling forth first wells up within the source and then flows from the source. How can an
entity flow into the primordial cause and make them to be? They would first already have to
exist in order to act as vessels receiving the flow of being. The language of emanation carries
within itself this ontological darkness. To make some entity be at all implies an existence that
must pre-exist it own being in order to be the object of activity that posits its existence. “The
capacities to discern smells, indicate their capacity to welcome fully those fragrances which
exceeds the intellect” (CH 332A). Emanation through the sense of smell indicates that it occurs
prior to the intellect, that is it happens outside of the spatial and temporal paradigm invoked by
the phrase “flowing into” used to express causal or existential meaning. The space in the
hierarchy that is opened up through the sacrament of oil is a space that exists prior to discursive
thought. We are introduced to a hierarchy whose spatial area is ruptured.
The self-diffusive character of the oil, is a metaphor for God’s emanation, which we saw
in chapter four. The good is the trinity, whose diffusion is from itself in itself back to itself in the
prÒodow-§pstrofÆ movement. The laws of causality are violated in the claim that the
diffusion of fragrance is both the cause of all things and at the same time ‘all things’ of which it
is the cause. The “pre” that is employed above is not meant to be understood in a temporal sense.
There is no temporal priority between one level of reality and the next, it is causal. Rather than
knowing entities that exist independently of that knowing, entities exist because God knows
them. It is a creative knowing; “before there are angels God has knowledge of angels and it
brings them into existence. It knows all else and, if I may say it thusly, it knows them from the
beginning and therefore brings them into existence” (DN 869A). Any temporal metaphor of
knowing things “pre” is joined to the spatial metaphor of knowing entities within God, of which
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he says “everything is around it [per‹ ÈtØn ª tå pãnt]” (DN 596C). Within this metaphor
of encircling, the temporal and spatial metaphors are fused into a causal sense. Encirclement is
the movement of one entity around another, of which the second exists before it is encircled.
However, the metaphor of emanation makes clear that the things encircled are the result of the
encircling. The procession of God into all things is the being of them, but the being of them is
nothing but their reversion in which each entity is. God is the “pre” to entities; it encircles
entities into existence. The hierarchy of being is essentially an encircling of entities into
existence.
But is this not a tortured way of speaking of the entities that are brought into existence?
The confusion of the cause and effect relationship points to a larger conflict between two
paradigms of existence that are posited within the hierarchy of being. There is, first, a nonapophatic hierarchical paradigm of participation. Each level participates in the superior cause,
which lies above it. Yet when we push this to its ultimate conclusion, every entity insofar as it is,
is nothing other than the source of diffusion. From this perspective, the levels of being and the
diffusion down through the levels of existence no longer exist. The levels are collapsed into one
another. The hierarchical rank and ordering of the universe are enfolded back into one another.
All entities are in their superior cause and insofar as they are in the superior cause, they are that
cause, pre-existing.
THE HEADLESS HIERARCHY
It has been suggested that Christ, who is identifiable and reveals yerx¤, sits at the head
of the hierarchy.367 But we must understand this in its correct circumstance. It must be, even
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within the hierarchies, that the being of entities is beyond being, for this is the fundamental
principle of Pseudo-Dionysius’ thought. In fact, in the Celestial Hierarchy he writes,
First of all, however, let this truth be spoken; that it was through the goodness that the
excessively-existing primordial-God [≤ ÍperoÊsow yerx¤], having fixed every being
of entities, brought them into existence. For this is the peculiar characteristic of the cause
of all entities, and of goodness surpassing everything, to call everything to communion of
itself [tÚ prÚw konvn¤n •t∞w tå oﬁke¤w kle›n], as each order of entities was
determined from its own analogy. For all things being a share in providence, which
bubbles out from the excessively-existing deity, cause of all things[§k t∞w Íperos¤o
k‹ pnt¤o yeÒthtow §kblzom°nhw]. For they would not be, unless they had
participated in the existence and source of things…for the ‘to be’ of all entities is the
deity in excess of the ‘to be’ [tÚ går e‰n pãntvn §st‹n ≤ Íp¢r tÚ e‰n yeÒthw]
(177C-D).

This brings together the paradox of participation and identification. Pseudo-Dionysius states that
yerx¤ “calls entities into communion” with itself, but he also says that this communion or
participation is their ‘to be’. As entities are “pre-contained” or ‘pre-held’ by God we could ask,
what were the entities before they were called into existence in order that they might be called at
all? This destabilizes the temporal sense of the “pre.” This is the stage of identification and
immanence. Entities participate in the ‘to be’ of yerx¤, they are that ‘to be;’ it is their ‘to be.’
And the being of all is the excessively-existing providence. Furthermore, “providence advances
into all things and it comes into being in everything, it is something in something but in an
abundance, nothing in nothing through nothing [oÈd¢n §n oÈden‹ kt' oÈd°n §stn]” (Ep. IX
1109C). Pseudo-Dionysius, here, has arrived at an explicit concept of the nothingness of
yerx¤, that is beyond his usual language of beyond being. I take “oÈd°n” to be referring to
“providence,” which proceeds into all entities, is made in all entities, but, per excellentiam, it is
in excess of all entities and so is nothing. Apophatic language affirms a hierarchy only to
collapse it from within. What is the highest, yerx¤, becomes a station of non-station. Insofar
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as we become equal and in unity with yerx¤, through y°vsw, we become as empty as the
nothingness toward which we are aimed.
Existence is now understood as the manifestation or comprehensibility of that
nothingness. We cannot know God, “for it is not this, but not that, nor is it in some way but not
in some other but it is all things [k‹ går oÈ tÒde m¢n ¶st tÒde d¢ oÈk ¶stn oÈd¢ pª m¢n
¶st pª d¢ oÈk ¶stn éllå pãnt §st¤n]” (DN 824A-B). Pseudo-Dionysius’ view of reality
is one of nested layers of existence whose ground is not a supreme being but a point that recedes
infinitely just beyond every approach, a point he calls “nothing.” The outcome of viewing the
hierarchy in terms of apophasis, reveals that it is essentially anarchic, without a érxÆ. We must
remove the érxÆ, if we are to be exposed to the divine as it truly is. Without a final being to
which one can point, thought is placed into a perpetual movement. Apophasis is continual
movement, which when mapped onto a topology of existence reveals that existence itself is
movement. To attempt to place a guarantee within the anacharic moment is to transform
apophatic discourse into a non-apophatic one. If what we are exposed to is nothing there is no
experience as such. All experience must have an intentionality to it, however Pseudo-Dionysius
speaks of nothing. The motivation is meant to subvert the hierarchy. Despite his comments of the
masses not understanding the sacraments, the mystery is not one that is only understood by a
few, but is rather a basic response to the nothingness to which we are exposed and situated
within. It is the waylessness experienced by both angels and humans. The hierarchy upon which
we place existence is one where it continually over comes itself.
Again returning to the angels who inquire among themselves the question-worthy status
of Christ, Pseudo-Dionysius writes, “they do not leap forth past the procession of enlightenment
provided by the divine [mØ prophd«s d¢ t∞w ktå ye¤n prÒodow §nddom°nhw
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§llãmcevw]” (CH 209C). The angels dwell in the mystery of Christ, which can only manifest
itself as mysterious when they are exposed to the weight of what is revealed to them, given their
proper place in the hierarchy. They are revealed to be what they are because of their questioning
among themselves. To receive and transmit the knowledge of the ineffable God is what it is to be
an angel, “the angel is an image [eﬁk≈n] of God, a manifestation of the unmanifested light
[fn°rvsw toË éfnoËw fvtÒw], a pure mirror, most transparent, unblemished, undefiled,
spotless, receiving whole, if it is right to say, the bloom of the good-stamped deiformity
[tØn …rÒtht t∞w égyotÊpo yeoede¤w], and unmixedly shining back in itself, as far
as possible, the goodness of the silence in the sanctuary” (DN 724B). The angels reflect that
which is unmanifested, making it manifest but as essentially unknowable.
Equally in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the divine is revealed as it is only when we hold
ourselves within the hierarchical level.
But insofar as the divine is the source of the sacred order, in accordance with which the
holy intellects acquire self-knowledge [ky' •t«n §pgn≈monew] anyone who
returns to the proper view of nature will see his proper self in what he was originally, and
will acquire this, as the first holy gift, from his recovery to the light. Now he who has
looked upon his own proper condition with unbiased eyes, will depart from the recesses
of ignorance, but being imperfect he will not, of his own accord, at once desire the most
perfect union and participation of God, but little by little will be carried orderly and
reverently through things present to things more forward, and through these, to things
foremost, and when perfected, to the primordial-God summit. An image of this
harmonious and sacred order is the reverence of the postulant, his self-awareness
[•tÚn §pgnvmosÊnh], the path he takes, with the help of his sponsor, towards the
hierarch (EH 400B-C).

Only when comparing oneself to others, who hold a higher place in the hierarchy, does one gain
a true sense of self. One realizes how far one is from the divine and that one must submit to the
hierarchical structure of the community, if one is to make progress towards the divine. It must be
stated again, that one’s proper place in the hierarchy is a sign of one’s ability to enact God. To
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know God is a reflection of one’s very being, “to be is to know God.”368 And so, being aware of
one’s proper place in the hierarchical order brings about one’s efficacy of knowing and enacting
God, which is to know nothing. It is only by holding ourselves within the hierarchy that we are
able to find an appropriate expression of the divine, which entails a necessary overcoming of the
hierarchy. In fact,
the unions, appropriate to angels, of the holy activities, whether they should be called
applications or receptions [§pbolåw e‡te prdoxãw] of the goodness in excess
unknowing and light, are ineffable and unknown…the deiform intellects, unified by these
in a manner imitating the angels as far as possible, since in the cessation of every
intellectual activity such a union of the deified [§kyeom°nvn] intellects to the
excessively-divine light comes about, hymn it most properly through the taking away
[éfr°sevw] of all entities (DN 593B-C).

In actively passing on the light of God, the angels conform the human intellect to God [yeoed°w]
(CH 196C) to such an extent that it transgresses its own inherent limitations by the “taking away
of all entities.” Held in the tension of the hierarchy reveals the essentially unknowable and
apophatic nature of God. This is increased as one is further initiated into the mystery of God,
which cannot occur if one oversteps one’s place in the hierarchy, since the tension felt within the
hierarchy would be diminished, as it is in Demophilus’ case. We must recognize how far we are
from realizing the mystery of the primordial-God, while at the same time truly being initiated
into the mystery, if God is to suddenly reveal itself as yerx¤. When we stand under the weight
of the hierarchical ordering can we overcome and surpass the ordering by finding unity with God
about which Pseudo-Dionysius states “according to this, then, divine things are to be thought, not
according to us, but our whole selves standing outside of our whole selves [˜low •toÁw
˜lvn •tvn §jstm°now] and our whole selves becoming of God, for it is better to be of
God and not of ourselves” (DN 865D-868A), which is the purpose of the rites, “all this is
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sacredly suggested by the symbolic tradition which makes naked the postulant of his former life,
depriving him of the very last attractions of this world” (EH 401A).
It will be useful if we look, one last time, to a definition of hierarchy. “The purpose of
hierarchy, then, is likeness and union with God, as far as possible, having it as its leader of all
holy knowledge and activity [ÈtÚn ¶xos pãnshw ﬂerçw §pstÆmhw te k‹ §nerge¤w
kyhgemÒn], by looking to its most divine beauty, as far as possible making members of its
dancing company [toÁw •toË ys≈tw] divine images, clear and spotless mirrors,
receptive of the primal-light and primordial-God ray…” (CH 165A), which Perl terms a
“bacchalian dance.”369 Indeed, when discussing the movement of the angels, Pseudo-Dionysius
writes, “the divine intelligences are said to be moved cyclically, united to the illuminations,
without beginning and without end, of the beautiful and good, but in a straight line, whenever
they proceed for the providence of their inferiors…but spirally because even in providing for the
inferior they remain not gone out in identity around the beautiful and good cause of identity,
ceaselessly dancing around [perxoreÊontew]” (DN 704D-705A). The hierarchy is a bacchic
revel in which the members dance, ecstatically and share in the divine. But only by entering the
dance, surrendering to it and our place in it can we participate in the ecstatic movement that is
God. There is no discursive ground around which we are organized but instead we are caught up
in the whirling circle of creation itself. “Here the divine erotic longing shows its own endlessness
and anarchicness [ênrxon], as an eternal circle, whirling around through the good, from the
good, in the good, and to the good in unerring coiling-up, always proceeding and remaining and
returning in the same and by the same” (DN 712D-713A).
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Pseudo-Dionysius presents us with a highly complex form of community. One in which
we must enter into so that the mysteries of yerx¤ become manifest. But within this hierarchy
we are led to realize that the hierarchy can no longer hold sway. When apophasis is applied to
the hierarchy, it reveals its own limitations, opening up to an unceasing movement of being and
thought. We are taken wholly outside of the rank and ordering of the hierarchy itself and we
surrender to the anarchic source from out of which the hierarchy originates. Its very beginning is
the overcoming of itself, in which the world itself opens out into a sacramental moment. Each
moment is imbued and saturated with the divine manifestation to us, if only we enter the divine
hierarchy.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation has been broken into two parts, the first concerned with Plato and the
second with Pseudo-Dionysius. Each part having a tripartite structure: discourse;
communication; and community. The previous chapters have sought to illuminate the way in
which philosophy in the Platonic tradition represented by these two thinkers presupposes its own
ground of rationality, this “ground” then giving way and receding into an abyssal depth. That is
to say, each of the chapters reveals the way philosophy opens itself up to its own limitations.
Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius, each in his own way, have been shown to expose these limitations
and draw us beyond them into the non-discursive background out of which the rationality and
philosophy.
According to the presentation in the Phaedrus, philosophical mn¤ would seem to be a
privileged form of discourse, since it is given to us from the gods and allows us to experience
them. For Plato, discourse concerning the non-discursive background takes the form of mËyow, a
myth or a tale. We also explored the relationship that lÒgow has to mËyow, which allows that
which cannot be expressed to be articulated in a manner that recognizes its own limitation while
still gesturing beyond it. Pseudo-Dionysius uses two forms of discourse: the kataphatic; and the
apophatic. Instead of being two separate forms of discourse, we saw that they are, in fact,
“intertwined.” Kataphasis presents us with positive statements. But contradictory statements are
made of God, e.g., “all things in all things and nothing in any” (DN 872A). Presented with this
aporia, we deny all statements of God, using apophasis. Everything that we have previously
affirmed we now take away, until nothing is left to affirm or deny and the intellect is left in the
silence of the via negativa.
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Having in each case seen that the discourse concerning that toward which we are aimed
escapes language, we then turned to the topic of how, for Plato and then for Pseudo-Dionysius,
to communicate that which eludes discursivity. In the Republic, Plato makes the claim that “the
good,” our ultimate concern is “§p°ken t∞w oÈs¤w,” “beyond being.” Taking this claim
seriously while using the vocabulary of “toiling, and distress” in the Symposium, “the good” is
excessively present, forcing itself upon us even as it resists rational thought. Any attempt to
bring it within the realm of the discursive is met with frustration. Taking up the claim that the
good lies beyond being, Pseudo-Dionysius communicates God by means of silence. Various
ways of such communication were used in Pseudo-Dionysius but especially that of prayer. We
saw that prayer does not affect the object of prayer but rather transforms the one who prays.
Prayer dissolves the subject in its division from the object, i.e., God. The individual becomes a
site of the excessiveness of God’s presence.
After having examined these privileged forms of communication, for Plato and PseudoDionysius, they the excess that they express, we, then, turned to the topic of community. We saw
that Plato’s form of community, as expressed in the Lysis, is not based upon a political model but
is rather a type of community that, as the Phaedrus shows, is essentially lacking a hearth, or
stable center, always rather revolving around the contestation of the isolated sense of self. It is a
form of community that attempts to incorporate, in the relations between its members, what we
lack on an ontological level. Pseudo-Dionysius coins the term “hierarchy” to describe how both
the celestial and ecclesiastical realms forms a cohesive whole. Although it is Jesus who heads
both hierarchies, this proves not to be a fixed and stable ground, for it is the unsolvable mystery
of Christ that Pseudo-Dionysius places atop them. This reveals that what Pseudo-Dionysius
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means to suggest by “hierarchy” is not a closed rank and ordering of being but rather a rank and
ordering that always threatens to overcome itself, ruptured from the very beginning.
Here, at the close of this dissertation, I would like to insist that far from being authors of
the distant past concerned with ideas of only historical interest, Plato’s and Pseudo-Dionysius’
works resonate with contemporary thought quite profoundly. I will, here, explicitly take up the
writings of Derrida, Heidegger, and Bataille in order to reveal present-day concerns as they are
related to my dissertation. By giving a brief overview of these contemporary three thinkers, I
have drawn our attention to how Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius share many of our modern-day
interests.
I. Deconstructing Discourse:
The specter of a fully discursive, rational system of discourse, or what has been
commonly understood by us as metaphysics has appeared on the horizon as problematic figures
since the conception of 20th century philosophy. As Rodolphe Gasché points out, “Western
philosophy is in essence the attempt to domesticate Otherness, since what we understand by
thought is nothing but such a project, heterology….”370 The very activity of philosophical
thinking has been characterized as the reduction of that which is other than itself, which is to say
the reduction of difference so that alterity is mastered and comprehended under the totality of
metaphysical signification. Portrayed in this manner, philosophy itself desires nothing other than
totality and complete comprehension of knowledge. Jacques Derrida through his reading of
historical discourse, in the course of his project of deconstruction, attempts to delimit the
comprehensive scope of philosophy, revealing the limits of Western metaphysics.
Deconstruction is a critical strategy for reading the history of metaphysics and unveiling
its inner structures. That is to say, deconstruction literally takes apart or dismantles the
370
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arguments and conceptual relations on which the aims and values of Western metaphysics are
grounded, revealing those foundations and thus these aims and values as highly question-worthy.
Derrida characterizes the limits within which metaphysical discourse takes place in terms of an
economy. Speaking of the metaphysical structural tradition Derrida writes,
These disguises are not historical contingencies that one might admire or regret. Their
movement was absolutely necessary, with a necessity which cannot be judged by any
other tribunal [emphasis added]. The privilege of the phonè does not depend upon a
choice that could have been avoided. It responds to a moment of economy (let us say of
the “life” of “history” or of “being as self-relationship”).371

An economy, in other words, is a structural obligation in which the values and ideals that define
the rationality of the discourse are limited. It names the discursive context of the whole and that
which directs the particular substantiations of the whole and thus cannot be investigated by some
system of signification outside of the pre-established economy. Economy, in this sense, names
the totality that metaphysical, discursive thought presupposes, i.e., a form of thought that fully
discloses the subject of its investigation.
Through deconstruction, Derrida endeavors to unveil the ways in which metaphysical,
discursivity cannot fulfill the requirements of its own economy. Metaphysical discursive thought
cannot accomplish its promise of complete self-relationship. Moreover, heterogeneous elements
are always present within the economy, of which the closed economic system cannot take
account. These elements form a “blind spot [tâche aveugle].”372 This blind spot is the disavowed
background within which the closed economy of signification claims to function. Derrida terms
this forgotten dimension of discursive metaphysics the supplement—a supplemental or vestigial
page in the text of historical discourse. The supplement, although, treated by the writer of the
text as extra, unnecessary, superfluous is, in fact, proven, by the text’s own internal logic, to be
371
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necessary. While Derridean deconstruction cannot make one gaze upon the blind spot anymore
than we can look at the blind spot found in the periphery of our own sight, it does, nevertheless,
break apart the disguise of a closed economy, forcing us to become aware that there is such a
lack in our intellectual sight.
It is true that deconstruction finds itself always already within a closed economy of
signification; however, it allow us, the reader of a text, to situate ourselves within a liminal
space. Situated as such, we cannot be held completely under the sway of the pre-established
values and aims of the economic system, since we are aware of the blind spot. Even though we
are aware of the blind spot, we cannot place ourselves outside of the text. It is within this
threshold space that Derrida allows the reader to become aware of the author’s intention and the
text itself, that is to say, what the “writer commands and fails to command in a language.”373
Derrida wishes to show that the author cannot simply write a text without influence from the
prevalent worldview and thus think in such a manner that does not serve a force that imposes
itself upon the author. While Derridean deconstruction does not (and cannot of its own accord)
propose to propose anything,374 it does work to show that the ideal of propositional discourse that
would be completely reducible to a stable meaning is itself a metaphysical construct which
philosophers fail to carry out every time they have to resort to discursive thought and to write a
text. To put it as concisely as possible, Derrida is pointing out the necessity of a form of thinking
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that exceeds the limits of rational discourse and that deconstruction is a method for articulating
that which exceeds discursive thought.
Derrida believes that we must comport ourselves to discursive metaphysical thought in
this manner, since its conception of philosophy has not come to terms with the basic ground out
of which metaphysics grows, i.e., logocentrism. In Of Grammatology, Derrida tells us that he has
characterized philosophy as logocentric because it approaches the world through logos, which is
concerned with discursivity (the history of metaphysics), rationality (the science of science), and
the articulation of meaning (the history of writing).375 Logocentrism, then, is the a priori
tendency of metaphysics to subordinate writing to speech. Speech, logos, should not be
understood as any particular substantiation of language, but rather as the formal rules that govern
over the possibility for language to occur at all. In the terms of Saussurean structural linguistics,
as we are told, this is equivalent to the subordination of the “signifier” to the “signified,” of the
material, contingent sign to the ideal of its permanent and stable meaning, thought to be present
in all of Western thought.
When deconstruction occurs we are able to peer behind all assumed immediate presence
of meaning, and start thinking from différance; “It is the domination of being that différance
everywhere comes to solicit, in the sense that sollicitare, in the old Latin, means to shake as a
whole, to make tremble in entirety. Therefore, it is the determination of Being as presence or as
beingness that is interrogated by the thought of différance.”376 Derrida developed this
“neographism,” which unveils the disavowed dimension of metaphysics, through an intentional
misspelling of the French différance and whose dissimilarity can only recognized in the written
word and not acknowledged when spoken. Changing the spelling by a simple replacement of an
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‘a’, a difference which obscures itself in the spoken word, impels us to think difference not as a
stable relation between the sign or the word spoken in discourse. The ‘a’ that remains silent
cannot be known via discourse, it remains a secret that is forever yet to come. It cannot, then,
belong to intelligibility; that which is thought through différance cannot be grasped fully and
thus never comprehended.
Différance allows us to think the Saussurean sign without relying on presence or a
ground—it opens a spacing such that the sign cannot be finally or authoritatively joined with a
referent. A sign is that which is put in the place of the once present thing or meaning. When we
do not have direct access to that which presented itself, we signify it through use of the sign, “we
go through the detour of the sign.”377 The sign is used when the present is no longer present, “the
sign represents the present in its absence. It takes place of the present.”378 Consequently,
différance must be in play in a way such that the difference between sign and signifier may be
revealed so that signification is possible at all. “It is because of différance that the movement of
signification is possible only if each so-called ‘present’ element, each element appearing on the
scene of presence, is related to something other than itself…”379 But the difference is not a stable
state of opposition between that which is sensible and that which is purely and objectively
intelligible, i.e., that which is thought through theōrein,380 but rather as a process or an event of
relation. Différance resists this opposition and does so precisely because it opens a space
between the repetitious movement of pure presence found in logocentric thought and the “metatextual interpretation,”381 which allows us to traverse this repetitious space. The locality that
différance opens is a non-site, a pre-discursive space, “which belongs neither to the voice nor to
377
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writing in the usual sense, and which is located, as the strange space”382 in our thinking. In this
way we are able to recognize the moment of blindness in the logocentric text and grants us
insight into the alterity that exceeds it, “in this way, deconstruction opens a discourse on the
other to philosophy, an otherness that has been dissimulated or appropriated by the logocentric
tradition.”383
Moreover, différance leads us to realize that no transcendental signified can be found.
Through différance, deconstruction incorporates that which is “alien, heterogeneous, in any case
irreducible to the intuitive telos,”384 through the trace. The trace is that which is heterogeneous, it
is the irreducible excess that is prior to the determination of presence. The trace cannot be a pure
presence of a single sign, or referent, of the signified, but instead, the signified, as thought
through the trace, points beyond itself and to a supplement, an excess, always referring
elsewhere and never to a single referent. The trace is a hole in the semantic field. It unveils that
the closure of logocentric metaphysics is fundamentally flawed. The trace should be understood
as a scar or fissure on the surface of the text.385 The text is opened slightly and now unable to
demarcate its inside from its outside, belonging and not belonging, which logocentric thought
creates. The trace is the vestigial, the blind spot, the supplement of non-presence, constituting the
possibility of an egress beyond the closure of metaphysics.
Thus, deconstruction incorporates, in the guise of différance, its limit (the trace), “which
hence does not mean anything—is ‘before’ the concept, the name, the word, ‘something’ that
would be nothing, that no longer arises from Being, from presence or from the presence of the
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present….”386 In other words, the ‘limit’ that deconstruction finds in différance is the trace that is
neither part of the system nor even ‘prior’ (in a temporal sense) nor is it externally situated to the
system. Allowing for the “movement of signification” différance is able to keep
within itself the mark of the past element, and already letting itself be vitiated by the
mark of its relation to the future element, this trace being related no less to what is called
the future than to what is called past, and constituting what is called the present by means
of this very relation to what it is not: what it absolutely is not, not even a past or a future
as a modified present [emphasis added].387

Derrida wishes to show that there is nothing outside of the text, “therefore, the text, language, or
sign is not the expression of anything prior to itself. It is, indeed, expression, but not the
expression of anything (else); it is sign, but does not refer to a separate signified.”388 The trace,
although pointing beyond itself, does not point to a transcendental signified. The trace is the
supplement or excess of language, but an excess of language, of the system; “the trace is also that
which forever prevents a self from being self, since the relation to Other is ‘older’ than
selfhood.”389 “The thinking of différance would thus have little affinity…”390 with presencecentric philosophy.
THE NON-ENTITY OF GOD
It is perhaps, finally, time to show that Pseudo-Dionysius does not rarify God into an
entity that exists over and against entities themselves. Derrida tries to distinguish his own project
from the negative theology of Pseudo-Dionysius. This he does accomplish. But I believe, as I
will now show, that is misinterprets the project of Pseudo-Dionysius in so doing. We cannot
understand this excessive-affirmation of God simply in a linguistical or even ontological manner.
To do so, would risk thinking that God lies over and beyond being, essentially stating that God
386
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has some type of being. One may be lead to believe that ÈperoÊs is a “hyperessentiality.” On
this account we have Derrida, who critiques the Areopagite for making God some being, and
wishing to differentiate negative theology from deconstruction.
Realizing that there are similarities between his own philosophy and that of negative
theology, Derrida seems to be particularly interested in how deconstruction differs from those
who write negative theology.391 There are plenty of individuals who have critiqued Derrida on
this point; for example, Jeffery Fisher in his article, “The Theology of Dis/similarity: Negation in
Pseudo-Dionysius,” argues that “Derrida rejects negative theology virtually out of hand as still
bound up in the ontotheology of the sign.”392 While there is some credence in Fisher’s statement
to the extent that Derrida is a little hasty to separate deconstruction from negative theology, there
is no evidence that I can see, that Derrida outright rejects negative theology. Rather it seems that
Derrida is attempting to draw attention to that which he sees as the greatest different between
deconstruction and negative theology, the conception of khōra.
As we will see, khōra is the place which is the receptacle for excess, allowing it to show
itself as excessive. After having given an account of Derrida’s critique of negative theology, I
will recount Derrida’s notion of khōra and attempt, through secondary literature, to connect
khōra with Pseudo-Dionysius’ conception of the divine, as thought by the Areopagite’s
excessive-affirmation.
Deconstruction, like negative theology, is concerned with that which exceeds discursive
reason and prediction. So that the two philosophies may be distinguished, Derrida drives a
conceptual wedge between deconstruction and negative theology by emphasizing the latter’s
391
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purely “mechanical repetition,”393 in the form of prayer—a topic to which I will return in a later
chapter. Having already decided upon the character of the addressee, the prayer is a mere
repetition of what one has already decided upon. Negative theology, unconsciously, through its
mode of greeting is caught within an infinite cycle of reiteration, “indefinitely defer[ing] the
encounter with its own limit.”394 This cycle leads to a “merely sterile, repetitive, obscurantist,
mechanical”395 mode of speaking; like a machine, one can repeat a prayer without thought.
For Derrida insofar as it is a form of greeting, “‘negative theology’ has come to designate
a certain typical attitude toward language, and with it in the act of definition or attribution….”396
Like deconstruction, then, according to Derrida, negative theology is a theory of language,
however a theory that is inherently contradictory. Because the negative theology of PseudoDionysius, in particular, must “indefinitely defer the encounter with its own limit,” negative
theology unwittingly places the divine, its limit, outside of Being, forsaking the divine to a realm
of “excessive-essentiality.” Derrida calls into question negative theology because “excessiveessentiality” is bound to the sign of ontotheology, i.e., a transcendent signified. Consequently,
negative theology “continues to posit a transcendent signified in that, in its very insistence that
God is not (a) being ‘but beyond’ being, it is attempting, in his [Derrida’s] words, to ‘disengage a
superessentiality’, to locate a presence above and other than all beings, or signs.”397 And yet
despite its place “beyond being,” Derrida writes that one is able to reach this “excessiveessentiality” through “a rarefaction of signs, figures, symbols.”398 The rarefaction of signs, which
lead to the union with God, reveals that all negative signs of the divine are nonetheless
393
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determined, by the transcendent signified “excessive-essentiality”, to have meaning. As a result
of relying upon a transcendent signified, the negative theology of the Areopagite cannot help but
expresses itself as affirmative. The negativity found in negative theology, according to Derrida,
is still bound up in affirmative meaning in the form of prayer and hymns. Derrida believes
negative theology cannot escape the economy of affirmative theology through approaching the
divine and accepting an answer the addressor can understand. By positing a transcendental
signified, negative theology unwittingly becomes seized by pure presence, a pure signified with
pure meaning: the negative and darkened view of the divine “excessiveessentiality” is
nonetheless “…the immediacy of a presence. Leading to a union with God,”399 resulting in
contact and vision of the divine.
In distinction to negative theology, deconstruction is able to peer behind all assumed
immediate presence of meaning, and start to think from différance, leading one to realize that no
transcendental signified can be found. Without a transcendental signified, there can be no
progression from effects to causes (the reification of signs), and thus proving the existence of the
divine, a conclusion that Derrida directs his argument against negative theology. On the other
hand, through différance, deconstruction incorporates that which is “alien, heterogeneous, in any
case irreducible to the intuitive telos,”400 through the trace. The trace is that which is
heterogeneous. It cannot be purely present to the signified it represents. Instead, the signified
points beyond itself and to a supplement, an excess, always referring elsewhere and never to a
single referent. The trace, then, is a hole in the semantic field. Thus, deconstruction incorporates,
in the guise of différance, its limit (the trace), “which hence does not mean anything—is ‘before’
the concept, the name, the word, ‘something’ that would be nothing, that no longer arises from
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Being, from presence or from the presence of the present….”401 In other words, the “limit” that
deconstruction finds in différance is the trace that is neither part of the system nor even “prior”
nor is it externally situated to the system.
Derrida wishes to show that there is no inside or outside of the text, “therefore, the text,
language, or sign is not the expression of anything prior to itself. It is, indeed, expression, but not
the expression of anything (else); it is sign, but does not refer to a separate signified.”402 The
trace, although pointing beyond itself, does not point to a transcendental signified. The trace is
the supplement or excess of language, but an excess of language, of the system. Différance, then,
seemingly as “the thinking of différance would thus have little affinity…”403 with negative
philosophy.
To give space for the trace to manifest, Derrida relies upon the Platonic idea of khōra.
Derrida mentions khōra in his two essays that explicitly address negative theology and within
Faith and Knowledge in a discussion that echoes his discussions on negative theology,404 and
finally in the essay entitled Khōra.405 Through the notion of khōra, Derrida is able to conceive of
a place that belongs neither to being nor to non-being; it is a third genus (Tim. 48e), a place in
which the trace is able to manifest but itself can be addressed neither affirmatively (as being) nor
negatively (as non-being). Constituting this odd space, khōra “neither promises nor threatens
anyone,”406 it is a place that is more originary than the split that salut produces—perhaps it is the
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source of the salut.407 As the primordial archē of the salut, khōra cannot be properly equated
with that which it springs from it, the promise or the threat.
Khōra gives room, allowing society to judge whether the trace is a promise or a threat
from which society is built to express itself accordingly; khōra gives place to oppositions, and so
“one cannot even say of it that it is neither this nor that or that it is both this and that.”408 Khōra
defies the logic of non-contradiction. Hence, one cannot name khōra.
The hermeneutic types cannot inform, they cannot give form to khōra except to the extent
that, inaccessible, impassive, “amorphous” (amorphon, 51a) and still virgin, with a
virginity that is radically rebellious against anthropomorphism, it seems to receive these
types and give place to them. But if Timaeus names it as receptacle (dekhomenon) or
place (khōra), these names do not designate an essence, the stable being of an eidos, since
khōra is neither of the order of the eidos nor of the order of mimemes, that is, of images
of the eidos which come to imprint themselves in it—which thus is not and does not
belong to the two known or recognized genera of being…Khōra is not, and above all not,
is anything but a support or a subject which would give place by receiving or be
conceiving, or indeed by letting itself be conceived.409

Khōra does not couple with the father (the “Good”), marking “a place apart, the spacing which
keeps a dissymmetrical relation to all this which, ‘in herself’, beside or in addition to herself,
seems to make a couple with her.”410 Khōra does not belong within an oppositional relationship,
it is beyond opposition, in excess of it. Khōra, itself, is supplemental, existing outside of all
paradigms, eluding “all anthropo-theological schemes, all history, all revelation, and all truth.”411
Khōra is the place which receives the excess allowing the trace to appear qua trace. Khōra is not
the productive force of the “Good” and does not couple with the “Good” but rather is the
receptacle for the excess that the “Good” produces. That which appears in khōra, the trace of the
trace, refers to further excess ad infinitum. Thus, khōra as khōra cannot be addressed “there is
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khōra but the khōra does not exist,”412 nothing can be said of khōra except that it gives space for
the trace to appear. One attempts to grasp khōra, yet all one can grasp is another trace.
Khōra is the space, par excellence, which Pseudo-Dionysius and the other negative
theologians, attempted to think but were, according to Derrida, unable.413 According to Derrida,
the Areopagite conceives not of the ungraspable divine but the Platonic “Good”, which “gives
birth to Being or to the essence of what is, to einai and ten ousian.”414 The “Good” produces that
which is capable of being anthropomorphized; it is that which must be anthropomorphized if it is
to be known at all.415 Consequently, what Pseudo-Dionysius describes is that which can be
expressed either negatively or positively and thus cannot describe the “excess,”416 which as
excess of the divine defies definition and as such takes the structure of the trace. As stated
before, it seems that it is the khōra that separates Derridean deconstruction from the negative
theology of the Areopagite. If we are going to attempt to incorporate Derridean terminology
within negative theology we must find a place in Pseudo-Dionysius that resembles khōra.
Jeffery Fisher does trouble Derrida’s interpretation of Pseudo-Dionysius’ notion of the
divine and his relation to it. He contends that “Dionysius engages in an apophaticism of the most
radical kind, that it is radical in a quite particular semiotic fashion, and finally that Dionysian
negative theology is significantly compatible with certain aspects of Derridean
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deconstruction.”417 One aspect that Fisher draws upon throughout his article418 to support this
claim is that Pseudo-Dionysius writes that God is not only excessiveessential but is also
ÍperyeÒthtow—“excessive-God.”419 This firstly, forecloses the opportunity to discuss a first
principle, since even the divine is a radically non-entitative God. This distinctively marks
Pseudo-Dionysius from Plotinus and the latter’s divine emanation. The Areopagite’s divine,
unlike the god of the Neoplatonist emanation, cannot be a semantic érxÆ. To make this point,
Fisher turns to a very similar passage that Derrida uses in his “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials”
to show that Pseudo-Dionysius engages in an esoteric ritualistic political project.420 Both authors
focus on Pseudo-Dionysius’ use of the Greek probebl∞sy.421 Derrida emphasizes the
literally translation as “shield” to show that Pseudo-Dionysius is speaking about “political
stratagems”422 to indemnify the community against the uninitiated many. “The ‘sacred symbols’,
the compositions [synthemata], the signs and figures of the sacred discourse, the ‘enigmas’, and
the ‘typical symbols’” used by the Areopagite, “are invented as ‘shields’ against the many.”423 In
other words, probebl∞sy are able to be placed because Pseudo-Dionysius does, according to
Derrida, have an affirmative conception of the divine, which he is attempting to keep holy and
safe from those who would bring disruption into the community. Fisher, on the other hand,
417
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translates probebl∞sy as “projection” and claims that the term “serves an epistemologicalsemiotic rather than ontological function.”424 He acknowledges the double meaning of
probebl∞sy; it indicates an outcropping, an extension, as well as a shield for defense. 425
With this root in mind, probebl∞sy could mean not only shield but also “to present,”
like a problem calling for its own solution. The Dionysian sign could, then, under this
interpretation, shields what it presents, while at the same time, present what it shields.426 The
divine language is, then, the presentation that shields while at the same time being the shield that
presents. The signifier and signified do not lie in dualistic opposition. In Fisher’s words,
In semiotic terms, we may understand projection (extension) as signifying the possible
ontological and epistemological connection of the created world to its archē (thus the
‘causal approach’) and projection (shield) as the semiotic interruption of semantic
stability (thus denial, the negative approach. The projection as the possibility of
signification coincides with projection as the necessity (or inescapability) of signification,
that is, of the sign never reaching its ground. Because what seems to reveal in fact
obscures, even deceives, Pseudo-Dionysius’ God can never be the semantic archē.427

The divine is revealed not in immediate presence, a noetic vision, but rather is opened to us in its
veiling, its withdrawal, within the signs, which conceal the divine from us. The signs,
consequently, do not lie before that which we are to be silent, but rather expresses this silence;
the sign is silence and silence is the sign.428 To cite Pseudo-Dionysius’ words from the Epistles I
1065a, “Someone beholding God and understanding what he saw has not actually seen God itself
but rather something of his which has being and is knowable.”429 Here, Pseudo-Dionysius
explicitly argues against anthropomorphism, and even its possibility. We see the necessity to
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cease human conceptual thought. The probebl∞sy draws one in with an outreaching motion,
but at the same time interrupts one understanding of the sign, or protects the sign. With this
double meaning truly the divine probebl∞sy only reveals insofar as it deceives and obscures
one’s discourse on the divine.
Through emphasizing ÍperyeÒthtow, one is able to avoid any “god-language,”430 and
consequently, excessive-affirmations concerning the divine cannot be transformed into finite or
mundane affirmations, since what one is discussing is not the divine itself but only signs, or to
use Derridean terminology, traces of the divine—“An unbridgeable gap persists between even
the ‘most God-like’ symbol and God.”431
While this is a fine counter-interpretation to Derrida’s interpretation of PseudoDionysius’ negative theology, one must still respond to Derrida’s critique that there is no khōra
to be found in Pseudo-Dionysius’ works, since this is the weight of Derrida’s argument
throughout all of his writings on negative theology. Derrida is worried about the place (political
and otherwise) that has to give rise to manifestations of that which is in excess of the human. In
fact, Fisher writes concerning Pseudo-Dionysius’ notion of the divine, “God is merely a
trace,”432 God cannot be found in discourse because even God is ÍperyeÒthtow, every sign is a
consequent of another sign, so that signs can only signify other signs. “If the good is excessive to
all existing things, as it is, and makes form the formless, and in it alone non-existence
[énoÊson] is an excess of existence, and not-life is held above life, and the mindless held about
wisdom, and whatever is in the good is of what preeminently makes form of the formless, and if
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one is allowed to say by the laws of God and the human, even not-being [mØ ˆn] itself in incited
upon the good excessive to all things” (DN 697A).
If we turn to the example of the circle’s center pre-containing its radii, we will understand
how God is nothing but an empty space. At the very center, at God per se, there is a complete
harmony of opposites. This movement of differentiation and gathering applies equally to
conceptual opposites (DN 821B), which are “in a simple unity within the universal cause. For
that source is the beginning of existing things and from it comes the to be itself” (DN 821B). The
‘to be’ itself is prior to opposites. God is that source in which concepts, as individuated,
breakdown. The movement of the excessively-overflowing nature of God ruptures being, at its
core this movement is the creation of all being. There is no unity, in the sense of an orginary
Oneness, but rather complete indifferentiation without unity. Unity can be derived only over and
beyond another positive concept, but the center of being, there is no concept. In other words, at
its core there is no non-contradiction to being, although it gives the principle of noncontradiction at the level of being, being the “delimitation which excessively-rises above
contradictions” (DN 825B).
In the discussion of God through kataphasis, we understand that God is the ebb and flow
of the movement of being, the unfolding and enfolding of being. There is nothing but pure
excessive-bubbling over. At the center, there is only an incessant source of nourishment, nothing
precedes it. A constant excessive-flowing source of productiveness, it is a source but not in an
ontological manner, complete separate from what bubbles over from it. As a center, or perhaps
more fittingly a zero point, it is the space from which prÒodow and §pstofÆ have room; God
is the non-present point at the heart of presence or being, “it is fullness in relation to lacking and
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excessive-fullness in relation to fullness…not suffering a loss with regard to its excessivefullness from its unspeakable emptying out of itself” (DN 648D-649A).
God, then, is literally nothing, but an open space into and out of which all things moves.
In the previous chapter God was revealed to be the aporetic space where non-contradiction does
not exist. We have already seen that Pseudo-Dionysius characterizes God as “word unsayable,
non-sense [élog¤], unconceptual, and without name, existing according to no thing’s existing”
(DN 588B). God is not simply something that cannot be conceived by the human mind due to
some lack or deficiency of discursive thought but rather passes over into literal non-sense. In
fact, God “is the form-making form in things formless, as source of form, formless in the forms
as excessive to the form” (DN 648C). Even as the source of the forms, God itself is without
form. Moreover, “If the good is excessive to all being and makes form the formless
[tÚ éne¤deon eﬁdopoe›] and both remaining in itself it is non-existent [énoÊson], in excess of
existence” (DN 697A). Pseudo-Dionysius continues with the same theme “Reason [ı lÒgow]
dares to say, that even non-being [tÚ mØ ˆn] participates in the beautiful and the good” (DN
704D). In the latter two passages, non-being and non-existence is ascribed to God and in fact the
word, reason, lÒgow, demands this—reason itself moves beyond itself. Discursivity demands
nonsense and non-being. God is literally nothing but an open space.
II. Heidegger’s Communication:
During his time writing Sein und Zeit, published in 1927, Heidegger critiques the
particular way of understanding that has dominated Western philosophical thinking. Western
thought has, according to Heidegger, emphasized the enduring presence of substance which
underlies all properties. This ontology is a metaphysics of presence. Emphasizing the absolute
presence of ‘what is’, these thinkers place themselves in detached relation to ‘what is’. They
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adopt a standpoint of theoretical reflection. Consequently, such thinkers attempt to achieve an
impartial, objective view of ‘what is’. Beings in the world lose their meaning and significance of
their being in the everyday experience of them. The goal of Heidegger’s philosophy is to
challenge the assumption that reality must be thought exclusively in terms of substance and the
presence of substances. His project during this time is to recover a more original sense of beings
by setting aside a view of beings that we have inherited from a theory of thought that has stressed
theorizing. There is no pure external vantage point from which we can gain access to beings.
Instead, Heidegger focuses on how beings show themselves, become manifest to us, or in what
way they show forth themselves for us in our everyday pre-reflective experience of beings.
In Sein und Ziet, Heidegger poses the question asked by traditional ontology, what is the
being of beings? However, he notes that this question is naïve if it does not from the beginning
inquire first into the meaning of being itself. Beings are only accessible insofar as they first
reveal themselves to us as relevant in some determinate manner, and then we must clarify the
conditions for beings revealing themselves to us. Distancing himself from a theoretical mode of
relation to beings, Heidegger proposes that we are always already in the world, engaged in
everyday dealings with beings in the world. For Heidegger, this gestures that we have a preunderstanding of the being of beings. If this were not the case, we could not experience beings at
all.
We are presented, however, with a different Heidegger beginning in the 1930 essay On
the Essence of Truth, in which he writes of a turn [Kehre] in his thought. During this time
Heidegger focuses on the project of thinking the history of being. Here, being is understood to be
a happening or occurrence. Being is the history of unfolding epochs of self-manifestation. We
are seen to be respondents who are called to the task of safekeeping being. Being, Sein, or Seyn
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as Heidegger begins to write it, has been forgotten; the Greeks focused not on Sein but rather on
Seiendheit, beingness. The history of metaphysics is thus a history of forgetfulness, specifically
vis-à-vis the withdrawal of the dynamic nature of being. The movement of emergence that
allows anything like existentia or essentia to appear remains hidden and concealed. We must,
then, retrieve the genuine beginning of disclosing being. A new poet, who is charged with the
safekeeping of being, is necessary to poetize the background upon which being shows itself.
Heidegger finds such poetizing in Hölderlin. The poetry of Hölderlin provides a language
that finds new names to invoke the gods of antiquity. Heidegger’s conception of language as a
saying whose “soundless voice” is able to call forth that which has been forgotten or concealed.
There cannot, however, be a final conclusive word concerning being, since the essence of being
is never conclusively sayable. Rather, we must think along with the poet who speaks in the silent
saying of language, reawakening us to a new experience of being.
In Sein und Zeit and in other writings and lectures from this period, Heidegger poses his
fundamental question as concerning the “sense of Being” (Sinn des Seins). He, here, uses
infinitive Sein, “to be.” Yet, after what he been termed the ‘turn’, Heidegger makes a point of
distinguishing his proper question from the fundamental ontological question asked by the entire
metaphysical tradition, which, in Aristotle’s formulation, is the question concerning “being qua
being” [tÚ ˆn √ ˆn] (Met.1003a21) or, the “being-ness” [oÈs¤] of beings (Met.1028b2–4). The
Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, according to Heidegger, studies “beingness” simply as the
universal feature of all things that are, consequently excluding the Heideggerian question of the
event of Being as a dynamic background dimension that is radically different from beings. In his
Beiträge zur Philophie, Heidegger adopts the obsolete German spelling Seyn so as to emphasize
that what he is questioning is something other than what traditional metaphysical ontology has
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been looking for. His question concerns a more archaic notion of Being that is not completely
detached from the metaphysical conception of beingness, but rather is viewed as its “condition of
possibility.”433
In Sein und Zeit and in Heidegger’s lecture courses from the 1920s, we find the attempt
to refer Aristotle’s apophantic and predicative “as”-structure (als) – S as P – back to a pretheoretical, existential and hermeneutic “in-order-to”-structure (um zu), based on the constitutive
temporal transcendence of the human Dasein towards the future, on the basis of which the
human being primarily encounters his surroundings as meaningful in a temporal context of
practical possibilities, i.e., in the mode of “handiness” (Zuhandenheit), not as simply present,
“accessible” (vorhanden) objects. It is true that in Sein und Zeit, logos is translated into German
through Rede, which does mean “speech,” but should, in this context, be understood in a wider
sense as “discourse” or “articulation,” “to make something clear and articulate,” and, more
significantly, to the English verb to read. With this in mind, it is essential that in Heidegger’s
later readings of logos, particularly in the Heraclitus fragments, he often translates logos as Lese,
which firstly refers to the verb lesen, “to read,” but as a noun means “harvesting, gathering in the
harvest.”434 These clues bring us to the core of how Heidegger fundamentally reads logos. The
most concrete and fundamental connotation of the Greek verb legein, from which the German
lesen derives – “to speak out,” “to discourse,” “to articulate” – is “(selective) gathering,”
“picking out,” “collecting”; in Latin, lego, legere comes to mean “to read.”
When we read, we look at a multiplicity of written symbols and we collect them together
into meaningful units: words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs. In this sense, reading is gathering:
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it is the formation of meaning and sense through the discovery of unity in plurality. This, for
Heidegger, is precisely the original Greek sense of logos as l°gen “to collect” or “to gather”435
the original essence of reason, of rationality, of discursively articulate meaningfulness, originally
understood not as some subjective faculty but as the very way in which meaningful reality in
itself is articulated. This also allows him to call logos an original Greek name for Being, i.e., for
the articulation of meaningfulness as such:
The Logos of which Heraclitus speaks is, as reading [Lese] and collection [Sammlung], as the
One that unifies all, not a feature among beings. This Logos is the original gathering that
preserves [verwahrt] beings as the beings that they are. This Logos is Being [Sein] itself, where
all beings [das Seiende] hold sway [west].436

In Heidegger’s reading, this original sense of logos is best captured by Heraclitus’ fragment 2:
“Having heard not me but to the word [toË lÒgo], it is wise [sofÒn §st] to go along with it
and to speak along with it [ımolog°en]: All is One [ßn pãnt e‰n].”Being as logos is
something that is heard, something whose address needs listening to.
Heidegger highlights the above fragment because he puts into question the primacy of
seeing and of visual metaphors in the metaphysical tradition. Aristotle, opening his Metaphysics,
emphasizes seeing as the sense which gives us the most precise and accurate acquaintance with
things, and which humans therefore value above all other senses.437 “Every human naturally
desires to know; a sign of this is our esteem for the senses. For apart from their use we esteem
them from their own sake and most of all sight” (Met. 980a22-24). The metaphysical key words
ﬁd° and e‰dow, “essence” or “form,” both mean literally the “look” of a thing, that is, according
435
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to Heidegger, the permanent and identical structure which allows the thing to show and present
itself, to be seen, as the very thing that it is. The highest form of “seeing” is, for Plato and
Aristotle, noËw, i.e., the immediate and indivisible grasp of the most permanent, necessary, basic
and simple principles and structures of meaningfulness [érx¤] that cannot be further analyzed
or justified (Post An. 72b4). This is the foundation for all scientific and systematic
comprehension of the basic character of reality.
It is to be noted that the important feature of noËw is that it is beyond logos, it is nondiscursive, non-referential, non-contextual. NoËw, as well as pure sensual perception of a simple
perceptible, such as a pure color, for that matter, is beyond propositional discursivity, in that it
simply discovers something without discovering it as something, simply apprehends something
without thinking something about it. NoËw is concerned with the érx¤ that are completely
beyond discursivity. Regarding these truths there is no possibility of error or misunderstanding,
of apprehending something in the wrong sense, as something that it is not – they are either
grasped as such or not at all. NoËw is above and beyond the realm of discursive meaningfulness
or logos, since it is concerned with the necessary foundations and principles that make discursive
articulation possible in the first place.
As opposed to the immediacy of noËw, where the perfect being is seen to become
completely identical with itself and to refer purely to itself, discursivity, logos, is seen to
presuppose difference and reference to otherness. Things that are discursively constituted as
meaningful always refer back to something other, something different, in order to be meaningful.
This is the final outcome of Heidegger’s Destruktion of the Aristotelian logos; this is what
Heidegger takes Aristotle himself to perceive in analyzing the basic structure of logos as
“t ktå tnow.” Logos as such is the endless movement of signifiers signifying other
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signifiers, i.e., referentiality, relativity and differentiality. Hearing, which is always bound to
logos, cannot therefore be the metaphysically foundational form of sensation. Precisely because
the Aristotelian metaphysics of presence cannot allow an absolute, foundational difference, in
order to be consistent, it has to found logos on something absolutely indifferent that relates and
refers purely to itself. It has to privilege direct seeing and touching over indirect hearing.
Moreover, Heidegger develops theological thinking and is related to his philosophical
thinking and is influenced by his conception of being. To understand the Medieval tradition,
Heidegger thought it was necessary to move beyond its logical and logocentric surface and
instead reach for the medieval “experience of life [Lebenserfahrung].” That is to say, the abstract
thinking that is thought to define medieval thought originates from a concrete experience of life.
The soul has an intense relationship to God and the medieval thinkers’, especially the mystic
Meister Eckhart, writings are the expression of this relationship. The soul belongs wholly to
God, according to mysticism. However, by God the mystics transforms the idea of God, and thus
of the idea of essence in general, “the essentia entis, into a being and makes the ontological
ground of a being, its possibility, its essence, into what is properly actual. This remarkable
alteration of essence into a being is the presupposition for the possibility of what is called
mystical speculation.”438 Thinking belongs to such a notion of God and Heidegger attempts to
break through the conceptual surface of the traditional metaphysical thinking to recover its living
core and life giving experiences.
God or being becomes something that cannot be grasped conceptually by human
understanding but rather only granted—coming to the human being in revelation. Thinking is a
gift, it is given, like an address, it becomes an event to which the human can only submit wholly.
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The human must cooperate with the divine or being to remain open to its advent. However, it is
perhaps necessary to point out that God and being are not the same for Heidegger. Being is not a
God who is here-present before us, but rather is manifestness, the happening of the unfolding of
being. Heidegger begins to poetize the concept of God, looking particularly to Hölderlin. It is a
god that must be experienced in a sacred and awe-inspiring moment.
III.Bataille and the Insufficient Community:
In the foregoing, we have appealed at crucial moments to Bataille’s thought, using it as a
wedge by which to open both Plato’s and Pseudo-Dionysius’ conception of community. There
we saw that the individuals lose themselves to the totality in which they find themselves. Now,
let us take up Bataille’s thought directly, as expressed in his Inner Experience and listen to what
he himself has to say concerning community.
Bataille’s writing constitutes a unique point of confluence among many of the 20th
century's most significant artistic, philosophical, scientific, and political currents. At one stage or
another of his career, Bataille assimilated influences from Catholic mystical theology, Hegelian
Idealism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, surrealism, existentialist thought, structuralism, and
Durkheimian sociology. He eventually rejected many of these currents or positions, sometimes in
violent terms. Yet Bataille’s mature texts bear traces of their lasting (and often conflicting)
impacts.
There are two major dimensions which characterize Bataille’s understanding of religion
and spiritual experience. The first is what Bataille terms inner experience: the territory of an
intensely private, inward-turning, and essentially ahistorical venture into the hidden regions of
the psyche. The second is the domain of religion as a social phenomenon: the public, historically
evolving dimension of religious life expressed in collective religious rites. These two key aspects
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of Bataille’s view of religion correspond to Bataille’s most important text on religion, Inner
Experience. In the following pages, Bataille’s treatment of mysticism in Inner Experience will be
surveyed. I will argue that “community” as Bataille understands this term furnishes a concept
connecting the dimensions of mystical experience and collective religious practice within
Bataille’s total view. Organized around the idea of community as the transgressive shattering of
bodily, psychological, and spiritual limits, Bataille’s theory illuminates religion and related areas
of thought and practice in challenging ways.
Bataille's first approach to writing on spiritual and religious phenomena presented itself
as a passionate, personal exploration of mystical consciousness. Inner Experience, published in
1943, was no work of disinterested scholarship, but rather the gripping confessional account of a
voyage into an inner world “in which anguish and ecstasy intermingle.”439
Bataille acknowledges that his concept of inner experience is comparable to forms of
mysticism known in the great religious traditions. Yet “the experience” as Bataille wishes to
describe and to live it is stripped of the dogmatic labels and qualifications attached to mystical
states in traditional religious frameworks. “I understand by inner experience what one usually
designates as mystical experience,” Bataille writes: that is, “states of ecstasy, rapture, at the very
least of meditated emotion”440 Yet, in reflecting on ecstatic states and the means of their
cultivation, his preoccupation is with the “naked experience” itself, “free from attachments, even
as regards its origins, to any religious confession whatsoever.”441 What concerns him is not
“chose du théologien” transcendent reality reduced to an object of quasi-scientific study, but
rather the raw, immediate, and convulsive fact of mystical experience itself, the dimensions of
passion and mystery into which the experience leads.
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A first decisive characteristic of Bataille’s understanding of inner experience is
announced in the refusal of any form of confessional attachment. Bataille declines all traditional
theological labels for the inner states he wishes to describe, dismissing the claims of organized
theological systems to furnish authoritative interpretations of mystical explorations. The
“dogmatic presuppositions” of organized religious traditions have “set unnecessary limits” on
inner experience.442 By integrating the data of mysticism into a familiar framework of
metaphysical and moral teachings, dogmatic religion robs the realities encountered and
apprehended through inner experience of their force. Preestablished religious systems and
frameworks of interpretation tame the intensity of the experience, guiding the spiritual researches
of religious mystics into the narrow channels defined by theological and ecclesiastical
authorities, taking away the decisive capacity of unfettered inner experience to “call everything
into question.”443 Bataille acknowledges that Christians have “excelled” in mystical
investigations, venturing “as far in this direction as dogma permitted.” Yet his own claim is to
have followed the method Christian mystics developed “with a more bitter rigor” than Christians
themselves have been able to deploy. Rather than submitting his inner research to any type of
“end given in advance” (beatific ecstasy, communion with God or Christ, etc.), Bataille
determines that “the experience should lead where it will.”444 This is true even (and especially) if
the experience moves into dark and troubling regions of the psyche in which traditional religious
categories lose their ability to make sense of events.
In many if not all previous cases, Bataille affirms, “inner experience has had ends beyond
itself, in which value and authority were placed.”445 God has played this role in Christianity and
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Islam; in Buddhist traditions, the “suppression of suffering” has been the aim of meditational
practice. In other settings, refined forms of pleasure or the acquisition of supernatural knowledge
(enlightenment) have been regarded as ends of spiritual discipline.446 For Bataille, all such
secondary goals fall away. Inner experience has its founding principle “neither in a dogma
(moral attitude), nor in science (knowledge can be neither its origin nor its end), nor in a search
for enriching states (experimental, aesthetic attitude).” The experience “can have no concern and
no goal other than itself.” Inner experience is its own “sole authority, sole value.”447
Connected with the concept of inner experience as its own authority is Bataille’s rejection
of the idea of the “project.” He understands under this term the mode of thought and action in
which our ordinary lives are inscribed, insofar as we find ourselves experiencing each action in
which we engage not as an end in itself, but instrumentally: as a step on the way toward
something else, a deferment [remise] of the full existence which is continuously projected ahead
of us, but which we can never grasp. The project is the mode of behavior demanded by all forms
of concerted, goal-oriented action arid by the structure of discursive thought itself. Yet the
project is also “a paradoxical way of being in time:” the perpetual “putting-off of existence.”448
For Bataille, inner experience, totally focused upon itself, abolishing deferred futures in the
intensity of the instant, represents the negation of the project and the mode of being the project
requires. The experience “is being without delay.”449 The end of inner experience in Bataille’s
sense is also its means: the fact of the experience itself. When end and means coincide fully,
projective-discursive thought is left behind, and the subject approaches, enters, becomes the state
Bataille terms “the extreme limit of the possible.”
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Like many other mystical writers, Bataille acknowledges the paradoxical structure of
inner experience. The aim of the experience is precisely to reach a state in which all projective
operations are suspended. Yet insofar as it rests on certain prescribed patterns of action, on what
could be termed a meditational discipline, at the very least a systematic focusing of awareness,
the experience retains aspects of the structures associated with the project. Thus, the “principle of
inner experience” must finally be formulated in paradoxical terms: “to escape, by means of a
project, from the domain of the project.”450
For Bataille, the mental and behavioral structures of the project reach far deeper than the
simple routine of forming plans and acting to carry them out. The “contestation” implied in inner
experience attacks conventional patterns of thought and action at a more fundamental level.
Language itself is the root of entrapment in the perpetual deferment of existence. All discursive
thought and the forms of knowledge generated by such thought are barriers to the shattering
immediacy of mystical experience. Thus, the experience can only free the subject from
projective thinking by opening the way toward unknowing [non savoir].
Words, Bataille writes, “drain away almost all life in us.” Yet beneath the regions
dominated by discursive thought, a “mute, secret, unseizable part subsists,” a part of ourselves
ordinarily hidden by the verbal activity in which we are almost constantly engaged. Only on rare
occasions, upon the emergence of certain types of “vague inner movements,” are we able to
“reach or gain control over” this secret region.451 As long as we “live without contesting the law
of language,” the ecstatic states to which this silent part of our selves yields access are “in us,”
but unacknowledged, “as if they did not exist.” But we can revolt against the domination of
language, and learn “to fix our consciousness on one of these states and, silencing the speech
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within us, to linger over the surprise” this state offers us, augmenting its intensity and
unfolding.452 The goal of such research is not more factual information about the complex
structures of inner life but awareness of the darkness and convulsive intensity of unknowing.
Citing precedents among Christian mystics and in the yogic practices of Indian traditions,
Bataille describes a dialectic of continual reversal. Discursive reason leads us to the horizon of
an ecstatic unknowing. In such moments, “the experience attains the fusion of subject and object,
being as subject unknowing, as object the unknown.”453 Yet immediately, as we attain
communication with “the hidden world, transformed into an abyss by unknowing,” unknowing
crystallizes and fixes itself into a form of (mystical) knowledge: an image of the divine which we
label “God.” This knowledge then instantly demands its own transcendence, its own dissolution
into a new form of unknowing. So the movement carries us restlessly “farther, even farther.”454
A perpetual spasm of annihilation, unknowing is “intolerable.” Yet it opens the way to
the highest pitch of ecstasy. It is a “state of nudity” revealing the deepest foundation of the
human condition. “Sinking down” into the paradoxical reality revealed and abolished by
unknowing, we seize the fact that “the only truth of man ... is to be a supplication without
response.”455 “UNKNOWING STRIPS BARE,” Bataille writes. “This proposition is the summit,
but must be under- stood thus: strips bare, so I see what [discursive] knowledge hid until that
moment, but if I see, then / know. In effect, I know, but what I have known thus, unknowing
strips it bare again.”456 Unknowing is the ongoing abolition of all mental con- tents, and the
dissolution/re-creation/redissolution of the containing mind itself.
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Inner experience reaches its high point in the phenomenon Bataille terms
“communication:” the ecstatic state in which the boundaries of selfhood dissolve and the
individual “communicates” in fusion unity with the world. The ecstasy to which the concept of
communication points should however by no means be understood as beatific joy, or even as a
serene absence of feeling. Rather, Bataille insists that the psychic forces set loose through
communication are inextricably bound up with pain, terror, and angoisse. To characterize the
experience in its entirety, insofar as it leads us to the “extreme limit” of that which is bearable for
the human mind, he uses the word supplice, translatable as “torment” or “torture.”457 The inner
world into which the experience conducts is not a luminous, peaceful realm, but is filled with
currents of convulsive violence. Bataille presents the “schema” of the “pure experience” as the
wrenching leap through which angoisse, when pushed to a sufficient level of intensity, launches
the subject into a fevered state of despair and self-abandonment out of which ecstasy surges, only
to collapse again as soon as the mind makes a movement to grasp and hold it. Angoisse, the
initial state of isolation and anguish out of which the experience unfolds, “presupposes the desire
to communicate, that is to lose myself, but it lacks the total resolution.” The anguished yearning
for communion at the same time reveals the self’s inability to communicate; it “bears witness to
my fear of communication.”458 The isolated self, ipse, is moved by the desire to “be everything,”
to dissolve in communion with the whole universe. Yet at the same time, it wishes to “remain
ipse,” to hold firm to its own individual selfhood. Out of the hopelessness of this position
emerges the despair and “abandonment” through which “the rapture [ravissement] begins.” Yet
as soon as the sudden ecstasy is seized as “my rapture, a rapture that I, ipse, possess,” it slips
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away, leaving the self once again trapped between its “desire to be everything” and its fear of
self-loss, until a new wave of ecstasy seizes and carries it again beyond its own boundaries.459
Both inner experience and public religious practice draw their power from their ability to
transform the human person from a “subject isolating itself from the world,” into “a place of
communication, of fusion between subject and object.”460 Yet, Bataille insists, such
communication can never be realized apart from acts of transgression which establish the realm
of the sacred as a space of violence, risk, and ambiguity.
IV. Summation:
Derrida, Heidegger, and Bataille, each in their diverse and unique ways, express the same
concerns with which the two main figures of this dissertation have dealt. Philosophy and what it
presupposes, a ground in which it can base itself, is essentially open. There is a concept that is
left unsaid and which can never be recouped within the confines of philosophy itself. Philosophy
undoes itself in the process of attempting to articulate what cannot be accounted for. Both Plato
and Pseudo-Dionysius emphasized the self-limiting mode of philosophizing.
According to Derrida, logocentrim is a metaphysical comportment we have toward the
world. It attempts to fully account for that which we experience through logos, reason itself.
Logocentrism is the tendency to subordinate the world to speech as the formal rules that govern
the possibility for language at all. To remedy this predisposition toward the world, Derrida
developed deconstruction, allowing us to see behind what is presumed in language and allows us
to start thinking from différance. This allows us to think without relying upon presence and
opens a space for thought. Platonic thought, as I have expressed it here, is essentially concerned
with rupturing discursive thought. In Plato writings, erotic mn¤ was utilized as a way to break
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open the closed economy of Lysias’ speech. This speech attempted to give a fully a complete
account of a love relationship between two individuals. Reason is at the center of this speech. To
correct Lysias, Socrates speaks to Phaedrus of the ecstatic nature of the soul, showing him that
any account of the human being must presuppose an element that the speech itself cannot grasp.
Likewise, Pseudo-Dionysius revealed that all positive statements concerning God are, in fact,
intertwined and dependent upon negative statements. These negative statements are intensified
concepts of the positive such that the entirety of the concept cannot be expressed by positive
statements. What is positively said is reliant upon what is unsaid about God, opening the intellect
to think what is unsayable. The intellect is forced to pay special attention to that which is
negatively expressed.
For Heidegger language and communication was never planed, but arose from out of the
necessity to account for to what we immediately exposed. We are living the wake of this
inadequate mode of expressing what we experience. Heidegger’s intention is to re-appropriate
certain words and concepts and to give to new meaning without completely repudiating its
everyday sense. Heidegger is concerned with the living experience of life itself. So too are Plato
and Pseudo-Dionysius. Both describe the living movement of that which cannot be discursively
articulated. Plato, using the language of eroticism, reveals how one is moved by that which
escapes the grasp of reason’s ability. Eroticism overwhelms the individual, despite him or
herself, and is brought into an exposure with that which passes by unnoticed, essentially hidden
from view. Pseudo-Dionysius employs the language of ecstasy to express this lived exposure to
the divine. Such language reveals that the divine is a living experience, a living liturgy, to which
we are exposed and not simply a concept with which one is theoretically concerned. For both
Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius our ultimate concern is that to which we can only submit ourselves
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wholly. As with Heidegger, there is an essential movement and manifesting, a happening of the
unfolding of this concern. It is a concept that must be experience in a sacred and awe-inspiring
moment.
We have used Bataille’s thought as a wedge by which to open both Plato’s and PseudoDionysius’ thought of community. There we saw that the individuals lose themselves to the
totality in which they find themselves. Now, we will see Bataille’s thought as expressed in his
Inner Experience and what he, himself, has to say concerning community.
To ask oneself before another: by what means does he calm within himself the desire to
be everything? Sacrifice, conformity, trickery, poetry, morality, snobbery, heroism,
religion, revolt, vanity, money? or by several means together? or all together? A wink of
an eye in which glimmers a deceitfulness, a melancholy smile, a grimace of fatigue
together betray the disguised suffering which the astomishment at not being everything,
at even having concise limits, gives us.461

With this passage, Bataille open the wound of insufficiency felt by each individual who
wishes to surpass his or her limited experience. In Inner Experience, he states that we cannot
escape our desire to be everything, to identify with the entirety of the universe. The wish to
surpass our limited existence may be satisfied in numerous ways. Just as inevitable as the desire
to be everything is the knowledge that we will die, that our individual existence is not
commensurate to the universe with which we seek identification. This uneasiness which we
experience before the inevitability of our disappearance pervades our being, it inspires anguish.
We avoid this suffering by suppressing the thought of death, or by postponing our existence in a
frenzied yet essentially absent devotion to the world of work or project. Yet just as we can never
be commensurate to the universe with which we seek identification, so that toward which we
turn can never totally suppress our suffering.
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The individual’s struggle between, on the one hand, the desire for continuity, which
implies a loss of discontinuous being, and, on the other hand, the individual’s desire to embrace
the whole, all the while maintaining discontinuity. Here Bataille sets out the inevitable tension
which arises between any particular, isolated element of being and the whole which transcends it.
The isolated element seek autonomy, yet wishes to embrace the entirety of the whole: on its own,
in isolation, it cannot fulfill this second wish. To identify with the entirety of the whole, it must
forego its desire for autonomy. It enters the transcendent whole, losing a good measure of its
sense of discontinuity only to find reawakened the frustrated desire if autonomy, The cycle is in
this way renewed.
The uncertain opposition of autonomy to transcendence puts being into a position which
slips: each being ipse—at the same time that it encloses itself in autonomy, and for this
very reason—wants to become the whole of the transcendence…Its will for autonomy
opposes it at first to the whole, but it withers—it is reduced to nothing—to the extent that
it refuses to enter into it. It then renounces autonomy for the sake of the whole, but
temporality: the will for autonomy is only abated for a time…462

Plato expresses the same sentiment in both the Phaedrus and Lysis when he discusses a
form of relationship that is closer than one based upon law. This form of community is has its
foundation in nature. In one passage on the Lysis, Socrates states “Then if you two are friends to
each other by some natural bond you belong to one another [Íme›w êr eﬁ f¤lon §stÚn
éllÆlow fÊse p˙ oﬁke›o¤ §sy' Ím›n Èto›w]” (Lys. 221e). The ambiguity in the Greek shows
the individuality of each by not uncovering each other. I remain in the world and experience
resistance and defend a place of dwelling [oﬁk¤] that is placed closer to me, i.e., the world. The
friend opens itself to me in his or her own uniqueness. What Lysis does not understand in his
experience of fl¤ is the need of experience of someone who resists to be reduced to mere use-
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value. The friend is not to be assimilated, not to be mastered but rather experienced. The
experience is not so radically different that it is wholly unknown to me, but is different enough
not to be mastered and placed in a sphere of economy.
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